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Abstract  
The insurable interest doctrine is one of the fundamental principles in insurance 
law. It has been long established that it can affect whether the contract is void 
and whether an assured can make a claim. It has played a role in distinguishing 
insurance contracts from other risk-transferring contracts, preventing wager 
policies and moral hazards, etc. However, since the nineteenth century, there 
has been a debate about what can be sufficient to constitute an insurable 
interest. Also, along with other issues with insurable interest, it has been argued 
that the requirement is nowadays unnecessary and may have had a negative 
effect on the assured’s position. Thus, the proposals to remove the requirement 
and to widen the concept of insurable interest, etc. have arisen globally 
amongst academics, the courts and legal practitioners. 
 
The UK has thus responded to the call for reform by the Law Commissions 
conducting a review project on insurable interest. They have in detail discussed 
the problems with insurable interest and then set out arguments for both 
retaining and repealing it. They then published the proposals for the purpose of 
clarifying and ascertaining the law on insurable interest. To benefit the 
discussion on reform in this area of law in the UK, the reform of the law on 
insurable interest in other countries, such as in Australia, New Zealand and 
China has also been studied. 
 
Without a deep understanding of the background and theory of insurable 
interest, it can be difficult to conclude whether it should be retained and which 
test for it should be adopted. In order to make it clear, the history and pure 
theory of insurable interest is discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 3 then 
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sets out the problems with the requirement of insurable interest derived from 
both law and practice. The remaining three chapters, i.e. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
have, from a comparative perspective, introduced the law on insurable interest 
in indemnity insurance, including marine insurance and relevant reforms. 
Indeed, other jurisdictions have adopted different approaches to the 
requirement of insurable interest at the time of contract and its definitions seem 
to be distinct from those in the UK. 
 
Finally, in conclusion, the core issue will be answered for the purpose of 
unifying the law on insurable interest in indemnity insurance and promoting the 
prosperity of the insurance industry: that is, whether the insurable interest is still 
required nowadays, and, if it is, when it must attach; additionally, whether an 
economic interest is sufficient to be an insurable interest or whether the legal 
relation to the subject matter of insurance is still needed. 
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Introduction  
The requirement for insurable interest is a fundamental principle in insurance 
contracts. Assureds failing to comply with the requirement will find their 
insurance regarded as void. To meet the requirement, the assured must have a 
real insurable interest or an expectation of acquiring such an interest in the 
subject matter of the insurance contract at the time of taking out the contract. 
Besides, in order to make a claim, there must be an actual insurable interest at 
the time of the loss. This has been clearly provided for in marine insurance 
contracts under the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (the 1906 MIA).  
 
There is a close connection between wagers and insurance. The elements 
constituting their definitions are similar and it is believed that insurance is 
derived from wagers. In the past, insurance was made on purely speculative 
events, like wagers. It is said that the origin of insurable interest arises from the 
statutory prohibition on wagers. Thus, before the study of insurable interest, it is 
necessary to first examine the history of wagers in Chapter 1. 
 
As the fundamental principle in marine insurance, rules on insurable interest in 
marine insurance, i.e. ss 4-15 of the 1906 MIA, will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
In particular, the requirement and the classic concept of insurable interest will 
be looked at, which is the basis for understanding other provisions on insurable 
interest and for the argument as to whether the requirement should be repealed 
and whether the classic test is too strict in restricting the marine insurance 
market. 
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After a detailed discussion of the law on insurable interest, then the problems 
with the doctrine are studied in Chapter 3, and the necessity for its reform. As to 
the problems with the earlier law, the law on insurable interest in non-life 
insurance was uncertain. Some statutes on insurable interest were also archaic, 
such as the Life Assurance Act 1774 (1774 LAA), the Marine Insurance Act 
1788 (the 1788 MIA) and the Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act 1909 
(the 1909 MIA). There is confusion whether the Gambling Act 2005 (the 2005 
GA) has an effect on insurance contracts. The UK law was complex because 
both statute and common law governed insurable interest; the rules under 
statute were different from each other depending on the categories of insurance; 
different kinds of insurance applied different rules of insurable interest. It thus 
needs clarification of the rules of law on insurable interest. In the practice of 
marine insurance, there also exist many problems, in particular, the buyer on 
Free On Board (FOB) or like terms cannot cover his pre-shipment loss due to 
the requirement of insurable interest. 
 
Because of the above problems, there have been calls for reforming the 
insurable interest requirement in UK and Chapter 4 will study the reasoning. 
The Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission 
have therefore been conducting a joint review of insurance contract law1 since 
January 2006 when they published a scoping study to consult on which areas of 
insurance contract law were in need of reform.2 As a result of the scoping 
project, the law on insurance contracts should better balance the interests of the 
                                                          
1 The Law Commission and The Scottish Law Commission (Law Commissions), Issues paper 4: 
Insurable Interest (henceforth , 2008 IP 4,) para 1.1;  
2
 Law Commissions, Insurance Contract Law: A Joint Scoping Paper (Law Com No 353, 2006) 
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assured and the insurer, reflect the needs of modern insurance practice and 
allow both assured and insurer to clearly know their rights and obligations.3 The 
law of insurable interest has more recently been selected by the Law 
Commissions in their second paper 4  as one area within the scope of the 
project.5 By looking at this reforming project, it is expected that certain problems 
with insurable interest will be addressed: such as whether the requirement of 
insurable interest should be repealed, the tests for it and the timing of any 
repeals, etc. 
 
The Marine Insurance Laws of Australia and New Zealand, including of course 
the rule on insurable interest, are identical with the UK 1906 MIA. Neither 
country is satisfied with the requirement of insurable interest and its strict 
definition. Both countries proposed reforming the law on insurable interest long 
before the counterpart reform in UK. It is thus meaningful to draw on the 
experience of the two countries for the reform in the UK and to clarify the 
relevant issues concerning insurable interest. 
 
Turning to the situation in China, in order to promote the development of the 
insurance market and better balance the benefits of the parties to contracts of 
insurance, the Insurance Law, including insurable interest, has been amended 
several times, as well as the Interpretation and Guidance by the Supreme 
People’s Court. However, the requirement, definition and some of the issues 
concerning insurable interest are not so clear, and this needs to be explored 
below. By analysing the methods of reforming insurable interest in the above 
                                                          
3 Law Commissions, Insurance contract law: post contract duties and other issues (2011 CP) 
para 1.1 
4 Law Commissions, Analysis of Responses and Decisions on Scope (Law Com No 353, 2006) 
5 2011 CP, para 1.3 
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countries, the law on insurable interest and the insurance business can be 
improved. 
Chapter 1 History of Wager Contracts 
1.1 The history of wager contracts 
 
There is a close connection between the doctrine of insurable interest and the 
attitudes of the law to wager contracts.6 The court held that a contract relating to 
which the assured had an insurable interest was not one of wager. When a 
judge encountered a case to determine whether or not the plaintiffs were 
gamblers, the learned judge did not describe the difference between contracts 
of wager and insurance by means of defining what gambling contracts are; he 
held that they were not gamblers on the basis that they had an insurable 
interest in the ships and cargos.7 The definition of the insurance contract is in 
turn defined as one having no wager elements. Valid insurance can in 
consequence be defined as any insurance that does not promote the spreading 
of wagers. 8  Also, for the purpose of the function of the insurable interest 
requirement, there is a debate that statutes providing for the requirement of 
insurable interest aim to forbid the problems caused by moral hazard and 
gambling.9 In light of the close connection, it is therefore appropriate to discuss 
wager policies at inception. 
                                                          
6
 Jonathan Gilman, Professor Robert M Merkin, Claire Blanchard and Mark Templeman, 
Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance (18th Revised edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 11-03 
7
 Robertson  v  Hamilton (1811) 14 East 522 [533] 
8
  Malcolm A Clarke, Julian M Burling and Robert L Purves, The law of insurance contracts (5th 
edn, Informa 2006) 132 
9 2008 IP 4, para 1.9 
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1.1.1 Difference between gaming, gambling, betting and wagering 
1.1.1.1 Need for first distinguishing gaming, gambling, betting and wagering 
The requirement of insurable interest is a useful tool to distinguish valid 
insurance policies from unenforceable wager contracts. By studying the history 
of wager policies, it will be plain as to how wager contracts without an insurable 
interest operate. Then, turning to its opposite, it will be clear that there is a real 
necessity for the requirement of insurable interest and that it would thus be 
helpful to study this doctrine. However, the formulation of “gambling or wagering 
by insurance” is often referred to when talking about a wager policy in the guise 
of an insurance contract being void for lack of an insurable interest. It is 
unfortunately not so easy to tell in detail the difference between “gaming, 
gambling, betting and wagering”, because they have closely allied meanings. In 
particular, in terms of the resemblance of gambling to wagering, confusion may 
occur if there is no distinction made between these two words.  
1.1.1.2 A gaming contract under English law 
Generally, the word “games” refers to most pastimes and many sports, 
irrespective of their lawful or unlawful character. Gaming also means the staking 
of money or money’s worth on the result of a game of pure chance, or mixed 
skill and chance; and gambling has the same meaning, with a suggestion that 
the stakes are excessive or the practice otherwise reprehensible.10 In the 2005 
GA, gambling means:  
 gaming 
 betting; and  
                                                          
10
 Encyclopædia Britannica (11th edn, 1911) vol 11, 450 
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 participating in a lottery.11  
Thus, in order to make it clear what a gambling contract consists of, it is 
necessary first to investigate what a gaming contract is. In the Gaming Act 1968, 
gaming means the playing of any game of chance for winning in money or 
money’s worth, whether any person playing the game is at risk of losing money 
or money’s worth or not.12 In line with this meaning, a gaming contract is one 
relying on the occurrence of a future event but does not require the parties to 
the contract to have an insurable interest. In addition to the above definition, the 
2005 GA further defines gaming as playing a game relying on a chance 
excluding a sport for a prize of:  
 winning in money or money’s worth; and  
 both a prize provided by a person organising gaming and winnings of 
money staked.13  
Obviously, the former definition is wider than the latter. Under common law, it 
was held that the playing of any game for money or money’s worth was 
gaming,14 which included horse-racing,15 other kinds of racing and some kinds of 
contest.16 By comparing these two concepts, it is obvious that common law 
definitions are wider than statutory definitions, because the latter is limited only 
to “any game of chance” other than “any game”. But both statutory and common 
law definitions show that the parties to a gaming contract do not have to 
possess an insurable interest in the subject matter and the purpose of gaming is 
                                                          
11
 2005 GA, s 3 
12
 Gaming Act 1968, s 52(1) 
13
 2005 GA, s 6(1),(5) 
14
 Dyson v Mason [1889] LR 22 QB 351 (QB) 356; Patten v Rhymer (1860) 121 ER 345 [5]; 
Ellesmere v Wallance [1929] 2 Ch 1 (Ch) 55; Ankers v Bartlett [1936] 1 KB 147 (KB) 152 
15
 Applegarth v Colley (1842) 152 ER 663, 666 
16
 Professor Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts (vol II, 32th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 41-004 
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to win a prize rather than to transfer a risk for which insurance has been 
designed. Apart from gaming being one part of gambling under the 2005 GA, 
the difference between gaming and gambling was set out as follows: to put it 
simply, the former meant joy, pleasure, sports or gaming; while the latter meant 
to play extravagantly for money.17 
1.1.1.3 Difference between gaming and wagering 
A gaming contract differs from a wagering contract. The definition of a wager 
contract is that one party to the wager has promised to pay the other party 
depending on the result of an uncertain event. To become a contract of gaming, 
participants have to take part in a game for the prize. More importantly, more 
than two parties can be allowed to participate in a gaming contract,18 whereas 
there can only be two parties to a wager contract. Albeit a wager can be made 
upon the outcome of a game and the parties to this wager seemingly take part 
in the game, such a game is not necessarily to be regarded as a wager. In other 
words, even though a wager is placed on the outcome of a game, it can still not 
be regarded as a wager if more than two parties have taken part in this game or 
if no party will have to win or lose. 19  In order to constitute a wager, four 
elements have to be satisfied, which will be discussed below in the concept of a 
contract of wager.  
1.1.1.4 Betting and lottery 
As to the concept of betting, it is a wider definition under the 2005 GA than that 
of a wager because one party to a bet may now bet on a certain event which 
                                                          
17
 John Ashton, The History of Gambling in England (London: Duckworth 1898) 15 
18
 Professor Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts (vol II, 32th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 41-004 
19
 Professor Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts (vol II, 32th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 41-004 
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can be controlled by the other party.20 It in detail means making or accepting a 
bet on: 
 the outcome of an event 
 the likelihood of anything occurring or not occurring; or  
 whether anything is or is not true.21  
In spite of the above definition, it has been argued that it is “self-referential and 
unhelpful”. Thus, it has been submitted that the person making the bet must 
normally pay a stake in order to participate in the bet; and that a person 
accepting a bet undertakes that he will make a payment to the person making 
the bet if that person’s forecast or assertion on the event listed above 
happens.22 It is obvious that betting on the outcome of a future event includes 
wagering policies, although a bet is commonly restricted to a wager on events 
relating to sports or games. Because betting is one kind of gambling, gambling 
of course includes wagering policies.23 
 
In general, lottery means speculation to obtain prizes by lot or chance. Under 
the 2005 Act, an arrangement will be a lottery if it satisfies one of the 
descriptions of a lottery in ss 14(2) and (3) of the Act. Section 14(2) sets out 
what a simple lottery is: it is an arrangement in the course of which one or more 
prizes allocated by a process wholly relying on chance will be allocated to one 
or more members who have paid so as to take part in the arrangement. Section 
14(3) provides for the definition of a complex lottery: a series of processes, not 
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just one process, which will allocate the prize, and the first of the process of the 
allocation wholly relies on chance. 
1.1.1.5 The same meaning in the specific context 
Although, in the 2005 GA, the definition of gambling, gaming or betting does not 
refer to the term of wager, there are some similarities between the definition of a 
bet under the 2005 GA, which is a type of gambling, and that of a wager at 
common law.24 One element of a bet is the likelihood of anything occurring or 
not occurring and betting is thought of as a special type of wagering.25 With the 
mutual intention in both betting and wagering, one party promises to pay the 
other party on the occurrence of some event or situation.26 Additionally, neither 
party should have an interest in the subject matter other than the stake itself. 
The scope of the concept of betting (and hence gambling27) under the Act is 
otherwise different from that of a wager at common law. The former does not 
include insurance contracts,28 an activity regulated under s 22 of the Financial 
Services and Market Act 2000.29 
 
Therefore, in the ambit of sham insurance, gaming, gambling, betting and 
wagering could be understood as a promise to win or lose for money upon the  
happening of a future uncertain event30 in which no party has an interest in the 
subject matter other than the stake. When gambling is referred to, it should be 
restrictively interpreted as wagering. In other words, gambling contracts refer 
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only to those contracts aiming to win money on the occurrence of a future 
uncertain event in which the assured has no insurable interest31 in the insured 
subject. Tindal CJ expressed the similar idea that gambling only referred to 
gambling in the guise of insurance wherein the parties had no insurable interest 
in the subject matter.32 Also, gaming could be understood as wager from the 
preamble of the Life Assurance 1774 LAA,33 which is still in force,34 where the 
meaning of wager, i.e. in the guise of insurance contracts without insurable 
interest, was regarded as not only a kind of gaming but also mischievous.35 
Similarly, a class of36 gaming or wagering contracts were deemed ones where 
the assured has neither an insurable interest nor any expectation of obtaining 
such an interest in the future uncertain event apart from the stake to win or 
lose.37 
 
In short, in the context of discussing an insurance contract being void for lack of 
an insurable interest, the terms of gaming, gambling, betting and wager could 
be regarded as synonymous. Therefore, a contract where the parties have no 
interest in the insured subject matter is a bet or wager;38  and the premise 
clarifies the confusion about the detailed distinctions of these terms. 
                                                          
31
 Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Co  [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 807 [163] 
32
 Paterson v Powell [1832] 9 Bing 320 [320], [ 327] 
33
 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, also known as the Gambling Act 1774 
34
 Robert Surridge, Noleen Dignan, Sara Forrest, Alison Broadberry and Duncan Backus, 
Houseman and Davies: Law of Life Assurance (11th edn, Butterworths 1994) 17 
35
 The preamble of the 1774 LAA 
36
 The other class is terms with PPI wording. 
37
 1906 MIA, s 4(2)(a) 
38
 Jonathan Gilman, Professor Robert M Merkin, Claire Blanchard and Mark Templeman, 
Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance (18th Revised edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 11-02 
43 
 
1.1.2 Life insurance’s abuse in the period leading up to the 1774 LAA 
1.1.2.1 Brief history of life insurance 
Life insurance originated in the Mediterranean around the fifteenth century, and 
was used to insure passengers’ or slaves’ lives during overseas marine 
voyages. 39  About one hundred and fifty years later, Italian merchants had 
introduced life insurance into England. Although there is a long history of life 
insurance in England, prior to the eighteenth century, most British people were 
not familiar with the idea of insurance.40  
 
Although life insurance did not originate from England, wager policies on life 
insurance entirely originated and developed in England41. The English were 
often passionate about the practice of wager policies in the guise of life 
insurance. As regards the location for wagering, although it was not uncommon 
to see people wagering at dinner parties and in gentlemen’s clubs, the British 
mainly wagered at insurance offices.42 
 
In the eighteenth century, gambling by means of life insurance was extremely 
prevalent in England.43 The subject matters for gambling in the guise of life 
insurance were surprisingly wide by the early years of the eighteenth century, 
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such as “a marriage, a birth, or the fall of a besieged city” or even “highway 
robbery, lying in conversation, cuckoldry, or death by drinking gin” for a time. 44 
1.1.2.2 The abuse of life insurance wager 
By the eighteenth century, wager policies by life insurance flourished and 
represented a large proportion of the insurance market.45 As a matter of fact, 
there was a booming market of wagering policies throughout the first three 
quarters of the eighteenth century until the passage of the 1774 LAA.46 It was 
common to see a British person daily taking out wager policies in the guise of 
insurance upon personalities’ life in which the policyholder had no insurable 
interest and on the chances of public events.47 The public were enthusiastic 
about wagers upon peoples’ longevity, and it was immoral to hope for the death 
of the persons wagered upon for the claim.48 
 
However, despite the undeniable popularity of wager by life insurance, those 
unscrupulous wagers upon third parties’ lives brought about many mischiefs. 
Wager had even been made upon whether George II could stay alive from the 
Dettingen battle.49 Besides, it would not be surprising to open a wager on the 
current parliament election or dissolution within one year.50 The preamble of the 
1774 LAA indicates such problems as follows: 
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Whereas it hath been found by experience that the making of 
insurances on lives or other events wherein the assured shall have 
no interest hath introduced a mischievous kind of gaming... 
 
Although the preamble did not state what exact kind of pernicious gaming had 
been introduced by wager policies by life insurance, generally speaking, as far 
as the eighteenth century is concerned, prior to the first half, objections were 
mainly focused on the problems of fraud and crime.51 During the second half, 
many had realised the inherent defect of wager policies: that it was deemed as 
moral degeneracy.52 Professor Merkin QC described “a mischievous kind of 
gaming” which had brought miserable outcomes as follows: 
“The duration of lives of persons believed to be on their death bed 
was a common hazard, and the dissolution of persons, who saw 
themselves insured in the Public papers at 90%, was, not unlikely, 
hastened by such announcement.”53 
 
The problems arising from fraud and crime were not uncommon in the 
eighteenth century. As to fraud, speculators would choose to insure those who 
were physically not in good condition. As a result, it was unfair to the 
policyholder who was not involved in fraud since they could recover less when 
the events insured against occurred. The underwriter would also encounter 
many more losses because they had to deal with more claims due to the fraud 
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of those deliberately insuring persons who were ill.54 This could be illustrated by 
the judgement of Langley J. in the case of Feasey.55 He stated that gambling 
was undermining the security of insurance companies and may have 
contributed to the passage of the 1774 LAA, because the aim of the Act to 
protect life insurers was clear.56 As for the evil of promoting crime, in order to 
successfully claim for recovery or get stakes, a policyholder having no interest 
in the insured lives could perpetrate a crime to hasten the claim.57 For example, 
in 1794, in the village of Berkley, Mary persuaded her husband, William Reed, 
to insure his life and she was later accused of being involved in Reed’s death 
when she tried to recover the insurance money.58  
 
People began to believe that wager by life insurance had inherent vice and in 
consequence such wager policies were violently deplored after the mid-
eighteenth century. 59  Rapid growth in the numbers of wager policies of 
insurance on third parties’ lives were denounced as “proof of the degeneracy of 
the time”.60 Taking part in contracts of wager was additionally harmful for the 
increasing of production of the whole society since the purpose of wager 
contracts was to win money without having to work, which inevitably resulted in 
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idleness.61  Wager was also said to have dishonoured the insurance industry 
because of the nature of wager.62 In 1770, two young men wagered whose 
father would live the longer.63 This notorious case inflamed the British public’s 
outrage. The mischiefs caused by wager, whether it be fraud, crime or wager 
itself, they all contributed to the legislature passing the 1774 LAA.64 
1.1.2.3 Reasons for the abuse of life insurance wager 
Three factors brought about the rapid growth in the numbers of wager policies 
wager policies by life insurance as follows: 
 the development of the insurance industry 
 no prohibition by English law 
 the insurer not inquiring the existence of insurable interest  
 
First, owing to the progress of material conditions in England,65 the insurance 
industry had made such great improvement that lots of undesirable risks had 
been brought under control. 66  Paradoxically, due to the elimination of 
controllable risks, the British were rather keen on risk-taking, just as wager 
contracts had revealed. 67  Therefore, the passion for speculation, like the 
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popularity of wager policies, had been stimulated by the practice of insurance in 
the eighteenth century.68 
 
Secondly, English law contributed much to the popularity of wager in the guise 
of life insurance, since underwriting life policies on third parties under which  the 
policyholder had no insurable interest, remained unrestricted by law, neither at 
common law nor by statutes, until the passage of the 1774 LAA.69 
 
Thirdly, underwriters made it easy for an assured, who had an insurable interest 
or not, to make wager policies on third parties’ lives, because they seldom 
inquired about the grounds for taking out such policies. 70  Just as Nicolas 
Magens commentated: “…..in London people take the liberty to make 
insurances on any one’s life without exception; and the insurers seldom enquire 
much if there are good or bad reasons for such an insurance”.71 
 
1.1.2.4 The effect of the 1774 LAA  
The effect on wager policies by life insurance of the 1774 LAA could be 
illustrated by the analysis arising out of the two betting books, which involved a 
variety of wagers, separately kept at the well-known gentlemen’s clubs of St 
James’s – White’s and Brook’s. Although there were statutes regulating wager 
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or gambling, general wager policies, other than those relating to marine 
insurance and life insurance, remained valid until the enactment of the 1845 
Gambling Act (1845 GA); and, before the 1774 LAA, no law then existed to 
prohibit wager in the guise of insurance on life. First, taking the figures in the 
betting book at White’s from October 1743 to April 1752, of the first 150 wagers, 
such policies on births and deaths of human lives collectively represented 52 
per cent.72  In comparison, by analysing the figures in Brook’s betting book 
spanning the mid-1770s, 29 per cent of 117 wagers concerned deaths or 
lives. 73  Therefore, comparing vertically, wager policies upon death or life 
decrease from 52 per cent to 29 per cent; comparing horizontally, wagers upon 
death or life decline from over half of all the wagers to only 29 per cent of all 
wager policies. It was clear that wager policies by life insurance had been 
effectively prohibited because of the passage of the 1774 LAA which ruled that 
life insurance policies without insurable interest, namely wager policies, shall be 
null and void74. 
1.1.3 Marine insurance’s abuse in the period leading up to the Marine Insurance Act 
1745 (1745 MIA)75 
It was common to see a marine policy inserting “interest or no interest” in 
the eighteenth century. In the case of Sadlers’ Co v Badcock76 , Lord 
Hardwicke briefly introduced the history of wager policies of marine 
insurance written on “interest or no interest”. His Lordship said that 
insurance on ships was as old as the laws of Oléron in the twelfth century 
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and Rhodes about the tenth century BC but wager policies without interest 
however first began in the Spanish trade. Whereas marine policies were 
intended to avert any damages or loss the assured might sustain, wager 
policies of marine insurance termed with “interest or no interest” were used 
in order to dispense with proof of insurable interest and to benefit from 
such sham policies. In the case of Dalby,77 the judge set out that policies 
of insurance against fire and against marine risks were then both good 
indemnity contracts which were made with the intention of indemnifying 
the losses the assured had suffered in the subject matter insured. Policies 
on maritime risks were afterwards used improperly, and people made 
mere wagers on the happening of those perils.  
 
The reasons for the popularity of wager policies on marine risks may be as 
follows: firstly, the assured tried, by averting proof of insurable interest, to 
successfully carry on contraband trade and benefit by destroying ships 
which were then called fraudulent policies;78 secondly, prior to the 1745 
MIA and the 1774 LAA, under common law, wager contracts of all kinds 
were valid; thirdly, before the 1745 MIA, though the common law leant 
strongly against these policies for some time, due to them being beneficial 
to merchants, the court rendered them valid. 79 In conclusion, due to the 
tacit acceptance by the court and the lack of relevant statutes to ban 
wager policies prior to the 1745 MIA, problems attributable to the abuse of 
such wagers increased.  
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Insurance companies then effected policies exceeding the bounds of their 
respective fortunes. The general British public were also fanatical about 
and addicted to wagers, leading to degeneracy among those of a lower 
class and suicide and disgrace among the nobility.80 This had occasioned 
moral objections to the abuse of wager policies.81 Patterson expressed 
strong social objections in detail: 
 
“More specifically, unearned gains lead to idleness, and the wagerer 
becomes a social parasite. On the moral side, idleness leads to vice; 
and the impoverishment of the loser entails misery, and, in its 
consequence, crime.”82 
 
1.2 The early statutory measures against gambling 
It has been stated that the progress of the development of the statutes as to 
contracts of gambling can be divided into two stages.83 The first stage is prior to 
the passage of the 2005 GA84. Under the Gaming Acts of 1710 and 1835, 
restriction had been imposed on credit for gaming. The 1845 GA makes 
contracts of gaming and wagering void and the Gaming Act 1892 invalidated 
certain transactions in relation to such contracts.85  The second stage is after 
the 2005 GA, in which the legislation relating to gambling before the Act was 
repealed;86 this was done by stipulating that a contract related to gambling can 
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be enforced,87 in spite of two exceptions that an unlawful gambling contract is 
by virtue of s 335(2) possibly unenforceable and the Gambling Commission 
may under s 336 have power to void certain bets. The insurable interest 
requirement may be imposed in three distinct ways: statutes as to insurance, 
statutes as to wager and the indemnity principle in contracts of marine 
insurance which has the nature of indemnity.88 Such statutes will be hereinafter 
examined. 
1.2.1 Legislation against gaming and gambling contracts of types other than 
insurance 
Prior to the eighteenth century, the beginning point when statutes interfered in 
the playing of games was probably in 1389; their purposes as with later statutes 
were to govern games or gaming in archery and other manly sports.89 Such 
legislation otherwise did not relate to a wager contract under which parties, who 
had no interest in the subject other than the stake, would stake money on the 
occurrence of an uncertain event.  
 
Gambling was for the first time prohibited by an Act in 154190 with the purpose 
of maintaining archery by suppressing certain games and preventing gambling 
which had caused social problems of impoverishment, crime and neglect of 
divine service.91 In 1621, an anti-gambling act was passed to prohibit lotteries. 
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Although for a long time wager contracts were at common law valid, legislation 
had tried to interfere in wager other than wager policies on insurance. Statutes 
were not aimed to govern wager until the passage of 16 Car. 2, c. 792 with the 
purpose of preventing fraudulent and excessive gaming. Accordingly, the party 
who won, by gaming or betting on the sides or hands of the players, was not 
entitled to recover a debt arising from such gambling, and wagers in excess of 
£100, and securities for the debt, were also void.93  Gaming such as cock-
fighting, horse-races, dog-matches…or games whatsoever were banned by 16 
Car. 2, c. 7. As a result, wagers upon such subjects would be held illegal. The 
Act of 9 Anne, c.19,94 the modern statute against gambling and wager, was 
afterwards passed, with the similar object of better preventing “fraudulent and 
excessive gambling and betting at games or sports”. The first section of the Act 
rendered void securities for such wagers for any amount and diminished the 
sum for which a loser could sue to £10. Therefore, gaming, gambling or 
wagering in general, not falling within these Acts, would not be held void.95 In 
other words, it was lawful to wager upon subjects which had not been prohibited 
by the two Acts. 
 
However, Parliament did not intervene in wager policies of insurance other than 
the foregoing wager contracts of other types until the eighteenth century. The 
1745 MIA for the first time prohibited marine insurance by way of gaming or 
wagering; and the 1774 LAA also directly made wager polices on life insurance 
void.  
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After the eighteenth century, the legislature had already intervened in gambling 
and few of them governed wager contracts of policies on insurance and of other 
types. In 1708, for the purpose of the war against France, an Act of 7 Anne c. 
16 was temporarily passed to avoid wagers and securities relating to the war.96 
Numerous statutes regulating gambling had been passed between 1710 and 
1892. Two Acts were passed aiming to restrict credit for gaming,97 which was 
also reflected in a later Act.98 All contracts by way of gaming or wagering99 
(which will be discussed below in detail) and promises to repay sums paid 
under such contracts100 were later made void. Besides, “excessive and deceitful 
Gaming” had been directed against such gaming by the Act of 12 Geo. II. c. 
28101 and 18 Geo. II. c. 34,102 and the latter one was passed because of the 
ineffectual prevention of such gaming. The 2005 GA then made gambling valid 
contracts by repealing s 18 of the 1845 GA. The foregoing Acts related to 
gambling otherwise did not affect wager polices of insurance except the 1845 
GA which indirectly made all contracts by way of gaming or wagering void. 
 
After the eighteenth century, even though there were a number of Acts 
governing gambling and wagering, the foregoing Acts of 1745, 1774 and 1845 
related to wager policies of insurance. In addition, s 4(1) of the 1906 MIA further 
provided every contract of marine insurance by way of gaming or wagering as 
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void. The 2016 Draft103, the ambit of which does not include marine insurance, 
then also made wager policies on non-life insurance contracts void. 
1.2.2 Acts against gambling in the form of insurance 
1.2.2.1 The Marine Insurance Acts 
1.2.2.1.1 The 1745 MIA
104
 
1.2.2.1.1.1 Scope of the Act 
The 1745 MIA was an Act with the purpose of imposing a prohibition on wagers 
by marine insurance in the scope of British ships and merchandise. Wager 
policies in the guise of marine insurance, however, could legally be made at 
liberty at common law upon foreign vessels, merchandise carried therein, British 
privateers, and merchandise carried from Spanish and Portuguese possessions 
in Europe or America, which was beyond the scope of the Act.105 
1.2.2.1.1.2 Effects of wager policies by marine insurance under the 1745 MIA 
It may not be very clear as to the effect of breaching s 1 of the 1745 MIA which 
renders wager policies on marine insurance null and void. A policy insuring 
cash advances on a ship subject to terms which can render policies itself proof 
of interest (PPI clauses) was held to be void under the Act.106 Also, the court 
held that the Act would avoid a policy inserted into PPI clauses (PPI policy) 
dispensing with proof of insurable interest.107 On the other hand, pursuant to 
Bankes LJ’s dictum, the 1745 MIA made PPI policies illegal because making 
such policies was against public policy.108  Scrutton LJ expressed the same 
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opinion in the same case.109 Arnould similarly set out that a wager policy on 
British ships and their cargoes shall be illegal under the Act.110 Anyway, the 
court would not enforce such policies any more. 
1.2.2.1.1.3 Objects of the Act 
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, wager contracts in the guise of 
marine insurance could be enforced by the courts at common law, even though 
the assured had no insurable interest in the subject matter.111 To suppress such 
practices, the Act for the first time stipulated the requirement of insurable 
interest in English statute112 and directly prohibited wager policies by way of 
marine insurance. 113  Its preamble however shows that guarding against 
wagering policies is not the sole object, but the Act is perhaps mainly designed 
to prohibit evils such as the assured carrying on illegal traffic and making 
insurance the means of gaining (or fraudulent destruction).114 For this purpose, 
Best CJ stated in Murphy115 case that: 
“The preamble of the Act shows that gaming was the least of the evils that 
the legislature proposed to remedy. Adventures on which gambling policies 
might be made but which were not likely to be undertaken for the other 
purposes which it was the object of the statute to prevent, are exempted 
from its operation. The preamble states that policies of insurance with 
clauses of interest or no interest, or such as in case of loss made the 
policies sufficient proof of interest, were used to protect persons who were 
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carrying on illegal traffic, and were made the means of profiting by the wilful 
destruction and capture of ships. … This shows that gambling was not the 
only thing guarded against.”  
 
As to illegal traffic, without proof of interest, wager policies made it easier for the 
assured to carry on contraband trade.116 In order to benefit from wager policies, 
the policyholder was tempted to wilfully destroy the ships and their cargoes, as 
well as to make overvalued insurance.117 The latter can also be referred to as a 
moral hazard attributable to the abuse of wager policies by marine insurance. 
The preamble in consequence expressed that wager policies without interest 
and inserted PPI terms or like ones had caused many pernicious practices, i.e. 
the assured would have fraudulently lost or destroyed ships, and their cargoes. 
Making wager polices a way of benefiting by the foregoing measures had thus 
brought about inconvenience to the insurer,118 for example, having undermined 
the security of the insurer, which was treated as one of the reasons why 
Parliament had passed statutes suppressing wager policies.119 
 
Nevertheless, some scholars thought that even if there is a statutory insurable 
interest, it is not sufficient to prevent the assured from profiting by destroying 
the insured subject. Taking the example of the valued policy, because the value 
of the insured subject matter is agreed at the date of the policy other than at the 
time immediately prior to the loss, even though the assured has an interest in 
the matter insured, the assured might be tempted to destroy it or just make a 
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wager policy on the chance of its loss where its agreed value excessively 
exceeds the actual value. Similarly, evils of fraudulent destruction might be 
caused by the marine insurance on the ship the value of which, according to s 
16 of the 1906 MIA, is ascertained at the time of the contract. 120 
1.2.2.1.1.4 PPI clauses not confined  to  certain specified words 
The 1745 MIA, which was afterwards fully repealed by the 1906 MIA, provided 
that no policies of insurance shall be made without interest or contain PPI terms, 
such as interest or no interest, without further proof of interest other than the 
policy, or by way of gaming or wagering, or without benefit of salvage to the 
assurer; such policies shall be null and void. Terms of “interest or no interest”, 
compared to other PPI terms, were not so commonly used because such words 
might imply that the assured could not satisfy the requirement of insurable 
interest.121 The policies which contained words like “interest or no interest” or 
“without further proof of interest than the policy” or similar words, which 
attempted to dispense with proof of insurable interest, are called PPI policies.122   
 
However, the recited PPI clauses under the Act did not necessarily mean that 
only the appearance of those certain specified words would render a policy null 
and void, whereas words to the same effect, that dispensed with the necessity 
of proof of interest, were sufficient to avoid such a policy. Therefore, in Murphy 
v Bell,123 in order to give the exact explanation of clauses without interest or PPI 
terms by the Act, Best CJ set out that “The meaning of this clause is, that no 
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insurance shall be effected by a policy so worded as to entitle the assured to 
recover against the underwriters a certain stipulated sum of money, whether he 
had any interest in the ship or cargo or not, or that binds the underwriter not to 
require any other proof of the assured’s interest but the admission of such 
interest in the policy.” In short, whatever words may be used, if that be the effect 
of the policy, no action could be maintained on it. In this case, the court held 
that the policy containing “that the goods insured were and should be valued at 
five tierces coffee, valued at £ 27. per tierce, say £ 135; that policy to be 
deemed sufficient proof of interest” had  the same effect as the policy containing 
PPI clauses and thus the policy was void under the Act. Best CJ justified his 
explanation giving two reasons. First, the evils caused by wagering policies 
enumerated in the preamble of the Act, such as fraudulent insurance and 
clandestine trade, were dreadful. It was thus necessary to impose a much more 
strict explanation of PPI terms. Secondly, without such an explanation, the court 
would have  rendered inoperative s 1 of the Act. Therefore, the courts tended to 
broadly interpret the meaning of PPI clauses. Similarly, the Court of Appeal held 
that a policy containing the term “full interest admitted” was void under the 1745 
MIA because this term not only meant that the interest shall, if it existed, be 
valued at a certain sum, but that no proof of interest needed to be provided, 
which in fact dispensed with the proof of interest.124  
1.2.2.1.1.5 The term relating to valuation of interest is not equivalent to that of dispensing 
with proof of interest.  
On the other hand, where a term merely meant the valuation of interest, the 
policy including such a term would not be void for the purpose of PPI terms, 
unless the fixed value hugely exceeded the actual value of the subject matter 
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exposed to marine perils.125 In Grant v Parkinson126, the policy was made on 
profits expected to arise on the cargo of the ship in the event of her safe arrival 
and included the term “in case of loss the insurers agree to pay the same 
without any other voucher (valuation) than the policy”. The court held that this 
policy with no insertion of PPI terms was not void under s 1 of the 1745 MIA and 
the assured who had a real interest was thus entitled to recover. Lord Mansfield 
stated that the policy in question was a valued policy which was not void if the 
assured could prove some actual interest and was not meant to conceal the 
interest but to get rid of the proof the quantum. Therefore, when deciding 
whether a term was a PPI term, the nature of the term needed to be carefully 
considered: if it was a valuation of interest in order to preclude dispute 
concerning the value of the subject insured at the time of recovering, which was 
the normal business practice and was not a breach of the indemnity principle, 
the policy would not be void for the purpose of PPI terms; by contrast, if it 
allowed the assured no necessity of proving its interest, the policy would be a 
void one within the ambit of the 1745 MIA. 
1.2.2.1.1.6 PPI terms will vitiate the policy even though the assured has a real interest.  
Best CJ held that if a policy included words like PPI terms recited in the Act or 
like terms, the case was within it and void, although it may be manifest that it 
was not a wagering policy.127 Where the assured having advanced money on 
the security of a ship made the policy on such advances with “full interest 
admitted” which had the same effect as PPI terms, the court held the policy was 
void for the purpose of PPI terms even though the policy was in effect not a 
wagering policy and the assured had a real interest in the ship to the extent of 
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such advances. 128  However, the case may be distinguished today. In the 
Feasey case, Waller LJ held that, due to the broad definition by modern courts, 
the courts nowadays would be reluctant to hold that a policy did not cover an 
insurable interest, even though the terms of the policy were plainly ones without 
interest or including PPI terms.129 
 
1.2.2.1.1.7 The validity of the valued policy for the purpose of PPI terms.  
It was thought in the past that the valued policy was void under the 1745 MIA, 
especially where fraudulent insurance caused by loss of ships may be attained 
by means of policies under which a much higher value was put on subjects 
insured than they were worth.130 It is not the case. Prior to the 1745 MIA, a 
valued policy was common and then, at the trial, the assured was not required 
to prove either value or interest, whether or not PPI terms had been included. 
After the enactment of the Act, it had been held that a valued policy was not 
void, but the assured needed to prove some interest. Where a policy contained 
“in case of loss the insurers agree to pay the same without any other voucher 
than the policy”, the term was the valuation of interest and the policy was a valid 
one.131 Best CJ thus set out the test of identifying whether a policy was within 
the Act that “If a policy then dispenses with all proof of interest, it is within the 
Act, and void. If the Plaintiff must prove his interest, and the policy only saves 
him the trouble of shewing its amount, it is a valued policy and good.”132 Even 
though there is excessive overvaluation, i.e. the agreed value by the assured 
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and the insurer inserted into the policy is enormously higher than the true value 
of the subject insured, the policy was still not void as long as it had no PPI 
terms because the assured has a real insurable interest.133 
1.2.2.1.1.8 Useful honour policies 
Honour policies were actually useful where the nature of interest was beyond 
the ambit of the statutory insurable interest or the insurable interest in the 
subject matter insured was too fluctuating to measure it.134 Because of the 
commercial convenience - that the assured, having a real interest, did not need 
to prove the amount of insurable interest, - and because of the evil of making 
insurance a way of profiting by deliberate destruction of the subject insured, in 
which the assured had no interest and by over-valuation on the chance of a loss, 
- the practice of honour policies prevailed.135 Thus, it could not be said that PPI 
policies, or, as more precisely called, honour policies, were designed to be an 
instrument of wager at their inception because such policies severed their clear 
commercial purposes at first and then, unfortunately, lots of them were made 
wager policies. 136  Therefore, PPI terms inserted into a policy could not be 
regarded as self-proof of the nature of a wager policy, even though the form of 
the policy would taint its validity.137 Honour policies were those which included 
at least one term similar to the effect of those stipulated in s 4(2)(b) of the 1906 
MIA. Losses suffered which were insured by such policies could not be 
compensated for by an action under the 1745 MIA, but nonetheless 
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compensation could be recovered under the honour of the underwriter.138 From 
the perspective of pure commerce, it is significant to distinguish honour policies 
from mere wager policies. This is because the interest of the former, which were 
some kind of non-legal or equitable risks and genuine in commercial practice, 
was distinct from the latter where the assured took no risks other than the losing 
of his stake.  
 
In addition, honour polices had been used where the assured had difficulty 
measuring the amount of its interest, despite having a real insurable interest: 
with the introduction of honour policies, it would be convenient for the assured 
who indeed had an insurable interest to insure certain types of subjects, since in 
certain cases the interest that the assured had was not easy to define or to 
determine its extent.139 Trying to avoid the difficult of proving the exact amount 
of insurable interest may be the chief reason for honour polices prevailing. The 
insurer would honour such policies as well only if the assured had a bona fide 
insurable interest. In the event of insurance on “Increased Value” of cargo, 
although the assured had an interest in cargo, it was difficult to define the 
increase exceeding the insurable value. Similarly, in the case of “Anticipated 
Freight”, where the shipowner was effecting a contract of insurance on his 
vessel and it was easy to prove its good conditions as a freight earner, 
nevertheless, because it was difficult to figure out the exact freight which his 
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vessel could earn, he would face difficulty when required to demonstrate the 
amount of interest he had in freight.140  
1.2.2.1.1.9 Conflicts between law and practice as to such policies 
There existed for a long time an unfortunate conflict between the statutes and 
the practice of businessmen. 141  As discussed above, for the commercial 
convenience of dispensing proof of the amount of interest, honour policies were 
commonly taken out. Despite the insertion of such terms into a policy, the 
insurer still had a right to claim in court that the assured had no insurable 
interest.142 In such a situation, the assured adopting the commercial practice 
would be put at a substantial disadvantage since honour policies were 
pronounced to be either illegal143 or void144 by statute. Furthermore, it should be 
noticed that the anti-wager Acts did not separately distinguish PPI policies and 
honour policies from those with actual interests. As long as PPI terms appeared 
on the face of the policy, such kinds of policies would be deemed as contracts 
by way of gaming and wagering, and void.145  
1.2.2.1.2 Names to be checked under the Marine Insurance Act 1788 (the 1788 MIA)146 
The application of the 1788 MIA was not only confined to marine insurance on 
ships and their goods, it also applied to indemnity insurances on non-marine 
subjects, such as merchandise, effects, or other property whatsoever.147 The 
1788 MIA was also repealed by the 1906 MIA so far as marine insurance was 
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concerned.148 As a result, the 1788 MIA still applies to policies of insurance on 
non-marine subjects. According to the 2016 Draft, the Act should be wholly 
repealed because it has for a long time been of no effect in insurance contracts. 
 
The Act provided that it would be void if the parties having an interest in the 
insurance did not at the beginning insert their names into the policy. The 
insertion was regarded as convenience for the insurer checking whether the 
assured had a valid insurable interest.149  However, when to test what was 
sufficient to prevent a policy to be a wager policy, the requirement of an 
“interest”, rather than “a valid insurable interest”, was enough. Also, the fact that 
the assured had an expectation of acquiring one was not a valid or real 
insurable interest, but nevertheless was sufficient to protect a policy from falling 
within the anti-wager Acts.150 
1.2.2.1.3 The Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) 1909 MIA (the 1909 MIA)
151
 
The Act prohibited wagers upon loss by marine perils:152 it rendered wager 
policies made in the guise of marine insurance illegal and those making them 
guilty of criminal offence. The Act provided for punishment of those who took 
out or helped on purpose to effect a marine insurance policy where the assured 
could not establish an insurable interest. The punishment was by a fine or 
imprisonment for up to six months, although no prosecutions were taken under 
the Act. 
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It has been argued that the Act should be abolished, mainly depending on the 
following two reasons: firstly, the criminal offence created by the Act was 
thought unnecessary,153 because the insurance contract, a commercial issue, 
should be governed by related financial laws154 rather than criminal penalties; 
secondly, the Act had no application in practice and no action had ever been 
taken under the Act.155 Thus, the 2016 Draft has proposed the repeal of the 
1909 MIA. 
1.2.2.2 Whether the 1774 LAA applies to indemnity insurance 
1.2.2.2.1 Grounds for the passing of the 1774 LAA  
Wagers by life insurance，which had continually caused the life insurance 
industry a lot of trouble, was believed to have led to the passing of the Act:  
“Contracts of this nature became so much a mode of gambling (for 
people took the liberty of insuring any one’s life, without hesitation, 
whether connected with him, or not, and the insurers seldom asked 
any question about the reasons, for which such insurances were 
made), that it at last became a subject of Parliament discussion.” 156 
Those wager contracts of insurance were thus regarded as a mischievous 
kind of gaming in the Act. According to s 1 of the Act, the assured under 
the insurance contracts within the ambit of this Act must have an insurable 
interest at the outset of the contract; otherwise the contract was rendered 
null and void.  
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1.2.2.2.2 Scope of the Act 
Although the 1745 MIA had prohibited wager policies in the form of marine 
insurance, wagers by other types of insurance had still been left to common law 
without Parliament’s intervention until the passing of the 1774 LAA,157 which 
intended to prevent wager policies of insurance contracts other than marine 
ones from evading gambling laws.158 The 1774 LAA prohibited wager policies of 
life insurance other than pure wager contracts of other kinds159 by providing that 
no insurance on lives or “any other events” should be made, worded by “no 
interest” or by means of “gaming or wagering”; otherwise, such policies were 
null and void.160  
 
It was argued that it may probably not be right to see the title of the Act and 
then to think that the Act only applied to life insurance. The unclear ambit of the 
Act may possibly have arisen from the terms “on any other event or events 
whatsoever” in s 1. Because of this provision, although s 4 clearly provided that 
the Act did not apply to the bona fide making of insurance on the subject of 
ships, goods or merchandise,161 it was argued that it may also apply to other 
indemnity insurance, like land, buildings and liability insurance.162 However, the 
Act in effect only applied to policies of insurance on life. Although in an old case 
the court held that the assured must have an insurable interest in the subject of 
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land and buildings at the time of making the contract, this decision has never 
been cited.163 Under the current common law, the position therefore seems to 
be clear that it limits its application merely to life insurance and thus does not 
apply to any indemnity insurance.164 One reason for such a position is that the 
1774 LAA was enacted to prevent a mischievous kind of gaming while it was 
clear that indemnity insurance was not included in that.165 In conclusion, the 
1774 LAA did not govern the policies on ships, goods or merchandise, nor land 
and buildings policies and liability policies. To make the law on insurable 
interest clearer and more certain, the 2016 Draft has suggested repealing this 
Act. 
1.2.2.3 Conclusion 
Different Acts apply to different kinds of wager policies of insurance: for wagers 
by marine insurance, the Acts of 1906 and 1909 apply; the 1774 LAA governs 
wager policies of life insurance on the payment of a sum of money on the 
occurrence of an insured event; for wager policies in other types of non-marine 
indemnity insurance, as discussed below, the 1845 GA applied. Because of its 
repeal by the 2005 GA, the non-life related insurance, including non-marine 
indemnity insurance, will be governed by the forthcoming Insurable Interest Act. 
To be valid under these Acts for the purpose of insurable interest, the assured 
must have an insurable interest or an expectation of obtaining one in the 
insured subject matter at the time of contract. 
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1.2.3 Two crucial gambling statutes 
1.2.3.1 Indirect requirement of insurable interest under the 1845 GA166 
Before the passing of the 1845 GA, only wagering policies on marine risks and 
life insurance were prohibited for being mischievous kinds of gaming; on the 
other hand, wager contracts in general remained lawful and wager policies of 
non-marine insurance were enforceable at that time and so remained until 
1845.167  
 
The problem then needed to be dealt with relating to the enforceability of wager 
policies of non-marine indemnity insurance. Although wagers by insurance 
against marine and life risks had been clearly subject to relevant statutes, the 
validity of wager policies in the form of insurance on non-marine chattels was 
left unclear at common law, which had been ended by the 1845 GA.168 Although 
the 1788 MIA also applied to non-marine insurance on goods, there was no 
requirement of the assured having an insurable interest. Likewise, even though 
there was a debate as to whether the 1774 LAA applied to indemnity insurance, 
it had been clearly held that only life insurance fell within the ambit of its 
operation.   
 
 
After the enactment of the Act, both wager policies of all classes of insurance 
and wager contracts of other kinds had been rendered unenforceable by the 
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1845 GA, 169  which provided that “All contracts or agreements, whether by 
parole or in writing, by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void”.170 
Following this provision, it was clear that gaming or wagering contracts were 
void, whereas the prohibition imposed on wager policies was rather indirect: 
under a wager contract, the parties to the contract had no insurable interest in 
the subject matter staked, apart from the sum to win or lose; by rendering a 
contract without interest void, the parties had to have an insurable interest in a 
contract to avoid being unenforceable. Consequently, the validity of wagers in 
the guise of all types of insurance on all subject matters for the first time was 
made definitely void according to s 18 of the Act. That is to say, it indirectly 
required that general indemnity contracts of insurance must fulfil the need for an 
insurable interest in order to be valid.171 
1.2.3.2 Uncertainty in insurance contracts under the 2005 GA172 
Doubts have arisen about whether or not the requirement of insurable interest 
was accidentally affected by the 2005 GA, which repealed section 18 of the 
1845 GA173 and allowed gambling contracts to be enforceable. Section 335(1) 
of the 2005 GA provides that a contract should not be unenforceable due to the 
fact that it relates to gambling. 174  Section 335(2) then stipulates that the 
enforceability of gambling by s 335(1) should be without prejudice to any rule of 
law preventing the enforcement of a contract on the grounds of unlawfulness 
(other than a rule relating specifically to gambling). Therefore, as long as a rule 
is concerning gambling, s 335 applies to such contracts, no matter whether 
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being void or unlawful leads to their being unenforceable. After the 2005 GA 
came into force, a wager policy which falls within the definition of gambling by 
this Act is no longer void under the Gambling Acts. Clearly, s 4 of the 1906 MIA 
relates to the enforceability of gambling contracts: s 4(1) sets out that wagering 
policies on marine perils are not enforceable while s 4(2) then points out two 
types of such policies: without insurable interest or the expectation of obtaining 
one and those containing PPI terms or similar. Therefore, it has been argued 
that s 335 has repealed s 4 and wager policies consequently are now 
enforceable. If so, because wager policies do not require independent insurable 
interest, s 335 thus has accidently abolished the requirement of insurable 
interest.  
 
One the other hand, it has also been argued that s 335 has not affected the 
operation of s 4. First, s 335 does not expressly repeal s 4 and intentionally 
influence the Insurance Acts. 175 Secondly, Parliament has not considered the 
influence of s 335 on s 4, which means the purpose of legislation was not 
intended to affect this area of insurance law. 
 
The Act has thus introduced “unfortunate uncertainty into the law” because 
Parliament had no discussion concerning its effect on contracts of insurance at 
the time the law was passed.176 Before the enactment of the Act, under the 
1845 GA and the 1906 MIA, in the context of marine insurance, the requirement 
of insurable interest has to be shown at the time of loss by the policyholder to 
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preclude insurance contracts from being treated as wagering agreements 
leading to their unenforceability. Under the 2005 GA, gambling contracts are 
now enforceable; consequently, as to its enforceability, it is not necessary to 
differentiate between indemnity insurance and wagering contracts. In light of the 
effect of the Act, it may be reasonable to conclude that, at least to make an 
insurance contract enforceable, insurable interest in non-marine indemnity 
insurance is no longer an essential requirement in England and Wales. 177 
However, in Scotland, it still remains a common law requirement.  
1.3 The validity of wagering contracts at common law 
As far as indemnity insurance was concerned, prior to the passage of the 1845 
GA, as to the validity at common law, the positions of wager policies of marine 
insurance, non-marine insurance and wager contracts of other kinds were 
different. It can be looked at in four stages: the period before the 1745 MIA, the 
period between the 1745 MIA and before the 1845 GA, then after the 1845 GA 
and before the 2005 GA, and then after the 2005 GA. At common law, before 
the passage of the 1745 MIA, wager contracts of all kinds were deemed as 
goods contracts with some restrictions178 and could be enforced by the courts, 
unless they became a public nuisance or broke public policy such as immorality, 
caused a breach of the peace or exposed a third party to ridicule.179 After the 
1745 MIA, although wager polices on marine risks and life had been prohibited 
by the relating Acts, wager policies of non-marine insurance and pure wagers 
were still valid at common law until the passage of the 1845 GA: after the 1745 
MIA, wager polices of insurance against maritime risks were illegal; the 1774 
LAA rendered void wager polices on life insurance; wager policies of insurance 
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on other subjects and general wager contracts remained valid under common 
law until the 1845 GA came into force. In other words, the provisions of the Acts 
of 1745 and 1774 appeared to be confined only to the scope of wager policies 
of insurance, and not extending to pure wager contracts.180 As a result, between 
the period after the 1745 MIA and before the 1845 GA, a wager policy in the 
guise of marine insurance and life insurance was void whereas a mere wager 
on such subjects was valid. After the 1845 GA and before the 2005 GA, all 
wager contracts were rendered void at common law. After the enactment of the 
2005 GA, the wager contracts not in the guise of insurance are enforceable by 
the courts. 
1.3.1 Wager contracts in general enforceable at common law before the 1745 MIA 
Before falling within the scope of Parliament’s consideration, namely, prior to 
the passage of the Act 1745,181 wagering was deemed to be a valid contract182 
and therefore not illegal at common law in England, though in Scotland183 it was 
held that contracts relating to wagers were void by the law of Scotland. 184 
Exceptions to the validity of wager contracts were those contrary to public 
policy.185 Prior to the period when the 1774 LAA was passed, a wager contract 
by insurance other than against marine risks was regarded as legal and even as 
a kind of insurance.186 Waller LJ thus stated that “gaming and wagering outside 
the insurance context was lawful and enforced by the courts”. 187  Generally 
speaking, it was safe to say that, due to no relating Acts, wager contracts were 
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legal under common law before the 1745 MIA, and even after the passage of 
the 1745 MIA before the 1845 GA, wager policies on non-marine indemnity 
insurance were still not void.188 Lord Mansfield was of the same opinion: 
“Indifferent wagers upon indifferent matters, without interest to either of 
the parties, are certainly allowed by the law of this country, in so far as 
they have not been restrained by particular Acts of Parliament: and the 
restraints imposed in particular cases, support the general rule. For 
where Parliament interposes and says, ‘Unless you have an interest in 
such a case, any wager or insurance upon it shall be void and of no 
effect;’ it implies, that in cases not specially prohibited by Act of 
Parliament, parties may wager or insure at pleasure. … wagers ... have 
too long and too often been held good and valid contracts.”189 
 
In Andrews v Herne 190  where the parties made a wagering contract as to 
whether Charles Stuart then being in exile could be restored to the throne within 
twelve months, the courts then held that such a wagering contract was good 
enough to satisfy the concept of a wager and valid for three grounds: firstly, the 
consideration for the wager was good; secondly, the wager was made on a 
future uncertain event that is, at the time of betting, whether Charles Stuart 
could be the king of England; lastly, the parties mutually intended to take out 
such a wager.  
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Therefore, the courts would not hesitate to adjudicate upon wagers, even 
though sometimes adjudicating such wagers was thought to have wasted the 
time of the courts191 and the courts actually were not in favour of wagers192. 
Even the result of a case before the courts could be made subjects of wager 
contracts, but nonetheless such wagers were also regarded to be valid 
contracts and not void. In Jones v Randall,193 a dispute arose as to the plaintiff 
recovering money won by him upon a wager: “whether a decree of the Court of 
Chancery would be reversed or not on appeal to the House of Lords”. The 
courts held that wagering contracts were neither banned by statute nor illegal at 
common law. Mr. Wallace and Mr. Mansfield upheld the plaintiff for the following 
three reasons: firstly, the wagering contract was an equal transaction, because 
each of the parties had equal knowledge or equal ignorance and both of them 
made the wager depend upon an uncertain event; secondly, such a contract 
was not the sort of contract which was prohibited by statute stating that the 
plaintiff could not recover his money; thirdly, at common law, there was no case 
to render such contracts illegal.  
 
According to the above judgement, wagering contracts were deemed fair 
transactions and legal at common law. It was clearly and manifestly right that 
there was no positive law to ban such contracts prior to the 1745 MIA, which for 
the first time formally recognised that insurance contracts effected without 
insurable interest were a pernicious practice.  
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1.3.2 Cases not within the general validity of wagers  
However, in some cases, running counter to principles of sound policy and 
morality, wager contracts might nevertheless be held to be void.194 According to 
the decision in Jones v Randall,195 the instances that wagers would be illegal 
were as follows: firstly, they were prohibited by the positive law. Wager 
contracts were however not void until the passage of the 1745 MIA, although 
during the period of the war in 1708, the Wagers Act 1708 was enacted to 
prevent wagers upon that war. However, the 1708 Act was just a temporary one 
and soon expired when the war ended. Wager policies of insurance on non-
marine insurance were not clearly prohibited by statute until the passage of the 
1845 GA. Secondly, the illegality of wagers was adjudged by judicial precedent. 
Wagers in general were valid before the 1845 Act under common law, with 
certain exceptions. Thirdly, they were contrary to principles of sound policy and 
morality. Those wagers could bring evils which, for example, could influence the 
exercise of some office, using physical violence. Lord Mansfield pointed out 
such principles, any of which might render void wagering contracts which were 
otherwise not prohibited by any statutes and not illegal at common laws. 196 The 
test for the morality should be inferred from the nature of a wagering contract. 
Both of the parties had equal positions and made sure such contracts to be fair 
transactions, namely, no fraud, no imposition imputed to either of the parties, 
equal knowledge or equal ignorance. Besides, the bet must depend on the 
future uncertain event, viz. neither of the parties would be sure to win or lose. 
He mentioned nothing about the test for the latter; the case of Atherfold v Beard 
was however about sound policy, which will be discussed in detail infra. 
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Besides, although wager contracts were not held void, the courts disliking this 
position at common law, then tended to hold the invalidity of wager contracts for 
many other reasons, like fool wagers:197 “wagering has long been frowned upon 
in England.”198 Ashhurst J199 expressed this dissatisfactory attitude to wager 
contracts: 
“In my opinion the Courts have gone far enough in encouraging 
impertinent wagers. Perhaps it would have been better for the public, 
if the Courts had originally determined that no action to enforce the 
payment of wagers should be permitted.” 
Accordingly, it was not right to think that the court could not go further, other 
than in the event of it being contrary to public policy and could only “discourage 
action on wagers by refusing to grant facilities in procedure available to other 
litigants”.200 
 
Furthermore, the validity of wagers could be vitiated by the subject matter of 
wagers or by the legality of such subjects, in spite of the general validity of 
wagers at common law. It has been submitted that wagers upon the following 
subjects were held illegal in addition to them leading to public mischiefs:  
“these included wagers on unlawful games; wagers that one of the 
parties would commit a legal wrong or do an immoral act; wagers 
which affected the interests and feelings of a third person so as to 
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make a breach of the peace likely; and wagers which were ‘against 
sound policy’.”201 
1.3.2.1 Wagers contrary to public policy invalid 
There  was a definite decision at common law that a wager could not bring any 
mischiefs or inconvenience to public policy; otherwise such wagers would not 
be enforced by the courts.202 The case of Atherfold v Beard203 can be used to 
illustrate the occasion in which a wager ran counter to sound policy. In this case, 
a wager concerning the future amount of any branch of the public revenues was 
made between two persons, who had no concerns in the subject. The courts 
held that such a wager respecting public matters was illegal, because it had 
introduced improper discussions and was contrary to the public policy of the 
kingdom. In Buller J’s opinion, which had gone further, a wager without interest 
was illegal, as he had put in this case: 
“I do not find that it has ever been established as a position of law, that 
a wager between two persons, not interested in the subject-matter, is 
legal.” 
 
He also made a distinction in terms of the validity of wagering contracts effected 
on public matters and private events. He stated that a wager was a good one if 
it was taken out on private matters;204 by contrast, he went further by referring 
to Lord Mansfield’s judgement in the case of Murray v Kell to decide that a 
wager on public matters was void. 
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Lord Ellenborough CJ said that most cases as to wager had not been so fully 
discussed regarding the illegality of wagers as they might have been.205 The 
court held that a wager, between the proprietors of two carriages for the 
conveyance of passengers for hire, stating that a given person should go past 
one of these carriages, and no other, was illegal, because such a wager would 
expose other parties rather than the parties who made the wager to some 
inconvenience.206  Further concerns had been set out that a wager like this 
might possibly produce inconvenience to the public, since such a wager might 
also be laid on a matter involving thirty or forty passengers, not merely to the 
specific person, which would certainly be productive of great inconvenience to 
the public.207  
1.3.2.2 Wager contracts on moral grounds rendered void  
Wager contract resulting in corruption, physical violence and other results could 
not be enforced by the courts on the ground that the principle of morality would 
be violated. 208  The case of Allen v Rescous 209  established that wagering 
contracts were illegal and void if such contracts led to physical violence. In Allen 
v Hearne,210 a wager between two voters, which was laid upon the event of the 
election, was held to be illegal, because it could lead to bribery. The decision 
was thus decided on the ground that such a wager could affect the two voters 
when they were involved in the elections of candidates. Such ideas were also 
enunciated in Jones v Randall, a wager having been used to disguise the 
intention of one party to purchase the bishopric was made void.  
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1.3.2.3 Foolish wager contracts unenforceable 
Categories of foolish wager contracts were blamed to have improperly occupied 
the time of the courts leading to loss of time for more important cases.211 Bayley 
J. observed that the wager was not illegal but foolish, for it not only produced 
inconvenience to a third party but also wasted time in a Court of Justice, which 
should be used for trying meaningful actions which would affect people’s rights. 
Because of the above two problems caused by foolish wagers, the courts held 
that judges ought not to try actions caused by such wagers.212 
 
Trying a foolish wager would tend to vilify and degrade a court of justice.213 
Since a wager had the nature of idleness made upon the matter as to how 
many ways of nicking seven on the dice can be achieved, Lord Loughborough 
also refused to try such an action upon such a wager.  He thought that the 
wager in question was highly improper to be made the foundation of an action. 
Besides, Gould J pointed out in the case, a public discussion of this wager of an 
idle nature would greatly prejudice the morals of the nation. Additionally, Heath 
J thought that the subject matter of this wager was illegal, because “all games 
at dice except backgammon are prohibited by law”. Sometimes the court would 
thus render an idle wager void simply for its foolish nature.214  Gibbs CJ refused 
to maintain an action on the wager upon whether an unmarried woman had had 
a child because he would not want to waste the court’s time. Going further he 
said that a court should not try a case respecting a wager between persons who 
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had no interest in the subject matter.215 
 
Acting in the same way, in order to avoid the wasting of courts’ time by hearing 
cases brought to the courts for idle curiosity, Lord Ellenborough refused to try 
an action on a wager in which the parties had no interest in the judgement by 
the court but only intended to satisfy their curiosity relating to the court’s 
decision. In this case, in order to make certain “whether a person may be 
lawfully held to bail on a special original for a debt under £40”, in which the 
parties had no legal interest in the outcome of this abstract issue of law, they 
laid money on it. His Lordship thought the decision on the point of law, which 
was the subject matter of the wager, was not for the purposes of justice and 
such an action would bring inconvenience to the courts and be regarded as 
indecent behaviour.216  
1.3.2.4 A wager affecting third parties’ peace void  
The common law affecting third parties had undergone a change of attitude 
from one of tolerance to one much stricter. At the beginning, despite its 
notorious reputation, a wager on the life of two young men’s fathers being run 
against one another was upheld as valid.217 The court held that a wager upon 
third parties was enforceable unless it might bring them physical violence.218  
 
Then, the court would not try an action upon a wager which had materially 
affected the interest or feelings of a third person as to violating public peace. In 
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Da Costa v Jones,219 a wager was laid between two unconnected persons upon 
the sex of a third party. The court did not maintain the action on the grounds 
that it would bring an injury to a third person and to the peace of society. Lord 
Mansfield in this case gave three species of wagers regarding third persons for 
which the judges would reject the actions: “an incitement to a breach of the 
peace”, like a wager on physical violence as to a third person,220 “an incitement 
to immorality” and “contra bonos mores”.  
 
At last, wagers made upon other parties in whatever manner affecting them 
were rendered unenforceable.221 A wager upon whether an unmarried woman 
had had a child was held void because a third party, the woman, had been 
affected regardless of whether or not her feelings or reputation had been 
injured.222 Similarly, a wager bringing any inconvenience was void and illegal.223 
 
A wager in relation to a third person could be maintained by the court only if the 
occasion that the third person who happened to be the subject matter of the 
wager would not be injured or affected by the wager.224 Accordingly, the case of 
Micklefield v Hepgin225 held that a wager was good as to “whether a certain 
agreement purporting to be subscribed by A really was subscribed by him”. 
Eyre, the Chief Baron, insisted that that wager was valid because the wager did 
not affect the character or feeling of the third party.  
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1.3.2.5 Wagers upon unlawful subjects invalid 
At common law, such wager contracts upon “cock-fighting, card games (other 
than those of mere skill) and (probably) all games of chance”226 were held void 
in the courts. No action could lie on a wager in relation to cock-fighting, and the 
court would not try such an action. Lord Ellenborough thought that there were 
two reasons for this doctrine. In the first place, cruelty to the cock in the game of 
cock-fighting should be considered questionable. Allowing such barbarous 
diversion could also degrade the Courts of Justice and was inconsistent with 
that dignity which was essential to the public welfare that a Court of Justice 
should always preserve.227  
 
So with a wager upon a dog-fight, the judge would order it to be struck out of 
the cause paper and he would not try such a case.228 Abbott CJ was of the 
opinion that trying an action concerning a dog-fight or man-fight was wasting the 
Court’s time and that such wagers were illegal. What should however be 
pointed out here is that a wager could not be simply decided legal or not merely 
because neither parties of the wager had an interest in the subject matter of the 
wager.229 In comparison, an action was rendered maintainable on a wager of “a 
rump and dozen” (a good dinner and wine), whether the defendant be older 
than the plaintiff, since no uncertainty and illegality existed as to the subject 
matter.230  
 
Also, the court would try an action upon a wager on a legal horse-race, however, 
two prerequisites must be satisfied: firstly, the sums betted by the parties must 
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be under £10, otherwise, it would run counter to 9 Ann. c. 14, which had 
prohibited various species of gaming under heavy penalties; secondly, the race 
itself must be, or upwards of, £50, or, it would be contrary to 13 Geo. II. c. 19，
which had prohibited many species of horse-racing and nevertheless had also 
allowed horse races to be run for plates or sums of money amounting to £50.  
 
Even though where the race run for was above £50, “a wager on the race might 
also be illegal unless it was a bona fide contest between two or more horses 
running on the turf.”231 Lord Eldon Ch J said so in Whaley v Pajot, 232 which 
related to an action on a wager “that a single horse shall run on the high road 
from A to B and arrive sooner than one of two horses placed at any distance the 
owner shall please” with the sum run for being above £50, that the court should 
not try such an action, for the grounds that in terms of the exceptions to the 
prohibition of kinds of horse-racing being deemed to be illegal, 13 & 18 Geo. 2 
related to bona fide horse-racing only, while the wager was obviously not 
concerning bona fide racing. 233  In Ximenes v Jaques, 234  a wager that the 
plaintiff could perform a journey of 240 miles in a post chaise and pair of horses 
in a given time was illegal, even though the sum run for was over £50, for it was 
not a case of bona fides. An action upon a wager on a horse-race, which was 
prohibited by the law due to lacking both of the qualifications, was not be 
maintained and might even have been illegal.235  
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1.3.3 Wager policies by insurance  
Although it had been suggested that wager policies were strongly disapproved 
of at common law in the earlier cases,236  the position of whether or not wager 
policies in the guise of different types of insurance were valid was in effect 
uncertain at common law before the passage of the 1745 MIA.237 Before the 
1774 LAA was passed, at common law, the courts always tended to enforce 
wager policies in the form of life insurance in England.238 Wager policies of 
insurance other than on marine risks, before the 1845 GA, could also be 
enforced. 239 By contrast, in equity, wager policies by insurance seemed to be 
void: for example, in a case of fire insurance, the assured was required to have 
an interest or property in the subject matter insured, at the time not only of 
effecting the insurance contract, but also at the time of the loss occurring.240  
1.3.3.1 Invalid in earlier decisions 
At common law, an old judgement241 held that a wager policy was void, namely, 
the assured could not recover against the insurer unless he had an interest in 
the subject matter, but such policies could otherwise be put before the courts. 
Despite the frequent use of PPI clauses, the courts would be more favourable to 
a bona fide assured than a wagerer. In equity, it was held as certain law that an 
insurance policy, in which the assured had no insurable interest, of course 
including a PPI policy, was void 242  and it had this effect from the very 
beginning.243 The ground for this decision was that insurance was made for 
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encouraging the advancement of trade, rather than for persons, who had no 
interest making wagers, to gain a benefit. This decision seemed to represent 
the opinions of courts of equity.244 In addition, an insurance policy upon goods 
made by the assured, who was not required to prove the interest, was held 
void.245 The Court of Chancery would also tend to decree an insurance policy 
without interest to be cancelled.246 
 
1.3.3.2 Valid period 
Unfortunately, later courts were favourable to the validity of wager policies by 
insurance. There has been abundant evidence to prove the enforceability of 
wager policies by insurance at common law insofar as what was well 
established by the authorities, and this was stated by Chambre J:247  
“particularly by the law of England as it stood at the time of passing 
the act 19 Geo. 2, a wager policy, in which the parties by express 
terms, such as the words “interest or no interest,” or “without proof of 
interest,” disclaimed the intention of making a contract of indemnity, 
was then (contrary to older determinations) deemed a valid contract 
of insurance” 
In particular, prior to the eighteenth century, in relation to some cases at 
common law, such as Jones v Randall248 and Micklefield v Hepgin,249 the courts 
would totally enforce gambling contracts under the pretence of insuring,250 as 
long as they were not falling within certain restrictions. It was also held in 
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Depaba v Ludlow that a policy with the term “interest or no interest” was a good 
one, and the significance of such terms was that the assured did not have to 
prove his interest, because the insurer could not controvert that.251 In fact, prior 
to passing the 1745 MIA, the validity of wager contracts and of those in the 
guise of insurance under English law was the same: they were enforceable 
contracts unless they did contravene public interest.252 In the case of Dean v 
Dicker, 253 an insurance policy having “interest or no interest” clauses written on 
the face of it was held as a wager and the plaintiff was entitled to recover since 
he had entered into a wager policy with the insurer on the basis of a total loss in 
the course of the voyage and this is what had happened. It could be inferred 
from this case that the courts would deal with wager policies and pure wagers 
and such policies were enforceable. The common law afterwards required the 
assured to show a loss to invalidate insurance by way of wagering; however, 
PPI terms were inappropriately used to evade the requirement of indemnity.254 
 
Because of merchants being able to benefit from such policies, PPI policies 
were widely used in the practice of insurance:255 in the time of Charles II, such 
policies were common in marine insurance practice; and they were also 
deemed to be valid and legal in the reign of Queen Anne.256 Wager policies 
then had not been prohibited by common law, the insurance companies would 
therefore not bother to inquire about the existence of insurable interest and 
issue such policies taking the advantage of the legal position to get much more 
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profit. In return, because wager policies could bring the practice of insurance 
more benefits and, to a large extent convenience, the courts tended to enforce 
such policies.257 Because of the above reasons, contrary to common sense, 
such contracts therefore became legal at last.258  
 
1.3.3.3 Intentions of parties to contracts affecting validity. 
However, the purpose of the parties to a wager policy by insurance would 
influence the validity of such a policy. If the parties really intended to lay a 
wager of winning or losing the stake, then such a policy would not be held void 
by showing this purpose of making a wager and they would not be regarded as 
being an indemnity contract and  not ruled by the principle of indemnity. This is 
because PPI policies on marine risks were in general valid at common law 
before the 1745 MIA.259 Despite the effect of the Act, a pure wager on marine 
risks, rather than one in the guise of marine insurance, was valid because 
wagers were valid until the 1845 GA. The assured thus needed not to prove its 
interest in the subject matter and the insurer would not be allowed to controvert 
that.260  By contrast, where it was intended to be an indemnity contract or there 
was no obvious evidence to show it was a wager, it would be regarded as an 
unenforceable policy due to the lack of insurable interest in the subject matter, 
just as was the position of a normal insurance contract. Because, if the policy of 
marine insurance in question was declared to be an indemnity insurance, and 
subject to the indemnity principle, the assured could not recover without 
showing its interest in the subject matter insured to prove its loss. 
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Because of the above analysis, where the insurer rejected a claim by the 
assured under an insurance policy not written with PPI terms but having had no 
insurable interest, neither could the assured be entitled to recover by bringing 
an action alleging it to be a wager policy. The nature of marine insurance policy 
mattered: if it was held as an indemnity contract and the purpose of the parties 
was deemed to be claiming for a real loss, as a result, the policy could not be 
enforced without the proof of an interest. A judge261  set out that: “a policy 
containing no such clause, disclaiming or dispensing with the proof of interest, 
was to be considered as a contract of indemnity only, upon which the assured 
could never recover without proof of an interest.”  If there was nothing to show 
that a policy was a wager policy, such a policy would be treated as one 
dependent on the requirement for insurable interest. Without showing the 
possession of insurable interest in the subject matter, the action would not be 
maintained and such a policy would be held illegal and void.262 On the other 
hand, by showing the existence of PPI terms in the policy, a PPI policy into 
which PPI terms had been inserted was held as a wager due to the form of the 
policy. 
 
Therefore, for the convenience of a claim, PPI clauses had commonly been 
inserted into wager policies to prove that the purpose of them was to wager 
rather than to get indemnified for a real loss. Without inserting such clauses into 
a policy, the assured could not recover his loss unless an insurable interest was 
proved.263 Although PPI clauses had been improperly used as an instrument of 
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wager for profiting, it was not right to have the view that only wager policy 
tended to use PPI terms.264 Such terms were originally used in circumstances in 
which the assured had a real insurable interest but which was difficult to prove. 
Lawrence J stated the same opinion that, on some occasions other than the 
possession of property, there may be some difficulty in showing that the 
advantages which the assured had insured would have arisen without the 
happening of sea risks. 265  Unfortunately, such terms were however widely 
abused as an instrument to wager.266 
1.3.3.4 Conclusion 
In light of the validity of wager policies at common law, they were then void at 
earlier common law and in contemporaneous equity law. Before the 1745 MIA, 
and later common law, for reasons of facilitating business, men validated wager 
policies of insurance. In spite of the validity, without declaring a wager policy to 
be a wager rather than an indemnity contract, it would be deemed as a normal 
insurance contract and the assured would be required to prove his possession 
of insurable interest in order to recover. Thus, both the 1745 MIA and 
subsequent common law required an assured to have an insurable interest at 
the time of loss for recovery. As to exceptions to the application of the 1745 MIA, 
such as foreign ships, in light of the validity of wagers under the common law, it 
would validate policies on subjects falling with the ambit of exceptions, which 
must include terms dispensing with insurable interest and PPI or like terms.  
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1.4 The relationship between contracts of wager and insurance 
The payments under both contracts of wager and insurance depend on the 
future uncertain event. It is the requirement of insurable interest that 
distinguishes them: for an insurance contract, the assured must have an 
insurable interest in the subject matter of the insurance or such an expectation 
at the time of the contract to avoid it being void, and it must have an interest in 
the subject at the time of loss to prove that it has suffered a loss should the 
matter be destroyed; in comparison, the parties to a wager contract have no 
interest in the contract other than the stake they will win or lose. If a policy is in 
the common form, it will be considered as a policy on interest. But if the face of 
the policy plainly shows it is a wager, it will be a wager.267 Even though the 
policy does not plainly declare it to be a wager, if it can be proved to be one, it is 
still a wager.268 The form of an insurance policy can affect the nature of the 
contract: if it be one declaring itself to be a wager, it will be deemed to be a 
wager contract; whereas if it be in the form of a normal insurance contract, it will 
be regarded as an indemnity policy of insurance. Even though the assured has 
a real insurable interest, the form of the PPI policy will result in the invalidity of 
such a policy. 
1.4.1 Definition of insurance contracts 
1.4.1.1 Various definitions 
It is acknowledged that it is not easy to give a precise definition of an insurance 
contract.269 In English law, no comprehensive definition has been given.270 A 
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helpful working definition of indemnity insurance 271 was however provided by 
Channell J as follows: “a contract of insurance is one whereby the assured pays 
some consideration (usually the premium) to recover a sum of money or for 
some corresponding benefit, which becomes due on the happening of an event 
having the nature of uncertainty and adverse to the interest of the person 
effecting the insurance.”272  
 
A definition of indemnity insurance was also given by Sir Peter Webster in a 
case273 concerning fire insurance, that: 
“it is an agreement by the insurer to confer on the insured a 
contractual right which, prima facie, comes into existence 
immediately when loss is suffered by the happening of an event 
insured against, to be put by the insurer into the same position in 
which the insured would have been had the event not occurred, but 
in no better position.” 
 
The definition, similar to the definition provided by Channell J, noticed that a 
contract of insurance was an agreement by the insurer to promise to pay the 
assured on the occurrence of certain events insured. Besides, the nature of 
insurance contracts, which were kinds of indemnity insurance, was also 
mentioned: the assured could only be put “into the same position in which the 
insured would have been had the event not occurred, but in no better position.” 
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The requirement of insurable interest was nevertheless discussed by this 
definition. 
 
According to an early publication, “a policy on insurance is a contract between A 
and B that upon A’s paying a premium equivalent to the hazard run, B will 
indemnify or insure him against a particular event.”274 Some have suggested 
that contracts of insurance could be defined as “a contract for the payment of a 
sum of money, or for some corresponding benefits, to become due on the 
happening of an uncertain event of a character adverse to the interest of the 
person effecting the insurance”.275 The latter was a better concept, because 
insurance against what type of particular event was not particularly mentioned 
by the former. 
 
The definition of insurance was in general set out by a French author, which 
meant a contract by which one party to the contract, by paying the consideration 
(the premium), aimed to get indemnified against loss arising from the fortuitous 
accidents insured against to which something is exposed; the other party to the 
contract charged himself with the premium as the price of perils and was bound 
to compensate such loss.276 Insurable interest was also not required by this 
definition. 
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Lawrence J 277  summarised that a contract of insurance, in which no 
requirement of insurable interest was mentioned, could be defined as:  
“a contract by which the one party in consideration of a price paid to him 
adequate to the risk, becomes security to the other that he shall not suffer 
loss, damage, or prejudice by the happening of the perils specified to 
certain things which may be exposed to them.” 
1.4.1.2 Three requisites of an insurance contract 
In general, to become a contract of insurance, three main elements must be 
satisfied: promising to pay the premium, an uncertain event, such event 
characteristic of being against the assured’s insurable interest.278 
 
In the first place, commonly, the assured should pay the premium, which is 
calculated by referring to risk, as the consideration for the insurer’s obligation to 
indemnify the loss. The first requirement in a contract of insurance considered 
by Channell J was that “a contract whereby for some consideration, usually but 
not necessarily for periodical payments called premiums, you secure to yourself 
some benefit, usually but not necessarily the payment of a sum of money, upon 
the happening of some event”.279 However, the requirement of a premium has 
not been mentioned by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(FiSMA), 280  which is intended to supervise and regulate the effecting and 
carrying out, as principal, of an insurance contract.281 An insurance company 
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under the earlier law was supposed to have a profit motive,282 but nevertheless 
under common law friendly societies could indeed carry on insurance 
business.283 The promise which the insurer has made is to indemnify money or 
corresponding benefits, and more specifically for the latter, reinstating or 
replacing damaged or lost property.284 
 
Secondly, the event should be characteristic of some amount of uncertainty.285 
In the case of indemnity insurance contracts, the insurer must, under his 
obligation, compensate the assured on the occurrence of the future uncertain 
event. Therefore, an insurance contract cannot be held valid which is 
dependent on a certain event occurring or an event having occurred, other than 
a policy containing the “lost or not lost” clause,286 before effecting the insurance 
contract.  
 
Last but not least, in the marine context, most importantly, the insurance must 
be against something.287 In other words, a loss or detriment of the insurable 
interest possessed by the assured in the subject matter would have taken place. 
Buckley admitted that, in the cases of indemnity insurance, it was definitely 
necessary to see “whether there has occurred an event adverse to the person 
who is insured, such as that, having suffered a loss by reason of that adverse 
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event, he is to be indemnified by the sum which is guaranteed to him under the 
policy”. 288  Such risks were regarded as one of the determining factors for 
defining a contract of insurance.289 Transfer of risk was clearly mentioned in 
Arnould: “A true contract of insurance is one under which, for some 
consideration, the policyholder secures to himself some benefit upon the 
happening of an uncertain event beyond his own control and adverse to his 
interests by transferring some or all of the risk to the insurers”.290 There was 
therefore no insurance if no risk was transferred from the assured to the insured. 
Waller J thus stated that a contract under which a broker was authorized to 
accept risks in the person of an underwriter by binding authorities was clearly 
not a contract of insurance, as no risk had been transferred by the assured to 
the underwriter under such a contract.291 
1.4.2 Concept of a wager contract  
1.4.2.1 Wagering contract defined 
Hawkins J gave the concept of a wagering contract in Carlill v Carbolic Smoke 
Ball Company, 292  although he conceded that there was difficulty to define 
precisely a contract of wager and to distinguish a wager from an ordinary 
contract. He stated that: 
“A wagering contract is one by which two persons, professing to hold 
opposite views touching the issue of a future uncertain event, mutually 
agree that, dependent on the determination of that event, one shall win from 
the other, and the other shall pay… a sum of money…; neither of the 
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contracting parties having any other interest in that contract than the sum or 
stake he will so win or lose…”. 
From the above concept, it seemed that, to constitute a wager contract, four 
essential factors must be fulfilled as follows. First, the issue of a future uncertain 
event would decide which party to a wager shall win the stake. The winning or 
losing of each party was uncertain, because it was dependent on the issue of a 
future uncertain event. It thus was not a wagering contract due to the certainty 
of either of the parties’ winning or losing; namely, if either or both of the parties 
were sure to win or lose, it was not a wager contract.293  Secondly, it was 
necessary for a wager that each party shall either win or lose. 294 Thirdly, the 
common purpose to wager by two parties to a wager, or mutuality of intent as to 
hazard, rather than to an indemnity contract, was indispensable to the definition 
of a wager contract.295 Mutuality of wagering should thus be entailed in the 
concept of a wager contract.296 If one party desired to make a wagering contract 
whereas the other did not, such a contract would then not be regarded as a 
wager contract, but nevertheless be deemed as having no difference with an 
ordinary contract, where appropriate, which was enforceable by law.297 Fourthly, 
in a wager contract, neither party had an interest in the subject matter of the 
wager other than the stake he shall win or lose.  
 
An example of a bet on a horse-race as a pure wager contract was recited by 
Hawkins J to explain the above elements of a wager. A had a bet with B, who 
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offered odds of ten to one, for £100 to win the Derby. Before the race was over, 
the outcome of the horse-race was uncertain, which was the first element of a 
wager. Before that, B may lose £1000, or win £100, and A may lose £100, or 
win £1000; but each must be a winner or a loser in the event, which satisfied 
the first element of the above concept. In such a bet, like the third element 
mentioned above, both parties had clearly known the nature and intention of his 
engagement, viz. there was mutuality in the bet contract, which was the second 
element. Lastly, neither party had an interest in the horse wagered on, other 
than the stake it shall win or lose. 
1.4.2.2 What kind of interest do the parties to a wager contract have? 
As to the essential elements of a wagering contract, more attention should be 
paid to insurable interest, in relation to the definition of a wagering contract, for 
it is deemed to provide “a dividing line between gambling and insurance”.298 
Interest nevertheless was not mentioned in detail by Hawkins J, although this 
was mentioned in his definition and in the above example, which reflected his 
whole definition. In other words, the nature of the interest required above was 
unclear: a statutory insurable interest or an interest to prove loss. So far as the 
above definition was concerned, the interest may be “any other interest in that 
contract” of the contracting parties, not the type of insurable interest which one 
or both of the parties may have in the property of the wagering object, because 
the proprietary interest was not the interest mentioned in the definition of a 
wagering contract. The subject matter of a wagering agreement was the future 
uncertain destiny of the property, not the property itself. 
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1.4.2.3 The concept of a wager policy 
Before the 1845 GA, the validity of a pure wager and wager policy is different. It 
is thus necessary, except for the above definition of a wager contract, to define 
a wager policy. The definition of a wager (or honour) policy may be given from 
two aspects: the form and the nature of such a policy. As to the form, as long as 
PPI clauses appear on the face of the policy, it will be vitiated by such clauses 
and rendered void. The following typical clauses may be expressly stipulated on 
the face of it: “interest or no interest” or “without further proof of interest than the 
policy itself” or “this policy to be deemed sufficient proof of interest”, or “free of 
all average and without benefit of salvage to the insurer”.299 In fact, it will be 
deemed as a PPI clause as long as it has the effect of dispensing with proof of 
insurable interest. Relating to the nature of a wager policy, the parties to it must 
intend to make a wager rather than an indemnity contract:300 it is taken out to 
win the stake or money instead of recovering the loss. 
1.4.2.4 Conclusion 
To be a wager contract, the four elements discussed above must be satisfied. 
The parties to a wager contract have no interest in the subject wagered on, 
whereas, even though generally the parties to a wager policy also tend to have 
no interest, in some situations they do indeed have an insurable interest in the 
subject matter insured. Thus, to constitute a wager contract, it is not necessary 
to require that the parties have no interest in the subject other than the stake to 
win or lose, whereas it is enough to be a wager contract where the parties 
mutually agree to make a wager on a subject dependent on the outcome of a 
future uncertain event, as a result of which each party shall either win or lose. 
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1.4.3 Similarity between contracts of insurance and wager 
1.4.3.1 Insurance deriving from wager 
There was a close connection between wager and insurance. From the 
perspective of the historical study, insurance, which was an instrument used to 
avoid risk, paradoxically evolved to a considerable extent from wagers. 301 
Actually, insurance itself was even made a type of wager:302 “Much insurance in 
the eighteenth century was indeed underwritten on purely speculative 
contingencies such as the outcome of sieges, the timing of births, and 
especially the longevity of individuals.”303 In the life insurance context, it was 
argued that insurance on life “was still a form of lottery, because insurance 
consists essentially of wagering on contingent events”. 304  Furthermore, 
according to a statistical analysis, during the period from 1759 to 1773, a total of 
52 life insurance policies were effected by an underwriter, some of which were 
pure wagers and eight of which were wager policies by insurance.305 Wager in 
the guise of insurance thus quickly became an established feature of the 
practice of insurance. 
1.4.3.2 Grounds for deeming wager policies as insurance 
In the eighteenth century, before the 1774 LAA was passed, wager policies in 
the form of insurance were often, for a time, regarded as a serious method of 
insurance. Defoe illustrated this view that a wager policy, which was previously 
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identified as a form of gambling, had now switched sides and become a type of 
insurance.306 It should not be surprising, for the following two reasons, to find 
that these two kinds of contracts were often conflated and confused.307  
 
In the first place, according to the above definitions of insurance contracts and 
wager contracts, there was indeed a similarity between the two contracts, 
because both of them required the consideration of a promise to pay a sum of 
money dependent upon a future uncertain event.308 Specifically, both of them 
had to satisfy the following three elements: (1) A mutual agreement between the 
parties that according to the issue of a future uncertain event, one shall receive 
from the other a sum of money; (2) the necessity that each party shall either win 
or lose; (3) mutuality of intent as to hazard, although the purpose of making the 
two contracts was different because insurance was intended to recover 
whereas a wager aimed to win a stake.309 Therefore, a mere wager contract 
might become a contract of insurance if the assured could prove he had an 
insurable interest in the subject matter, 310  which was the key factor in 
distinguishing these two classes of contracts. 
 
Secondly, the reasons were that both contracts of insurance and wager were 
often dealt with by insurance companies. 311  In the eighteenth century, the 
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business of insurance routinely handled various pure wagers and wager policies: 
“bets on the movement of stocks and the outcome of battles, the possibility of 
shipwrecks, and the hour of people’s deaths”.312 The reasons why insurance 
offices had taken out wager policies were that “the sporting part of insurance … 
is almost as considerable as the [insurance of real property]; and is on the 
whole much more profitable”.313 On the other hand, the grounds why wager 
contracts availed themselves of insurance were that more chances of 
speculative contingencies could be furnished by the tool of insurance314 and the 
English law was reluctant to invalidate the contracts of insurance, especially, life 
insurance.315 Besides, by means of insurance, wager policies could obtain an 
extremely good reputation.316 
1.4.4 Distinction between insurance and wagers 
1.4.4.1 Insurable interest 
1.4.4.1.1 Insurable interest is a key factor to distinguish a wager from an insurance 
contract 
Both contracts of insurance and wager were aleatory ones,317 although Lord 
Summer agreed that a wager contract was an aleatory contract whereas a 
marine insurance contract was an indemnity one under which the assured must 
prove possession of an insurable interest at the time of loss.318 Notwithstanding 
the dispute, both included three elements of the concept of wager contracts 
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summarized by Patterson319 other than the factor of insurable interest. Insurable 
interest had a significant effect on the distinction between contracts of insurance 
and wagers, 320  which provided “a dividing line between gambling and 
insurance”. 321  Colman QC regarded it as an essential feature of a wager 
contract that neither party had any interest in the subject matter wagered on 
except for the stake to be won or lost.322 In the case of O’Kane v Jones,323 it 
was contended that the introduction of the concept of insurable interest was 
intended to distinguish “legitimate” contracts of insurance from gaming and 
wagering contracts. In the indemnity insurance context, the reason why the 
assured took out a contract of insurance was to avoid the risk of loss adverse to 
the insurable interest possessed by the assured in the subject matter and to 
protect such an interest.324  
 
The future uncertain event must be adverse to the assured’s insurable interest, 
otherwise the assured would never be exposed to the risk of loss by perils of 
the sea and the insurer may have to return the premium because there would 
be no consideration for the premium.325 By comparison, none of the parties to 
wager contracts had any interest in the subject other than the sum wagered. 
Due to the lack of insurable interest, a wager could never become a contract of 
insurance. As to the risk of a wager arising from the concluding of wagering 
contracts, the only risk of loss is that the sum or money wagered would not get 
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paid.326 Thus, a contract without an insurable interest or an expectation of such 
an interest would be deemed to be an invalid wager. In a word, insurable 
interest was of high importance in distinguishing insurance from wagers. The 
fact of the assured having an insurable interest may transfer a pure wager into 
an insurance contract. In fact, as long as the assured had an insurable interest 
in the subject matter, the contract was an insurance contract rather than a 
wager, even on the occasion where the interest was overvalued, unless there 
were PPI clauses on the face of it.327 Contrastingly, a contract without it could 
only be regarded as a wager.328  
1.4.4.1.2 A middle kind of interest not necessarily meaning an insurable interest 
There was thus a necessity to prove that the assured had an insurable interest 
to support the validity of the policy. It was argued that the existence of an 
insurable interest was of itself proved as long as the policy was not a wager 
because in such a case the assured had an interest in the subject insured which 
was sufficient to prevent it being a wager and so amount to an insurable interest. 
There may thus be a dispute as to whether an interest sufficient to prevent a 
policy being a wager meant an insurable interest or whether the existence of an 
insurable interest could be fulfilled by the absence of a wager contract. It was 
on this basis that all contracts for the payment of money on the happening of a 
future uncertain event could only be divided into two types: wagers without an 
interest and insurance contracts with an insurable interest.329 For example, a 
dictum of Anthony Colman QC stated that “Neither the words of any statute 
                                                          
326
 Rober Merkin, Insurance Law: An Introduction (1st edn, Informa Law from Routledge 2007) 
chapters 1, 7 
327
 Glafki Shipping Co SA v Pinios Shipping Co No 1, The Maira (No 2) [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 660, 
667 
328
 Prudential Insurance Co v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1904] 2 KB 658 
329
 Jonathan Gilman, Robert Merkin , Mr M J Templeman, Claire Blanchard, Julian Cooke, 
Philippa Hopkins, Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance (18th Revised edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 
11-01 
105 
 
since 1845 nor any judicial pronouncement suggest that there should be a 
category of contracts of insurance which were not wagering contracts but which 
on account of the absence of an “insurable interest” should not be 
enforceable.”330 Due to the confusing position, in the case where the question 
whether the assured has an insurable interest in the subject matter of insurance 
arose, it may be wrongly argued that there was an insurable interest because 
the policy was not a wager one or the other party did not contend that the policy 
was not a wager one.331  
 
The dictum was however disapproved of by the Court of Appeal in the Feasey 
case: an interest which was sufficient to preclude a policy being a wager and 
could take a policy out of the realms of the 1845 GA did not necessarily amount 
to an insurable interest. In reality, there were some kinds of interest which could 
prevent a policy being a wager but nonetheless was not sufficient to be an 
insurable interest. In the case of Macaura, even though Summer LJ confessed 
that the assured would sustain a loss due to the loss of timber caused by fire, 
he still held that, because the timber was the company’s assets, the relationship 
between the assured and the timber in question was thus not one recognised by 
law or in equity.332 In this case, even though the interest in question was that 
the assured suffered a pecuniary loss caused by the loss of the insured timber 
and it could preclude the policy being a wager, it was not an insurable interest. 
It was submitted that there was a middle interest which could preclude a policy 
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being a wager but however not amount to an insurable interest.333 The middle 
interest may include an economic interest or pecuniary interest, i.e. whatever 
the nature of the interest, the assured would benefit from the preservation of the 
property or be prejudiced by its loss or damage, which was not an insurable 
interest in the past although it is now recognised as one type of an insurable 
interest. Thus, when to test whether an insurable interest existed, the starting 
point should focus on the existence of an insurable interest or the relationship 
between the assured and the property insured rather than prove the absence of 
a wager. 334 
1.4.4.1.3 The mere expectation of future benefit sufficient to prevent a wager 
The mere expectation of an insurable interest rather than a valid or actual 
insurable interest was sufficient to prevent an insurance being a wager.335 In 
Buchanan v Faber,336 a mere expectation of obtaining future rights dependent 
on the preservation of the property insured against which was not a real 
insurable interest was held sufficient to take the assured out of the realms of a 
wager, where such an expectation arose from the fact that he would in future 
make a contract by which in the case of the preservation he would benefit. A 
contract of marine insurance in which the assured had no real insurable interest 
at the time of concluding the contract was thus not necessarily void under s 
4(2)(a) under the 1906 MIA. However, the mere hope of a future relationship to 
the subject matter insured was insufficient to prevent a policy being a wager.337 
Thus, it was the relationship that the assured could in future benefit from the 
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property rather than of only a future relationship that could distinguish insurance 
from a wager. 
1.4.4.2 The intentions of the parties  
The objects or intentions of contracts of insurance and wager were deemed to 
be the substantial factor in distinguishing these two kinds of contracts, which 
were similar in form. 338  Blackburn, J. stated that the distinction between 
contracts of insurance and wager was that insurance aimed “to indemnify the 
insured in respect of some interest which he has against the perils which he 
contemplates it will be liable to”.339 The parties to a wager contract did not aim 
to protect an interest, because neither of the parties had any other interest in 
that contract other than the sum at stake he will win or lose340 which was the 
essential feature of a wager, 341 whereas the purpose of the assured was to 
protect his interest in the subject matter insured by claiming for the loss suffered 
from the perils insured against. 342 The party taking out an insurance policy was 
thus attempting to get indemnified in the case of sustaining loss which would be 
suffered upon the occurrence of perils insured against,343 while the purpose of a 
wagerer was nonetheless to benefit from a wager or just to win a stake.  
 
In light of these distinguishable intentions, they were thus beneficial for 
differentiating the two types of contracts. In addition, without such a clear 
distinction, the insurer would be given an unfair disadvantage. In the words of 
Mansfield CJ, “unless there were words to distinguish wagering from other 
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policies, there would be a great disadvantage to the underwriters. On a 
wagering policy, there is no salvage, no abandonment, no return of premium for 
short interest; it is the interest of the insured that the ship should be lost: but it is 
the contrary on a policy on interest; there is salvage, there is an abandonment, 
there is a return of premium for short interest; there it is usually the interest of 
the merchant to labour for the safety of the vessel”.344  
  
Now back to the issue as to how to distinguish a wager and an insurance 
contract. The courts’ attitudes were that in order to enforce a wager policy by 
insurance, the policy must expressly state that there was no requirement for the 
assured to own or demonstrate an insurable interest in the assured subject.345 A 
policy in the normal form would be deemed to be an indemnity one and 
accordingly the assured was required to show the possession of insurable 
interest. Where one party to the policy argued it to be a wager policy to 
dispense with the necessity of proof of interest, the argument would be rejected 
unless PPI terms appeared on the face of it. Various forms of PPI policies were 
commonly written on the face of the policy to demonstrate it was just a mere 
wager, and if be true, there was no necessity of proof of interest. Since there 
were some similarities between contracts of insurance and wager, it was 
necessary to show what kinds of policy it belonged to on the face of the policy. 
A wagering policy and a policy on interest were contracts of different nature. To 
be a wager policy, there must be express PPI terms on the face of the policy to 
prove the wagering intention, which if lacking would be otherwise treated as an 
indemnity policy and the assured must then prove its insurable interest in the 
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subject matter insured. Nonetheless, should a contract be intended to be one of  
wager, no PPI terms had been written in the contract, namely it was an 
insurance contract in the common form, the assured then could not recover if no 
interest could be demonstrated.346 It was based on the fact that if nothing on the 
contrary showed that the contract was a wager, it would be deemed as an 
indemnity contract made on interest.347  
1.4.4.3 Different origins of risks 
Because under a contract of wager neither party had an interest on the 
happening of the future uncertain fortuity, except for the sum to be won or lost, 
nor was there any real consideration for making such a contract, 348 the contract 
thus of itself created a risk of loss which did not exist prior to the concluding of 
the contract. The risk of loss thus was only from the contract itself: if the 
contracting parties had not taken out such a wager, they could never put 
themselves at risk of losing a stake. By creating such a risk, in order to win the 
stake, evil resulted, just as was pointed out in the preamble of the 1745 MIA: 
bringing about moral hazards, encouraging the carrying on of many prohibited 
and clandestine trades and the introduction of “a mischievous kind of gaming, 
under pretence of insuring against the risk on shipping and fair trade”.349 By 
contrast, the risk of loss on insured property, intended to be transferred from the 
assured to the insurer by an insurance policy, had existed before the insurance 
contract was taken out.350 In the context of indemnity insurance, the risk of loss 
was derived from the sufficiently close relationship between the assured and the 
insured subject matter, which could amount to an insurable interest, and such 
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an interest was not dependent on the conclusion of the insurance contract. 
Valid insurance was thus an effective method to avoid risk of loss by the perils 
insured against and to improve the economic prospect.  
1.4.4.4 A future held event or not 
There may be a difference between the two types of contracts on the nature of 
the event as to the question as to whether it must be a future event which could 
not be within the hold of parties. By and large, wager contracts could not be 
made upon future events which could be within the control of either of the 
parties. 351 However, in some cases, wagers could also be made upon an event 
which had happened and could be decided by either party to the wager.352 For 
the former, a horserace “already run” could be made the subject of a wager.353 
For the latter, a wager between A and B could be made upon whether A would 
wear a red tie tomorrow.354  
 
By contrast, the case in insurance was different. The insurance contracts must 
be taken out on future events which could not be within the hold of the parties. 
The grounds were that the purpose of an insurance contract was to avert risk of 
loss caused by the perils insured against which was adverse to the assured’s 
interest. Had the outcome of the insured event happened, the contract in 
question could not be deemed to be an insurance contract because the risk did 
not exist at the outset of the contract which had occurred.355  An insurance 
contract made upon a certain event was thus impossible to exist since the 
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occurrence of an event must have the nature of uncertainty. If the event had 
already occurred, the assured possibly needed not to insure his interest, which 
was a waste of a premium where the risk of loss which happened was outside 
the coverage by the insurer; conversely, the insurer would not accept such an 
insurance contract, because they would be given an unfair disadvantage from 
which there may be no possibility of benefiting. Due to insurance not being able 
to be made on the outcome of a certain event, neither party should totally 
control the outcome of an insurance event to prevent putting an unfair 
disadvantage on either party.  
Chapter 2 Provisions of the 1906 MIA356 on Insurable Interest  
The 1906 MIA codified two thousand cases357 and it did not try to create new 
principles of marine insurance. Although its provisions, where appropriate, apply 
to insurance contracts on other subject matters,358 insurable interest is one of 
the few areas limited in its effect to marine insurance. That is because the terms 
of s 4 and s 5 plainly provide that: the former states that a contract of “marine” 
insurance is void if the assured cannot meet the requirement of having an 
insurable interest at the outset of the contract; and s 5 provides that, broadly 
speaking, an assured has an insurable interest if it is interested in the “marine” 
adventure.  
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2.1 Necessity of insurable interest 
2.1.1 The principle of indemnity requiring insurable interest 
The requirement of insurable interest is governed in two different ways by s 4 
and s 6 of the 1906 MIA. 359  Except for insurable interest, most the Act’s 
regulations apply to other forms of non-marine indemnity insurance. 360  The 
marine insurance contract is one which aims to let the assured get indemnified 
from the insurer on the occurrence of agreed marine losses;361 this shows it is a 
type of indemnity insurance. 362  As to such an indemnity insurance, the 
contractual principle of indemnity must be satisfied: in order to make a valid 
claim, the assured must suffer a loss caused by the perils insured against and 
cannot recover beyond the amount of loss which he has sustained. In order to 
prove he has suffered loss, the assured thus needs to show that he has 
possessed an interest at the date of the loss.363 Should the assured have no 
insurable interest in the subject matter of insurance, then no loss will be 
suffered by him, insurance will thus become a tool for benefits364 and he cannot 
recover from a claim raised from such a contract because the insurer will 
effectively defend himself by averring no insurable interest exists.365 Insurable 
interest must therefore be required by “one who on his own account would 
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attempt to enforce a contract of marine insurance”.366 The purpose of insurance 
is to put the assured, after the loss, in the same circumstances as before the 
loss. Insurance thus is a tool to indemnify the assured in the case of loss, not to 
benefit from making a claim. Insurable interest is thus required as a 
fundamental principle of marine insurance. 
2.1.2 The insurer will have a good defence to the assured without insurable interest 
Anthony Colman QC referred to the origins and purpose of the requirement for 
an insurable interest, and in accordance with his reference, the principle was a 
useful means to ban invalid claims and wagering contracts. 367  It is thus 
beneficial to put the insurer in a fair advantageous position. In Anderson v 
Morice, the plaintiff, the assured, purchased a cargo of rice from a vendor in 
Rangoon and insured the cargo “at and from Rangoon.” While loading at 
Rangoon, the Sunbeam which was chartered for shipping the cargo sank after 
the larger portion of the cargo was shipped whilst the remaining cargo was in 
lighters alongside. The insurer defended him on the basis that the assured had 
no insurable interest in the cargo before the delivery of the whole cargo had 
been completed, because until then, no cargo was ever at his risk. The court 
held that the plaintiff could not recover the loss. This was because, under the 
sale contract, the plaintiff bore no risk at any time until the loading was 
complete368 and therefore had no insurable interest in the cargo before that time. 
This decision was affirmed when an appeal was raised before the House of 
Lords, where the opinion as to the issue of whether the assured had an 
insurable interest of the Lords was equally divided.369 
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2.2 Avoidance of wagering or gaming contracts 
2.2.1 Brief history of insurable interest 
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, at common law, a contract of marine 
insurance without insurable interest, which was in effect a wagering contract, 
could be enforced, save for some exceptions. 370  When considering the 
submissions in The Moonacre,371 Anthony Colman QC stated such situations 
where an assured with no interest could enforce a contract of marine insurance 
in the first half of the eighteenth century: “that is to say even if he stood neither 
to lose nor to gain from the success or failure of the adventure or the loss or 
survival of the insured property. These contracts were in substance wagering 
contracts.” In order to be enforceable, some wager policies, even some policies 
having a genuine interest, needed to have PPI terms inserted to avoid the 
inconvenience of being considered a contract of indemnity.372 Then, prior to 
1906, four statutes were passed by Parliament to prohibit wagering contracts in 
the form of insurance. 373  In terms of these statues governing indemnity 
insurance, wagering contracts not only in the guise of marine insurance, but 
also all classes of contracts, had been rendered void.374 Thus, after the mid-
nineteenth century, the court would not enforce a wagering contract in the guise 
of insurance unless the assured had an interest in the subject matter insured, 
namely he would stand to suffer a loss caused by the perils insured against, or 
benefit from the safety or due arrival of the insured property. 
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It has been well recognised that insurable interest here has developed to act as 
the hallmark of a valid insurance policy, without which it is a mere wagering 
contract.375 For example, Siberry QC commented that to test if an assured had 
an insurable interest, what should be borne in mind was that “the concept of 
insurable interest was introduced as a means of distinguishing ‘legitimate’ 
contracts of insurance from gaming and wagering contracts”. As for the origin of 
insurable interest, it was thus argued that it had stemmed from the 1745 MIA 
which first distinguished valid marine insurance and wager policies by marine 
insurance by virtue of requiring insurable interest and prohibiting such policies 
on British shipping and their goods.376 It has been argued that it may not have 
been the case that insurable interest was not required until the passage of the 
1745 MIA. The reason was that, before the enactment of the 1745 MIA, English 
law had recognised that, under indemnity contracts, the assured must have an 
interest in order to procure a legitimate insurance contract. For example, a case 
in 1711 held that the wagering policy was invalid because the assured 
possessed no interest in the subject matter.377 However, that argument may not 
be right. The interest mentioned in the above argument may be one for the 
indemnity principle rather than for the requirement of insurable interest. The 
position was thus probably still unclear, for the nature and ambit of the interest 
under the two doctrines may not be the same. It thus may not be the case to 
hold the view that common law requiring the assured to have an interest in 
essence imposed an insurable interest requirement on the assured. 
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2.2.2 Wagering contracts by marine insurance unenforceable 
2.2.2.1 Wagering policies void 
Section 4(1) of the Act provides that every contract of marine insurance by way 
of gaming or wagering is avoidable. Subject to this provision, the courts will not 
enforce a deemed wager policy which will be one, as having been described in 
s 4(2), effected by the assured who cannot satisfy the requirement of insurable 
interest. An insurable interest thus is “indispensable to one who on his own 
account would attempt to enforce a contract of marine insurance”.378 The effect 
of this section seems to reproduce the relevant provisions of the 1745 MIA and 
the 1845 GA. The former for the first time avoids marine policies on British ships 
and their cargos either by way of gaming or wagering or with PPI clauses, 
“whether in fact they are wagering policies or not”.379 Even if the assured has a 
genuine insurable interest, contrary to the Act, for instance, termed with PPI 
clauses on the face of the policy, the policy would be void. As a result of the 
effect of the 1745 MIA, the statute requires that the assured has to prove its 
insurable interest in the subject matter and should not take out PPI policies. On 
the other hand, it is suggested that s 4 of the 1906 MIA has made two changes 
to the 1745 MIA relating to the applicable subject matters and areas.380 First, 
the 1745 MIA provides that it does merely apply to British ships or cargos and 
does not extend to foreign vessels.381 By contrast, a policy will be within s 4 of 
the 1906 MIA as long as it is one of marine insurance by way of gaming or 
wagering. Secondly, wager polices by way of insurance against marine risks 
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were legal at common law in Ireland despite the 1745 MIA having been 
enacted.382 In the case of Keith v Protection Mar Ins Co of Paris,383 the Irish 
court held that the 1745 MIA did not apply to Ireland by the Irish Act, 21 & 22 
Geo. 3 c.48 whereas s 4 of the 1906 MIA is now extended to Ireland under 
which a wagering policy is currently void. The 1845 GA indirectly rendered all 
wager policies in the form of various insurance void by requiring an interest 
possessed by the assured, under which the expectation of benefiting from the 
insured property may nevertheless be sufficient to prevent the policy being a 
wager. 
2.2.2.2 Two classes of insurance policies 
A wager policy of insurance may be deemed to be an insurance contract. Lord 
Mansfield was of the opinion that, considering their similar form, insurance 
policies could be divided into two types, at the time when wager policies were 
popular. One kind was insurance of indemnity, like marine insurance; the other 
was wager policies in the guise of insurance, with which s 4 of the 1906 MIA 
was concerned.384 
 
As far as s 4(2) of the 1906 MIA is concerned, wager policies furthermore have 
been divided into two types: the first one relates to a marine insurance contract 
where the assured has no insurable interest in the subject matter or has no 
expectation of acquiring one; 385 the second type concerns the policy written on 
the face of it containing PPI clauses which do not require the assured to prove 
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he has an interest.386 Section 4(2)(b) of the 1906 MIA makes it clearer that it 
applies to policies including “any other like PPI term” than the terms of s 1 of the 
1745 MIA which has the same effect but nonetheless is a little ambiguous.387   
 
It seems that under s 4(2)(a) the assured can be deemed not to have entered  a 
wagering contract as long as the assured has an insurable interest or an 
expectation of acquiring one, even though the policy has PPI or like terms. On 
the other hand, according to s 4(2)(b), the policy will be considered to be a 
wagering one on the appearance of PPI or like terms in the policy, even though 
the assured has a genuine insurable interest or a real expectation. The latter 
shall be correct. It has been suggested that PPI terms or any other like terms 
dispensing with the necessity of proof of interest will vitiate the policy even 
though it is manifest that it is not a wagering contract and the assured has a real 
interest. 388  It has thus been submitted that a policy made by the assured 
possessing an insurable interest is a valid one unless it contains PPI terms.389 
Bankes LJ for this purpose suggested that the subsection was in effect intended 
to deal with the problem that, rather than whether the assured had a real 
insurable interest, certain insurance policies covering marine risks prevented 
the insurer from inquiring about the question as to whether the assured had an 
insurable interest. His Lordship thus drew the conclusion that s 4(2)(b) in fact 
referred to the form of the policy, as a result of which the policy subject to PPI 
terms or like ones would be made void as a gaming or wagering contract of 
marine insurance under s 4, even though the assured had a real insurable 
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interest in the subject matter of the policy.390 In other words, a prima facie 
wager policy in the form of marine insurance tainted by PPI terms cannot be 
turned into a valid one by reason of the existence of a true insurable interest. 
2.2.2.3 The first class of wager policies without interest 
2.2.2.3.1 Deemed to be a gaming or wagering contract 
The terms are that a policy without interest and with PPI clauses “is deemed to” 
be rather than is a gaming or wagering contract. To be a real wager contract, 
four elements must be fulfilled: mutual intention to wager, the outcome of a 
future uncertain event, one party having to win or lose and having no interest. 
Willes J dissenting from the rest of the court thus said that the policy in question 
could not be a gaming policy unless the mutual intention of the parties to it was 
to wager: “But I cannot think it a gaming policy. It does not appear to me that 
the parties had an idea they were entering into an illegal contract.391” Thus, 
where the assured has no interest and no expectation of obtaining such or has 
inserted PPI clauses into the policy, it is not a real wager unless all four 
elements have been fulfilled. A contract of marine insurance is therefore not 
necessarily to be a wager contract merely because the assured has not had an 
insurable interest in the insured subject. For example, the feature of a wager is 
not fulfilled where, despite lacking insurable interest, the parties to the contract 
have not professed to hold opposite views on the outcome of the future 
uncertain event.392  
 
Therefore, when to decide whether a marine policy can be deemed to be a 
wager one and void for the purpose of s 4, the elements for the definition of a 
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wager contract need not to be considered except for the interest by s 4(2)(a) 
and the appearance of PPI clauses by s 4(2)(b). It may then be correctly said 
that no mutual intention to wager is required for the purpose of s 4(2), i.e. a 
policy may be “deemed” as a wager policy even though the parties to the policy 
have not mutually intended to wager, as long as the assured has no insurable 
interest or the expectation of acquiring such interest and has made a PPI 
policy.393  
 
Here the doctrine of insurable interest is treated as the hallmark of valid 
contracts of insurance differing from void wagering contracts. Policies of 
insurance may be divided into two types by s 4(2): policies of indemnity and 
wagering. A policy having an insurable interest is a normal indemnity one 
whereas it will be deemed to be a wagering policy as long as no interest or PPI 
policies are existing. It is thus not right to say here that a policy cannot be a 
wagering one until the four elements discussed in Chapter one have been 
established. Grounds for this approach may be that the only insurable interest is 
the essential and substantial element of distinguishing indemnity policies from 
wagering policies, not mutuality nor the other elements. 
 
2.2.2.3.2 No insurable interest or no expectation of such one 
A policy will be deemed to be a gaming or wagering policy of insurance against 
marine perils where the assured cannot satisfy the requirement of insurable 
interest. In Kent v Bird,394 a surgeon and a passenger in the same ship made an 
agreement as to whether the ship in question could save her passage to China. 
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The court held that it was a wager policy because both parties to the policy had 
no interest in the case, which was deemed to be a gaming and wagering policy. 
In the case of Lowry v Bordieu,395 the plaintiffs had lent money to the captain of 
a ship, a common bond was therefore given to them. For the security of the 
common bond, the plaintiffs took out a policy from the underwriters, the 
defendant, which was termed as follows: “in case of loss, no other proof of 
interest to be required than the exhibition of the said bond: warranted free from 
average, and without benefit of salvage to the insurer”. After the risk of loss had 
been completely run, the plaintiffs took an action to recover the premium, 
averring that the policy was void due to their lack of interest. Lord Mansfield 
said that the plaintiffs had no interest, which rendered the policy a gaming one 
prohibited by the 1745 MIA, on the ground that “if the ship had been lost, and 
the underwriters had paid, still the plaintiffs would have been intitled to recover 
the amount of the bond from” the captain.  (Ashhurst J concurred with this 
view.)396 Even though the policy was void, the assured nonetheless would not 
be entitled to recover the premium, because it was an executed contract instead 
of an executory one. 397 A sum of money could only be recovered when the 
contract remained executory, 398  whereas it was not recoverable where the 
contract was executed and the risk had been completely run.  
 
Under s 4(2)(a), a policy by way of gaming or wagering, namely a wagering 
policy, is a policy that the assured has no insurable interest, or expectation of 
acquiring one, in the subject matter of the insurance other than the sum to be 
won or lost. Therefore, this subsection is directed only to the assured who has 
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no insurable interest, rather than those who possess an insurable interest but 
have overvalued their interest in the subject. Hobhouse J stated that s 4(2)(a) 
was “opposed to an insurance by someone who does in truth have such an 
interest but merely overvalues it or provides for payments to be made in the 
event of loss which exceed or are likely to exceed the amount of his actual 
loss.”399 
 
Following from s 4(2)(a), a policy taken out without any expectation of insurable 
interest will be held void. Therefore, such an expectation is sufficient to prevent 
a policy being unenforceable. If the assured indeed expects an insurable 
interest at the time of taking out the insurance and finally has not obtained such 
an interest before the loss, the policy will thus be a valid one.400 A policy was 
accordingly held enforceable in which the assured had the hope of acquiring an 
insurable interest even though the expectation failed because of an accident.401 
2.2.2. The second class of PPI policies  
2.2.2.4.1 Useful PPI or honour policies 
The existence of honour policies was recognised by the court, 402 albeit s 4(2)(b) 
now focuses on forbidding PPI policies. 403  In practice, the effect of honour 
policies understood by the insurer is not to cover a mere wager but to protect “at 
least the possible existence of a business interest”, 404 such as advances and 
                                                          
399
 Glafki Shipping Co SA v Pinios Shipping Co No 1, The Maira (No 2) [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 660, 
667 
400
 Jonathan Gilman, Robert Merkin , Mr M J Templeman, Claire Blanchard, Julian 
Cooke, Philippa Hopkins, Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance (18th Revised edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2013) 11-07 
401
 Anderson v Morice (1876) 1 App Cas 713 
402
 Thames & Mersey Mar Ins Co v Gunford Ship Co [1911] AC 529 
403
 Professor Robert M Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 
25-017 
404
 Gedge v Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation [1900] 2 QB 214, 223 
123 
 
disbursements, in the context of a marine insurance policy, which means “any 
interest which is outside the ordinary interests of hull, machinery, cargo, and 
freight”.405 Honour policies have usually been used in two situations.406 The first 
situation is where insurable interest is possessed by the assured; it is 
nevertheless hard for the assured to prove the amount of the interest. 407 
Although PPI policies have strictly been banned by English law, they do not 
necessarily mean that the assured does not have an insurable interest in the 
subject matter insured.408 The other is the situation where there indeed exists 
some business interest, which, however, cannot be regarded as satisfying the 
legal requirement of insurable interest.409 To illustrate this kind of interest, an 
insurance policy on “disbursements” is in the case. A ship whilst on a voyage 
was grounded. After the ship had grounded, the assured effected an insurance 
policy upon disbursements to convey relevant parties’ interests in the 
commission and brokerage. However, the court was not  in favour of the plaintiff 
and held that no insurable interest could be possessed by the assured.410 
2.2.2.4.2 The appearance of PPI terms vitiating the validity 
However, PPI or honour policies were widely used as a tool to wager. Section 
4(2)(b), the effect of which only applies to marine insurance rather than other 
forms of insurance,411 thus aims to render void policies written with PPI terms 
contained in the section. When such terms appear on the face of a marine 
policy, it will be regarded as a gaming or wagering policy, although the assured 
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did not necessarily intend to wager412 or has not satisfied some element of a 
wager contract, which leads “to the irresistible inference that these policies were 
insurances by way of gaming or wagering”.413  In other words, the assured 
cannot make a PPI policy enforceable in a court by arguing that it has a real 
interest. This may be understandable, looked at from the perspective that the 
subsection is designed to prevent the evils arising out of PPI terms but will 
exclude enquiry into the existence of an insurable interest rather than relate to 
whether the assured has a real interest.414 
 
The English law, not just under common law but also in the legislation, took a 
strict view on policies containing PPI terms. Lord Eldon insisted that the 1745 
MIA aimed to prohibit PPI policies which did not need an assured to show his 
interest in the insured subject.415 Under the 1906 MIA, once such terms appear 
on the face of the policy, the assured will also be deemed to have the intention 
of wagering which is contrary to public policy and can bring many evils, and 
consequently, such a policy will definitely be made void.416 McCardie J also said 
that “The subsection constitutes an emphatic condemnation by the Legislature 
of any gaming contract with respect to marine insurance. … So early as 1745 
the Legislature had perceived the evils of gaming contracts of this description 
and had provided a measure of legislation to deal with them.”417  
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2.2.2.4.3 Reasons 
The fact that PPI policies have been contrary to public policy may justify the 
above strict approach by English law. Before the 1745 MIA, the requirement of 
insurable interest was first established as a matter of public policy to prevent 
public problems like mischievous gaming, illegal traffic and making insurance a 
way of profiting. Although the 1906 MIA had repealed the 1745 MIA and 
changed the effect of lack of insurable interest from being illegal to being void, 
the above evils were much the same as when the 1906 MIA was passed. 418 
Bankes LJ expressed such a view that “the making of a PPI policy is against 
public policy” and the reason for the Legislature passing relevant provisions 
concerning wager policies in the 1745 MIA and the 1906 MIA was to prohibit the 
evils occurring under such policies. 419 Parliament then held the view that a PPI 
policy dispensing with proof of interest, which s 4(2)(b) is intended to forbid,420 
had brought many mischiefs and run counter to public policy.  
2.2.2.4.4 The term of “Without benefit of salvage to the insurer” 
The object of s 4(2)(b) relating to the term seems to be directed merely to 
insurance on the subject capable of salvage, not to things incapable of 
salvage.421 “Without benefit of salvage to the insurer” is one such term regarded 
as having a similar effect on a policy as a PPI term.422 Under s 4(2)(b), the 
policy will be regarded as void as long as the term has been expressly stated on 
the face of the policy, despite the assured having a real interest, regardless of 
the intents and purposes of the parties.  
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The exception to the above effect relates to the proviso of s 4(2)(b), which 
states that where there is no possibility of salvage, a policy may be effected 
without benefit of salvage, which could be understood as without benefit of 
abandonment to the insurer. 423 Because the nature of some subjects do not 
allow the assured to abandon the damaged subject to the insurer, a policy 
falling within the proviso does not intend to dispense with proof of insurable 
interest. It had thus been stated “that the want of power to abandon was not a 
certain criterion of insurable interest; that in many cases there might be 
insurable interest without power to abandon, as in the case of freight, bottomry, 
and respondentia”,424 upon which an insurance policy had been taken out by 
the assured who had nothing in the nature of an insured subject matter to 
abandon to the insurer in the event of loss.425 Thus, where the policy provides 
that, in the event of the total loss (actual or constructive), the freight insured 
shall be paid “in full”, this clause does not mean without benefit of salvage.426  
 
2.2.3 The effect of wagering policies on other policies by the same assured on the 
same adventure 
As for the issue as to whether a wagering policy could affect the enforceability 
of other valid policies entered into by the same assured on the same adventure, 
a long dictum was made to make void all policies in question although no other 
direct authority on this issue has been found. 427  In the Gunford case, the 
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agency effecting the insurance for the assured did not disclose to the insurer 
that the hull of the ship had been largely over-insured and that the policy on 
disbursements had contained PPI clauses. Because the agent failed to disclose 
these two facts, the court held that the insurer was entitled to avoid the policy. 
In this case, although the entire ground of defence raised by the appellants was 
non-disclosure, Lord Shaw of Dunfermline made a long dictum which stated that 
all policies shall be void due to the wager policy taken out by the same assured 
on the same adventure based on the following two reasons. First, taking the 
example of a policy on a vessel, the voyage was a single voyage and the ship, 
the freight, the cargo, and the crew had all been involved in this single one 
adventure. It can be said that in order to benefit from wagering, the assured 
would be inclined to damage or destroy the ship. Where the assured made a 
wagering policy on, for example, the freight and it also made valid policies on 
the ship and the cargo at the same time, all polices would thus be not 
enforceable. Secondly, the law would not enforce a contract which put a conflict 
between duty and  self-interest. It was the duty of every party to policies to keep 
the ship in safety while the party effecting a wagering policy would tend to 
damage the ship for his own interest. The dictum then referred to an exception 
to his above view relating to third parties: “the foregoing observations are not 
directed to the case of insurances upon ships in which third parties have 
acquired, in ignorance of the other and over insurances and in good faith and 
for valuable consideration, separate interests. The rights of such parties would 
require to be separately and fully considered.”428 Leaving aside the dispute as 
to whether such an adventure is a single one, the legal principle of no conflict 
between duty and self-interest should be regarded as a strong argument for 
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supporting the idea that a wager policy will taint all other policies by the same 
assured on the same adventure. 
2.3 Insurable interest defined 
2.3.1 Reasons for the difficulty to define insurable interest 
It is hard to define insurable interest in words which are applicable to all types of 
insurance contracts,429 even merely in the context of marine insurance for which 
only a non-exhaustive definition has been provided. Besides, judges hold 
different criteria of what amounts to an insurable interest.430 For example, Ward 
LJ held the view that the test of economic interest, that the assured may benefit 
from the preservation of the insured subject or may be prejudiced from the loss 
of or damage to such subjects, is not sufficient to constitute an insurable 
interest; on the other hand, the assured must have a legal or equitable interest 
in the subject insured, at least in the realm of marine and property insurance.431 
This was based on two decisions of the House of Lords in which they held that 
the assured must possess a legal or equitable interest in property. 432  By 
contrast, Waller LJ held a broader view that the assured did not have to have a 
legal or equitable interest in the property, whereas a pecuniary interest was 
sufficient to satisfy the definition of insurable interest under s 5(2) of the 1906 
MIA which was thought by him to be a broad definition.433 The court should thus 
carefully consider the context and the terms of a policy before them, on the 
basis that the construction can determine the nature of the policy in question for 
the purpose of the proper application of the test of insurable interest and 
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whether the policy can embrace the insurable interest.434 Also, the uncertainty 
of the concept can be attributable to an increasingly changing market: “the 
definition has changed dramatically over the years to keep up with the changing 
market.”435 In conclusion, the definition of insurable interest is one that is not 
fixed and is continually changing. 
2.3.2 s 5(1) 
2.3.2.1 A wider attitude towards definition by s 5(1) 
Section 5 of the 1906 MIA is the only legislation which tries to define insurable 
interest and none of the other Acts mentioned in Chapter 1 have ever given it a 
definition. Although the courts have not exactly given it a definition, s 5 is indeed 
derived from the decisions in case law and there is no difference in definition 
between these two regimes. This definition is only applicable to marine 
insurance and not an exhaustive one but a partial concept including illustrations, 
such as those provided for in ss 7 to 14, which may amount to an insurable 
interest.436 Section 5(1) generally requires that a person who can be deemed as 
having an insurable interest is the one who is interested in a marine adventure. 
2.3.2.2 Illustrations 
Section 5(1) derives from the judgement of Wilson v Jones.437 In this case, a 
shareholder in a telegraph cable company, entered into a policy upon a marine 
adventure of the conveyance and successful laying of the cable. The court held 
that, by construing the terms of the policy, he had an interest not in the cable, 
which was the property of the company, but in the success of the adventure, 
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from which his share of profits could be derived. After careful examination of the 
words of the policy, the court identified that the insured subject, intended to be 
covered, was the marine adventure and then held that the assured, as the 
shareholder, was entitled to have an insurable interest in such an adventure 
because he had a pecuniary interest in the laying down of the cable rather than 
the cable itself. Therefore, although as in the judgement of Macaura case, the 
assured as a shareholder did not have an insurable interest in the timber which 
was the asset of the company because he would sustain no economic loss from 
the loss of the timber; in light of the Wilson case, a shareholder can have an 
insurable interest in profits to be derived from the asset which is owned by a 
company where a court has identified that the subject matter of the policy is the 
profits rather than the asset owned by the company. 
 
Based on the following two points, s 5(1) represents a broad attitude to the 
issue as to whether an assured can have an insurable interest in the insured 
subject because of the approach in the Wilson case. First, when deciding 
whether the assured has an insurable interest in a share of profits, Blackburn J 
has adopted Lawrence J’s test of pecuniary interest. Secondly, after the 
judgement that the assured had actually had an insurable interest in profits, 
although the subject insured is seemingly limited to the property of cable, the 
court, applying a wider view of property by correctly construing the policy, held 
that the subject matter of the policy was the profits arising from the successful 
laying of the cable rather than the cable. 
131 
 
2.3.3 s 5(2) 
2.3.3.1 Two tests for the definition of insurable interest in s 5(2) 
Section 5(2) particularly describes the situation where a person can be deemed 
to be interested in a marine adventure or in property where he has a legal right 
to, or a legal liability for, the property insured, namely a legal relation to the 
assured, and on the happening of its loss or damage he will be prejudiced. In 
the first place, the person must be so situated that he has a legal or equitable 
right in the insured subject at risk. As to an “equitable relation”, it can be 
understood as “a close legal relationship between the person insuring and the 
property insured”.438 The relation is based on either an equitable ownership to 
the property or a claim on it, e.g. an equitable possession by a beneficiary of a 
trust. Thus, a cestui que trust has an equitable interest in property and such an 
interest is insurable.439 Secondly, due to the nature of a contract of marine 
insurance which is one of indemnification and the existence of a legal right, the 
person must have a pecuniary interest in the subject matter insured; that is, “he 
may benefit by the safety or due arrival of insurable property, or may be 
prejudiced by its loss, or by damage thereto, or by the detention thereof, or may 
incur liability in respect thereof”. When explaining the essence of the interest 
being able to be constituted a valid interest, Sir MD Chalmers noted that an 
insurable interest must be a legal interest in property exposed to sea perils. 440 
The definition provided by s 5(2) has commonly been regarded as one from the 
judgement of Lord Eldon in Lucena’s case. However, without the first point of a 
legal interest, the second point mentioned above concerning the definition may 
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now be sufficient on its own to amount to a valid insurable interest.441 Therefore, 
after the authority of the case of Lucena, there are two tests as to what can 
constitute a valid insurable interest in property: Lawrence’s broad test of moral 
certainty, or pecuniary or economic test and Eldon’s strict test of a legal relation 
to the subject insured, 442 although it has been argued that Lawrence’s test in 
fact also requires a legal relation to the insured property.443  
2.3.3.2 The requirement of a legal relation 
Since the legal or equitable relation in which an assured stands to the marine 
adventure or to the property insured can affect the existence of a valid insurable 
interest, there is thus a necessity to precisely understand such a relation. 
Besides, the requirement of a legal interest is responsible for the approach 
adopted in English law that the assured cannot have an insurable interest in 
property unless it has a legal or equitable interest in it or arising out of a 
contract relating to it.  
 
It has been suggested that the legal or equitable right in property insured, 
defined by s 5(2), is derived from Eldon’s test and the strict test thus needs to 
be examined. In the words of Lord Eldon, in order to constitute a valid insurable 
interest, the legal interest the assured has had must be a proprietary right in 
property or a right from a contract pertaining to it.444 Consequently, there are 
two sources as to what can constitute an insurable interest. The former is a 
proprietary right to the property. As for the latter, a possessory interest is an 
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insurable interest. Also, a creditor can have a legal relation if he has a claim on 
the property pledged to him for advances. Then any legal liability under an 
existing contract445 or relevant law is insurable.446 As provided by s 5(2), the 
insurable interest in property arising from a legal right derivable out of a contract 
in relation to it must also be one that may bring about loss or incur liability to the 
assured.  
 
However, due to the tendency of the widening of insurable interest, despite the 
expression of “legal relation” in judgements, it may be sufficient to constitute it if 
a person has beneficial rights or owns a duty on a contractual basis.447 Thus, 
two powers of attorney granted exclusive use and enjoyment of the insured 
property can constitute an insurable interest, though it may be less than a legal 
or equitable right. With the two powers of attorney granted by the company 
owning the yacht in issue, in spite of the lack of a strict legal right in it, the 
assured could exclusively enjoy and possess the yacht for his own purpose. 
The court thus held that it was the exclusive use derived from the contract 
between the company and the assured granting the two powers of attorney that 
afforded an insurable interest in the yacht.448 As sub-contractors, the assured 
who had effected a contract of construction could also have an insurable 
interest in the plant under construction only because he would suffer pecuniary 
loss from damage to or destruction of the work, i.e. if the construction of the 
work failed, he would lose the opportunity to obtain remuneration for doing the 
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work.449 In light of the strict test, a right derivable from a contract relating to the 
insured property also had a legal liability; otherwise sub-contractors had no 
insurable interest in the plant as the subject matter of the policy taken out after 
the completion of the sub-contractors’ construction when there was no contract 
of construction between them and the owner of the plant, even though they 
might assume liability for loss of or damage to the work.450 What should always 
be borne in mind is that in the modern context of indemnity insurance a legal or 
equitable relation to the assured has no longer been a necessity to constitute a 
valid insurable interest in property; whereas a mere pecuniary interest based on 
a contract is sufficient.451  
2.3.3.3 No present existing right, no insurable interest 
2.3.3.2.1 A mere expectation is not insurable. 
Also, in light of what amounts to a legal right, it must first be an existing one 
rather than a mere hope or expectation.452 It has been firmly laid down as 
English law by the courts that a mere expectation of acquiring benefits from the 
continuing existence of the insured subject cannot confer on the assured an 
insurable interest in the subject. Where there was only a mere hope of 
benefiting from the preservation of the insured subject, by taking out a contract 
relating to it sometime in the future, the court held that the assured had no 
insurable interest in the property as goods, because the relation between the 
assured and the property was the bare hope which could not be any right 
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recognised at law or in equity.453 Even though captors at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century might benefit from capturing enemy’s ships by the Naval 
Prize Acts or by a grant from the Crown, only those having an existing right in 
ships could insure them. In the case of Lucena, the commissioners had insured 
the vessels at the time of sailing but under the Naval Prize Acts they could not 
take care of the captured Dutch vessels until their arrival in the UK and until 
then they had no right to them. The courts thus held that the assured, as the 
commissioners who only had an expectation of benefiting from the safe arrival 
of the ships and its goods, had no insurable interest in property because they 
were not entitled to the vessels until they could exercise their duties to the ships 
after the safe arrival of the vessels in the UK.454 Similarly, a captor who had not 
already captured a ship, and thus only had a mere hope of a grant from the 
Crown, had no insurable interest in the ship.455 By contrast, a person who had 
already captured a vessel could have an insurable interest in its sailing to the 
UK and thus could insure such a marine adventure because it had a legal 
interest in the vessel. In a word, in light of the strict test, only those who have 
already had an existing right can have an insurable interest in property, 
whereas a mere expectation to insured property or one from a relevant contract 
cannot. 
2.3.3.2.2 A moral obligation is not insurable. 
As a consequence of the strict test, a moral obligation cannot amount to an 
insurable interest either, since it is not an existing right to the subject matter of 
the policy either at law or in equity. Under honour policies, even though the 
insurer has honoured the policy and promised to pay the assured in the event of 
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loss of the insured subject (which is however by the nature of the policy only a 
moral obligation rather than a right or interest recognised by law) the assured 
hence cannot have a valid insurable interest arising from such a moral 
obligation. Therefore, an assured cannot have a valid insurable interest in the 
insured subject only because of having a mere moral obligation over it. 
2.3.3.4 Legal Liability and potential liability 
In s 5(2), a person can also possess an insurable interest in insured property 
where he is so situated in relation to the property that he may assume the legal 
liability of paying the price or, through his negligence, paying for its loss or 
damage. In accordance with the strict test, liability must be subject to 
proprietary or possessory interest. But now, mere potential rather than actual 
legal liability depending on an existing contract or “proximate physical 
relationship” to the insured property may be sufficient to give rise to an 
insurable interest in property, and even possibly an insurable interest in 
liability.456 Such a relation must be close enough that a sub-contractor can be 
materially adversely affected by loss or damage of the property on construction 
sites.457 The assured can thus have an insurable interest in property arising 
from a contract relating to it if damage to or destruction of the property will give 
rise to liability on their part to the owner of the property. Thus, in cases where 
the assureds as buyers have taken out a contract of sale of goods on FOB or 
CIF terms which requires that buyers take the risk of loss after goods have been 
put on board, those who have no title to or possession of goods could have an 
insurable interest in the goods since under the binding contract they are so 
situated to the property that they are legally liable to pay the price whether or 
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not the goods arrive safely. 458  Similarly, a sub-contractor who has a mere 
potential liability to the property on construction sites has an insurable interest in 
the whole of the work, even though he has not agreed that the property has 
been at his risk. Because of the potential liability for a sub-contractor damaging 
the property of other interested parties under their separate contracts, and even 
the damage or loss arising from their breach of the contract or from their 
negligence, the courts held that sub-contractors could thus have an insurable 
interest in the whole property under construction.459 
2.3.3.5 Test of moral certainty or pecuniary interest 
There is an insurable interest in cases where the expectation is not a mere 
hope but a factual expectation or moral certainty of receiving a benefit or 
incurring potential liability. This kind of expectation was expressed as one so 
certain that it had never been known to be defeated.460 Although this kind of 
relation was not recognised by the courts as a valid insurable interest in the 
past,461  it has now been settled on high authority that moral certainty or a 
pecuniary interest is sufficient to constitute an insurable interest in property.462 
According to Lawrence’s test, where a person had a moral certainty or well-
founded factual expectation of benefiting from the continuing existence of the 
subject matter insured or sustaining a loss from, damage to, or destruction of, 
the insured subject, the assured had an insurable interest in the subject, 
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regardless of the existence of a right recognised in law.463 By contrast, Lord 
Eldon rejected the submission of moral certainty amounting to an insurable 
interest and thought that there was no intermediate area between the certain 
right in property, or derivable from a contract relating to it, and the mere 
expectation or hope. His Lordship then stated that a person could not have an 
insurable interest in property unless he had a right in property or arising out of a 
contract pertaining to it and due to such a relation he may suffer a loss arising 
from the loss of or damage to the property.464  
2.3.4 Conclusion 
In order to match the new development of insurance business, the definition of 
insurable interest has been continually expanded. Although terms of “legal 
relation” may be used by the courts to test the existence of insurable interest, 
which renders it seemingly true that the strict test must be followed, in fact, it 
has more recently been established that a pecuniary interest or potential liability 
based on an existing contract may be sufficient to constitute an insurable 
interest. But it is still good law that a mere expectation or moral obligation 
cannot invest in an assured an insurable interest. However, where an interest 
possessed by a person does not fall within the area of s 5 of the 1906 MIA, it 
does not necessarily mean that the interest is definitely uninsurable, because in 
s 5 the definition itself is a non-exhaustive one.465 
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2.4 When interest must attach 
2.4.1 Time of an insurable interest 
2.4.1.1 At the time of loss matters 
This section addresses the issue as to when interest must attach, namely, when 
the assured must have a valid or actual insurable interest in the subject matter 
of the policy. In light of s 6 (1) of the 1906 MIA, the timing should be at the time 
of loss rather than of the taking out of the contract of insurance. In the past, an 
interest had to be vested in the assured both at the time of the policy and at the 
time of the loss.466 Under the former law, it was material to find out whether or 
not the assured had an interest at the time of effecting the policy.467 By contrast, 
in the case of Rhind v Wilkinson,468 it was held that the interest did not need to 
attach at the time of effecting the policy. Section 6 (1) has now laid down that an 
insurable interest must be vested in the assured no later than at the time of the 
loss, and this affects whether the assured can make a successful claim to the 
insurer; therefore, it is immaterial whether the interest has attached at the date 
of effecting the policy, which relates to the validity of a contract of insurance.469 
Clause 11(1) of the Institute Cargo Clauses (ICC) therefore restates the words 
of s 6 (1) that “In order to recover under this insurance the Assured must have 
an insurable interest in the subject-matter insured at the time of the loss.”470 
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2.4.1.2 Grounds for such timing 
The reason for requiring that the assured must possess an insurable interest at 
the time of loss was that it was usually commercial practice to insure goods on 
a return voyage, long before the goods were bought, which made impossible 
the averment of having an interest at the time of the policy.471 The requirement 
is of particular importance in today’s international sale of goods, for the property 
of goods will frequently be transferred during the insured period. 472  It is 
sometimes difficult, or even impossible, to ascertain the person who finally is at 
risk of sea perils before the time of loss. Besides, where an open cover has 
been taken out that “is widely used to refer to a form of cover that applies to all 
risks falling within it for a specific period of time, subject to a maximum limit per 
risk but no overall aggregate”,473 the goods under such a cover often do not 
exist, let alone the attachment of a valid insurable interest at the date of the 
contract of insurance. 474  Under the aforesaid situations, requiring that the 
assured must have an interest at the time of the policy will be unreasonable and 
not helpful for the market.  
2.4.1.3 Different timings meaning different requirements 
The requirement of insurable interest in marine insurance under the 1906 MIA 
has been provided for in two different ways.475 Section 4 first requires that at the 
date of the contract of insurance the assured must have an insurable interest 
and an expectation of obtaining such an interest and must not take out PPI 
policies, otherwise the validity of the policy will be rendered void.  In the case of 
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proving the policy not to be a wager policy, it is material to observe whether the 
assured has a potential interest at the date of effecting the policy or not. For the 
purpose of returning premiums under the contracts due to their being void as 
wager contracts, it will be sufficient to prevent them being void by proving that 
an expectation of acquiring an interest has existed at the time of the policy. 
Section 6(1) secondly requires that, in order to recover a loss, the timing when 
an actual interest must attach is at the time of loss, while a potential interest 
rather than a valid insurable interest is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of s 4. 
This reflects the doctrine of indemnity; without proof of an interest the assured 
are not able to have suffered a loss.476 However, in light of the strict test, the 
interest required here is also a legal or equitable interest, rather than one which 
is just being used to prove a loss but is not sufficient to be an interest 
recognised at law or in equity. Nowadays, the assureds are entitled to claim 
against the insurers where they have sustained a mere pecuniary interest. 
2.4.1.4 Whether an assured having assigned his interest can recover depending on the 
timing of assignment 
It is clear from the principle provided by s 6(1) that the assured who has an 
insurable interest at the time of loss can claim. The assured who has had an 
insurable interest at the time of loss but later assigns it to a consignee can also 
be entitled to recovery. Also, the assured who has no insurable interest at the 
time of loss because they have assigned their interest to a consignee, can sue 
on a policy as long as they act as trustees of the consignee by a contract of 
trust or the assignment of the policy. The principle that the assured must be 
interested at the time of loss has codified the doctrine of indemnity. If the 
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assured cannot prove that he has an interest in the subject matter at the time of 
loss, he could not prove a loss having been sustained by him. Where, therefore, 
the assured had sold his interest in the ship or goods before the loss, it was 
held that he could not sue the insurer for the recovery, for he had no interest at 
the time of loss (the fact that he had an interest at the time of underwriting the 
insurance was immaterial), he had lost nothing and consequently he was 
unable to be indemnified.477 As a result of the requirement that the assured has 
to possess a valid insurable interest at the time of loss, the assured who has 
had one at the time of loss, but later loses or assigns his interest, is thus entitled 
to recover because he can still claim as long as he had an insurable interest at 
the time of loss.478 The court then determined in favour of the assured who sued 
on a policy where they had had an interest at the time of loss but assigned his 
interest after the loss of the insured subject. 479  Despite the principle of 
indemnity and the principle that the assured must have an insurable interest at 
the time of loss, those who have lost interest in the insured subject before its 
loss can also make a claim as trustees on behalf of consignees with an 
assignment of policy or an agreement to such an effect. Where the assured did 
not have an interest at the time of loss, for example, having sold the subject 
insured to consignees before the time of loss, they could also take an action 
against the policy as the trustee of the consignee by means of them having 
handed over the policy to the consignee upon the assignment or by having kept 
the policy alive for the consignee’s benefit by a contract.480 
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2.4.2 “Lost or not lost” terms 
 2.4.2.1 Position under s 6(1) of the 1906 MIA 
Subject to the proviso of 6(1) which requires the assured to possess an 
insurable interest at the time of loss, its terms was laid down as “Provided that 
where the subject-matter is insured “lost or not lost”, the assured may recover 
although he may not have acquired his interest until after the loss, unless at the 
time of effecting the contract of insurance the assured was aware of the loss, 
and the insurer was not.”481 The outcome of breaching the duty of disclosure 
relating to a loss having occurred before effecting the policy is that the insurer 
may avoid the policy.482 Although the principle of the timing when insurable 
interest must attach has been breached by this proviso, according to its first 
application, the assured who is allowed to recover where he has not acquired 
insurable interest prior to loss must subsequently have a valid insurable interest 
after loss.483  As to its second application, it has also been provided for in 
Schedule 1 of the 1906 MIA for the construction of a policy that: “Where the 
subject-matter is insured “lost or not lost”, and the loss has occurred before the 
contract is concluded, the risk attaches unless, at such time, the assured was 
aware of the loss, and the insurer was not.”484 This construction is applicable to 
a policy which has not been concluded prior to the loss having occurred while 
the assured had, or had no an existing insurable interest.485 The form of Ship 
and Goods (SG) policy was widely used in the past;486 it was first set out in 
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1779 and continued in use until 1982, expressly incorporating “lost or not lost” 
terms in its first paragraph.487  
 
The rule in relation to “lost or not lost” clauses was on the basis of the 
judgement in Sutherland v Pratt,488 where the assured sued on a marine policy 
termed with a “lost or not lost” clause; the assured was supported by the court 
in his claim to recover for the loss of the insured subject of cotton which had 
been pledged to him in order to secure an advance, though the loss of the 
cotton damaged by bad weather had occurred before he acquired the interest 
by virtue of the pledge. Of course, this rule only applied where the assured was 
not aware of the loss, just as in this case where neither parties to the insurance 
contract had realised the partial loss from goods in transit at sea. Also, where 
the parties under the CFR sale contract suffered loss from the damage of cotton 
as the insured subject before shipment, the court held that the assured was 
covered under the marine policy, termed with the “lost or not lost” clause.489 It 
also should be noted that the “lost or not lost” clause covers partial loss as well 
as total loss.490  
2.4.2.2 Two functions or meanings of the “lost or not lost” clause 
Although it is argued that it may not be necessary to set down this rule to avoid 
a claim against pre-shipment loss being defeated,491 in the context of cargo 
insurance, the clause has its main significance in protecting the assured buyer 
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on CFR or FOB terms to recover such a loss.492 It has been suggested that the 
meaning of “lost or not lost” comprises two different meanings: “retrospective 
declaration” and “retrospective insurable interest”.  
 
The justifiability of its existence is that the clause is required by the business 
community to prevent pre-shipment loss. In the past, it was difficult for the 
assured buyers to communicate with sellers abroad as to the condition of goods 
located abroad and they often could not know such information until they had 
received the goods.493 The original purpose of “lost or not lost” clauses was thus 
to protect the assured being able to recover who did not conclude a policy until 
a loss had occurred on condition that neither parties to the policy had known the 
loss.494 The issue may then be addressed that the buyer on CFR or FOB terms 
relying on a policy with the clause and having suffered a loss before the loading, 
intends to get indemnity from the insurer rather than the seller by reference to 
their contract of purchase and sale. In commercial practice, the buyer is more 
likely to make a claim against the insurer instead of the seller in the situations, 
in particular, where the buyer will be confronted with difficulties in recovering 
from the seller, for example, where the buyer has paid in advance and the seller 
is now insolvent.495 The function of retrospective interest in the clause may 
assist the buyer where the insurer may argue that the assured buyer cannot 
recover because a risk or policy cannot attach before the cargo insured has 
been loaded on board the delivering ship, as a result of which the buyer has 
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had no interest. Also, it is devised to inhibit policies from being wager policies 
because the assured has to subsequently possess an insurable interest.496  
 
As to “retrospective declaration”, this means that a policy with such a clause 
can be taken out by an assured who has had, or not had, an existing insurable 
interest after the loss has occurred, except when the assured had known of the 
loss while the insurer was ignorant of it.497 An assured may thus be able to 
recover in light of retrospective declaration,498 such as that for facultative or 
facultative/obligatory open cover.499 
 
The meaning of ‘retrospective insurable interest’ is that the “lost or not lost” 
clause applies where the assured has not acquired an insurable interest before 
the loss of, or damage to, the insured subject but subsequently has obtained 
one.500 For example, it frequently happens in international sales of goods that 
the goods will not be assigned to the last buyer, by which the interest will be 
invested in him, until there is only one day left before it arrives at its 
destination.501 The last buyer seldom has chance to be aware of the loss of, or 
damage to the goods, before he checks the goods at the destination. The 
problem can be avoided in that the assured buyer who has suffered a loss, 
before obtaining an insurable interest and making a claim against the insurer, is 
asked to take up the responsibility to prove that he has had an interest at the 
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time of the loss. The buyer, who may be only able to find out the loss of, or the 
damage to, the cargo at the time when the cargo has arrived at the discharging 
port, may be covered by a policy with the clause which allows him to 
subsequently obtain an insurable interest prior to loss.502 Thus, in addition to the 
normal future loss, the assured, having no better knowledge of the loss than the 
insurer, may also recover the loss covered by a policy with the “lost or not lost” 
clause before he has acquired an interest but finally does acquire one.503  
2.4.2.3 The “ lost or not lost” clause not applicable before attachment of risk 
Although the “lost or not lost” clause may entitle an assured, after the loss of, or 
damage to, the subject matter insured, to conclude a policy or obtain an 
insurable interest, it cannot assist the assured where the period of risk in 
property insured has not commenced. Under s 5 (2) of the 1906 MIA, the 
assured must possess a legal or equitable relation either to the insured property 
at risk of the assured or to the marine adventure itself. The clause is subject to 
this provision and can only operate in the foregoing two ways in which risk or 
policy has attached. The clause however is not relevant to the commencement 
of the risk the assured bears. Therefore, even though the clause has been 
incorporated into a policy relating to a contract of sale of goods on FOB or CFR 
terms and under its provision the assured can make retrospective declaration or 
cover, the assured has acquired inadequate cover for pre-shipment risks which 
have not attached.  
2.4.3 No act can vest an interest in an assured having no interest at the time of loss 
Subject to s 6(2) of the 1906 MIA, the requirement of insurable interest cannot 
be satisfied by an assured who has no interest at the time of loss, no matter 
                                                          
502 Howard Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance ( 2nd edn, OUP Oxford 2006) 3.14 
503
 Sutherland v Pratt (1843) 11 M & W 296 [311] 
148 
 
what measures it has taken after it has been made aware of the loss. In the 
Anderson case, the risk would not pass to the assured until the whole goods 
had been loaded onto the vessel. However, part of the goods loaded on board 
had been lost so that the assured could not have an insurable interest in the 
goods because, pursuant to the policy, risk would not pass until after completion 
of the loading of the whole goods. In order to obtain the interest, being aware of 
the loss, it chose to take up the shipping documents after loss. It was held that 
the assured who had been aware of the loss could not acquire an insurable 
interest by means of exercising such an option to accept lost goods which was 
part of the whole goods to which the risk could not attach, until the completion 
of the whole shipment. 504  In two situations a purchaser might accept an 
incomplete cargo loaded on board: firstly, it was compelled to do so as the full 
performance of the contract of purchase and sale: for instance, the vendor had 
finished his part to perform the contract; secondly, he voluntarily elected to 
accept such lost cargo and paid the vendor for it.505 However, such an election 
to accept under a contract of purchase and sale was different from an election 
under a policy covering the foregoing contract: where the policy effected would 
not attach until the whole cargo had been loaded onto the ship and part of that 
cargo had been lost; as a result, the assured could by no means acquire an 
interest since it could not have an interest until the full cargo was loaded on 
board.506  
 
Nevertheless, where an interest had been vested in him, a purchaser of goods 
who had entered into insurance against perils insured against could have the 
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option to accept or reject those goods which have unfortunately been lost, 
depending on whoever it was easier for the assured buyer to claim an indemnity 
from, the insurer or the seller. 507 Therefore, after having been aware of the loss 
of goods, whether the loading on board was completed or uncompleted, the 
assured could not recover from the insurer in virtue of exercising the election to 
accept the lost, so that it could throw the loss onto the insurer and relieve the 
parties to the contract of purchase and sale, unless an interest had been 
invested in him.508 Likewise, even though an assured could obtain retrospective 
insurable interest in accordance with the “lost or not lost” clause, he still could 
not acquire an insurable interest by any act or election after he had known, prior 
to his having attained that interest, the information as to the loss that had 
occurred.509 
2.5 Both defeasible and contingent interests are insurable 
2.5.1 Defeasible and contingent interests 
Section 7(1) declares that an assured can insure its defeasible interest in the 
subject matter of a policy, and also its contingent interest. The former is an 
insurable interest which the assured may lose by subsequent events when the 
subject is on its voyage at sea. For example, a vendor can have a defeasible 
interest in goods until title or risk to them has been transferred to a vendee.510 
Also, as stated by s 7(2), a vendee of goods is entitled to have an insurable 
interest, defeasible at its own option of rejection due to breach of condition511 or 
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the vendor’s delay in delivery.512 Although the coverage of a contingent interest 
is not easy to precisely identify,513 the latter may mean the kind of interest which 
can attach in transit at sea depending on the occurrence of a contingency or the 
fulfilment of certain conditions. It is been suggested that the ruling that a 
contingent interest is insurable is an inherent requirement of the insurance 
definition because the subject in which the assured has such an interest is 
exposed to marine perils insured against.514 Where the title or risk has been 
passed to a vendee, he may have such an interest.515 Where a vendee has 
rejected goods, a CIF vendor, following the transfer of policy from the vendee, 
may have a contingent insurable interest in the rejected goods and thus claim 
against the insurer.516 
2.5.2 Contingent interests 
2.5.2.1 Examples of contingent interests 
2.5.2.1.1 Interest in prizes is insurable 
Insurable interest in prizes can be a defeasible or a contingent interest.517 
Captors’ interest is contingent because after capture they will either attain 
proprietary rights in ships by condemnation by a British Admiralty Court or have 
to pay costs to a court for improper capture. If ships are lost or recaptured 
during homeward voyages or returned to their neutral owners, the interest is 
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defeasible. In the opinion of Grose J,518 it seems that a defeasible interest is 
insurable, from the perspective that having such an interest at the time of the 
insurance contract was sufficient to trigger risks. By contrast, it was not an 
absolute property as an actual insurable interest in the insured subject, as this 
must attach at the time of loss to support a claim. 
 
Captors of enemy ships could have no proprietary rights vested in them before 
condemnation by a British Admiralty Court, although after such an order they 
could obtain such retrospective rights back to the date of capture.519 Thus, the 
question often arose as to whether a captor could insure his interest in a 
captured ship pending the condemnation. Lord Mansfield gave a positive 
submission in his obiter dictum in Le Cras v Hughes,520 on the ground that  
captors had possessed a well-founded expectancy of a grant from the Crown 
following condemnation, although in this case, depending solely on the Spanish 
Prize Act 1708 which declared that captors who had captured Spanish ships 
could accrue ownership in them, such captors could sufficiently possess an 
insurable interest in the vessels. In Boehm v Bell,521 the court affirmed Lord 
Mansfield’s submission as to captors’ insurable interests in captured enemy 
vessels pending condemnation. In this case, three captors of British vessels 
seized Dutch ships and her goods in time of war for the purpose of prize. 
However, the Court of Admiralty ordered that the vessel and the majority of 
goods should be restored to the original owners who were neutral to the war. 
This meant that lack of condemnation of ships to be prizes conferred no 
proprietary rights on captors. They consequently claimed for a return of 
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premium paid, arguing that they had no insurable interest and the risk had 
never attached. Nevertheless, three judges of the court unanimously held that 
the captors had an insurable interest in the captured subject because the Court 
of Admiralty might order them to pay damages and costs if the capture was 
improperly made and therefore they could not recover the premiums for the 
insurance.522  
 
Though both of the foregoing two cases show that captors of vessels pending 
condemnation can have an insurable interest, the decisions are based on 
distinct grounds: the first suggests that an actual expectation or moral certainty 
can be sufficient while the latter relies on captors’ risk of paying damages and 
costs for unfit capture. The latter view may be more appropriate because the 
first is a far more remote relationship and is not based on an existing interest. 
The expectation test by Lord Mansfield has been rejected by Lord Eldon and 
Lawrence J in Lucena v Craufurd523 and by judges in other courts524. Lawrence 
J’s opinion is consistent: in Boehm v Bell, succeeding with condemnation, 
captors would have an insurable interest retroactive to the date of capture due 
to the Crown’s grant; if not, they might also have one because they were at risk 
of paying costs. Thus, a mere expectation is not insurable. 
2.5.2.1.2 Liability and inchoate rights 
A contingent interest can also consist of three other types of interest: liability, 
reinsurance, 525  expectancies or inchoate rights relying on existing rights, 526 
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such as freight, anticipated profits and commission as are insurable. For such 
inchoate rights, coupled with present existing rights, only perils insured against 
can in the ordinary course beat the assured’s successful benefits from the 
marine adventure. Carriers,527 other bailees other than carriers,528 insurers529 
pursuant to their respective contracts are all liable to indemnify the goods under 
their carrying, control or cover on the occurrence of loss of or damage to the 
subject. Captors are liable to pay damages or costs to the court or restitute the 
improper vessels to the neutral shipowners. 530  The manager of the ship 
pursuant to the management contract is exposed to liability to the vessel if it be 
damaged or lost.531 It is clear from s 5(2) of the 1906 MIA that an assured who 
may potentially incur liability for the insured subject matter can have an 
insurable interest in property; it thus is seemingly unnecessary to deal with 
insurable interest deriving out of liability from the perspective of contingent 
interest. However, with the rule that a contingent interest is insurable, it may 
give good ground for the proposition that contractors and sub-contractors under 
a co-insurance effected by the main contractors or owners of property have 
insurable interest not only in their liability for the loss or damage to the property 
but in the entire contract works, holding the surplus of recovery over the amount 
of its own liability as trustees of its co-assureds.532 
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2.5.2.2 The main problem is relating to whether the interest attaches at the time of 
loss 
When considering whether there is a right of indemnity arising from a contingent 
insurable interest, the main issue is to determine whether the assured 
possesses an insurable interest at the time of loss rather than at the time of 
contract, 533 despite a restitution of premium possibly requiring the existence of 
the interest at the time of contract.534 Freight is one example of a contingent 
interest and it is accepted that having a charterparty can confer on shipowners 
an insurable interest and render them at risk of sea. What the court needs to 
address is thus whether shipowners can have an interest to recover where the 
loss had happened before the chartered voyage has commenced. In Barber v 
Fleming,535 the shipowner as the assured had chartered his ship for cargos, 
then at A, from B to C. When the ship was sailing in ballast from A to B, she 
suffered loss. Then the shipowner made a claim against the insurer to recover 
the lost freight under the policy covering the voyage from A to C. The court 
mainly needed to deal with whether the freight had sustained loss, or the 
interest had attached, at the time of loss.536 The court held that the assured 
could recover the loss of the chartered freight because the interest had attached 
at the time of the damage to the vessel which under the charterparty had sailed 
for C and incurred relevant fees. The fact that the shipowner had got a 
charterparty and had taken action to fulfil such contract made the interest in the 
freight an inchoate interest rather than a mere expectation.  
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2.5.3 Defeasible interest 
2.5.3.1 Insurability of a defeasible interest 
Section 7(2) affords an example of an insurable and defeasible interest that an 
assured buyer, having had an insurable interest, chooses to discontinue the 
interest, in the stated circumstances of a seller’s delay in making delivery, or 
other reasons like having shipped goods of inferior quality. Thus, this kind of 
interest is insurable although it is possible that the assured may lose his interest 
in the subject at his own election because “a defeasible interest is one which is 
liable to be defeated by subsequent events.”537 
 
This provision may be based on the judgement in Sparkes v Marshall.538 Under 
the contracts between the vendor and the vendee, based upon their 
correspondence, the cargo had been appropriated to the vendee. From this 
vested right in the vendee, his interest in the cargo arose. In this specific case, 
the vendee could accept or reject the cargo at his option because the vendor 
breached the contract and sold the cargo to another purchaser after the cargo 
had been appropriated to the assured, the original buyer. The original assured 
could choose to reject the subject of the insurance, which made the interest a 
defeasible one due to the breach by the vendor. He nonetheless chose to 
accept the cargo lost in transit and made a claim against the insurer. This option 
has commercial sense because where the assured buyer has the right to accept 
or reject the goods insured at the time of loss, he is inclined to accept them to 
enable him to have a claim against the loss covered by the insurer. Should the 
goods be rejected, the assured may not claim against the insurer. According to 
the judgement, the defeasible interest possessed by the assured was held as a 
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sufficient interest to support an action against the insurer. An insurable interest 
possessed by the assured is defeasible only at the assured’s own option.539 If it 
is a seller that can decide whether or not to deliver in order to perform a 
contract, that relation between a buyer and the subject matter of contract of 
purchase and sale may merely be an expectation rather than an insurable 
interest. This is also the effect of s 6(1) of the 1906 MIA: a buyer who has none 
of, or not all of, the insurable interest at the time of loss, because the seller has 
not totally transferred its interest in goods to the buyer, cannot recover.  
 
Also, where an assured chose to pay, confirming their acceptance, and 
received the bill of lading for the insured cargo after the loss had occurred, the 
assured was supported by Bovill CJ and Denman J to insure and recover not 
only their own interest to the extent of their advance on the cotton but also to its 
full value.540 
2.5.3.2 Buyers’ election under s 6(2) and s 7(2) 
There is a difference between s 6(2) and s 7(2) of the 1906 MIA as to whether 
an assured can obtain an insurable interest by its election. Different 
preconditions have  different rules. In accordance with s 6(2), due to an assured 
at inception having no insurable interest at the time of loss, it therefore cannot 
obtain one at its election. By contrast, pursuant to s 7(2), it can obtain one 
because it is in the situation where it has an insurable interest, but with a 
defeasible nature, at the time of loss. Furthermore, s 6(2) only relates to 
whether an assured can recover from an insurer, whereas s 7(2), together with  
s 7 (1), provides for the insurability of these two kinds of interest, namely, it is 
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relevant not only to the issue whether the assured can claim but also to the 
validity of a contract of insurance.   
2.6 Partial interest 
2.6.1 Illustrations for partial interests 
Besides the limited interests of defeasible and contingent ones exemplified by s 
7(1), s 8 of the 1906 MIA provides another one as a partial interest which of any 
nature is insurable.541 It is suggested that an undivided or hotchpot interest is 
one type of partial interest, as well as, more widely, an interest possessed by 
the assured who only has partial or limited interests in the insured subjects. In 
this case it may insure to the full value of the subject, holding the surplus in trust 
for the others interested in the subject. In relation to the latter, thus, a person 
having a right to mortgage542 or lien543 on the subject matter insured can have 
such a partial interest in the property; similarly, the interest possessed by a 
carrier or other bailees;544 a contractor and subcontractor can have such an 
interest as well;545 the same principle also applies to a consignee having a 
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partial interest in a ship546 or cargo.547 As to a consignee placing an insurance 
as a principal, whether it can recover beyond its own interest to the full value of 
the subject depends on the construction of the policy: it can only be entitled to 
do this where it has had such an intention at the time of the policy.548 It would 
be commercially convenient to allow a person, such as a warehouseman, who 
has a merely partial interest in property to insure in its own name and recover 
the whole amount of the insurance.549  
2.6.2 Undivided interests 
As to undivided interests, Lord Blackburn in Inglis v Stock held that an 
undivided interest in a parcel of goods on board a ship may be described as an 
interest in goods just as much as if it were an interest in every portion of the 
goods.550 In this case, the assured buyer purchased 200 tons of sugar from the 
British merchant D and also the same quantity from B who had purchased from 
D, both on FOB Hamburg condition. To fulfil the two contracts, D’s agents 
engaged space for the shipment of 390 tons of sugar, undivided, from Hamburg 
to Bristol, during which the ship was lost. D, with the knowledge of the loss, 
appropriated two parcels of sugar to respective contracts. The assured then 
brought an action against the insurer under its floating insurance to recover the 
two parcels. The dispute was whether or not the assured had an insurable 
interest. Although both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords held that the 
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assured had an insurable interest in goods under the two contracts of purchase 
and sale, some of the judges decided on the ground of the FOB terms, which 
rendered the buyer to be at risk after the sugar was on board the ship551 while 
others relied on the reason that the assured was at risk because under the two 
contracts of purchase and sale it was bound to pay for the price whether the 
goods arrived or not. 552  Lord Blackburn also expressed the view that an 
undivided interest was insurable.  
2.6.3 Hotchpot interests possessed by a part-owner 
A part-owner, either a joint-tenant or a tenant in common, can have an insurable 
interest in the whole of the subject matter of the policy, which thus can entitle an 
assured to insure and recover to the extent of the full value of the subject, 
holding the residue in trust for the others interested in the subject insured. In 
Page v Fry,553 the plaintiff as agent of M purchased a parcel of corn for M who 
however offered another mercantile house a joint concern in the cargo. This 
was accepted by the house because they thought that the quantity might be 
much too large for themselves. M then ordered the plaintiff to effect a policy for 
the ship and the corn. Lord Eldon held that the plaintiff had an insurable interest 
in the entirety of the cargo even though it was only a part-owner of the insured 
subject. Heath J also said that a joint-tenant or a tenant in common should be 
able to have such an interest in the entirety so that they can insure and recover 
the full amount of the insurance. 
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2.6.4 Hotchpot interests owned by shareholders 
In Wilson v Jones, it was held that a shareholder of the company had an 
insurable interest in a marine adventure, the successful laying of the submarine 
cable.554 This interest can be treated as a hotchpot interest, which is a partial 
interest, being insurable. However, the court in the case did not rely on this 
point; nevertheless, it held the assured possessed an insurable interest on the 
ground that the true subject was the successful laying of the cable rather than 
the cable itself. 
2.6.5 Hotchpot interests in ships and possessed by consignees 
Hotchpot interests, whether in ships or cargoes, may be types of partial 
interests.555 In Robertson v Hamilton,556 the ship the Ross belonging to the 
assured plaintiff and the Atlantic belonging to F, with cargoes on them 
belonging to other parties, were captured by the Spaniards. In order to restore 
them, their owners separately authorised C to deal with the captor, which gave 
C full powers of attorney as to the captured property. By parting with part of the 
cargoes, the captor agreed to return the captured subjects as one whole lump 
for their common benefit, which made them hotchpot properties. The plaintiff, 
the owner of the Rose paid C for the expenses of the restoring and outfitting of 
both ships to London. C then consigned the rest of the captured subjects to the 
plaintiff, who afterwards insured the Atlantic. It was afterwards recaptured by 
the French and the plaintiff thus claimed in their own names to recover for the 
total loss of that vessel. The court then needed to consider whether the plaintiff 
had an insurable interest in the Atlantic and to what extent they could recover.      
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The court held that every owner interested in the hotchpot properties had an 
interest not only in its own property but also in the conjoint property restored. 
The decision was based on two grounds. Firstly, the plaintiffs were owners of 
the ship the Rose which was one part of the hotchpot property restored. 
Secondly, by having paid the expenses for the restoring and outfitting, they 
could be treated as the consignees and representatives of their agent C who 
had advanced money for the restitution and thus had an interest in the whole 
hotchpot.557  The court held as well that one owner of part of the hotchpot 
property could recover to the extent of the full value of the whole mass of the 
property restored, holding the surplus excess of its own interest in trust for 
those interested in respective subjects.558 
2.6.6 Hotchpot interests in cargoes and possessed by consignees 
In the case of Ebsworth,559 the plaintiffs, cotton brokers and agents in London, 
were undertaking dealings as to consignments of cotton from a merchant B 
living abroad, making advances thereon by acceptance against the 
consignments. Two open floating policies after declaration, intended to cover 
the plaintiffs and B, were effected between the plaintiffs and the defendants. 
The ship with the cargo of cotton was lost at sea. The judges in the case 
unanimously decided that the plaintiffs had an insurable interest to the extent of 
their advance. As to the question whether they were entitled to insure and 
recover to the whole amount of the insurance in their own names, holding the 
surplus beyond their own interest in trust for other parties interested, in this 
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case B, the court was equally divided. Bovill CJ and Denman J said they were 
entitled on the ground that the cotton as a whole was the security for the 
plaintiffs’ liability to pay under their acceptance and they were also consignees 
under their advance to manage the consignments. In this case, the assured had 
a hotchpot interest, together with B in the cotton and also an interest, not 
extending to the whole value, of some of the cargo, both of which were 
insurable partial interests. 
2.7 Re-insurance 
2.7.1 An insurer can reinsure his insurable interest in his risk 
2.7.1.1 Validity of reinsurance 
Section 9(1) says that the reassured can have an interest in the preservation of 
the subject matter of the primary insurance after it has entered into the contract 
of the aforesaid insurance and reinsure such an interest by reinsurers under a 
contract of reinsurance.560  
 
In the context of statutory regulation, contracts of reinsurance saw a change 
from invalidity to recognition by various Acts. Reinsurance in the first place was 
unlawful until 1864.561 Section 4 of the Marine Insurance Act 1745 debarred 
reinsurance: an insurer was not allowed to reinsure unless he was dead or 
bankrupt or insolvent. This provision was to protect the insurer against a claim 
as to insurance without insurable interest,562 because as with original insurance, 
reinsurance policies were made in the guise of wager and, specifically to 
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reinsurance, they were used to speculate in the rise and fall of premiums.563  In 
1864, the ban on reinsurance was removed and reinsurance was thus provided 
as a valid contract by s 1 of 27 & 28 Vict. c. 56. However, the validity of 
reinsurance was later expressly recognised by s 92 of the Stamp Act 1896 and 
s 9 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906.564 By contrast, at common law, contracts 
of insurance including reinsurance were always valid.565 
2.7.1.2 The nature of reinsurance 
It should be noted that reinsurance is generally not an insurance of liability and 
the subject matter of reinsurance is the same as that of the original insurance 
for reasons of history.566 The reassured has an insurable interest in the risk as 
to the loss of the subject matter of insurance and can recover the loss to the 
extent of what he has insured.567 It has long been laid down as law with high 
authority that reinsurance, which is not a contract of liability insurance, is 
nevertheless an independent insurance effected by the reassured and the 
reinsurer on the same subject matter as the primary insurance has covered.568 
The main importance of treating the reinsurance as a separate contract is that 
the reinsurer only covers “what its own proper law holds it to cover”569 and third 
party procedure cannot be applicable. 
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2.7.1.3 A different approach in practice 
Reinsurance is however often treated as liability insurance and the subject of 
reinsurance can be contracted in the common course of insurance business. 
Under such contracts of reinsurance, the reassured can recover at the time 
when, under terms showing liability insurance, the reassured is liable to pay the 
primary assured.570 Lord Griffiths said that “In the ordinary course of business 
reinsurance is referred to as ‘back-to-back’ with the insurance, which means 
that the reinsurer agrees that if the insurer is liable under the policy the 
reinsurer will accept liability to pay whatever percentage of the claim he has 
agreed to reinsure.”571 Thus, the reinsurer was held liable to the reassured 
because the reinsurance was effected by the reassured by wording showing 
liability insurance: “by the reinsurance policy, the underwriters promised that if 
Vesta (the reassured) became liable for a loss under the insurance policy, then 
the underwriters would make good 90% of the loss. Vesta became liable for a 
loss under the insurance policy and the underwriters must perform and observe 
their promise in the reinsurance policy.” 572  The italicised words are terms 
showing liability insurance.  
 
As to the extent that the reassured can recover, the cover under reinsurance 
should not be wider than that of the primary insurance and the reinsurer need 
only pay the reassured’s legal liability. Therefore, the form of a reinsurance 
policy is often termed as “being a reinsurance subject to all clauses and 
conditions of the original policy or policies, and to pay as may be paid 
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thereupon.”573 The exceptions in the original policy should also apply to the 
contract of reinsurance. Thus, the reinsurer need not pay the reassured where 
the extent of the cover under the two kinds of insurance is different.574 
 
Furthermore, subject to the wording of reinsurance policies, the nature of the 
reinsurance can be a reinsurance of liability rather than one on the subject 
matter insured by the original insurance. Thus, in Feasey,575 the court held that 
the subject matter of the reinsurance between S and the Lloyd’s syndicate was 
its possible loss for compensating shipowners, as its members, for injury or 
death of the employees on board the ships, rather than the subject of the 
original insurance which was its members’ liability for personal injury or death. 
The reassured S, a Protection and Indemnity club (P&I Club), was entitled to 
have an insurable interest in its liability because the subject of the reinsurance, 
its liability, embraced its interest in the liability, that it was at risk of suffering a 
loss if injury or death of the employees occurred relating to its members. The 
court further held that it also had an insurable interest in the lives and well-being 
of the employees. Although it did not necessarily mean that a policy on liability 
could cover life, where the policy indeed intended to cover life, it should be 
allowed so to do. 
2.7.1.4 Different nature of insurable interest possessed by the assured and the 
reassured 
The subject matter of a contract of insurance and reinsurance is the same.576 
However, the nature of the insurable interest in the subject of those two different 
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types of insurance is different.577 As to the original insurance contract, whether 
an assured has an insurable interest, and what is its nature, should be tested by 
common law rules and the relevant provisions under the 1906 MIA. The 
purpose of a contract of insurance is to protect the assured’s insurable interest 
from being damaged or lost. In the latter context, the reassured has an 
insurable interest in the liability for the risk to the subject matter insured under 
the original policy, which has been confirmed by s 9 of the 1906 MIA. The 
reassured’s interest in the risk is a type of contingent interest. 578  However, 
differing from the purpose of the original insurance, which is to protect the 
insurable interest of the assured other than the subject, a reinsurance is 
devised to protect the subject matter of the original policy other than the 
reassured’s insurable interest in the so-described subject.579 Consequently, the 
amount being able to be recovered by the assured under the original insurance 
will not necessarily be the same as the amount recoverable by the reassured 
under the reinsurance. “For example, the liability of the primary insurer will not 
necessarily be for the whole loss suffered by the original insured but may be 
subject to exceptions and limitations.” 580  Also, unless the reinsurance 
specifically provides, the reinsurer generally is only liable for the reassured’s 
legal liability to the original assured and not for the liability outside of the cover 
of the original insurance, such as ex gratia payments.581 
2.7.1.5 Distinction between double insurance and reinsurance 
Contracts of reinsurance and that of double insurance are different. The parties 
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who made the contracts are different: the former is taken out by the reassured 
for his own account whereas the latter is both effected by or on behalf of the 
original assured.582 There is also a difference between the risks to be covered: 
reinsurance having been entered into, is devised to be obliged to the primary 
insurer for the whole or part of the risk that it has been bound to pay under the 
original insurance while for double insurance, the original insurance is on a risk 
already covered by other contracts of insurance.583 The extent of cover as to 
reinsurance is by and large narrower than that of original insurance while the 
sum insured under double insurance is generally larger than the insurable value 
under unvalued policies or the fixed value under valued policies. 
 
2.7.2 An original assured generally cannot claim directly against the reinsurer 
2.7.2.1 Reasons for the rule 
Section 9(2) reflects the doctrine of privity of contract and states that subject to 
the terms of the original contracts and reinsurance, the original assured cannot 
bring an action directly against the reinsurer. The original insurance and 
reinsurance contracts are independent contracts. The former is taken out 
between the original assured and the primary insurer while the latter is a 
contract between the primary insurer and reinsurer.584 Therefore, in light of the 
general principle relating to the privity of contract,585 the original assured cannot 
directly claim against the reinsurer. 586  In Nelson v Empress Assurance 
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Corporation,587 which was the first case in relation to whether the third party 
procedure could apply to the reinsurer, it was held that the third party procedure 
did not apply to cases in which the reassured tried to take an action against the 
reinsurer, insomuch as the contract of original insurance and that of reinsurance 
were separate ones and the contract of reinsurance was stated as not one of 
“indemnity” that the reinsurer would be liable to indemnify the reassured for its 
risk of pecuniary loss under the original insurance. Should that be the case, the 
reassured would be inclined to indemnify the assured and afterwards seek to 
get “indemnified” from the reinsurer. Besides, if the third party procedure was 
allowed, much inconvenience would be incurred: one was that, sometimes, 
what the reinsurer had insured was, subject to the terms of policy of reinsurance, 
not necessarily the same as cover accepted by the reassured under the original 
policy; the other was that it was possible that additional expenses might be 
incurred because the reassured might again sue on the reinsurance if the 
previous third party procedure had failed.588 
2.7.2.2 Contravention of the principle of privity of contract   
According to s 1 of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, which 
overrides the principle of the privity of contract, in two situations, the reinsurer 
may be sued directly by the assured as the third party.589 Firstly, by the express 
agreement of the reinsurance policy, the original assured may change the legal 
position so as to breach the principle of privity and take an action directly 
against the underwriter of a policy of the reinsurance.590 This has been provided 
for by s 9(2) of the 1906 MIA: without such an agreement, the original assured 
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was not entitled to sue under the reinsurance policy and recover losses from 
reinsurers for loss caused by insured perils.591 Vice versa, the original assured 
would have had a direct claim against the reinsurer had there been such an 
agreement.  
 
Secondly, where the original assured can under the terms and intention of the 
reinsurance contracts gain an advantage, he thus may directly claim against 
reinsurers.592 In the ordinary course of business, in order to entitle the assured 
to directly pursue an action against reinsurers, reinsurance contracts normally 
include a cut-through clause.593 The clause is chiefly designed to prevent the 
original assureds themselves from being unable to recover from reassureds due 
to their insolvency. Thus, pursuant to s 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986, original 
assureds may have an advantageous position: where reassureds go into 
insolvent liquidation, subject to some qualifications, the provision of the clause 
can have the effect that reassureds give a preference over the original 
assureds. However, the effect of the clause giving a preference may be in 
violation of the pari passu principle by s 107 of the Act which means that 
unsecured creditors in a winding up shall be dealt with equally. This may not be 
accurate because s 107 is subject to s 239 in relation to preferential payments, 
s 4(a) of which stipulates that original assureds, despite normally being 
unsecured creditors, may enjoy preferential payments if reassureds are liable to 
indemnify their loss.  
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2.8 Bottomry 
2.8.1 It is the lender that must insure 
In this section, it declares that “The lender of money on bottomry or 
respondentia has an insurable interest in respect of the loan.” The lender of 
money, not the borrower, can insure the money loaned in pursuance of a 
bottomry bond or respondentia on the security of ship or cargo, because if the 
ship or cargo cannot arrive safely, it is the lender that will lose his money 
advanced,594 i.e. he bears a sea risk as to the safe arrival of the vessel. He may 
also possibly possess an insurable interest in the vessel or cargo provided he 
can in certain circumstances have a lien on the vessel.595 
2.8.2 Obsolete concept 
Bottomry and respondentia were early forms of marine policies and have long 
been obsolete, not only at the present time, but also at the time prior to the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906.596 As “essentially a combination of loan, security 
and insurance”,597 they are kinds of inchoate rights founded on existing rights 
and are insurable.598 To put it simply, in order to complete the voyage, the 
master was empowered to take a loan from money-lender on the security of the 
vessel and freight, which was called a bottomry bond, or of cargo, which was 
referred to as respondentia.599 Where the ship or goods arrived in safety, the 
assured had to repay the advance or loan by the lender with interest; in the 
case of loss as to the security, the lender would recover nothing and the 
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assured did not need to repay the advance.600 However, the master of the 
vessel could borrow by bottomry or respondentia when there was really a 
necessity, for instance, in cases of emergency, and these were limited by some 
restrictions.601  
2.8.3 The definition of bottomry bonds 
Bottomry bonds are contracts in the nature of mortgages on a vessel, i.e. the 
master of the vessel borrows money from a lender by pledging its keel or 
bottom, pars pro toto, as a security for repayment. The loan is intended to 
enable the master of the vessel to fit it out to continue the voyage or to 
purchase a cargo for a specified voyage. The legal effect of the bond is that the 
lender cannot obtain the repayment of the loan where the vessel has been lost 
in the course of the specified voyage by maritime perils stipulated in the 
bond.602  
 
To be an effective bottomry bond, one essential of maritime risk must thus be 
identified603  at the risk of the lender. In other words, the lender’s payment 
advanced is conditional upon whether the vessel can safely arrive,604 and is not 
guaranteed that it can be definitely returned without being exposed to suffer a 
loss from maritime perils. Under a bottomry bond or respondentia, whether the 
lender could be repaid the advance is dependent on whether the vessel or 
cargo exposed to risks at sea specified in the contracts can safely arrive at her 
destination. Should a ship or its cargo be lost by the perils enumerated, the 
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lender will lose his advance; he will otherwise have repayment of the loan and 
the premium or relevant interest as agreed with the borrower.605  As to the 
essential of maritime risk, Parke, B further states that whether or not the lender 
is at risk of sea perils can affect the validity of hypothecation.606 It should be 
noticed that the word hypothecation has an ambiguous meaning, which could 
mean bottomry or mortgage only. Parke, B may here refer to the meaning of 
bottomry in his statement because the security is the ship. Without referring to a 
sea risk in a bond, it would be rendered invalid.607 
2.8.4 Voyage must be specified 
To be a valid bottomry bond, the voyage must be specified. Without specifying 
the voyage, on the part of the borrower, the load could be repaid too soon, and 
so would not fulfil the purpose of bottomry for the lender; or the sea risk could 
not be identified because the duration of the voyage was unclear. On the part of 
the lender, the payment of money advanced could be indefinitely postponed; as 
a result, the vessel would be made a secret maritime lien for a long time.608 In 
both cases, they are not a valid bottomry bond. 
2.9 Master’s and seamen’s wages 
2.9.1 Seamen’s wages and goods 
2.9.1.1 Reasons for previously banning seamen from insuring wages 
Section 11 of the 1906 MIA has made it clear that either the master or a 
seaman of a ship can have an insurable interest in his wages. At common law, 
at one time, seamen were not allowed to earn their wages until the vessel had 
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earned her freight,609 nor could they insure wages and any commodities as 
substitutes for wages. Where seamen’s agents negligently failed to take out an 
insurance for them, the seamen could not recover the value of their wages by 
suing the agent.610 One reason for this rule was that enabling a seaman to 
insure his wages might be contrary to principles of public policy.611 For instance, 
by allowing such insurance, seamen might not try their best to preserve the 
vessel when a sea risk occurred. Therefore, the wages of a mariner who 
deserted the vessel before the completion of the voyage had been held to be 
forfeited.612 Similarly, there were worries that allowing seamen to insure their 
wages would encourage certain misbehaviours because they could also recover 
wages by such a policy in the case of desertion, even though they were not paid 
by the shipowner.613  In addition, the above common law rule was in effect 
evaded if seamen’s wages were entitled to be covered by insurance.614 
 
Another ground for this rule was that it was also believed that freight was the 
mother of wages: 615  therefore, “by the law of England it was an implied 
condition of the seaman's contract with the ship-owner that his wages were 
dependent on the earning of freight by the ship.”616 Where freight could not be 
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earned as the ship had been lost before it would have come to a delivering port, 
wages were also not due.617 Without the earning of the freight, wages then 
could not become payable.  
2.9.1.2 Goods purchased with wages can be insured 
While wages of seamen were not allowed to be the subject matter of an 
insurance, the goods have never been debarred: either the goods were bought 
by seamen with wages they had received or they were shipped on board. This 
was based on the fact that a seaman’s interest in wages was a contingent one 
while he already possessed a vested title to the goods, which were an insurable 
interest.618 
2.9.1.3 Alteration 
The position at common law as to whether a seaman can insure his wages has 
been changed by statutes cutting the connection between the earning of wages 
and the receiving of freight. At common law, seamen’s wages were not payable 
until the earning of the freight. They were consequently uninsurable because 
they were not dependent on an existing entitlement to wages, i.e. they might be 
lost not only arising from marine perils insured against but the earning of freight. 
Afterwards, the common law rule as to seamen’s wages being uninsurable and 
dependent upon freight was abolished by statute. 619  Section 183 of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1854 provided that wages were totally independent on 
the earning of freight, though seamen who had not done their best to save the 
ship in the event of its wreck or loss had no right to claim. Under s 38 of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1995, seamen could, on the occurrence of wreck or loss 
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as to the ship in question, attain his wages payable in the two months following 
the date of the wreck or loss for his unemployment and could thus insure and 
recover his vested interest by statute in wages. Seamen’s wages thus were no 
longer dependent on the receipt of freight, and no link between freight and 
wages existed.620 To sum up, seamen’s wages cannot directly be influenced by 
the earning of freight and are payable as existing rights under the contract of 
employment, and they are thus insurable, which has been expressly stipulated 
in s 11 of the 1906 MIA.  
2.9.2 Wages of the master can always be insured 
By contrast, the master could take out an insurance contract upon his wages, 
and any commissions and privileges to which he was payable.621 He could also 
insure any interest that the master might have in the vessel. 622  As to the 
master’s interests in other subjects, besides wages, depending on existing 
rights, Lord Mansfield stated “that the law allows the captain of a ship to insure 
goods which he has on board, or his share in the ship, if he be a part-owner; 
and the captain of a privateer, if he be a part-owner, to insure his share.”623  
2.9.3 Grounds on different rules relating to the insurability of wages of seamen and 
master 
The rule of law in relation to the insurance of wages of the master and the 
seamen was different. In the case of King,624 although the court was concerned 
to decide the insurability of the captain’s commission and privileges and indeed 
so held, the court also discussed in detail the difference as to insurance of 
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wages between the master and the seamen. The master’s wages, commission 
and privileges could be deemed to be its investments which were legally 
insurable. Besides, when explaining the different legal position as to wages of a 
master and a seaman, Chambre J commented that the shipowner had personal 
trust and confidence in the master and the latter was liable to the former under 
the terms of their agreement, due to which the shipowner would not fear that the 
master would desert its vessel. Also, he said because of such trust and 
confidence, the master could not take an action against the vessel in the Court 
of Admiralty, but must pursue his remedy at law. He furthermore added that a 
master himself was regarded as quasi-owner of the vessel and bound to be 
tried. By contrast, shipowners have no personal trust and confidence in seamen, 
and the latter could sue at law and was of course not a quasi-owner.625  
2.10 Advance freight 
2.10.1 The risk of loss of advance freight can confer on the person having advanced 
the freight an insurable interest 
The principle of insurable interest as regards advance freight is provided by s 
12 of the 1906 MIA as follows: a person can have an insurable interest in its 
advance freight because it is commonly unrepayable in the event of loss.626 It is 
settled law that, unless contracts otherwise provide, freight627 will not become 
due until the completion of the voyage, so it is the shipowner who generally is at 
the risk of loss of freight and thus has an insurable interest in freight. However, 
the position of advance freight can be distinguished due to the express 
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stipulation arising from the contract:628 where freight has been advanced by a 
person, the such as an owner of cargo or charters, to shipowners, such person 
rather than owners of ships is at risk of loss and has an insurable interest in its 
advanced freight. The practice of prepaying part of freight was popular in the 
carriage of goods by sea, because the shipowner might not afford the long 
voyage, like a long voyage from the UK to India, while freight was not easy to 
be pledged.629 In addition, subject to terms of agreement, advanced freight was 
not repayable in English law. At common law, the law was first set down by 
Saunders CJ in 1682 and “has remained ever since”630 and confirmed by De 
Silvale v Kendall631 that, unless otherwise provided, advance freight could not 
be repaid to the freighters even though a loss of the vessel had happened 
before it arrived at its delivering port.632 Also, unless charterparty otherwise 
provided, advance freight was not repayable in consequence of the loss of the 
ship and cargo on the voyage caused by sea perils.633  
2.10.2 Difference between advanced money 
The money advanced by charterers, by constructing charterparties, can be a 
part of freight or otherwise a loan. 634  A difficulty may thus arise when to 
distinguish them. Be that as it may, the distinguishing is important because such 
distinction will affect whether the money advanced is insurable635 and who can 
effect a policy on the prepayment of money.     
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2.10.2.1 Types of advance freight 
The kinds of advance freight will be first discussed. It can be divided into 
repayable freight and unrepayable freight dependent on the charterparty. By 
making clear different types of advance freight, it will be manifest that who is at 
risk can have an insurable interest, the shipowner or the charterer. The issue as 
to whether prepayment of cash can be recovered by the charterer can affect 
who can effect a policy on such advance. Consequently, a policy on advance 
freight can be taken out by the right party to the charterparty. Therefore, where 
the advance money as a part of freight was prepaid and unrepayable by the 
charterer, meaning it had already been in the shipowner’s pocket, which 
rendered him not being at risk as to such advance, he did not need to make a 
contract of insurance. By contrast, where such freight was not repayable, the 
charterer who bore the risk of losing the advance freight due to the loss of the 
cargo and thus had an insurable interest.636 At common law, whole freight was 
not payable before the voyage was completed and the cargo was discharged, 
apparently, the shipowner had to bear the risk of all the perils of the sea.637 
Advanced freight may thus be meaningful to the shipowner in two respects: one 
is as disbursements during the course of a long voyage for those who are not 
competent to afford them; the other is that the shipowner, by asking for an 
unrepayable advance freight by the charterer, could manage to bear less risk in 
general.638 For the latter, Lord Ellenborough CJ was of the opinion that the point 
of advance freight was to be free from all contingency, the residue was to abide 
by the contingency during her performing voyage. 639  Conversely, with the 
express terms of the charterparty stipulating advance freight repayable in the 
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event of the vessel lost, the shipowner may be entitled to insure such freight 
because it was the shipowner that was at risk of losing the prepaid money if the 
ship was lost.640 The key test is the issue of who is at risk. 
2.10.2.2 Rules for loans 
In the usual event of prepayment of money provided for the ship’s 
disbursements or meeting vessel’s expenses, at the loading port, such advance 
is regarded as a loan to the shipowner.641 With respect to a loan in the form of 
repaid money, it should be repaid at any time by an action against the 
shipowner642 since the recovery by the charterer must be repaid and does not 
depend on whether freight has been earned by the shipowner.643 It thus cannot 
be insured by either party to the charterparty because neither the shipowner nor 
the charterer are at risk of loss as to a loan. Thus, where a case respecting an 
advance of money which might have been insured, by the construction of the 
instrument, was brought before the court to adjudge whether it was an advance 
freight or a mere loan, it was held that it was advance freight as it was the 
repaid money as to advance freight, not a loan, that could be insured. 644 
Although the issue whether the advance was a part of freight or a loan was not 
the main concern in the case, with the appearance of terms such as “owner to 
insure the amount”, Pollock, CB stated that it was advance freight,645 because it 
might be reasoned that the advance rather than a loan was insurable. 
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2.10.2.3 How to distinguish advance freight from a loan 
The distinction between advance freight and a loan should be made by properly 
constructing the charterparty.646 Only by the interpretation of the “entire” charter, 
can the intentions of the parties thus be inferred. 647  As to lacking relevant 
provisions in the charter, the intentions of the parties can also be inferred from 
the agreement or the conduct of the parties.648  
 
Although the distinction mainly relies on the construction of particular contracts 
in each case, the following common three phrases may be construed as freight 
in advance. The stipulations such as “such freight to be paid as follows” or “the 
residue of such freight to be paid” could be depended on to determine that 
advanced money was a part of freight,649 as the italicised words of freight and 
residue plainly meant that advance money was a part of freight.650 Besides, 
advanced money including phrases like “not requiring interest or commission” 
may be interpreted by the courts as advance freight, rather than a loan. In the 
event of a loan, interest and commission would be charged.651 Additionally, it 
was held that the money advanced was a loan because nothing more was 
stipulated by the charter other than that cash should be paid in advance to meet 
the vessel’s expenditure or disbursements.652  
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2.11 Charges of insurance 
2.11.1 The ambit of the charges of insurance 
The provision of s 13 of the 1906 MIA is that “The assured has an insurable 
interest in the charges of any insurance which he may effect.”653 In the past, 
around 1811, “the charges of insurance” generally contained three types of 
charges: the premium, the brokerage (if paid by the assured) and the stamp.654 
This enlarged ambit of interest may be based on the fact that due to the very act 
of insuring the assured is at risk not only relating to the amount of the invoice 
price at the loading port, but also to premiums, brokerage and stamp duty. 655 
 
Due to the repeal of stamp duty on marine policies by the Financial Act 1970 
which came into effect on 1 August 1970, charges therefore only consist of the 
gross premium, including premium and commission.656 Further, it makes sense 
that charges of insurance are commonly referred to as net premium. In practice, 
brokerage is commonly paid by insurers, though it is only obtained by the broker 
deducting it from the gross premium paid by assureds to him. In this case, 
charges of insurance only include net premium. Nevertheless, it can be paid by 
the assured where he has contracted with the broker to pay the latter the 
commission.657 In this event, charges of insurance comprise both net premium 
and brokerage because the latter is at risk of the assured. 
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2.11.2 Charges of insurance being insurable is helpful for ascertaining the insurable 
value of the subject insured 
The provision of s 13 of the 1906 MIA assists the ascertaining as to the 
insurable value of the subject matter insured stipulated by s 16, which thus 
includes charges of insurance based on its being insurable. This section 
resolves the problem as to how, in the context of an open policy,658 the value of 
goods should be estimated. In the context of a valued policy, the approach is 
clear that the agreed value insured in the policy is the valuation. As to valuation 
of loss covered by an open policy, the assured needs first to ascertain the value 
of goods, unlike that of a valued policy which has been fixed at the time of the 
contract of insurance, in order to get fully indemnified. Where the court was 
asked to decide the insurable value of cargo under an open cover, it held that 
the assured could recover the value of goods upon a sound policy, the value of 
which consists of not only the invoice price at the loading port, but also the 
premium and the brokerage. 659  
2.12 Quantum of interest 
2.12.1 Interest in Mortgage 
2.12.1.1 Two different interests of mortgagor and mortgagee 
As to the amount of interest of a mortgagor and mortgagee, it has been 
declared in s 14(1) of the 1906 MIA as follows: the mortgagor still has an 
insurable interest in insured property, though it has been mortgaged to a 
mortgagee. He can thus take out a separate policy on the property to insure to 
the extent of its full value. Also, the mortgagee has an insurable interest in the 
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above property and can make his own contract of insurance. Unless the policy 
otherwise provides, he can only insure to the extent of his mortgage debt.660  
 
Although the property is mortgaged to the mortgagee as security on debt to part 
of or to its full value, in the event of loss, the mortgagor will lose that part or 
whole of interest in the property and still be liable for the debt. The interest of 
the mortgagor was thus held as an equitable interest remaining to him, whereas 
the mortgagee’s interest was regarded as a legal interest.661 The latter derives 
from the contract of mortgage. These two distinct types of interests between 
mortgagee and mortgagor decide the amount they can insure.662 For the part of 
a mortgagee, he can insure the amount mortgaged out of the relating contract 
because his debt is at risk; as for a mortgagor, he still has an interest as to title 
of the property in its full value, in spite of the property having been mortgaged to 
its full value.663 If the insured property be lost, the mortgagor will thus sustain a 
loss. 
2.12.1.2 Specific rules 
The rule of s 14 also applies to cases where the transaction was in effect a 
mortgage, while the form of the transaction was seemingly one of a sale of the 
vessel, under which the absolute title of the mortgagor would have been 
transferred.664 A loss of mortgage debt caused by the barratry of the mortgagor, 
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as the master, could also be recovered by a mortgagee.665 As obiter, A. L. 
Smith set out that both mortgagor and mortgagee had an insurable interest 
because where the policy on a mortgagor’s interest was assigned to a 
mortgagee, any defence which would be brought against a mortgagor would 
also be against a mortgagee.666  Where the debt from which the mortgagee’s 
interest derived had been paid off, he could not have such interest in the debt 
any more. In Levy & Co v Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co, 667  albeit the 
mortgagee were entitled to recover where mortgaged debt was paid off because 
of the specific facts, he would ordinarily bear no risk and thus lose the interest in 
the mortgage once such debt had been paid off.  
2.12.2 A person having partial interest can insure on behalf of himself and others as 
well. 
2.12.2.1 A person having partial interest can insure on behalf of others 
S 14(2) of the 1906 MIA sets out that a mortgagee, consignee, or other person 
having an interest in the subject-matter insured may insure on behalf and for the 
benefit of other persons interested as well as for his own benefit. 668  This 
principle codified the judgement of Bovill CJ and Denman J where the court 
held that the assured, who was both the mortgagee and the consignee, having 
interest, being recoverable by them, in respective part of the insured subject, 
could insure other beneficiary parties’ interest, not limited to their own interest, 
in the subject and recover the whole value of the subject beyond the mortgage 
debt and retain such surplus as trustees for other persons interested.669 A judge 
thus stated that a person having a limited interest may insure to the extent of 
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the whole value and recover such value.670 A mortgagee could therefore have 
insured not only his own interest but that of the mortgagor on the latter’s 
account.671  
2.12.2.2 A mortgagee, consignee, or other person having an interest 
There was no doubt that a mortgagee could recover upon the policy on a 
mortgage debt, although the amount covered had not yet been decided by the 
jury.672 This has been addressed by s 14(2) of the 1906 MIA. The rules as to the 
amount recoverable for a mortgagee’s interest, which is a type of creditor, are 
the same as those general rules relating to a creditor: he can have an insurable 
interest and can recover to the sum of his own limited interest in the subject 
matter of the policy pledged to him as security on debts, because he may have 
a lien or claim on it, unless he has at the time of the contract of insurance 
intended to cover the interests of other persons interested, which can entitle him 
to cover the whole value of the insured subject, holding the residue as trustees 
for other persons interested or insurers.673  A consignee who has advanced 
money for property consigned to him is also one such creditor; while a naked 
consignee and one who is authorised by a consignor to sell, dispose of or 
manage it are not, though the latter may have an insurable interest due to the 
grant of rights. A naked consignee who only possesses the insured property will 
be regarded only as an agent and thus has no insurable interest in it because 
he has no legal rights to it, nor will he suffer an economic loss by its loss. By 
contrast, a consignee can also be treated as a commission agent due to the 
grant of power by a consignor to sell or dispose of the insured property, where 
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he can aver an insurable interest in it because with the grant he may lose the 
commission if it is lost. Of course, he cannot have an insurable interest in an 
expectancy of commission, which is not a present existing interest.  
 
Other interested persons include those such as a bailee,674 a carrier with a lien 
over goods,675 contractors and sub-contractors having pervasive interests,676 an 
owner leasing his land677 and any joint owner.678 They may have interests of 
various natures in insured property, such as partial interests or contingent 
interests.  Although they may merely be interested in their own limited interests, 
they may be entitled to insure in their own names on behalf of themselves to the 
amount of their own interests, as well as on behalf of other persons interested 
to the extent of the total value of the subject, holding the surplus in trust.  
2.12.2.3 The rule of double insurance protects the indemnity doctrine  
From a theoretical view, such a rule is justified. Over-insurance by double 
insurance may arise because persons having different interests in property 
insured may take out their own separate insurance contracts, leading to the 
sum insured being in excess of the valuation in valued policies or its full 
insurable value in unvalued policies. However, rules under s 32 of the 1906 MIA 
can prevent each party having effected insurance from recovering the amount in 
excess of that in which he is actually interested. Firstly, before recovering from 
other insurers, he must have given credit against the valuation for the sum 
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having been recovered in valued policies;679 similarly, where he has made an 
unvalued policy, he must have given credit against the full insurable value for 
the sum having been received.680 Secondly, where he has recovered a sum 
exceeding the amount he is interested in, he will be trustees for his insurers 
who have the right of contribution as to surplus.681 
2.12.2.4 How to treat surplus 
As to the sum exceeding a mortgagee’s own limited interest, he as a trustee 
has to return them to others interested, such as an owner of a ship or cargo, or 
an insurer. Also, the underwriter may recover back the surplus from him.682 
Rules with regards to other interested persons are, it has been suggested, the 
same as that of the mortgagee.683  
2.12.2.5 Conditions as to whether a person having a limited interest can recover the 
full value  
2.12.2.5.1 Intention at the time of contract determining the amount recoverable 
A person having a partial interest in the insured property can only recover to the 
amount of his own limited interest. However, where he has satisfied the 
following three conditions, he can recover the full amount of the property, 
holding the excess under trust as to the residue. The first condition for his right 
to recover such amount is the form of the policy, i.e. it has to be one that will not 
limit him insuring the full value of the insured property.684 
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The second is relating to the intention of the assured who must have intended 
to insure on behalf of other persons interested at the time of making an 
insurance contract. 685 In the case686 where the insurer claimed to recover back 
their proportion of the sum paid to the mortgagee, who had insured the property 
by double insurance, the issue arose as to whether the mortgagee had received 
more than the amount he had an interest in. The intention needed to be first 
dealt with because if he had intended to cover the full value at the time of 
insurance contract, he was entitled to recover such value. The court thus held 
that the intention of the mortgagee in effecting the valued policy, i.e. to insure 
the sum mortgaged only, or the whole value of the vessel on behalf of the 
owner, should be decided by the jury because it could affect on whose account 
the insurance had been made. Similarly, where a claim was raised by a lienor to 
recover the amount on his interest in a cargo, the jury was directed to decide 
what interests had been intended to be insured effecting the policy.687  It was a 
question of construction of the policy as to whether the assured only intended to 
cover his own interest only or the whole value.688  
 
In particular, in the case of a valued policy, the intention of insuring whose 
interest is important. If the mortgagee intends to insure his mortgage debt only, 
he can thus recover money amounting to his interest only. By contrast, he may 
recover the amount to the full extent of the value on the valued policy had he 
insured the whole value of the vessel. The principle as to an unvalued policy is 
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said to be the same as the above rules respecting the valued policy, which also 
depends on the intention of the mortgagee.689  
2.12.2.5.2 Bilateral agreement between the assured and the insurer may be material. 
Apart from the above two conditions, where a person having a limited interest 
has been regarded as an undisclosed principal in order to recover the full value, 
the insurer’s agreement may be a requisite. Other interested persons having a 
limited interest may be treated as undisclosed principals to the insurer who had 
not been notified by the assured to include such an undisclosed principal as a 
co-assured. The insurer does often not concern himself with the undisclosed 
principal, subject to the terms of the policy and the situations where it has been 
taken out, and that is why a person interested can insure on behalf of other 
persons interested.690 However, where by construction of the terms of the policy 
in question an undisclosed principal having a limited interest cannot be covered 
unless the insurer is willing to cover, bilateral agreement between the assured 
and him is needed.691 The agreement is necessary because the inclusion of an 
undisclosed principal as a co-assured can affect the insurer’s right of 
subrogation, especially where the assured is a shipowner and an undisclosed 
principal is a shipyard, for the latter is liable for damage to the former’s ship. If 
such undisclosed principal is a co-assured, in the event of the loss of the ship, 
the insurer after payment to the assured will not be entitled to exercise his right 
of subrogation on the undisclosed principal. According to a recent authority, it 
was held that the policy in question could not cover the shipyard as an 
undisclosed co-assured, unless the insurer had so agreed at the time of 
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effecting the policy.692 Also, it may be deduced that the unilateral intention of the 
assured may be insufficient to entitle him to recover the full value, because the 
agreement of the insurer to include a co-assured may be necessary. Perhaps 
that is why it has been suggested that, from more recent authorities, the 
unilateral intention of the assured without having communicated with the insurer 
cannot of itself determine the amount recoverable.693   
2.12.3 Quantum of an owner’s interest 
2.12.3.1 Being able to be remedied by a third party cannot prevent an owner from 
having an insurable interest in its own property. 
Although a third party may have agreed, or be liable, to indemnify the owner of 
the subject insured in case of loss, the owner can still insure his property to the 
total value.694 This common law point originated from a case as to a charter 
party in which the charterer had agreed to indemnify the owner of the ship to the 
extent of the whole estimated value and the court held that the owner had still 
an insurable interest with regards to the full value of the ship insured. 695 
Similarly, the owner of the goods could insure the whole value of his goods, 
notwithstanding that the shipowner would be liable to remedy the loss caused 
by his negligence.696  
2.12.3.2 The right of subrogation 
Where the third party who had agreed to or was liable to indemnify the assured 
in the event of loss nonetheless did not pay the assured, the insurer of the 
assured who had then indemnified the latter’s loss could thus be subrogated to 
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maintain an action to recover the amount having been paid by him to the 
assured. 697  The right of subrogation could prevent the assured’s double 
indemnity698 and could make sense of why two persons could insure the same 
subject to the extent of its whole value699 because the insurer of the owner 
might sue against the third party to prevent the assured, after having received 
cover, again obtaining remedy from the third party. The case in which remedy 
had been made by the third party would be different: the assured could not 
claim against the insurer because the loss suffered by him had been recovered 
from the third party.700  
 
2.13 Assignment of interest 
2.13.1 The contract of insurance not running with that of purchase 
Section 15 of the 1906 MIA applies to all forms of insurance.701 It solves the 
problem as to whether a mere sale of goods can have the effect of 
automatically assigning a relevant contract of insurance. Pursuant to its 
provisions, where the assured has assigned or parted with all his interest in the 
property insured under the contract of purchase, the contract of insurance does 
not run with the subject matter of insurance unless there is an express or 
implied agreement with the assignee as to the assignment of the policy to 
violate the privity of contract: for example, the transferring of the policy with the 
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assignment of property has been included in the contract for sale.702 Without 
such agreement, the assured is the only person who has a right to sue upon the 
policy to recover under the contract of insurance.703 Subject to that, where the 
interest of the assignor in property is transmitted to the assignee by act or 
operation of law, such as the assignor’s death, bankruptcy or subrogation, 
despite it being without the foresaid agreement for the purpose of assigning the 
policy to the assignee, he may enjoy the rights under the policy.704 
 
After the transferring of insurable interest in property, with no express or implied 
agreement as to transferring the policy, its enforceability now needs to be 
discussed. First, the marine policy is assignable: with regards to the assignment 
of a marine policy, s 50 of the 1906 MIA has provided the time, the effect and 
the form of its assignment.705 It is different from the rule in relation to other 
forms of property insurance against non-marine risks that a policy cannot be 
assigned without the agreement of the insurer.706 Secondly, an assured having 
no interest cannot assign and sue upon a policy: the policy is invalid and not 
assignable where the assured, before or when he assigns his interest, has not 
expressly or impliedly agreed to transfer the policy but afterwards assigns the 
policy, except in a case with relation to the assignment of a policy after loss. 707 
Likewise, after the assignment of the insured subject, even though the owner 
still has the policy in hand, due to his no longer having an interest in the subject, 
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the policy has lapsed since the assignment.708 
2.13.2 Position in a case of non-marine property insurance 
Despite being a decision on a non-marine case, the case of Rayner v Preston 
shows the grounds for s 15 regarding the different subject matter of purchase 
contract and insurance contract and privity of contract. The case was an appeal 
by the plaintiffs who purchased a house which had been insured by the vendor 
against fire before the purchase and sale contract was made. The policy of 
insurance was not mentioned in the contract of purchase. The house purchased 
was damaged by fire after the date of the contract but before the time fixed for 
completion. An action was brought by the plaintiff to claim the money received 
by the vendor from the insurer.  
 
The court held that the plaintiffs, the purchasers, despite having paid the price 
for the insured house, had no right to the insurance contract effected by the 
vendor. Cotton LJ stated that there must be appropriate terms under the 
contract for sale in relation to the assignment of the policy, or the purchasers 
were not entitled to enjoy the benefits of the vendor under the policy. He 
distinguished the contract for sale from the contract of insurance, which was 
expressed to be a collateral contract. Firstly, the policy could not affect whether 
the purchaser should perform its duty under the contract for sale: even if there 
had been no policy, where the house had been damaged by fire, the purchaser 
still had to fulfil its contractual duty. Secondly, the purpose of the policy was to 
pay the money value of the damage to or loss of property other than a sum to 
repair property, whereas the assured was free to use its recovery from the 
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insurer. The judgement from Brett LJ made it clear that by analogy with the rule 
as to marine insurance and subject to the principle of privity of contract, the 
contract of insurance did not run with the land. He thought it would be helpful to 
make a clear understanding of the relationship between vendors and vendees, 
and vendors and insurers, by distinguishing between the subject matter of the 
contract of insurance and that of purchase and sale, which were totally different 
matters. In relation to the former, the vendor and vendee had no relationship as 
to the subject matter of the contract of insurance, which was money only, 
because the contract of insurance was a mere personal contract between the 
vendor and the insurers, to which they were the only parties for the payment of 
money. Thus, unless the policy had been effectively transferred, the vendee 
was not entitled to sue on the policy. By contrast, vendor and vendee indeed 
had a relationship as to the subject matter of insurance and that of the contract 
of purchase and sale, which was a house, ship, goods, etc. However, under 
these circumstances, the vendor could not be regarded as the trustee of the 
vendee and even if he had been a trustee, the benefits under the policy could 
not been transferred to the vendee because of privity of contract.  
2.13.3 Position in marine insurance 
Subject to s 15 that the contract of insurance does not run with that of purchase 
and sale, nevertheless, in the following two situations, the assignee under a 
contract of purchase can obtain the assured’s rights under the contract of 
insurance: an express or implied agreement should be made in virtue either of 
an assignment of the policy at the time of the contract of purchase or of the 
assignor holding the policy as the trustee for the assignee.709 The interest in a 
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policy cannot be transferred merely by the assignment or sale of the subject 
matter insured, unless there is an agreement as to passing the interest under 
the policy of insurance. Thus, where there was no express or implied 
agreement with regard to passing the interest of the policy to the assignee as 
the purchaser under the contract of purchase, he is not entitled to recover from 
the insurer. 710  The assignor, who has assigned his interest in the insured 
property after the making of the contract of purchase and before the loss, 
cannot sue upon the policy unless he acts as the trustee of the assignee where 
the policy has already passed to the latter or the former has promised to keep 
the policy operative on behalf of the latter. 711   
Chapter 3 Problems Regarding Insurable Interest  
3.1 Problems with different statutes on insurable interest 
The situation of English law on insurable interest has been described as a 
confusing and illogical mess.712 The problems and uncertainty arising out of 
such a situation are as follows, in particular, with respect to the bewildering 
mixture of statutes and common law: 713  with rulings on the requirement of 
insurable interest, the effects of the 2005 GA respecting whether the 
requirement of insurable interest has been repealed by it, and the difference of 
interest between the indemnity doctrine and the insurable interest doctrine. 
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3.1.1 Various statutes regulating insurable interest 
As far as marine insurance contracts are concerned, there are complex and 
varied statutes to regulate the effect of not requiring an assured an insurable 
interest in such contracts.714 It is stated that the uncertain position of the law as 
to insurable interest is attributable to a succession of moral hazards caused by 
wager policies.715 
3.1.1.1 Marine insurance Acts 
Under the 1745 MIA, in light of marine policies, an interest must be possessed 
by the assured and policies without an interest or those of wagers and PPI will 
be held null and void.716 They have also been held illegal.717 However, the 
outcome of failing to have an interest under the 1745 MIA can now be ignored: 
it has been repealed and restated by the Act 1906.718 The 1788 MIA directly 
sets out that the names of persons interested in insurance contracts must be 
inserted into policies.719 It has also been repealed by the 1906 MIA in the realm 
of marine insurance. 720  Nowadays, by contrast, it is not the names of all 
interested persons, but those of the assured or of those who take out the 
insurance on its behalf that must be inserted into a marine policy.721 Section 4 
of the 1906 MIA declares that contracts of insurance by way of gaming or 
wagering will be rendered void due to a lack of insurable interest.722 Later, with 
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respect to an assured effecting a policy lacking an interest, the outcome of an 
unnecessary criminal offence is created by the 1909 MIA.723  
3.1.1.2 Gambling Acts 
It is imposed by the 1845 GA that all contracts, of course including ones of 
insurance, by way of wagering or gaming, are void and unenforceable.724 Since 
the implementation of the 2005 GA,725 s 18 of the 1845 GA has no longer any 
effect: gambling contracts are now enforceable. Interest appears not to be 
required any more under the 2005 GA, for gambling contracts, where the 
parties have no interest in the subject other than the sum staked, can be 
enforced. However, after the passage of the 2016 Draft, ss 5-6 have made it 
clear that insurable interest in the realm of insurance is unaffected by the 2005 
GA , in particular, the above position in contracts of marine insurance being left 
unchanged. 
3.1.2 Whether the requirement of insurable interest has been repealed by 
accident by the 2005 GA 
3.1.2.1 Arguments on the 2005 GA having affected insurance 
The confusing position as to whether an assured must have an insurable 
interest after the passage of the 2005 GA has brought complaints. 726  All 
contracts by way of wagering or gaming have been made void by s 18 of the 
1845 GA, and by doing so, have created an indirect requirement of insurable 
interest for all kinds of insurance contract,727 although there are some doubts 
that the interest created by s 18, under which an actual prospect of interest is 
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sufficient to make the contract enforceable, is different from the statutory 
insurable interest or a valid interest. 728  However, the position has become 
unclear brought about by the abolition of s 18 by s 335 of the 2005 GA,729 which 
has made certain gambling contracts legally enforceable since its coming into 
effect on 1 September 2007. 730  Because s 335 of the 2005 GA makes 
enforceable all contracts relating to gambling and s 4 of the 1906 MIA involves 
gambling, it is thus submitted that the latter has been affected by implication. 
Under gambling contracts, no other interest is needed to be shown by the 
assured other than the stake.731 As a result of the aforesaid enforcement of 
gambling, the requirement of insurable interest has thus been argued to have 
been repealed. 
3.1.2.2 Reasons for no effect on insurance by the 2005 GA    
3.1.2.2.1 Effect of the 2005 GA on the 1906 MIA 
There has been some debate as to whether the statutory insurable interest in 
marine insurance has been affected by the enactment of the 2005 GA.732 The 
grounds are as follows: s 4(1) of the 1906 MIA states that a marine insurance 
contract in relation to gaming or wagering is unenforceable, whereas s 335(1) of 
the 2005 GA states that a contract concerning gaming or wagering should not 
be rendered unenforceable.733 There is an exception by way of s 335(2) to s 
335(1): subsection (1) is without prejudice to any rule of law preventing the 
enforcement of a contract on the grounds of unlawfulness (other than a rule 
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relating specifically to gambling).734 It is thus likely that a marine insurance 
contract by way of gambling may be enforceable under s 335(1), unless it is 
preserved by s 335(2). It appears that s 4(1) is not preserved by s 335(2): what 
s 4(1) renders is the “avoidance” not the “unlawfulness” of any marine insurance 
contract by way of gambling. Besides, s 4(1) is a rule in respect of gambling, 
which seems to be the area covered by s 335(1).735 It is however fallacious to 
submit that s 4(1) has been influenced by s 335(2), which will be discussed 
below. 
3.1.2.2.2 Four reasons for insurance having not fallen within the regulation of the 
2005 GA  
Before the passage of the 2016 Draft, academics strongly argued that the 
position was unaffected. The requirement of insurable interest, at least in 
marine insurance, should still remain. It has been suggested that the following 
four reasons can be adopted to support such a proposition.736  
 
First, pursuant to the 1909 MIA, “a contract by way of gambling on loss by 
maritime perils” is criminal and illegal. Because such a contract relates to 
gambling and s 335 renders gambling contracts enforceable, it seems that s 
335 has affected the 1909 MIA. However, this is incorrect. S 335 only relates to 
the enforceability of gambling contracts while the 1909 MIA provides that 
gambling policies on marine perils are not only unenforceable but also illegal 
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and a criminal offence. Accordingly, s 335 cannot affect the operation of the 
1909 MIA. 
 
Secondly, s 4 of the 1906 MIA avoids wager policies not only because of 
gambling but also because they violate public policy. From the point of view of 
legislative purpose, making void insurance contracts without insurable interest 
or expectation of obtaining one and containing PPI terms or like ones, a type of 
wager policy, is not the only purpose of s 4 of the 1906 MIA. The first prohibition 
on a PPI policy by the 1745 MIA was mainly based on it being against public 
policy rather than gambling, which was explicit from the preamble to the 1745 
MIA. It was held that the preamble of the 1745 MIA showed that preventing 
wager policies was the least of the evils that the Act intended to remedy; the Act 
in effect mainly aimed to prohibit persons from carrying on illegal traffic and to 
stop insurance from being made the means of profiting by the wilful destruction 
and capture of ships.737 Although the effect of making a contract contrary to the 
requirement for insurable interest had been transferred from being illegal by the 
1745 MIA to void by the 1906 MIA, the view of the legislature remained 
unchanged and enactments of the Acts were even believed to merely and 
mainly be the result of lack of insurable interest being against public policy.738 
Therefore, a wager policy should not be deemed as having been denounced 
only because of its being a tool to be used in gaming or wagering. S 4 should 
therefore remain unaffected by the 2005 GA because it aims not only to ban 
gaming or wagering but also to protect public policy. Admittedly, the 
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requirement of loss by the indemnity principle can also nullify wager policies.739 
It has been thus submitted that neither marine insurance contracts nor any 
other contracts of insurance have been affected by the 2005 GA.740  
 
Thirdly, courts may not agree with the interference by the 2005 GA on marine 
insurance due to there being no such explicit intention from Parliament. From 
the courts’ perspective, the courts will probably incline to the position that the 
2005 GA has no effect on s 4 of the 1906 MIA sub silentio. According to the 
mischief rule, the intention of Parliament enacting the 2005 GA should be 
considered. Nevertheless, the express purpose of the 2005 GA is not for 
insurance but for regulating certain types of licensed gambling activities and 
taking account of the effect of the internet and new technology;741 that is to say, 
the effects on marine insurance have not been discussed by Parliament.742 The 
2005 GA then does not expressly repeal relevant sections of the 1906 MIA.743 
Taking the example of the approach of New Zealand, where the Gambling Act 
2004, s 9 intends to affect insurance by way of gaming or wagering, it 
manifestly provided that such a wager policy is no longer prohibited. Besides, 
insurance does not fall within the statutory definition of the 2005 GA.744 Clearly, 
as far as marine insurance is concerned, not only at common law,745 but by 
virtue of s 4(1) of the 1906 MIA,746 an assured is nevertheless required to 
possess an insurable interest. The 2005 GA has no provision to regulate 
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insurance, or the requirement of insurable interest, which “seems to indicate a 
legislative intention not to change the law with regard to insurance without 
interest, at any rate with regard to marine insurance, and probably with regard 
to insurance generally since the provisions of the 1906 MIA are, where 
appropriate, regarded as applicable to contracts of insurance generally”.747  
 
Fourthly, from a regulatory point of view, s 10 of the 2005 GA sets out that “bet” 
in the Act does not include a bet the making or accepting of which is a regulated 
activity within the meaning of section 22 of the FiSMA, nor does gambling.748 
Thus, the 2005 GA does not apply to a regulated activity. In the UK, FiSMA 
regulates the effecting and carrying out the contract of insurance as principal 
and insurance is therefore a specified activity by FiSMA. It is therefore desirable 
to assume that s 335 of the 2005 GA does not overrule s 4 of the 1906 MIA, 
which means the former does not repeal the requirement of insurable interest in 
marine insurance.749  
3.1.2.2.3 The current position 
According to the above analysis, s 4 remains unaffected and wagering policies 
thus are still void. By contrast, s 335 makes gambling contracts enforceable. 
Pursuant to the definition of gambling by the 2005 GA, wagering policies are 
included in gambling contracts: wagering policies fall within the definition of a 
bet, by virtue of s 9, which means making or accepting a transaction which 
depends on the outcome of an event and the likelihood of anything occurring or 
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not occurring; a bet is, by s 3, included in the concept of gambling. It may be 
confusing that the broader gambling is enforceable while the narrower wagering 
polices are unenforceable. It has been set out that it may be less surprising if 
the following two points are observed: first, the insurer is not authorized to carry 
on a gambling business even though gambling is now enforceable; secondly, 
the same position existed after the passage of the 1745 MIA but before the 
enactment of the 1845 GA during which wagering contracts of policies had been 
made illegal while wagering contracts of other kinds had been legal and 
enforceable.750   
3.1.3 Whether the indemnity principle can substitute the requirement of 
insurable interest 
3.1.3.1 Indemnity doctrine 
The assured uses indemnity insurance contracts to compensate its loss which it 
has suffered arising from perils insured against. Indemnity doctrine is the very 
fundamental principle of all indemnity insurance contracts and the foundation of 
every rule regarding that insurance law.751 In light of the doctrine, an assured 
cannot be indemnified against its loss unless he can prove the loss by showing 
an interest which he has possessed in the subject matter of the indemnity 
insurance. In other words, he can get fully indemnified up to his own full interest 
and only be entitled to recover to the extent of his loss, but no more.752 This 
principle can therefore prevent the assured from benefiting by way of insurance. 
Also, the indemnity doctrine requires the insured subject matter or the interest 
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to be exposed to the risk of loss by casualties. That is, although the assured 
has a type of interest in the subject all the time, where he has suffered a loss 
before the interest is at risk or the insurer begins to undertake its 
indemnification liability, the assured can still not be indemnified.753 
 
Bowen LJ held that such definition of the doctrine of indemnity should be 
understood in the widest sense as a non-exhaustive one.754 Thus, the interest 
needed by the indemnity principle may be wider than that required by the 
statutory insurable interest. A legal interest in the insured subject matter can 
definitely satisfy both principles of indemnity and insurable interest. By contrast, 
some kinds of interests are not sufficient to constitute an insurable interest but 
are able to be an interest required by the doctrine of indemnity, such as the 
mere pecuniary or economic interest, or a factual expectation of acquiring such 
an interest, first stated by Lawrence J in Lucena v Craufurd.  
3.1.3.2 Relation between doctrine of indemnity and insurable interest  
The requirement of insurable interest is intended to prohibit moral hazard and 
wager policies in the guise of insurance755 and to focus on the relationship 
between the assured and the insured subject756 of insurance. In comparison, 
the indemnity principle is designed to test whether the assured has sustained 
an actual loss and can be indemnified.757 Both of the principles can thus prevent 
no-loss recovery. Besides, both of them can prohibit wager policies because 
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under the indemnity principle the assured who has suffered no loss cannot get 
compensated.758 Clearly, the parties to a gambling cannot suffer a loss in the 
sense of insurance contracts. 
 
There is no doubt that a marine insurance contract is essentially nothing but 
one type of indemnity contract to compensate an assured’s loss.759 It has been 
contended that the principle of insurable interest is derived from the doctrine of 
indemnity.760 Marine insurance contracts governed by the indemnity doctrine 
thus make the need for the requirement of insurable interest,761 for, without the 
requirement, the assured cannot prove having sustained a loss incurred by the 
perils insured against during the cover of the policy.762  As to a contract of 
marine insurance, not only must the implied doctrine of indemnity be fulfilled, 
but also the statutory principle of insurable interest.763 
 
As for the situation where an assured only has an expected interest at the time 
of the contract, which is not successfully acquired during the later course, the 
outcomes in light of both doctrines are the same: the policy can be enforceable, 
not being a wager policy, but nonetheless the assured cannot be compensated 
on the policy for failing to show the loss.764 
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The distinction between principles of indemnity and insurable interest has been 
argued as one without a difference. 765  Under both principles in indemnity 
insurance, the effect appears to be same that the assured cannot be 
compensated without the proof of loss.766 The broader approach to insurable 
interest by the courts is held as an argument for the similar function of the two 
principles, 767  i.e. pecuniary interest is sufficient to constitute an insurable 
interest. As to wager policies, both doctrines can prevent an assured from 
recovering on wager policies. The moral hazard, in tempting the assured to 
make benefits by destroying the insured subject, can also be minimized by the 
principles of indemnity and insurable interest768, because under both doctrines 
the assured can only recover the amount of loss and no more. It has been 
argued that the doctrine of indemnity can judge the loss and make the contract 
certain.769 Consequently the key point with regard to whether an assured can 
recover under policies is only the contract taken out by the assured and the 
insurer.770 It has therefore been argued that there is no necessity for retaining 
the doctrine of insurable interest. The requirement of insurable interest has 
been blamed for introducing uncertainty, especially since the 2005 GA. 771 
Different conclusions may be made by the following distinction between these 
two principles.  
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3.1.3.3 Difference between the doctrine of indemnity and insurable interest 
There is a need to distinguish these two principles, as it may be confusing as to 
whether or not the requirement of insurable interest is useless by arguing that 
the doctrine of indemnity has the same effect. 
3.1.3.3.1 Different nature 
Although both principles of indemnity and insurable interest need the assured to 
show the possession of an interest, each one is of a different nature.772 The 
position is unclear as to whether the doctrine of indemnity inherently requires an 
assured to show the strict statutory insurable interest in the insured subject773 in 
order to prove its loss, at least in the realm of non-marine indemnity insurance 
in England.774 If the indemnity principle is an implied contractual term, there is 
no need to consider this issue. Relevant property law can help to decide 
whether the assured has suffered a loss. The main focus of the indemnity 
principle is then to look at whether the assured has suffered a loss. And 
checking the interest under this principle is also aiming to serve this purpose. If 
it is obvious that, under related property law, the assured has or has not 
suffered a loss, there is in effect no need to explore the interest at all.  
 
However, for the position of an express contractual term, which can be decided 
by the parties, it is uncertain whether the interest required by the indemnity 
principle can go beyond that required by the insurable interest principle. It 
seems to be right. It has been stated that: for the former, the nature and extent 
of a mere economic or pecuniary interest is sufficient; by contrast, for the latter, 
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only the legal or equitable interest can satisfy the definition in s 5 of the 1906 
MIA.775 According to this statement, if an assured merely suffered an advantage 
or profit which it could obtain in the ordinary course of things, such as future 
freight or expected profit, it can be indemnified under the indemnity principle.776  
 
Further, seemingly, the parties to an indemnity insurance contract can waive the 
indemnity requirement as an express contractual term. 777  As a result, the 
interest has in fact been widened. For example, the reinsurer may have agreed 
to indemnify the reassured even if he cannot prove to have legal liability to the 
original assured. In such a case, due to the reinsurer having waived his right to 
require the legal interest, this method has in fact broadened the interest under 
the indemnity principle. That is because the right, not sufficient to create a legal 
liability, can also amount to such an interest. On the other hand, the insurable 
interest requirement, being an express statutory requirement under s 4 of the 
1906 MIA, cannot be altered or waived. 
3.1.3.3.2 Insurable interest applies to contracts not governed by the indemnity doctrine. 
There are two exceptions to the indemnity doctrine: life policies which have 
been held not to be a contract of indemnity 778  and valued policies. 779  The 
assured of the former is entitled to insure an unlimited sum780 on the occurrence 
of the specified event because the value of life cannot be measured. For the 
latter, the assured can recover the value of the insured subject having been 
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stated in the policy, even though the sum insured on the face of the policy is 
more than the insurable value of the subject matter. However, the assured of 
those two kinds of policies must satisfy the requirement of insurable interest. 
The 1774 LAA creates such a requirement regarding life policies.781 Taking the 
example of a valued policy on marine risks, the assured has to fulfil such an 
insurable interest as well.782  
 
Also, again, a bailee who has sustained no personal loss can recover, which is 
an exception to the indemnity doctrine. He however must fulfil the requirement 
of insurable interest before he can claim.783 If there was only the doctrine of 
indemnity, having abolished the doctrine of insurable interest, a bailee may not 
be entitled to recover under the policy on the loss of goods of owners because 
he has suffered no loss.  
3.1.3.3.3 Different origins 
The doctrine of indemnity is a requirement at common law.784  The interest 
needed to be demonstrated under the requirement of indemnity as deriving from 
the terms of contracts, whether expressly or impliedly. 785  By contrast, the 
insurable interest principle is a statutory requirement. For marine insurance, it is 
the 1906 MIA that provides that an assured effecting a contract must possess 
an insurable interest or expectation of acquiring one.786 That is, the insurable 
interest principle is a statutory requirement which cannot be amended or waived. 
The position is the same concerning the indemnity principle being an implied 
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term. Because the related property law will directly decide whether or not a loss 
arises, there is no scope for parties to change the nature of the interest in the 
contract in order to better prove a loss. As an express contract term, the 
indemnity principle may be altered by the parties to an insurance contract.787 In 
other words, they may have agreed to insure a subject matter in which the 
assured has no legal, pecuniary or economic interest. In practice, for example, 
“a reinsurance contract can provide that the reinsurer shall pay a 
reinsured’s claim without forcing it to prove actual legal liability where 
the reinsured has entered into a bona fide and businesslike 
settlement.”788 
3.1.3.3.4 Different outcomes for failing to fulfil the two principles 
According to the indemnity principle, the assured simply cannot be 
compensated in the case where it cannot provide an interest to demonstrate its 
loss. Thus, it is a matter of focusing on whether there is an actual loss and the 
assured can recover. For the insurable interest doctrine, by contrast, in the 
context of marine insurance, under the Act 1906 s 4, the contract will be void if 
the assured has no insurable interest or expectation at the outset of the contract. 
It is a matter of the contract’s validity. So in the case where the assured has an 
expectation of having an insurable interest at the outset of the contract, but he 
ends up losing it:  
 the contract is valid under s 4; and 
 the contract is valid as above but the assured cannot be compensated 
due to no proof of loss according to the indemnity principle. 
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Under s 6(1), additionally, the assured cannot make a valid claim if he has no 
insurable interest at the time of loss.789 It is thus a consideration that when the 
assured must have an insurable interest in order to make a claim, i.e. at the 
time of loss. More seriously, under the 1909 MIA, failing to possess insurable 
interest is imposed as a criminal offence.790 
 
On the subject of indemnity doctrine, the assured has to suffer an actual loss in 
order to recover. So as to prove a loss and make a valid claim, he has to 
demonstrate he possesses an interest in the matter insured. Because of s 6(1), 
in order to make a claim, the assured must have an insurable interest at the 
time of loss. Seemingly, the former can replace the latter because it requires the 
assured to have an insurable interest at the time of loss to make a valid claim. It 
may not be the case. That is because the former’s focus is loss. Furthermore, 
where the indemnity principle is an implied term and related property law can 
directly decide whether there is a loss, the requirement of interest at the time of 
loss may not be considered. On the other hand, s 6(1) deals with the timing of 
making a claim and there is a need always to take insurable interest into 
consideration.   
3.1.3.3.5 Different timing of acquiring an interest 
Under the indemnity principle, having an interest at the time of loss suffices to 
prove an assured’s loss.791 As to preventing a void policy, the assured must 
satisfy the statutory insurable interest at the time of effecting the insurance.792 
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Besides, with respect to a contract termed with “lost or not lost”, a retrospective 
interest may be sufficient to enable the assured to recover.793 
3.1.3.4 Possible effect of the replacement of insurable interest by indemnity doctrine 
3.1.3.4.1 The present situation 
Those arguing for the substitution of the requirement of insurable interest by the 
indemnity doctrine may have ignored a fact: that is, the reason why there is no 
necessity of looking at whether a loss, seemingly satisfying the indemnity 
doctrine, is derived from a legal or equitable interest, is that a loss suffered by 
the assured has always been tested by the requirement of insurable interest.794 
The illusion of the substitute may not be the case: it is insurable interest that 
helps the indemnity doctrine to limit the boundary of a loss.  
3.1.3.4.2 The effect of the unfortunate substitute 
It is clear that the event will be regulated by relevant property law in the case of 
the indemnity doctrine being an implied term, not having expressly been termed 
in the contract.795 However, having more flexibility arising from the express term 
of indemnity in the contract, the boundary of the doctrine will be unclear due to 
the lack of the insurable interest principle.796 The indemnity doctrine, being an 
express contractual term, may probably be amended or waived by the parties to 
the insurance contract.797 Should the statutory insurable interest or pecuniary 
interest have been repealed, with the uncertain ambit mentioned above of the 
indemnity doctrine, the loss possibly being defined by the parties to the 
insurance may go too far. Remote interest may be used to prove a loss in order 
to attain recovery. The presumption mentioned by Eldon J may have in effect 
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come true: thousands of people, like the dock company, then the dock-master, 
then the warehouse-keeper, then the porter, who all would have something to 
do with the property and get something by it may be entitled to insure.798 It is 
the principle of insurable interest which requires that the assured must have an 
insurable interest in order to be entitled to insure.799  
 
In the context of marine insurance, the substitute may not bring benefits. 
Conversely, the problem as to the uncertain boundary of loss under the 
indemnity doctrine will arise and make the law confusing and uncertain. In the 
case of something happening outside the doctrine of indemnity or determining 
whether an assured can get indemnified, it has been suggested one should go 
back and look at the doctrine itself: apply the broad principle of indemnity, and 
you have the answer. 800  Under the present law, such a problem with the 
understanding of the wider interpretation of the indemnity doctrine does not 
need to be explored just because of the function of insurable interest: a loss 
must arise out of a legal or equitable interest.801 
3.1.3.4.3 Relevant examples for the uncertain boundary of loss under the indemnity 
principle 
As a result, it is open to debate whether the assured can mount a claim on such 
a situation where, for example, a loss caused by the liability to pay a voluntary 
donation, which is not one that the indemnity doctrine is devised to indemnify. 
This kind of unusual indemnity may be defined in the contract.802 In the practice 
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of reinsurance, the law nevertheless seems to recognize a loss stipulated by the 
contract, not by legal liability: the reassured may be entitled, by the express 
terms of the contract, to recover the loss not involving his legal liability but he 
agrees to pay voluntarily,803 such “as ex gratia payment, w.p. (without prejudice) 
payments or compromised settlements”.804  
3.2 The definition of insurable interest is unclear under both common 
law and statutes. 805 
There is a debate as to which test for insurable interest has been established by 
s 5(2) of the 1906 MIA: the narrow one or the broad one. Due to this uncertainty, 
different British courts and judges held different views on what is sufficient to 
constitute an insurable interest. In order to deal with this obscure question, the 
case of Lucena v Craufurd806 needs to be first looked at, as the leading case of 
insurable interest in marine insurance. It gave the binding classic definition of 
this doctrine set out by the House of Lords in 1806, arguably from the judgment 
of Lord Eldon, having been codified in the 1906 MIA.807 Therefore, it was a 
concept from common law rather than created by the Acts.808 In the light of the 
courts’ attitudes towards what amounts to an insurable interest in at least 
indemnity insurance, the history has seen a change from Lord Eldon’s narrower 
test which was the leading judgement in this case to Lawrence J’s broader 
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test,809 although someone argued that Lord Eldon’s test was not narrower than 
Lawrence J’s.810  
3.2.1 Definitions of insurable interest at common law 
3.2.1.1 The narrow test 
3.2.1.1.1 The facts of Lucena v Craufurd 
Commissioners, who had been authorised by the King to oversee the marine 
adventure of several Dutch East Indiamen at and from St. Helena to London, 
which had been taken by one of His Majesty’s ships, insured such a journey. 
Soon a war was declared between the United Provinces and Britain; as a result, 
the ships were finally condemned as prizes to His Majesty. Due to the 
occurrence of a loss of ships during the voyage, the Commissioners, stating the 
interest was in the King, sought to establish a claim under the policy. The 
insurer averred that the claim failed under 19 Geo. 2 c.37 as a wager, since the 
claimant had no insurable interest in the ships. In order to determine whether 
the Commissioners had a sufficient interest in the ships to insure them, the 
House of Lords sought the advice of the judges of the lower court.811  
3.2.1.1.2 The meaning of the narrow test 
Lord Eldon held that the policyholder could not have an insurable interest 
unless a person had a legal or equitable relation to the subject insured, i.e. a 
right to the property or a right derived from contracts, which was known as the 
narrow test or the strict test. Lord Eldon here set out the classic definition of 
insurable interest, which emphasised the legal or equitable relation to the 
subject, as follows:  
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“In order to distinguish that intermediate thing between a strict right, 
or a right derived under a contract, and a mere expectation or hope, 
which has been termed an insurable interest, it has been said in 
many cases to be that which amounts to a moral certainty. I have in 
vain endeavoured however to find a fit definition of that which is 
between a certainty and an expectation; nor am I able to point out 
what is an interest unless it be a right in the property, or a right 
derivable out of some contract about the property, which in either 
case may be lost upon some contingency affecting the possession or 
enjoyment of the party.”812 
 
According to this definition, unless the assured has a right in the property or a 
right or liability under a contract, which is a quite certain and strict relation, it 
cannot satisfy the requirement of insurable interest. As for the right to the 
property, it is not limited to the ownership to the property and the limited interest 
of a mortgagee or consignee is insurable as well.813 This definition couched as 
a technical approach814 may be objective due to the certainty and convenience 
of the courts to form a judgement. However, in some cases, this test was 
considered to be too strict.815 Under the narrow test, the right must be of a 
nature as such a close relation between the assured and the subject insured as 
“direct relationship to the property itself”.816 That is probably the reason why s 
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5(2) also provides that a person having interest in a marine adventure can have 
an insurable interest. 
3.2.1.1.3 The application of the narrow test 
The following are the cases prior to the 1906 MIA which have adopted the strict 
test for insurable interest. In Lucena v Craufurd, the court held that the 
Commissioners had no insurable interests in the ships because they had no 
existing right to the insured ships before they would have arrived in England. 
Instead, they only had a mere hope of authority and duty relating to them which 
was not insurable. 817  In Anderson v Morice, the plaintiff as the assured, 
purchased a cargo of rice from a vendor in Rangoon and insured the cargo “at 
and from Rangoon.” While being loaded at Rangoon, the Sunbeam which was 
chartered for shipping the cargo sank after the larger portion of the cargo was 
shipped with the remaining cargo being in lighters alongside. The insurer 
defended himself on the basis that the assured had no insurable interest in the 
cargo before the loading of the whole cargo had been completed, because until 
then, no cargo was ever at his risk. The court held that the plaintiff could not 
recover the loss because, under the sale contract, the plaintiff bore no risk at 
any time before the completion of the whole cargo, therefore had no interest in 
the cargo until the loading was completed.818 This decision was affirmed when 
an appeal was raised before the House of Lords, where the opinion as to the 
issue of whether the assured had an insurable interest of the Lords was equally 
divided.819  
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Some post-1906 MIA cases have adopted the strict test as well. As to marine 
policies on cargoes, in the case of Macaura, 820  the assured who in effect 
suffered personal loss failed to seek indemnity for the loss of timber which had 
been insured by him. The judgement relied upon the narrow test following the 
judgement of Lucena under which an interest in property or derivable from 
transfer of risk must be had by an assured, and held that the assured had no 
insurable interest in the timber insured because it was the asset of the company 
and he as the shareholder thus had no rights to the company’s property. In 
Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd v Orion Insurance Co Ltd, 821  the CFR buyers on 
discharge found that the goods bought by them had been replaced by water 
and they had paid “against document long before outturn”, so they sustained 
heavy loss by the substitute. The plaintiff buyers, in accordance with the strict 
test, were held not to be entitled to recover from the defendant insurers and 
having no insurable interest as they could not prove the attachment of the risk, 
that the oil in drums they had agreed to purchase from sellers had ever been 
loaded on board. Besides, it should always be borne in mind that, before 
determining whether an assured can recover, whether the risk or policy 
attaches should first be examined.822 Without further concerns about transfer of 
property, the fact that no risk has ever attached can alone dismiss the claim.  
 
The strict definition of insurable interest in the context of hull insurance can be 
demonstrated by the case of Piper v Royal Exchange Assurance823. On the 
basis that the damage to the vessel occurred during her voyage to the plaintiff 
buyer before her arrival at the destination, it was held that the buyer had no 
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insurable interest because at the time of loss during the transit the buyer bore 
no risk which was taken by the seller. Ward LJ held the view that “the economic 
interest element” that the assured “may suffer a disadvantage from the loss of 
the thing assured” is not enough and the assured must have a “legal or 
equitable” interest in the subject insured, at least in the realm of marine and 
property insurance.824 It may thus be analysed from the view that a “legal or 
equitable” interest has been construed as an interest in property or by the 
passing of risk derived from sale contracts.  
 
Under the narrow interpretation of insurable interest, the legal or equitable 
relation to property or derivable from contractual right at the time of loss, or an 
expectation of such relation at the time of the contract must be satisfied, so that 
the requirement of insurable interest can be fulfilled. Consistent with the 
technical rule adopted by courts respecting insurable interest, the assured may 
however unduly be prevented from recovery.825 In light of this test, economic or 
pecuniary interest826 that the assured may benefit by the safety or due arrival of 
insurable property and be prejudiced by loss of or damage to the insured 
subject827 is not sufficient to amount to insurable interest.828 Thus, the following 
test of economic or pecuniary interest has its rationality. 
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3.2.1.2 The broad test 
3.2.1.2.1 The meaning of the broad test 
By contrast, Lawrence J defined the requirement of insurable interest that a 
person may have an insurable interest if he could have a moral certainty of 
benefiting or sustaining loss due to the preservation or loss of the insured 
subject matter exposed to insured risks.829 An interest under this view thus did 
not necessarily imply a right to a property or under a contract, but nonetheless a 
moral certainty of benefiting from the preservation of the insured subject 
exposed to perils insured against was sufficient for the policyholder to establish 
an insurable interest. The following was his words, which were also thought to 
have been incorporated in the terms of s 5(2) of the Act 1906:830 
“A man is interested in a thing to whom advantage may arise or 
prejudice happen from the circumstances which may attend it; …And 
whom it importeth, that its condition as to safety or other quality 
should continue: interest does not necessarily imply a right to the 
whole, or a part of a thing, nor necessarily and exclusively that which 
may be the subject of privation, but the having some relation to, or 
concern in the subject of the insurance, which relation or concern by 
the happening of the perils insured against may be so affected as to 
produce a damage, detriment, or prejudice to the person insuring: 
and where a man is so circumstanced with respect to matters 
exposed to certain risks or dangers, as to have a moral certainty of 
advantage or benefit, but for those risks or dangers he may be said 
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to be interested in the safety of the thing. To be interested in the 
preservation of a thing, is to be so circumstanced with respect to it as 
to have benefit from its existence, prejudice from its destruction.” 
 
However, even though the foresaid words by Lawrence J are commonly 
understood as the definition of insurable interest, it has been submitted that 
they are in effect not because the concept of moral certainty is obscure and 
taking his whole decision into consideration he has expressed the opinion that 
the insurable interest must be one dependent on an existing concern in the 
subject matter insured.831 Due to this disagreement, it may be arguable that the 
Lawrence J’s test may not be broader than that of Lord Eldon. Be that as it may, 
the former should be construed as a test broader than that of the latter and as 
the present test for insurable interest under current English law. It has been the 
settled law that even though in relation to an insurable interest in property the 
legal right test is not needed, the mere expectation is not insurable. Pursuant 
with it, there should be something between them to test the existence of 
insurable interest, that is, the Lawrence J’s test; whereas Lord Eldon has 
rejected the intermediate concept as insurable interest and only accepted the 
certain right as one. An insurable interest under the Lawrence J’s test is not a 
legal or equitable right to the insured subject nor a mere expectation, but a 
moral certainty or well-founded expectation of being economically interested in 
the subject. Although such a certainty needs to be ascertained by a court by 
reference to the facts of the case in question, it can be literally understood as 
some relation closer than a mere expectation but not necessarily being 
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sufficient to be a legal right, i.e. a moral certainty is also dependent on present 
existing rights but not necessarily on legal rights. Therefore, the test of 
Lawrence J may be wider than that of Lord Eldon, which means that even 
though the two tests have both been relied on for existing rights to the subject 
they are in effect different tests as to what can constitute an insurable interest.       
3.2.1.2.2 Whether a moral certainty is sufficiently certain to be an insurable interest. 
Lord Buckmaster in favour of the narrow test states that the element of “moral 
certainty” as to the definition given by Lawrence J cannot be made an essential 
part of a definite legal concept.832 It however may be not right when analysing 
insurable interest from a broader view. The “moral certainty” may be understood 
from the view that the insurable interest, as the intermediate thing between a 
strict right and a mere expectation, must be ascertained. If the interest in a thing 
intended to be insured can be deprived by many risks other than the perils 
insured against, such an object cannot be the subject matter of insurance.833 
The broader definition focuses not only on the relationship between the assured 
and the insured subject matter, but also on the possibility of contingency, some 
risks independent of perils insured against, which can affect whether an object 
is the subject matter of insurance. Loss suffered by the assured should merely 
be caused by the perils insured against, not by the variety of events 
independent of insured perils. As a result, the assured can only recover the loss 
caused by the insured perils, rather than by all the other contingencies. In 
Lawrence J’s opinion, without the possibility of weighing the odds of its being 
intercepted by fortuitous accidents, which are risks independent of specified 
ones in the policy, due to such uncertainty of interest, the object may not be the 
subject of insurance. The interest in such a subject of course cannot be 
                                                          
832
 Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619 (HL) 627  
833
 Lucena v Craufurd (1806) B & PNR 269 [301] 
223 
 
insurable because the property able to be the subject matter of insurance is the 
precondition as to deciding whether an interest is insurable. 
 
Thus, in Pole v Fitzgerald,834 the court held that the subject matter of insurance 
was the ship, not the voyage, for it was impossible to value the loss of the 
voyage possibly caused by various uncertain events. This can also be 
explained by an interesting example. An uncle has told his niece that he will 
send her his ship as her eighteenth birthday present. And he has not insured 
the ship. If the niece wanted to take out an insurance on the ship, under the 
current law, she cannot have an insurable interest, for that is so uncertain that 
there may be various contingencies besides specified risks to defeat the oral 
promise: the uncle may just be making a joke or he may cancel his promise and 
sell this ship. Even under the wide test, this situation moves too far. 835 
Therefore, if the relation can be morally ascertained that, without the occurring 
of perils insured against the assured will benefit, the court should be in favour of 
his having an insurable interest. It is the courts’ duty to determine whether the 
relation is close enough to amount to the moral certainty of insurable interest. 
 
Lord Eldon refused the proposition of “moral certainty”, deeming it as so wide 
that a person having a very remote relation to the insured subject can insure. 
Perhaps Lawrence J’s test was not as uncertain as Lord Eldon had thought 
because taking the whole judgement of Lawrence J into consideration an 
insurable interest must be also based on a present existing right and a mere 
expectation was not insurable. Besides, “moral certainty” would of course not 
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allow hundreds, even thousands to insure a subject because it was the court’s 
duty to weigh the odds of its being interrupted by fortuitous accidents, i.e. 
without the certainty of the contingency to which the subject was exposed, such 
a thing cannot be a subject of insurance and the assured accordingly has no 
insurable interest and is not entitled to insure. 
3.2.2 The test for insurable interest provided by s 5(2) of the 1906 MIA  
3.2.2.1 Debates on which test s 5(2) has provided 
3.2.2.1.1 Different understandings as to s 5(2) 
According to s 5(2) of the 1906 MIA, when to test whether an assured 
possesses an insurable interest, two elements must be satisfied: the strict 
interest of “a legal or equitable interest”, which derives from Lord Eldon’s test, 
and the broad interest of “economic interest”,836 which originates from Lawrence 
J’s advice.837 There has thus been a debate as to which test s 5(2) really refers 
to: supporters of Lord Eldon’s test argue that the test should be a narrow one 
because the strict interest of “a legal or equitable relation” must be satisfied and 
a merely moral certainty of benefit or prejudice or a mere expectation of interest 
is not sufficient.838 It is argued that the reason why the first element has been 
added is on the basis that the latter is too wide. As it has been said, without the 
former requirement, an “economic interest” test may carry us into “the land of 
dreams”.839   
 
On the other hand, those who uphold Lawrence J’s test argue that s 5(2) in 
substance refers to the broader test, by which the fact has been emphasised 
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that the “economic interest” is sufficient to constitute an insurable interest and 
then whether the “economic interest” may be affected by the perils insured 
against.840  
3.2.2.1.2 That a person interested in a marine adventure has an insurable interest reflects 
the wider test. 
Section 5(2) has non-exhaustively defined the principle of insurable interest and 
has particularly given two examples of the subject matter of the marine 
adventure policy, that is, “the adventure” or “any insurable property at risk”.841 In 
terms of the two different subjects, the tests for insurable interest in them are 
also different. 
 
As for the subject regarding “the adventure” at risk, it may be an illustration of 
the broad approach adapted by the courts for the market need at that time, 
which extends the ambit of the interest limited to the right to an item of property 
and its being at risk. In the view of Sir Chalmers, who drafted the 1906 MIA, it 
seems that s 5(2) should be understood broadly, which reflects the broad test. 
He expresses in terms that “The definition of insurable interest has been 
continuously expanded, and dicta in some of the old cases, which would tend to 
narrow it, must be accepted with caution.”842 A relationship, recognisable by law, 
to the insured subject, can certainly be sufficient to constitute insurable 
interest.843 The relationship nevertheless may not necessarily be limited to a 
right to the property or at risk. In addition, s 5(2) is intended to further describe s 
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5(1) as to who can be an assured or who can have an interest or what is 
sufficient to satisfy insurable interest.  
 
Section 5(1) relies on the decision of Wilson v Jones844; the broadening of 
insurable interest is achieved by way of correctly identifying the subject matter 
of insurance at risk as a marine adventure rather than an item of property. In 
this case it was held that the assured under a form of marine policy in common 
form could possess an interest in the marine adventure, although he had no 
interest in the insured subject of cable as the asset of the company. It may be 
deduced from the case that the relationship should be construed widely by 
correctly identifying that the subject matter of insurance was the adventure of 
laying the cable rather than the cable. With the cover for the adventure, the 
assured possesses an insurable interest in the adventure because the usual 
form of a marine policy under its terms can be widely construed by the court to 
extend beyond the property to cover the loss of adventure. 845  This rule is 
convenient for the commercial practice of insurance, in particular, cargo 
insurance policies, because the assured can be better insured by a marine 
policy being able to cover both the loss of cargo and adventure.846 
3.2.2.1.3 The test to insurable interest in an item of property at risk: the change from the 
narrow to the wider one 
Although as above submitted the definition in virtue of s 5 should be widely 
construed, it has been argued that an assured cannot have an insurable interest 
in an item of property unless he has a legal relation to it. Where the assured has 
an ownership to, or possession of the insured subject, or is at risk of loss on the 
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happening of the perils insured against, he can certainly be entitled to be 
interested in the subject.847 It has thus been held that a buyer can have an 
insurable interest due to goods at his risk, even though no property has been 
transferred to him.848 A buyer can be deemed as taking risk only at the time he 
is obliged, under contracts of sale, to pay for goods, regardless of whether or 
not the goods will arrive in safety. Such types of interest are the narrow ones 
which are set out by Lord Eldon in terms of “a right in the property, or a right 
derivable out of some contract about the property”.849 The change of attitudes 
by the courts to an insurable interest in property from the strict test to the wide 
one has been discussed below.850 
3.2.2.1.4 Conclusion 
Since it may be right that both Lord Eldon and Lawrence J have agreed that an 
insurable interest must be one on an existing interest, s 5(2) may in effect 
reflect both judges’ opinion.851 Thus, Farwell LJ held that the insurable interest 
under the test of Lawrence J must be a legal interest rather than a mere 
expectation of acquiring one.852 In addition, the debate may be solved because 
Sir Chalmers has pointed out that the definition under s 5 is a continually 
expanding one and Waller in Feasey has held that the definition of insurable 
interest by s 5(2) should be widely interpreted.853 Thus, in the modern context,  
s 5(2) should be regarded as having reflected Lawrence J’s economic test. 
3.2.2.2. Distinction of subject, insurable interest and value 
The elements of the subject matter of insurance, insurable interest in it and its 
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value are different concepts and confusing. They are separate but can impact 
one on the other.854  A subject matter of insurance in the marine insurance 
context is every lawful marine adventure855 and a subject in which an assured 
can have an insurable interest has been non-exclusively enumerated by the 
1906 MIA from s 5 to s 14, such as a marine adventure, a property, wagers, or 
freight. The element of insurable interest which is nonetheless a specific kind of 
relation between the assured and this subject has been analysed above  in the 
concept of insurable interest.856 In relation to the value of the subject, whether 
valued or unvalued, it may generally refer to the price of the property, i.e. where 
damage to or loss of the subject occurs, the money that the insurer is liable to 
pay the assured. It is in effect the subject matter of a contract of insurance 
which is mere money. Consequently, the liability of the insurer is to pay money 
to the assured, rather than to repair or restore ships or cargoes. Lawrence J 
gave the differences between the property of a subject as a kind of value of the 
subject and the interest in it, which would be helpful to the understanding of the 
requirement of insurable interest. The value or property can generally be 
measured by the price, while insurable interest means every benefit and 
advantage arising from the subject.857 The insurable interest is thus different 
from and not limited to the property of the subject.  
3.2.2.3 A mere expectation cannot amount to an insurable interest  
Insurable interest has to be an interest depending on the present existing right 
to the subject matter of insurance, which is not a mere expectancy on such 
subject. A mere expectation, according to the analysis of above paragraph, is a 
kind of too remote relation between the assured and the subject matter, which is 
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not sufficient for the requirement of insurable interest.858 The interest in a mere 
hope cannot be insurable because such interest is so uncertain which may be 
intercepted by too many contingencies other than the insured perils. The court 
may thus not decide that the assured has moral certainty that perils insured 
against can bring it benefits or prejudice. In Lawrence J’s words, the assured 
must have a relation that could amount to “moral certainty” of advantage or 
benefit, but for perils insured against rather than other contingencies he could 
benefit from the insured subject’s preservation. “Moral certainty” thus amounts 
to an insurable interest and is a concept to distinguish “a strict right, or a right 
derived under a contract, and a mere expectation or hope”, 859  which the 
assured must have at the time of loss, if the assured wants to recover under a 
claim. Therefore, a person could not merely insure an expectation in a thing.  
 
This could be illustrated by the case of Knox v Wood,860 where the assured had 
insured the commission on freight for the guarantee of the cargo and the 
commission upon the sale of the cargo which would be delivered by a ship back 
from Jamaica to Dublin. However, the adventure was frustrated by the capture 
of the ship on her way from St. Thomas’s to Jamaica. The court held that the 
assured possessed no insurable interest in both commissions, since they were 
merely based on expectation of obtaining homeward cargo, having depended 
on no existing rights, i.e. there was no contract of commission and sale for the 
cargo. According to Lord Ellenborough, the insurance was just an expectation of 
an expectation. Such expectation should not be supported, otherwise “This 
case carries us into the land of dreams; and, if supported, would introduce the 
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practice of insuring a 20,000 pounds prize in the lottery without purchasing a 
ticket!” Although the policy embraced the so-called PPI clause “without benefit 
of salvage”, which was prohibited under the 1745 MIA,861 the authority on the 
test for insurable interest still applied. Besides, this verdict was also based on 
the requirement of the indemnity principle, viz. the purpose of marine insurance 
contracts was to indemnify the assured’s loss incurred by insured perils; 
therefore, the assured could not make profits by insurance contracts.  
 
An exception to the above rule, that a mere expectation is not insurable, is 
expected profits.862 In this case, an interest in such profits is deemed as an 
insurable interest contingent on the completion of shipment and safe delivery of 
cargo rather than a mere expectation. Unless clearly expressed in a policy, the 
profits are not covered under a policy on property. Thus, in Anderson,863 Lord 
Chelmsford set out that the purchaser assured would have been entitled to 
recover the loss of the profits in which he had an insurable interest if he had 
specified the profits as the subject of insurance. 
3.2.3 Later decisions in favour of Lawrence J’s test 
Lawrence J’s test was merely included in an advice, which was different from 
Lord Eldon’s which was contained in a speech pronouncing the decision. 
However, the former “has been approved many times in later decisions”.864 
Subsequent courts tend to have moved from the narrower test to the broader 
test that a factual expectation of economic benefit from preservation or loss on 
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destruction is sufficient to amount to the requirement of insurable interest, which 
has been approved by the Court of Appeal in Feasey865 and now seems to 
represent the current law. Furthermore, the courts will look for ways to find an 
insurable interest by properly construing policies, i.e. if the underwriter, having 
known the assured’s circumstances, takes out an insurance with the assured 
who has paid a premium, the courts will usually extend the concept of insurable 
interest to confer on the assured an interest.866 That is possibly one of the 
reasons why in the past insurers rarely use the lack of an insurable interest as a 
defence, except in the context of fraud.867 
 
For example, where the insurer argued that the assured had no interest in the 
cargo prior to shipment but who clearly suffered loss occurring prior to shipment  
due to the payment for the cargo, the court leaned in favour of the assured 
having an interest before the loading by broadly understanding the test of 
insurable interest.868 Be that as it may, it is not the invariable approach adopted 
by the court. Similar to the judgement of the pre-1906 MIA case of Anderson v 
Morice ,869 where to decide whether the assured had an interest, the fact as to 
whether goods were at his risk was carefully examined, and the strict approach 
was approved by a court in the modern context.870  
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3.2.4 Conclusion  
Despite the tendency of the broad test of insurable interest, judges have 
different views as to whether the requirement of insurable interest should be 
construed strictly or widely. 871  Confusion will arise: the parties to insurance 
policies are not sure whether the assured has an interest before shipment and 
the courts are unclear with respect to which decision they should follow. 
Besides, there is no agreement on which test has been provided for by s 5. The 
unclear and confusing state for the definition of insurable interest both under 
common law and the 1906 MIA has been causing trouble to the market and the 
courts, leading to disrespect for the law itself.  
 
However, in the context of marine insurance, an assured may have an insurable 
interest in the following situations:872 
 where he has a legal or equitable to a marine adventure; 
 where he has a legal or equitable title to the property; 
 where he has a legal or equitable right to the possession of the property; 
 where the property is not in his possession, but under a contract he will 
be benefitting from the safety of the property. 
3.3 Problems in the marine insurance practice 
3.3.1 The statutory pre-loading clause of “lost or not lost” 
The meaning of the “lost or not lost” clause is unclear. Due to clause 11 of ICC 
1982 and 2009, it appears that only the function of retrospective declaration has 
now operated. This change can in practice have an effect on CIF buyers who 
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have suffered a loss during the period after the assignment of policy by a seller 
and before the transfer of risk. Furthermore, despite a policy including such a 
clause, dispute often arises on whether risk has attached, and whether an 
assured has suffered a loss and can recover such loss, not of the insured 
subject matter of goods, but of financial loss.873 In addition, it may be confusing 
as to whether the clauses of “lost or not lost” and “warehouse to warehouse” in 
isolation can protect a buyer from pre-shipment loss.  
3.3.1.1 Changes to the “lost or not lost” clause 
3.3.1.1.1 Distinct understanding with respect to the “lost or not lost” clause 
Before the change by clause 11 of ICC 1982, there has existed different 
understandings as to the meaning of the clause “lost or not lost”. Relying on the 
provision of Schedule 1, s 1 of 1906 MIA, some argue that it only means 
retrospective declaration: an assured in ignorance of loss may recover where 
loss has occurred before the insurance contract is concluded but nevertheless 
an interest must have been acquired by him. 874  In contrast, it has been 
submitted that the meaning of the clause also includes retrospective interest.875  
 
The “lost or not lost” clause should operate in the foregoing two distinct ways. 
This is not only relied on in the provisions under s 6 (1) and Schedule 1 of the 
1906 MIA, but also by high authorities: it was held that the assured could 
recover against the policy with a “lost or not lost” clause which was concluded 
after a loss, sustained by his having had or not had an insurable interest, had 
already arisen, i.e. after the loss but prior to his obtaining an insurable 
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interest.876 It may not be right to contend that it is different understandings that 
make cases worse where buyers, who have paid for goods before acquiring an 
interest, cannot recover from insurers because they have no interest at the time 
of loss of the goods before shipment although they have sustained financial loss. 
It is still good law that an assured not aware of loss may recover loss occurring 
before he acquires an interest.877  
3.3.1.1.2 Exceptions to general rules regarding time of having interest 
By and large, as for marine insurance, an assured must show his possession of 
insurable interest at the time of the loss.878 It means that an assured cannot 
benefit from the clause unless he has already suffered loss.879 Although the rule 
is straightforward, under contracts termed with clauses of “lost or not lost”, 
because an assured who can only require his insurable interest after loss may 
still be entitled to recover, this seems to be a breach of the indemnity doctrine. It 
has been admitted that the “lost or not lost” clause is a point of law with 
difficulty.880 The rule is particularly important in occasions of international sales 
of goods, for property in goods may be transferred many times during the period 
of cover, involving various transfers of risk.881 As well as the principle of “lost or 
not lost”, there is another exception to the general principle as to the timing of 
insurable interest: a person can acquire an insurable interest by the assignment 
of the policy even though the loss occurred before the assignment.882 
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3.3.1.1.3 Distinct effect under the “lost or not lost” clause and clause 11 of ICC 1982 and 
2009 
The issue needs to be discussed as to whether the effect of s 6(1), and 
Schedule 1, of the 1906 MIA and that of clause 11 of ICC 1982 and 2009 is the 
same. So far as that set out in s 6(1), and Schedule 1, of the 1906 MIA is 
concerned, an assured can recover despite retrospective insurable interest883 
and retrospective declaration.884 The assured nonetheless cannot by any act or 
election recover after being aware of the loss in virtue of accepting shipping 
documents.885 In light of clause 11 of ICC 1982 and 2009, it says that subject to 
the precondition that an assured has an insurable interest at the time of loss, he 
can recover the loss occurring before insurance contracts are concluded unless 
they have already known the loss whereas the insurer has not.886 Without this 
precondition, it seems that these two clauses have the same effect that 
obtaining of retrospective interest is available to assureds.  
 
Therefore, it is not right to say that “the lost or not lost” clause in the 1906 MIA 
has the same effect as clause 11 does, but nevertheless the latter is in effect 
narrower than the former.887 The former has been held being able to operate in 
two different manners: it provides both retrospective declaration and 
retrospective interest.888 In contrast, according to the latter, an assured can only 
make a retrospective declaration, but cannot acquire a retrospective interest.889 
That is because the latter commences with the terms subject to the general rule 
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that the assured must possess an interest at the time of loss. That is to say, the 
prerequisite condition for recovery is that policyholders have an insurable 
interest at the time of loss. Conversely speaking, unlike the effect of “lost or not 
lost” terms, under clause 11 of ICC 2009, policyholders cannot get recovery 
who do not obtain an interest until loss or damage has happened. In a word, 
clause 11 is within the ambit of the general rule: clause 11.2 may mean that it 
only provides retrospective declaration, but does not admit the acquisition of 
retrospective interest. By contrast, the “lost or not lost” clause goes so far as to 
be outside the realm of general rules: the assured may still recover his loss 
occurring before his acquirement of insurable interest. 
3.3.1.1.4 Effects of the change on CIF buyers 
CIF buyers appear to have been affected by the narrowing change caused by 
clause 11,890 under which they need to consider how to get an advantageous 
position. Two cases of loss will be discussed, i.e. loss before the transfer of risk 
and loss after its transfer. As to the latter, an assured is entitled to recover if the 
loss occurs after the transfer of risk and that of the policy, by which he has an 
insurable interest and a valid transfer of policy. Thus, the more sophisticated 
situation requiring more attention is that where the loss occurs after the transfer 
of risk but before the assignment of policy. In this case, a seller will, subject to 
particular agreement, have no insurable interest in goods any more but will still 
hold the policy, whereas a buyer has had an insurable interest by way of the 
transferring of risk but no policy, depending on the assignment of policy by the 
seller. Both of them thus cannot recover if a loss occurs. However, with the 
incorporation of the “lost or not lost” clause, the buyer can recover because its 
effect of retrospective declaration renders valid the obtaining of the policy after 
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cover, provided that the seller has agreed to pass the policy to the buyer before 
the loss. Obviously, under clause 11 of ICC 2009 which has the same effect of 
retrospective declaration a buyer on CIF in this case is unaffected. The buyer 
should thus apply this clause in a policy in order to get a better cover. 
 
More sophisticated events will arise as to loss occurring before the transfer of 
risk. As to a loss occurring during the period before the seller has passed the 
policy to the buyer and before the transfer of risk, the buyer can recover as the 
consignee of the policy by the seller even though he has no insurable interest at 
the time of loss. Thus, there is no need to incorporate the “lost or not lost” 
clause and clause 11 into the policy. The case is different where the loss has 
happened during the period after the seller has passed the policy to the buyer 
and before the transfer of risk. In this event, the seller cannot recover because 
despite having the right of title to goods, he has assigned the policy to the buyer; 
nor can the buyer recover since he is not at risk in spite of holding the policy. 
With the assistance of the “lost or not lost” clause, the buyer may however 
recover because it has the effect that enables him to obtain an insurable 
interest after the occurrence of loss. However, with the operation of clause 11 
which has no such effect, the CIF buyer may be in a more disadvantageous 
position than that under the “lost or not lost” clause. He thus should be aware of 
this change to avoid the mere hope of recovery under a policy with clause 11 
inserted when he cannot recover.   
3.3.1.1.5 Construction of terms of sale contracts can determine the transferring of risk. 
It is noteworthy that terms of sale contracts can affect the passing of risk, which 
has an effect on the application of the “lost or not lost” clause. It is in the 
practice of cargo insurance that the issue often arises as to whether the 
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assured has an interest at the time of loss.891 It has been suggested that, in 
order to address this issue by exactly ascertaining the timing regarding transfer 
of risk or ownership, careful examination of the terms of sale of goods contracts 
is needed.892 Terms of contracts of sale can influence passing of risk, i.e. when 
goods have been loaded on board ships under contracts. Therefore, when by 
the construction of contract of sale of goods, property or risk would not have 
been passed until the whole goods had been on board the carrying vessel, it 
was approved by the House of Lords that the plaintiff as the FOB buyer bore no 
risk at any time, thus had no interest in the cargo.893 In this case, the cargo was 
a whole thing: it did not exist at the time of effecting the insurance contract and 
would not exist until it had been passed over the ship’s rail (now loaded on 
board).894 However, with similar facts that only a portion of goods was loaded 
on board when the vessel and such goods sunk, but with distinct policy terms 
as “wheat cargo now on board or to be shipped”, it was held that the buyer had 
an insurable interest in the lost part of the goods, for the risk of loss regarding 
the portion of goods attached when any part of the goods were on board.895 
 
Also, whether the total or partial loss occurred, by way of a “warehouse to 
warehouse” clause, after risk has attached but before insurance having been 
concluded can be recovered is dependent on the construction of policies. Loss 
occurring before risk or policy has attached cannot be recovered, simply 
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because the loss is not within the cover of the policy.896 As discussed above, 
where a loss has occurred during the period before the passing of risk and after 
the assignment of policy to the buyer, both CIF sellers and CIF buyers may not 
be entitled to recover such a loss.897 Therefore, with reference to contracts 
termed with a “warehouse to warehouse” clause, it has been held that damaged 
goods are entitled to be recovered by CIF buyers while lost goods are not, 
where both damage and loss has happened in transit from factory to Shenzhen 
before the insurance is concluded.898 Waller LJ takes the view that the policy 
does not attach when the loss has occurred: the lost goods, which should have 
been the subject, cannot be appropriated to the insurance contract, because the 
lost goods do not exist when concluding the contract; in contrast, in spite of the 
damage, those damaged goods still exist so as to be assigned to the 
contract.899 Nevertheless, it is not right to say that the assured cannot recover 
the loss occurring before any appropriation to a binding insurance contract. It is 
a matter of construction of the policies. The court has thus held that the policies 
have covered the loss of the goods destroyed by fire in their unassigned state 
by construing the terms of policies.900 
 
However, where pre-loaded goods have suffered total loss or destruction, the 
position is still uncertain relating to whether FOB or CFR buyers are entitled to 
claim for such total loss.901 They may be entitled to claim because a “lost or not 
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lost” clause includes both partial loss and total loss.902 With admittedly no direct 
authority on this issue, it has been suggested that, on principle, they can 
acquire the property in the pre-shipment loss, of at least part of the goods, at 
the time and in the manner in which it would have passed had the containers 
not been lost.903 
3.3.1.2 The clause must be consistent with the principle of indemnity 
The “lost or not lost” clause only applies to cases in which the assured suffers a 
genuine loss, which is also a requirement of the doctrine of indemnity.904 The 
question can arise when to examine whether the assured has sustained a loss 
covered by the policy. As to loss occurring before loading and suffered by 
buyers FOB who had paid for the cargo, the Supreme Court of New South of 
Wales held that they could not call in aid the “lost or not lost” clause to be 
indemnified, on the ground that they had no interest in the goods before loading 
on board the vessel and thus they suffered no loss.905 The Court of Appeal 
agreed with the opinion that the buyer had no interest in goods before shipment, 
but nonetheless set aside the judgement for it held that the buyers had an 
interest in financial loss regarding those pre-shipment goods paid by them. It 
followed the decision that the assured was entitled to recover the financial loss 
as to the advance on the security of damaged goods, not the loss in respect of 
goods in which it had no interest at the time of loss but acquired an interest by 
pledge after the loss.906 The fact that buyers have contractual remedies against 
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sellers cannot prevent buyers from recovering from insurers. 907  This is 
consistent with the decision that the plaintiff pledgee who had contractual 
remedies against the pledger could also make a successful claim under the 
policy.908  
3.3.1.3 Risk must attach before applying the “lost or not lost” clause 
 As with the foregoing discussion, subject to the doctrine of indemnity, an 
assured can thus claim only where risk has attached and consequently has 
sustained loss. Under s 5(2) of the 1906 MIA, the assured must possess a legal 
or equitable relationship either to the insured property at risk of the assured or 
to the marine adventure itself. The clause is subject to this provision and can 
only operate in the foregoing two ways in which risk or policy has attached. It 
has thus been argued that the effect of the “lost or not lost” clause is not that an 
assured can recover the loss or damage before the policy attaches.909 To wit, 
loss able to be recovered must occur at the time the insured subject has been 
exposed to the risk of loss by the perils insured against,910 generally when 
goods are on board the carrying vessel.911 The effect of the “lost or not lost” 
clause has extended the normal timing of insurable interest under a normal 
marine insurance policy, i.e. the assured may recover the loss of which they are 
not aware even though they can have an interest only after such loss. 912 
Without the possibility of such acquisition of insurable interest, under contracts 
termed with the “lost or not lost” clause, the assured cannot recover.913 Indeed, 
the “lost or not lost” clause is an exception to the principle that an assured 
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should have an interest at the time of loss.914 Such extension and exception 
nevertheless cannot change the position that the clause can operate only after 
the risk or policy attaches. 
 
In cases of deciding whether buyers can derive assistance from clauses of “lost 
or not lost” and “warehouse to warehouse”, the problem should first be 
addressed as to when the cover provided by policies is available or when risk 
specified in policies attaches. Under a sale of goods contract CFR termed with 
clauses of “lost or not lost” and “warehouse to warehouse”, buyers could not be 
permitted to recover country damage occurring prior to shipment from sellers 
unless they could not be indemnified by their insurers. Buyers then made a 
claim against sellers to reimburse the country damage. In the Queen’s Bench 
Division (Commercial Court), it was held that the assured buyers’ claim failed 
who had been covered by the policy because they may recover the loss 
occurring before they obtained an interest and because “lost or not lost” clause 
includes both partial loss and total loss.915 In the Court of Appeal, the judgement 
agrees with Sellers LJ, obiter, by giving similar grounds. 916  Willmer LJ and 
Donovan LJ held, obiter, the opposite view as to the effect of insurance clauses 
that loss occurring before shipment had not been covered because a “lost or not 
lost” clause did not include loss occurring “before the period of risk specified in 
the policy has ever commenced”.917 Although the four judges had the same 
view that the clause could operate in the manner of the proviso of s 6(1) of the 
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1906 MIA, opinions have divided into two parts concerning whether risk has 
attached.918  
 
Again, before considering the problem as to the passing of property, the issue 
as to whether the risk has attached should be addressed first.919 The judge 
would not contemplate the wider period of cover provided by the clause of “lost 
or not lost” and “warehouse to warehouse” if the risk was not borne by buyers 
and did not attach.920 Upon the fact that the assured, the CFR buyers, could not 
succeed in proving the impossibility with respect to the loss incurred by the 
substitution of water for essential oil occurring prior to the shipment, the court 
held that the CFR buyers could not make a claim for they undertook no risk.921 
However, where risk had commenced from the sellers’ warehouse, i.e. “the 
warehouse to warehouse” clause had been invoked, loss that had occurred 
before shipment was held to be recoverable with the assistance of the “lost or 
not lost” clause.922 
3.3.1.4 The “lost or not lost” clause of itself cannot improve a buyer’s position 
3.3.1.4.1 Cases where FOB or CFR buyers may benefit from the “lost or not lost” clause 
Consistent with two meanings of the clause, FOB or CFR buyers, not aware of 
loss, may call in aid the clause in the following two situations: where loss has 
occurred before the insurance contract is concluded but after the attachment of 
risk, or after such attachment where the assured can acquire an interest only 
after the loss and the interest consequently is indeed transferred to him.923 For 
the latter, dispute may arise as to whether buyers can obtain an interest in the 
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insured subject of lost goods occurring before shipment. It has been suggested 
that they can acquire the property in the pre-shipment lost goods, at the time 
and in the manner in which it would have passed had the containers not been 
lost.924 
3.3.1.4.2 The “lost or not lost” alone cannot assist FOB or CFR buyers to recover pre-
shipment loss 
However, the “lost or not lost” clause cannot advance the timing as to the 
attachment of risk. In terms of FOB or CFR buyers, who have paid against 
documents, risk passes to buyers at the time goods are loaded on board and so, 
even under the “lost or not lost” cover, they may not be permitted to recover the 
loss occurring before such a time, i.e. goods are at sellers’ risk, not at buyers’ 
risk, which means they have no interest at that time.925 In such case, loss 
occurring before shipment is not within cover because policy or risk has not 
attached.  
3.3.1.4.3 Combination of “lost or not lost” and “warehouse to warehouse” clauses 
In order to protect a buyer of goods on FOB or CFR terms against pre-shipment 
loss at an earlier point of time, the “warehouse to warehouse” clause is thus 
needed which prescribes that the insurer starts to be liable for loss from the 
inland place, warehouse or place of storage named in the policy, where the 
subject matter insured is first moved for the purpose of commencing transit.926 
Moreover, the “warehouse to warehouse” clause may serve to avoid “the 
difficult and often expensive investigation of where the damage claimed in fact 
occurred whether it fell within the ambit of a normal marine cover”.927 
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It should be noted that the clause is not triggered where goods leave a place 
inland, rather than commencing transit, but for storage elsewhere or packing. 
Consequently, the insurance can commence at an earlier time when goods in 
effect leave the warehouse to initiate transit to the termination place specified in 
the policy.928  
 
However, it is noteworthy that, although policies also include the “warehouse to 
warehouse” clause which intends to extend the cover period to risks occurring 
before goods are on board the moving vessel, 929  the clause does not 
necessarily mean that the insurer will be bound under the policy for the 
extended time goods are sent off from the factory,930 nor for the limited time 
only goods are delivered at the warehouse in the shipping port.931 The nature 
and area of the clause thus are not invariable: when to identify the extension of 
the clause, terms of every particular contract must be carefully construed.932 
 
As the foregoing discussion shows, the “warehouse to warehouse” clause is 
also one tool to protect FOB or CFR buyers of goods against pre-shipment risks. 
However, despite its incorporation into a policy, an assured may still not be 
adequately protected without the assistance of the “lost or not lost” clause. 
Where the loss has occurred prior to loading onto the ship which means that the 
loss has occurred before the assured can acquire its insurable interest, even 
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though the policy has attached before that time by reference to the effect of the 
“warehouse to warehouse” clause, the assured may not be entitled to recover 
because he has no insurable interest before risk has passed to him which 
happens after goods have been loaded on board. However, the assured may be 
covered under a policy also with the “lost or not lost” clause which allows 
retrospective interest which renders it irrelevant that the assured had no 
insurable interest at the time of loss but has subsequently attained one. 
 
Thus, the Court of Appeal held that the assured, as the CIF buyers who sued on 
the policy entered into by the insurer and the seller which had been assigned to 
the buyers, were entitled to recover with the incorporation of the two clauses.933  
  
Furthermore, where policies contained both clauses of “lost or not lost” and 
“warehouse to warehouse”, the latter was nevertheless argued, obiter, by two 
judges not to be invokable, for the goods were never in the warehouse; it was 
submitted that buyers could not derive assistance from the former to recover the 
pre-shipment loss.934 FOB or CFR buyers having paid against documents may 
thus recover pre-loading at least part of the loss of, or damage to, insured 
goods by incorporating those two clauses under the authority of NSW 
Leather.935 In this case, New South Wales Leather Co Pty Ltd v Vanguard 
Insurance Co Ltd936, FOB buyers effected an open policy on goods containing 
“lost or not lost” and the “warehouse to warehouse” clause. Goods of leather 
were found missing after buyers collected the containers at the port of 
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destination. The court found that the leather goods had been missing before 
they were passed over the ship’s rail because the seals were found to be intact 
on the containers. As to the pre-loading loss of goods, buyers suffered no loss 
because they bore no risk derived from the fact that they had no obligation to 
pay for such loss. However, they suffered a financial loss arising from paying for 
the goods stolen before loading, because risk had commenced at the beginning 
of the transit under the “warehouse to warehouse” clause. The court held that, 
such a financial loss was sufficient and the assured buyers, would be entitled to 
claim for recovery from the insurers because under the policies including the 
“lost or not lost” term, they acquired insurable interest after the loss.937  
 
In short, without the combination of these two clauses, the “lost or not lost” term 
of itself cannot assist FOB or CFR buyers who have suffered loss occurring 
prior to loading because it only operates in ways of retrospective interest and 
retrospective declaration and not of moving up the time of transfer of risk, which 
is the function of a “warehouse to warehouse” clause. 
3.3.1.4.4 Insurers are reluctant to offer cover with “lost or not lost” clause and “warehouse 
to warehouse” clauses 
As discussed above, neither the “lost or not lost” clause nor the “warehouse to 
warehouse” term can of itself protect FOB or CFR buyers having suffered pre-
shipment loss in all situations.938 What is even worse is that, in the insurance 
industry, it is difficult for FOB or CFR buyers to get cover containing the two 
clauses, although a “warehouse to warehouse” clause was incorporated into  
the transit clause of the Institute Cargo Clauses (All Risks) 1963 and has now 
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been clause 8 of both ICC 1982 and 2009.939 The “lost or not lost” clause 
cannot assist them despite its having been termed into policies because the 
time of passing risk cannot be advanced. It is not only that the “warehouse to 
warehouse” policy is difficult to obtain: “the lost or not lost” clause has not been 
included in most standard insurance policies,940 like the MAR Form of policy, 
and now the Market Reform Contract.941 Clause 11 of the ICC 1982 and 2009 
(A) has denied its function of retrospective interest and only accepted that of 
retrospective declaration. Nor is the “lost or not lost” clause stipulated in any 
sets of the Institute Hull Clauses in the modern context.942 The “lost or not lost” 
clause was provided for in the SG Form,943 i.e. both policies on ship and cargo 
include this clause, which was nonetheless replaced by the Lloyd’s MAR Policy 
Form. The latter has no “lost or not lost” clause any more. 
3.3.1.5 Conclusion 
It can thus be concluded that neither the “warehouse to warehouse” clause nor 
the “lost or not lost” clause can separately allow an insured as FOB or CFR 
buyers of goods to recover goods lost or damaged prior to being loaded on 
board the ship.944 In light of FOB or CFR terms, the time and place at which risk 
passes to the purchaser are ascertained, namely, at the time of goods being 
loaded on board the ship.945 The purchaser cannot have an insurable interest 
unless risk has passed to him from the seller. Although the combination of the 
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above two clauses may assist the assured to recover pre-shipment loss, it does 
not necessarily mean that either of them can change the ascertained time and 
place. The former clause relates to extension of period of cover which normally 
attaches after goods have been loaded onto the ship.946 An assured who has 
suffered a loss before shipment is not covered by a policy including just this 
clause because has not had an insurable interest during this period nor even 
acquired one after loss. The latter deals with the problem as to whether, after 
the loss has occurred, a policy can be retrospectively made and an insurable 
interest can be retrospectively attained where both parties to the policy have not 
realised the loss. As discussed, it can do so. It also does not change the 
position as to the timing of risk passing and is not applicable prior to the 
attachment of risk. Besides, even the combination of these two clauses cannot 
assist such a buyer if it does not subsequently acquire a real insurable interest 
in the cargo.947 
3.3.2 Owners of goods on CIF, FOB or CFR terms 
3.3.2.1 Positions under CIF contracts 
3.3.2.1.1 Loss of or damage to goods sold CIF occurs before shipment 
The timing of the passing of risk. In international sales of goods, the most 
important thing is to ascertain the time and place of transfer of risk from sellers 
to buyer, which is convenient to help both parties make clear their contractual 
obligations and which party should effect the insurance. 948  Under standard 
forms of FOB, CFR and CIF contracts, the last of which are most frequently 
used in international sales of goods, the timing of transfer of risk from seller to 
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buyer is very clear: when goods are on board vessel at the shipment port.949 A 
buyer, on whose behalf an insurance contract has been effected by the seller, 
has property to goods as soon as they are dispatched from or on board the 
vessel at the port of shipment so goods are at his risk and he will bear the risk 
of loss from that time onward.950 The timing of transfer of risk is different from 
that of the passing of property in goods by way of the buyer paying sellers 
against bills of lading that represent the property of goods.951 However, it has 
been stated that buyers tend to contract on FOB or CFR terms for the benefits 
as to “control of premium costs, policy conditions and claims handling” and for 
developing the insurance industry in importers’ nations.952  
 
Problems may be encountered by buyers on CIF sales. All buyers on the 
mentioned three terms may be in trouble when they attempt to recover financial 
loss as to lost goods having paid for them, other than with loss of goods 
occurring before shipment. 953  Under CIF contracts, it may be confusing to 
ascertain whether a purchaser can recover the loss of or damage to goods 
occurring prior to passing of risk, i.e. the purchaser neither takes the risk of loss 
nor has title to or possession of goods.954 In particular, containerised goods955 
have been damaged before loading on board the carrying vessel, on which a 
clean bill of lading has been issued. The shipment by containerisation has the 
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further inconvenience of the goods not being able to be inspected when they 
are passed over the ship’s rail.956  
 
How to resolve such problems. With the combination of the “lost or not lost” 
and “warehouse to warehouse” clauses, an assured may recover a pre-
shipment loss. 957  Where policies incorporated the words “including from ex 
factory” and an express insurable interest clause which provided retrospective 
cover, it was held that CIF buyers to whom insurance policies had been 
assigned by sellers, were entitled to recover the damage which had occurred in 
inland transit during the period after the policies had attached but before they 
had been concluded and before any appropriation of the goods to any particular 
affreightment or insurance contracts.958  
3.3.2.1.2 Loss or damage under contracts on CIF terms occurs after shipment 
Both sellers and buyers under contracts on CIF terms may encounter a difficulty 
in recovering a loss happening during the period after the transfer of risk and 
before the assignment of policy.959 Besides the assistance by clauses of “lost or 
not lost” or clause 11 of the ICC 2009,960 the above-mentioned problem may 
also be addressed by CIF buyers claiming as assureds in their own right, which 
can be achieved by these clauses having specifically been stipulated in policies, 
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for they have insurable interest because of the risk having been transferred to 
them. CIF buyers can be included in policies as assureds by means that 
policies have been taken out wide enough to describe them as assureds. This is 
what London market open covers frequently do when placing insurance and 
clause 15.1 of ICC 2009 provides for an insurance which can cover a person by 
or on whose behalf the policy has been made.961 By this method to enlarge the 
ambit of “assureds”, CIF buyers can claim for loss or damage occurring during 
any period in transit as assignees and assureds.962 
3.3.2.2 Whether CFR or FOB buyers have interest in pre-shipment loss 
3.3.2.2.1 The predicament encountered by FOB or CFR buyers. 
Difficulty of recovering from insurers. Under sales on CFR or FOB terms, 
risk of loss or damage passes from sellers to buyers after goods have been 
loaded on board the carrying vessel and it is buyers that take out contracts of 
insurance. 963  It has been established that FOB buyers have an insurable 
interest when goods are at their risk after goods are loaded on board.964 Before 
shipment, during the transit from the sellers’ factory or warehouse to vessel, 
without provision of pre-shipment clauses in policies, it is sellers that are at 
risk 965  and in this period, should a loss occur, a buyer generally has no 
obligation to pay for the cargo.966 As they are not liable to pay for goods, they 
are not at risk,967 whereas they can definitely have an insurable interest in cargo 
due to their liability to the seller, i.e. they have to pay the price whether or not 
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the cargo will safely arrive.968 Before transfer of risk and title to or possession of 
property, they thus possess no interest. However, it is not unusual to see that 
CFR or FOB buyers have paid for goods against documents prior to transfer of 
risk, which however is not necessarily the contractual obligation of buyers. 
Insurers thus may refuse to indemnify them by arguing that they have no 
insurable interest in the subject matter insured at the time of loss because they 
have borne no risk until the goods have been loaded on board. It is evident that 
they have sustained financial loss arising out of the payment for lost goods, they 
however cannot recover such loss under a valid policy due to failing to satisfy 
the requirement of insurable interest. Sellers are also not entitled to recover 
from the buyers’ insurers, despite having an insurable interest, for they are not 
assureds under the policies effected by FOB or CFR buyers. 
 
Difficulty of recovering from sellers. In theory, FOB or CFR buyers can 
recover the purchase price from sellers who bear such risk of loss but paid for 
by buyers in order to get shipping documents. They may be remedied by sellers 
relying on a contractual right of the contract of sale and sales of goods 
legislation, trade practices legislation and the tort of negligence (where the 
damage to the goods can be reasonably foreseeable by the seller).969 It may 
nonetheless in practice be difficult for them to obtain contractual remedies. The 
reasons why they are only able to do this in theory not in practice are that, firstly, 
it is difficult and costly to conduct litigation in sellers’ foreign jurisdictions; 
secondly, buyers may worry about sellers’ financial viability. Besides, contracts 
of purchase and sales agreed by them prohibit buyers from recovering from 
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sellers before they have exhausted all means of recovery from their insurers970. 
On this basis, the court held that buyers could not obtain contractual remedies 
from sellers because of contractual terms. 971  The dilemma is set out as a 
misfortune that FOB or CFR buyers have to bear.972  
3.3.2.2.2 How to get recovery from insurers973 
Insure the right subject matter. As a result of the above-mentioned 
predicament, FOB or CFR buyers’ position are not well protected. It has been 
submitted that, in order to entitle buyers to claim for loss occurring prior to the 
shipment, buyers are well advised to take out policies on “anticipated profits of 
goods” or “in the nature of a guarantee of the seller’s obligation to deliver”.974 
The submission is on the basis that the policy on profits can also cover the loss 
of the cargo. Also, an assured is interested in the advance on security deriving 
from his liability, i.e. having to pay the price and thus being at risk of losing the 
prepayment in good faith for containerised cargo lost before the shipment.975 
 
Usage of the pre-shipment clauses. Besides the statutory “lost or not lost” 
clause and the “warehouse to warehouse” clause under ICC 2009976, buyers 
may also be entitled to recover from insurers for loss or damage prior to 
shipment according to other wide cover clauses of pre-shipment. 977  Two 
examples of such clauses can illustrate this point of view. The first kind of 
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clause, similar to the “warehouse to warehouse” clause, is devised to bring 
forward the point in time at which buyers are at risk under sale contracts. In 
general, the buyers can have an interest, according to the sale contracts, only 
after the shipment. With this advance of timing, they can bear risk at the 
beginning of transit prior to acquiring an insurable interest by shipment.978 The 
second kind of clause will deem any loss found at the port of unloading as 
having occurred during the transit within the cover. It may therefore be 
convenient for buyers to recover from insurers for they do not need to prove the 
time of loss.979 With these pre-shipment clauses, it may not be necessary to 
address the complex and difficult problem as to when the loss has occurred or 
whether FOB or CFR buyers have an insurable interest at the time of loss. 
 
Appropriate price terms agreed. When buying containerised goods, FOB 
buyers may overcome the disadvantageous position caused by the requirement 
of insurable interest by virtue of an FCA term.980 By this term the risk to be 
borne by buyers can start at an early point of time at which the risk passes to 
them when goods are first loaded into containers, which is certainly prior to the 
point in time of loading on board the vessel.981 However, inconvenience may be 
brought to both parties to the contract of sale attributable to the continuing use 
of FOB terms, regardless of the fact that goods will be loaded into containers 
first not on board ship, where the FCA term should be applied. As with the 
inappropriate inserting terms of FOB, buyers cannot claim for loss occurring 
before shipment while sellers will take additional risk during the period after the 
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container’s reception of goods and before loading.982 It may also be difficult for 
them to contract on terms that they fully inspect the cargo first before payment. 
It is impractical to inspect containerised goods during the period after the 
sealing of goods into the container and before they are loaded.983 The case is 
the same for the period after shipment and before delivery at the port of 
unloading due to the common practice of inserting “cash against documents”. 
Before paying cash to attain their documents of title, buyers have no right to 
inspect cargoes.  
 
Difficulty as to the application of pre-shipment clauses. In order to recover 
the loss occurring before shipment at the time FOB or CFR buyers have no 
interest, pre-shipment clauses have been provided by the market. It has 
nonetheless been contended that there are problems with these pre-shipment 
clauses, at least in the Australian market: “when cover first attaches and the 
extent of the obligation on the insured to use all reasonable means to first 
recover from the exporter or supplier”.984 It has also been argued that there is 
no legal basis, neither by statute nor under common law, for the existence of 
pre-shipment clauses.985 What is worse, commercial practice of such clauses is 
contrary to the requirement of insurable interest of the 1906 MIA, which renders 
void policies with no interest.986 Under the statute, such policies termed pre-
loading clauses, not including the “lost or not lost” clause, required to acquire 
retrospective interest, should be void because buyers have no interest before 
shipment. In cases in Scotland, policies having no interest which have 
                                                          
982
 Incoterms 2000, FOB; cited by ALRC 91, para 11.54 
983
 Michelle Taylor, ‘Is the Requirement of an Insurable Interest in the Marine Insurance Act Still 
Valid?’ (2000) 11 ILJ 147, 159–60; cited by ALRC 91, para 11.56 
984
 Michelle Taylor, ‘Is the Requirement of an Insurable Interest in the Marine Insurance Act Still 
Valid?’ (2000) 11 ILJ 147, 156–57; cited by ALRC 91, para 11.46-47 
985
 ALRC 91, para 11.47 
986
 1906 MIA, s 4; ALRC 91, para 11.46 
257 
 
nevertheless been honoured by insurers are held enforceable. 987  The Law 
Commission has expressed its concern about this inconsistency between the 
practice and the statute: “It leads to uncertainty, and may bring the law into 
disrepute if it is seen to be flouted.”988  
 
The existence of a contract of sale being sufficient proof of insurable 
interest. It has been submitted that if there is a contract of purchase and sale, 
an assured buyer may be deemed as having been at risk and thus has an 
insurable interest in goods.989 This opinion is based on the nature of insurable 
interest as a continually expanding concept and on the wide approach adopted 
by English courts. 
3.3.2.2.3 How to protect FOB or CFR sellers’ interest in the adventure 
Under sales of goods on FOB or CFR terms, after goods have been loaded on 
carrying vessels, sellers may have lost both the property in the goods and the 
position of being at risk to the goods. However, since they can have an interest 
in the adventure by the modern broader construction of insurable interest,990 
they may thus conclude a contract of insurance against contingencies that the 
goods have been lost or damaged and buyers fail to pay.991 For example, under 
the London market open cover which normally includes a Seller’s Interest 
Clause, sellers can do this.992 
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3.3.2.3 Containerisation  
3.3.2.3.1 Difficulty caused by containerisation as to timing of having an interest993 
With the new development of containerisation, the previous law as to 
individually packed goods cannot adapt to the commercial practice so far as the 
timing of transfer of risk is concerned. Unlike with the case of bulk cargo being 
shipped in a loose condition where buyers will be protected by transporters 
refusing to issue a clean bill of lading as to goods damaged inland, buyers of 
containerised goods may only find out the loss or damage at the port of 
destination.994 In the insurance industry, it is not common practice to adequately 
inspect goods which have been sealed into containers before loading because 
“the goods often pass through numerous transit entities prior to shipment”.995 As 
a result, the insurer may contend that the buyer has no insurable interest in 
insured goods during the inland transportation prior to taking the risk. In other 
words, confusion and dispute may occur because, due to this incapacity for 
inspection, it will be unclear when and where loss of, or damage to goods has 
happened, which will determine whether an assured can recover by comparing 
the timing of loss with that of transfer of risk.996  
3.3.2.3.2 Whether buyers attain insurable interest when cargo loaded into containers 
Containerisation, which has been widely used in international trade, has thus 
caused complex problems as to insurable interest. The confusion may be 
resolved by deeming the timing of transfer of risk as when goods have been first 
loaded into a container, just like their having been shipped on board. There is 
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no such law ruling as to whether risk can pass to buyers at the point in time 
goods are loaded into containers before being loaded on board the vessel.997 
Kirby P raised this issue but reserved his opinion as to whether buyers 
purchasing containerised goods have an insurable interest in the goods, never 
mind the profits derivable from goods, once they were first placed in the sealed 
containers.998 It has been however submitted by the judge that there should be 
a legal ruling as a response to the new technological and commercial 
development concerning containerisation.999 The ground for the submission is 
that containers, in certain contexts, could be functionally deemed as part of a 
vessel,1000 as held by the United States Supreme Court that “the container is a 
modern substitute for the hold of the vessel”.1001  
 
Nonetheless, without international acceptance, containerisation as a way of 
international shipping may not change the timing of transfer of risk. Although 
there is an FCA term, buyers are inclined to insert FOB terms into contracts of 
international sale of goods. It may be inferred from this fact that FCA terms 
have not obtained widespread international acceptance, which is necessary for 
the wide use of terms. Consequently, in practice, risk would not be deemed as 
being transferred to buyers when goods are first loaded into containers. 
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3.3.3 Various insurable interests 
3.3.3.1 Users of the property having a legal right 
The issue as to whether a user of property has an insurable interest in it needs 
to be looked at. In a case concerned with a hull policy, The Moonacre has 
somewhat expanded the definition of insurable interest,1002 despite objections 
that it is a reflection of the narrow test.1003 According to this case, the question 
was considered as to what relationship can amount to an insurable interest 
when a person uses the insured subject matter by powers of attorney, in 
consequence of which he may benefit from preservation or be prejudiced by the 
loss. In this case, also, the requirement of insurable interest is not construed 
according to the strict test of legal or equitable title to property but as the test 
that a manager in possession of yacht who has enjoyed a pecuniary interest 
can also have an interest in the vessel. The case is an authority for saying that 
a pure duty of taking care is sufficient. Thus, the case has not applied the 
proprietary interest test. In short, although the case has expanded the concept 
of insurable interest, he still has to use the terms of “legal relation” depending 
on existing rights which seemingly reflects Lord Eldon’s strict test. However, the 
terms above used in this case are so wide that the insurable interest based on 
powers of attorney and duty has actually reflected the broader test and they 
cannot be regarded as having represented the strict test.  
 
The case of Sharp v Sphere Drake Insurance Co1004 was concerned with the 
constructive total loss of a yacht, The Moonacre, caused by fire in the context of 
a hull insurance policy. Mr. Sharp bought a yacht, but the registered owner of 
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this ship was an off-the-shelf company for tax-efficiency reasons. Later, he 
insured the ship in his name through a broker. After the fire, Mr. Sharp claimed 
against his insurers for the loss, but the claim was rejected by the insurers on 
several grounds, one of which was that Mr. Sharp had no insurable interest in 
the vessel. 
 
It was held that he had an insurable interest in the vessel by analysing three 
sources of insurable interest, each of which could entitle Mr. Sharp to an 
insurable interest in the yacht. Firstly, because with two powers of attorney 
conferred by the registered company he had a legal relation regarding 
enjoyment of exclusive use of the boat for his own purposes. Such powers were 
a valuable benefit and thus were sufficient to give him an insurable interest in 
the assured.1005 Secondly, of course, under such powers, the yacht is actually in 
possession of Mr. Sharp as the bailee of it. Despite being examined by the strict 
test, such a bailee was entitled to have an insurable interest in light of the fact 
that it is not a mere bailment, but the user had pecuniary rights in the yacht, that 
was, the exclusive use of it.1006 Thirdly, he took responsibility for the registered 
company to exercise reasonable care over the management and navigation of 
the boat on the occurrence of loss of the vessel.1007  
 
His claim failed for other reasons, but the comment on insurable interest was 
the settled law. Therefore, an user who merely has a duty of exercising 
reasonable care, founding on an existing right, may have an insurable interest. 
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3.3.3.2 Shareholders 
3.3.3.2.1 The strict approach to shareholders 
In Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd, 1008  Mr. Macaura was the sole 
shareholder in an estate company, which was formed by himself; he sold a 
quantity of timber estate to the company in the forms of shares in the company 
which made him the company’s sole shareholder and its creditor. Later he took 
out a policy of insurance on the timber against fire in his own name with an 
insurer. The timber was soon destroyed by a fire. Mr. Macaura sought to make 
a claim under the policy; nevertheless, the insurer declined to indemnify him, 
averring that he had no insurable interest in the timber, which was the property 
of the company. 
This authority following that of Lucena by the House of Lords sets out the strict 
test. Both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords held that Mr. Macaura, as 
either the sole shareholder or simple creditor, had no insurable interest in the 
timber，because he stood in no legal or equitable relation to the timber owned 
by the company at all despite the fact that he had been materially adversely 
affected by the fire. Three kinds of interest have been explored, but not one is 
sufficient. In the first place, as a shareholder, he could not establish an 
insurable interest in the timber which was the property of the company based on 
the principle that a company was an independent entity. He had, therefore, no 
legal or equitable interest in the company’s property or a right under a contract. 
As a shareholder, he had an insurable interest in profits from his shareholding 
and he could have rightly taken out an insurance contract on profits. However, 
he failed do so. Secondly, as far as the position of creditor was concerned, a 
creditor could have insurable interest in property of his debtor only where he 
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had a claim on the property mortgaged or pledged to him for advances1009 while 
a simple creditor had no interest.1010 Although he had a pecuniary interest in the 
company, such a claim could still not be supported by a court, because if it were, 
it would follow that any creditor would be at liberty to insure the furniture of his 
debtor; but no such claim had ever been recognised.1011 Thirdly, this case also 
shows that a person having mere possession of a property does not necessarily 
enable him to have an insurable interest in the property. The timber in issue 
was still on the estate of Mr. Macaura on the occurrence of fire. Thus, in order 
to defeat a mere bailment, the bailee must have beneficial rights or a duty to 
goods bailed to him.1012 
3.3.3.2.2 Shareholders may insure its company’s adventure1013 
By contrast, in Wilson v Jones,1014 the court relaxed the concept of insurable 
interest and found an insurable interest in favour of the assured, as a 
shareholder of the company, by identifying the subject of insurance as the 
marine adventure not the cable. The different outcomes are due to different 
conditions stipulated in the policies and to a careful reading of the policies. Thus, 
in order to correctly ascertain the subject matter, the terms of the policies must 
be carefully examined.1015 Besides, this case has approved that a shareholder’s 
interest may well be insured by an insurance on profits rather than the property 
of its company from which profits derive.  
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3.3.3.2.3 Property of a company may be insured by a natural person 
In light of The Moonacre, a shareholder may even have an insurable interest in 
his company’s asset merely because of a duty or economic interest.1016 There 
are some similarities between The Moonacre and Macaura that the insured 
subject is the property of their companies not belonging to themselves. The loss 
to a shareholder is not due to his relation to the insured property but derived 
from his relation to the company. 
 
Even though it is argued that the decision of The Moonacre has been seemingly 
based on that of Macaura because the former sticks to the terms of “legal 
relation” to the insured yacht,1017 it may not be the case. The former case tries 
to relax the definition of insurable interest by recognising that a proprietary 
interest is not necessarily required in insurance on property while a shareholder 
having economic benefits is entitled to recover. By contrast, the latter has put a 
limitation on that concept by holding that the shareholder has no insurable 
interest in timber unless he has a proprietary interest in the company’s property. 
 
Furthermore, as to the specific explanation of the nature of insurable interest, 
Anthony Colman QC has distinguished that in The Moonacre, averring that the 
relationship of Mr. Sharp to the vessel and of Mr. Macaura to the timber are 
different, because Mr. Sharp has beneficial rights and duties to the vessel in 
consequence of which he may stand to benefit by the safety of the vessel, and 
be prejudiced by damage thereto, whereas Mr. Macaura has no legal or 
equitable relation to the company’s asset. Thus, the existence of and different 
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construction of terms of contracts between a shareholder and a company and 
approaches adopted by the courts will lead to totally distinct outcomes as to 
whether the assured has an insurable interest. 
3.3.3.2.4 Conclusion 
A commentator observed that Macaura still “continues as the law in the United 
Kingdom”,1018 despite the tendency towards the wide explanation of insurable 
interest. It is approved by English law that a shareholder is not entitled to have 
an insurable interest in assets of its company and thus cannot insure. Although 
it is submitted that the rule by Macaura should be applied there, the question 
whether a person has an insurable interest needs to be addressed, because 
although it is a decision of the House of Lords,1019 later cases either do not refer 
to Macaura or are not following it after making reference to it, 1020  nor do 
authorities in other jurisdictions.1021  
 
Even in the context of shareholder cases, subsequent courts have inclined to 
confer a broader insurable interest on the shareholder. Four methods have 
been adopted. First, because he can have an insurable interest in profits 
deriving from his company’s property, the court can hold that he has such an 
interest on conditions of policy by construing the subject insured as the 
adventure of the company rather than its property. Secondly, even though the 
House of Lords has held that a shareholder has no proprietary interest in the 
company’s property, again, an economic interest or a duty with an existing right 
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is sufficient to constitute an insurable interest. Thirdly, where a shareholder is in 
possession of the company’s property and has a vested beneficial right to it, his 
pecuniary loss can be protected. Last but not least, a creditor can have an 
insurable interest if he has a lien or security on the company’s property. 
3.3.3.3 Bailees 
3.3.3.3.1 The subject a bailee can insure 
Interest in bailment is one of the earliest extensions of the concept of insurable 
interest. A bailee, who is in charge of the custody or care of the property of 
insurance, may insure either its liability for his risks as to the loss of or damage 
to the property incurred by sea perils insured against or insure directly on the 
property, the subject matter of insurance. In order to determine which type of 
insurance has been taken out by a bailee, terms of insurance contracts should 
be referred to. Thus the fact that a bailee, being responsible for property in 
bailment, commonly effects a liability insurance does not necessarily mean that 
he cannot take out an insurance on the property.1022  
 
The leading case is Hepburn v A Tomlinson (Hauliers) Ltd1023 in which the 
assured as carriers, Tomlinson, had the policy. It then made a claim for the 
owner of the cigarettes lost by theft in transit. The insurer rejected it arguing that 
the carriers had no liability because the theft had not occurred through its 
negligence but by the owner’s negligence. Roskill J held, which was approved 
by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, that the “all risks” insurance 
policy at issue should be construed as insurance on goods rather than merely 
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on liability. Thus, the bailees had an insurable interest in goods and could claim 
as trustees of owners though they had suffered no loss.   
3.3.3.3.2 The amount a bailee can recover  
As to the amount a bailee, or others who have an analogous position to it, like a 
mortgagee or sub-contractor,1024 on the occurrence of loss, a bailee can recover 
to the extent of the whole value of the property, not limited to the amount for 
which it should be responsible, even though the loss or damage is not 
occasioned by its actionable fault. 1025  If a bailee had suffered no loss or the 
amount he had recovered exceeded what he should be responsible for, then he 
would be regarded as the trustee of the owner of the property who had suffered 
a loss and the rest should be paid by the bailee to the owner.1026  
3.3.3.3.3 Mere possession 
By contrast, a mere bailment cannot confer on a bailee an insurable interest. In 
both cases of The Moonacre and Macaura, the assured was thought to be a 
bailee of the insured subject. However, the result as to ability of recovery is 
different. In Macaura, the claim was not upheld by the court on the ground that 
he could not insure as a bailee of the timber because he took no liability or duty 
for the safe custody of the timber; he had merely permitted their remaining upon 
his land.1027 In The Moonacre, Mr. Sharp was nevertheless entitled to have an 
insurable interest based on bailment because he had enjoyed beneficial rights 
to the insured yacht.1028  
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3.3.3.3.4 Reason for the wide construction 
Lord Campbell CJ points out that a bailee can insure “without orders from the 
owner, and even without informing him that there was such a policy.”1029 In 
commercial practice, bailees usually insure the subject matter under their 
custody, at their own expense, and keep a floating policy for its potential 
customers. In a line of authorities, the court has in the latter case adopted a 
broader version of the test with regard to bailees,1030 i.e. they may take out a 
policy on the owner’s interest besides their own.1031 Furthermore, the broad 
approach to bailees’ insurable interest is in effect contrary to, or at least an 
anomaly of, the fundamental doctrine of indemnity because a bailee has either 
suffered no loss or recovered more than the amount of his own interest.1032  
  
There are four grounds for the principle that a bailee can insure and recover in 
excess of his own interest up to the full value of the subject matter insured.1033 
Of course, there must have been an existing contract of bailment. In the first 
place, historically, the possessory interest of a bailee is such that he can 
recover the full value of property bailed to him in trover. Due to such possession, 
he is interested in the whole property bailed. Secondly, such an insurable 
interest is derived from his responsibility, not necessarily the legal liability, for 
property bailed. Then, commercial convenience justified a bailee’s right to 
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insure up to the full value of the insured subject.1034 Furthermore, such practice 
has not been banned under British law.  
3.3.3.4 Pervasive insurable interest 
3.3.3.4.1 Parties who can have a pervasive interest 
A sub-contractor can have a pervasive interest. In modern context, it is of 
high importance to determine whether a sub-contractor who is involved in a 
construction project has an interest in the whole contract works. In the entire 
contract works, like contracts of building or engineering, it is the usual practice 
that a single policy is required to be effected by the head contractor to cover site 
owners, all contractors and sub-contractors in connection with the entire risk to 
the whole contract site.1035 Those parties having a pervasive interest should 
have the quality that “all the parties, with their joint efforts, have one common 
goal, e.g. the completion of the construction”.1036 It has been settled that a sub-
contractor can have a pervasive insurable interest in the entire property, 
including that of others on site, not limited to his own property or for which he is 
responsible.1037 
 
A sub-contractor can thus insure and recover the entire works insured. As for 
the amount he can recover, the position is the same as others having a limited 
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interest, such as a bailee or a mortgagee.1038 Thus a co-assured sub-contractor 
can insure the entire contract works in addition to its own property which is 
supplied to constitute a part of the works being performed, and recover up to 
the full value of the entire subject in its own name on the occurrence of loss by 
the perils insured against, holding the surplus on trust for other interested 
parties.  
 
Nature of interest insured. In terms of what the nature of sub-contractors’ 
interest is, i.e. an interest in their liability only for the part which they are 
responsible for or, in the case of the entire construction works, based on the 
liability that they may negligently damage property belonging to other persons 
interested having its source from their contracts, the court will rely on terms of 
the policy to determine the nature of the interest insured.1039 Thus, should a 
policy comprise terms of “all risks of loss or damage to the insured property”, 
the subject matter of insurance will be construed as on property rather than on 
liability.1040 Although liability can be covered by an insurance on it, by way of 
correctly formulating a policy, there is no rule to prevent a person, including a 
sub-contractor, from insuring such liability by a cover on property.1041 
 
Illustration. Due to the lack of English authority, an important decision as 
regards a non-marine subject from the Supreme Court of Canada consisting of 
the Chief Justice and eight judges, was cited.1042 The issue was so difficult to 
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address that every court had a different judgement. The Supreme Court 
restored the decision of the trial court which had been reversed by the Court of 
Appeal and held that the insurers were not entitled to pursue a subrogated 
claim in the name of the plaintiff against the sub-contractor for loss caused by 
its negligence because the latter had a pervasive insurable interest in the entire 
works and was also a co-assured under the policy taken out by the plaintiff. In 
the case of Petrofina,1043 with similar facts to the above case, an insurance 
policy had been effected by the main contractors for the entire construction 
works. The policy stipulated the main contractors, sub-contractors and other 
relevant parties as assureds. The main contractors employed sub-contractors 
for the heavy lifting operations. Damage was caused when the equipment 
provided by sub-contractors was dismantled. The insurer who had indemnified 
the plaintiffs sued and exercised the right of subrogation in the plaintiffs’ name 
against the sub-contractors’ negligence. For the first time the English court 
clearly set down the law that sub-contractors could have a pervasive interest in 
the whole contract work and thus be included in the single policy taken out by 
the main contractors as co-assureds, just like the position of a bailee.1044 Such 
a policy was an insurance on property rather than on liability.  
3.3.3.4.2 Reasons for recognising a pervasive interest 
Firstly, after examining the legal principles by analogy with that on bailment1045 
and the authorities on pervasive interest, 1046  despite not being English 
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authorities, there was no reason why sub-contractors should be prevented from 
insuring the whole of the construction works.1047 Secondly, from the perspective 
of commercial convenience, the reasons for recognising a pervasive insurable 
interest in sub-contractors are as follows. It firstly can at least lessen extra 
paperwork. Then, by extending the definition of insurable interest so as to make 
a single policy covering all the relevant parties and entitle a sub-contractor to 
have an interest in the whole project, overlapping claims and cross-claims on 
the occurrence of an accident between them can be avoided. 1048  Relevant 
parties also do not need to pay for costly premiums which may be quite 
uneconomic for them if they are just a small sub-contractor while they 
themselves have to insure their liability. 1049  Thirdly, depending on the wide 
concept of insurable interest, a sub-contract can have an insurable interest in 
entire contract works, because sub-contractors have had sub-contracts of 
construction which on the occurrence of an accident will come to an end and 
they will consequently lose the opportunity of remuneration.1050 Fourthly, even 
though under the strict test, they may still have an insurable interest by analogy 
with bailees being held to have an interest up to the full value of goods insured 
by them,1051 a sub-contractor under a sub-contract has been held to have part 
of the value, despite not having the whole possession of the whole contract 
project.1052 It thus can have a possessory interest. Fifthly, in terms of a partial 
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interest being insurable, a sub-contractor’s interest may also be insurable by 
way of regarding it as a partial interest.1053 
 
However, there is doubt in relation to whether the rule on the interest had by a 
bailee can be analogous to the one on pervasive interest under co-
insurance.1054 The reason for attempting the analogy is because a bailee is 
liable to the owner of goods while he is entitled to have an insurable interest in 
the whole goods and recover the full value, which is an issue needing to be 
dealt with regarding sub-contractors. However, it has been argued that the 
ground may be inaccurate for a bailee has possession of the insured subjects 
whereas contractors and sub-contractors do not possess other parties’ 
property.1055 Be that as it may, it may not be accurate, in light of the fourth 
reason of the above paragraph. Besides, the above argument has obviously 
reflected the strict test as to possessory interest, which does not match the 
current approach by the courts. Again, the objection to the analogy sets out that 
the nature of interest possessed by a bailee and sub-contractor is different: the 
former relates to its liability to the owners of the subjects while the latter is 
regarding the proprietary interest of other parties.1056 Actually, both interests in 
the property are based on their potential liability and where a bailee intends to 
insure the owner’s interest, he in fact insures the owner’s proprietary interest. 
Such is the case of a sub-contractor. In addition, the rule relating to the partial 
interest can help to deal with the doubt as to the rationale of the above analogy. 
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Even though property on sites may belong to other parties, from the perspective 
of partial interests, because of the construction contract, the entire work has 
become a new whole property. Every contractor and sub-contractor who has a 
partial interest in the entire work can thus have an insurable interest in every 
party owned by other parties, despite having no possession or proprietary 
interest in other parties’ properties.1057   
3.3.3.4.3 Insurers cannot exercise their right of subrogation against a co-assured 
sub-contractor 
General rule and exceptions. When to decide whether a sub-contractor can 
defend itself because an insurer cannot exercise its right of subrogation against 
co-assureds, two steps need to be looked at. First, insurers are not empowered 
to exercise their right of subrogation against a co–assured sub-contractor 
following the fact that they have a pervasive interest in the entire project and 
have been so insured. This is the fundamental rule. The next step relating to the 
following two exceptions needs to be investigated in order to decide whether the 
general rule applies. Should co-assureds have committed wilful misconduct, or 
they have not been covered by the policy in issue, the general rule is not 
applicable and insurers can exercise their rights of subrogation.1058 As to the 
first exception, the policy will not cover a claim deriving from wilful misconduct 
and putting forward such a claim will be fraudulent, which can discharge 
insurers from all liability for losses covered by the policy. As regards the second, 
it is manifest that in order to recover, co-assureds should get cover beforehand. 
Thus, on the evidence and the construction of the policy, the Court of Appeal 
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found that the sub-contractor was not covered by the policy and held that the 
fundamental rule was not applicable to this situation.1059 
  
Reasons. In Petrofina, two reasons have been offered as follows. It is first on 
the basis that the right of subrogation cannot be exercised against the assured 
itself. Either in cases of joint insurance under a same policy or co-insurance 
under several policies, relevant assureds having either inseparable or pervasive 
interests should be treated as one. 1060 In particular, the policy on the whole 
contract work is a single policy generally taken out by the head contractor to 
cover the whole risk, leaving other contractors or sub-contractors as co-
assureds free from effecting other policies. 1061  All relevant site owners, 
contractors or sub-contractors thus are co-assureds who should be treated as 
one, which prohibits the operation of rights of subrogation. Secondly, principles 
of circuity can prevent an insurer from suing a co-assured in the name of 
another.1062 
 
Illustrations. In National Oilwell (UK) Ltd v Davy Offshore Ltd 1063 , the 
defendants (DOL) employed the plaintiffs (NOW) as a sub-contractor to supply 
a system for the construction of a floating oil production facility. NOW took an 
action against DOL for unpaid invoices, whereas DOL alleged that the loss was 
caused by the breaches of NOW, who delivered them defective goods and 
delayed in delivery, which far exceeded NOW’s claim for unpaid invoices. While 
the insurers of DOL, who had paid for most of its losses, exercised rights of 
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subrogation against NOW, NOW alleged that it had rights to waive the insurers’ 
subrogation rights, because it was a co-assured under the policy.  
 
Colman J held that, without wilful misconduct and failing to be covered under 
co-insurance, sub-contractors have a pervasive interest in the whole property 
on sites and thus insurers were not able to excise a right of subrogation by 
paying one assured against any other co-assureds. The judge also gave two 
explanations for not permitting such a right of subrogation. Firstly, such 
permission would be in breach of the express terms included in the policy, i.e. it 
covered all the assureds’ loss or damage caused by all risks, despite their 
incurring them by their negligence or breach of contract. 1064  Secondly, the 
principle of circuitry of action also prevents insurers from recouping the sum 
paid to one co-assured but against other ones. It is meaningless to allow 
insurers to excise rights of subrogation against other co-assureds for the loss 
being paid by them to plaintiff co-assureds while the loss had been covered by 
them on the policy which has also covered other co-assureds.1065 Again, Lloyd J 
in Petrofina held the same rule in relation to the exercising of the right of 
subrogation by insurers in the name of co-assureds against other sub-
contractors based on the similar two reasons discussed above.1066 
3.3.3.5 Managers of a vessel 
Regarding hull insurance, the issue may arise as to whether or not the manager, 
who had no shares or insurable interest as enumerated in s 5(2) of the 1906 
MIA in a vessel, had insurable interest. In O’Kane v Jones,1067 the definition of 
insurable interest was also enlarged as to managers of the vessel, which was 
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supported by the court; they could have an insurable interest. The Martin P, 
which was under the management of ABC, although the managers of the 
vessels retained a residual management role, was insured by a policy led by the 
underwriter of Wellington. ABC Maritime, who was the vessel’s sub-managers, 
took out an insurance on it with Jones after receiving the threat of cancellation 
of cover by the broker because of non-payment of the premium. Later, 
the vessel ran aground. The assured claimed for a constructive total loss 
against Wellington and the insurer paid the claim, but the insurer argued that 
Jones was a co-insurer and was liable to contribute because there was the 
Jones policy. One issue which needed to be decided was whether ABC had 
insurable interest in the vessel. 
 
Siberry QC held that the legal relationship between the assured manager and 
the vessel was satisfied as to the requirements of s 5(2) of the 1906 MIA: i.e. 
under the management contract, in the case of any loss of the vessel, it would 
suffer a loss of earning remuneration or incur a liability. In the details, he still 
used the legal relationship to test whether the manager had an insurable 
interest or not. The right, derived from the Management Agreement, authorising 
ABC to manage and own a duty, was sufficient for the legal relation in s 5(2). 
Besides, should the vessel be lost or damaged thereto, the manager would lose 
the chance to work and be remunerated.1068 By contrast, whether an assured 
had an insurable interest did not necessarily depend on possession of insured 
property. In other words, insurable interest should not be confined as 
possessory interest. He also held that being insufficient to satisfy s 5(2) could 
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not prevent a person from having an insurable interest because s 5(2) itself was 
a non-exhaustive concept. 
 
Siberry QC by referring to authorities on insurable interest has observed the 
tendency to adopt the broader test.1069 Therefore, according to his judgement, a 
mere economic interest based on an actual contract may be sufficient to confer 
on an assured an insurable interest. Similar to that of The Moonacre, although 
terms of “legal relationship” have been expressed in order to satisfy s 5(2), The 
Martin P has substantially broken through the limitation imposed by Eldon’s test 
and broadened the concept of insurable interest. It has been suggested that the 
wide approach to insurable interest in hull insurance should be applied in 
marine cargo insurance.1070  
3.3.3.6 P&I club’s interest 
3.3.3.6.1 Basic facts  
The most important case in the current context in relation to the principle of 
insurable interest is the Feasey case, in which the authorities relating to the 
requirement of insurable interest have been thoroughly examined in order to 
find out the attitude of the courts to the requirement and the approach adopted 
by the courts to decide whether an assured can have an insurable interest in 
the subject matter of the policy of insurance. Despite it being concerned with a 
policy on life, many authorities on insurable interest in property have been 
examined. In this case, the court was concerned with the dispute as to whether 
the assured, a P&I club, who had an insurable interest in its potential liability to 
its members for personal injury or death of the “Original Persons” and had made 
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a contract of insurance between it and a Lloyd’s syndicate to cover such a 
liability, could have an insurable interest in the lives and well-being of such 
persons as the subject matter of the policy.1071 By analysing pervasive insurable 
interest in property,1072 the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of Langley 
J1073 who ruled that the assured was entitled to have such an insurable interest. 
Thus, a person only having potential liability rather than legal liability can have 
an insurable interest in insured property.  
3.3.3.6.2 The three-steps approach as to a court analysing insurable interest 
When a case regard whether an assured has an insurable interest is put before 
a court, the court will first try to identify the subject of the insurance by analysing 
the terms of the policy; then to analyse the nature of the assured’s interest 
therein; and finally to consider whether the subject embraces that interest or the 
assured has an insurable interest in the subject.1074 The principle has in fact 
been provided for in s 26 of the 1906 MIA which rules that the subject which 
must be reasonably ascertained in a marine policy shall apply to the interest 
intended to be protected by the policy, although the nature and extent of the 
interest need not to be specified in the policy. The arguments were based on 
non-disclosure and lack of insurable interest that the insurer was not liable for 
recovery because the number or nature of the interest possessed by the 
assured thus could not be upheld by the courts.1075 In other words, under some 
authorities, the assured must stand in an interest recognised by law in property 
at risk of sea perils,1076 although a legal or equitable interest in property insured 
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has currently been held as unnecessary. It is thus necessary to carefully look at 
the subject insured and insurable interest which are different but can impact one 
on the other.1077  
 
As to the first step to identify the subject, by and large, it cannot be ascertained 
unless the terms of the policy have been examined. Sir M.D. Chalmers 
mentioned that the issue regarding whether the subject from which an interest 
arises was sufficiently described in the policy could cause confusion.1078 It was 
laid down as law that the subject matter of a policy described in it in general 
terms could be specified and identified by asking what interest he had or what 
he had at risk without contrary evidence.1079 The manner of observing which 
part of freight was at risk was used by the court to decide what subject the 
shipowner in effect insured.1080 Where the court had to decide whether the 
insurance in issue was one on the ship or on the voyage, it was held that the 
subject matter insured was the ship, based on the help of insurable interest 
which must have the nature of being capable of valuation.1081 In the Wilson 
case, the court was concerned with identifying the subject matter insured: if it be 
the cable, the assured as the shareholder of the company would have no 
insurable interest in the company’s asset; if however it be a share of the profits 
from the cable, it would have. Blackburn J held that the policy in question was 
one on shares owned by the assured by reference to its insurable interest 
actually in the shares rather than the cable because the assured would have 
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obtained benefits from the success of the adventure and been prejudiced due to 
the failure.1082 Therefore, despite the fact that where the terms are not certain 
enough to ascertain the subject, it sometimes may be helpful that the courts first 
look at what insurable interest the assured has,1083 and what should always be 
borne in mind is that the subject is decisively defined by the terms of the policy. 
 
The nature of the interest the assured has therein shall be analysed so that the 
question as to whether the subject can embrace the insurable interest can be 
dealt with. In addition to deciding whether the assured has an insurable interest, 
it is thus also of importance to find out whether the insured subject matter 
includes such interest.1084 The policy should cover the loss which arises out of 
the loss of or damage to the insured subject; in other words, the insurable 
interest should be appropriate to the policy by which the interest can be 
covered.1085 According to the strict test of insurable interest that the assured 
must stand in a legal or equitable relationship to the property, where the 
assured has insurable interest in something other than the subject, i.e. the 
subject cannot embrace the insurable interest the assured had, the assured 
cannot recover. Where the policy was on ships and its goods, even though the 
assured who only had a mere expectation might gain profits in which they had 
insurable interest, for the subject insured could not embrace insurable interest 
in profits, the court thus held they had no insurable interest in the subject.1086 A 
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policy taken out to cover goods of rice could not be construed to cover the 
interest in profits arising out of the sale of goods.1087 Consequently, for the 
purpose of a successful claim, the assured should insure the right interest 
because there was a good distinction between the insurance on goods and 
profits deriving from goods.1088 In the Anderson case, it was held that albeit the 
assured had an insurable interest in profits on the rice, according to the true 
construction of the policy, the assured had no insurable interest in the rice 
which was the subject insured because the rice did not embrace the interest in 
profits deriving from another contract.1089 Similarly, in Macaura’s case, due to 
the subject matter insured being the timber, although the assured as the 
shareholder had an insurable interest in shares of profits, the assured had no 
insurable interest to support recovery because the timber could not embrace 
such an interest in the shares. In line with the above authorities, by reference to 
the nature of insurable interest the assured had, even though the assured had 
insurable interest in profits, the courts held the assured could not recover 
because the clearly specified subjects of the policies could not embrace the 
insurable interest they had.1090 The cases of Lucena and Macaura are binding 
House of Lords authorities, and they have adopted a strict approach to defining 
insurable interest. That explains why in some cases the courts uphold the 
proposition that the assured must have a legal or equitable interest in the 
subject, although some authorities are in favour of economic interest being 
sufficient to constitute an insurable interest. As argued by Ward LJ, judges may 
be forced to adopt such a narrow attitude because of such authorities unless 
                                                          
1087
 Anderson v Morice (1874–75) LR 10 CP 609, 621; cited by NSW Leather Co Pty Ltd v 
Vanguard Insurance Co Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 699 
1088
 Anderson v Morice (1874–75) LR 10 CP 609, 621; Maurice v Goldsbrough Mort and Co 
Ltd [1939] AC 452 (AC) 460-461; cited by NSW Leather Co Pty Ltd v Vanguard Insurance Co 
Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 699  
1089
 Anderson v Morice (1874–75) LR 10 CP 609, 621-22 
1090
 Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Co [2003] 2 All ER 587 [80] 
283 
 
the House of Lords changes the principles.1091 Besides, where the assured only 
has a mere expectation of advantage or profits from the safety of the subject 
insured, which is not insurable in all cases for it is too remote a relationship 
between the assured and the subject, the subject definitely does not embrace 
this too remote interest which  the assured has. 
3.3.3.6.3 The courts nowadays tend to refuse the technical defence of insurable interest 
A court will lean in favour of the assured having an insurable interest in the 
subject matter of the insurance, despite the situations where the subjects or 
terms of the policy are so specific, they could not embrace the insurable interest 
the assured had.1092 Thus, the defence by the insurer that the assured cannot 
recover due to lack of insurable interest in the subject insured nowadays will not 
be accepted by a court. Taking the example of a pervasive interest, although 
the common practice for the assured, as the sub-contractors who have an 
insurable interest in potential liability arising from the contract made between it 
and the main contractor or the owner of the property, is to effect an insurance 
policy on liability, and the subject of the policy made by the main contractor or 
the owner has been specifically identified as the whole property under 
construction, where by correct construction of the policy on the property its true 
intention includes to protect potential liability, the court will favour the view that 
the property embraces the insurable interest in potential liability and the assured 
thus has an insurable interest in the property.1093 
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The above authorities may rely on the following reasoning. First, the courts 
regard the defence of lack of insurable interest by the insurer as a mere 
technical defence which has no merits and does not relate to the loss when a 
claim is raised by the assured.1094 This technical defence thus will not be upheld 
by the courts at present, even by many of those prior to the implementation of 
the 1906 MIA.1095 It has been established by the court that when it decides 
whether the assured can recover, what they intend to look for is whether or not 
the assured has bona fide suffered loss, not at little technical objections.1096 
Where the insurers are able to decide whether to cover a risk and have then 
received the premium, with the true intention of fulfilling the insurance contract, 
such defence should not arise.1097 Secondly, it is from the perspective of social 
advantage that the courts tend to validate a contract by virtue of supporting an 
insurable interest rather than to avoid it due to lack of such an interest.1098 The 
courts would thus, as the authority of common law, tend to hold the assured as 
having met with the insurable interest requirement wherever possible.1099 
Chapter 4 Proposals for Reform of Insurable Interest in Indemnity 
Insurance by the English Law Commissions 
4.1 Introduction of the project 
The UK had waited a long time for the reform of insurance contract law before 
the English and Scottish Law Commissions launched its reform project in 2006. 
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In 1957, the Law Reform Committee, the forerunner of the Law Commission, 
had proposed the reform of specific areas of insurance law.1100  There was 
however no response. The English Law Commission then examined insurance 
contract law on the subjects of non-disclosure and breach of warranty in 
1980.1101 In 1997, the National Consumer Council considered these two issues 
and subrogation as well.1102 Both of them thought that there was a need for 
reforming insurance contract law. However, neither of their proposals was 
implemented. The Law Reform Committee of the British Insurance Law 
Association in 2002 published a report and then brought the Law Commission 
back to looking again at the reform.  
 
In the area of insurable interest, the Law Commissions have produced the 
Issues Paper 4: Insurable Interest (IP 4) in January 2008, Chapter 3 in 
Insurance contract law: post contract duties and other issues (2011 CP), the 
Issues Paper 10 (IP 10) in March 2015, the draft Insurable Interest Bill 2016 
(2016 Draft). The IP 4 was just aiming to seek views on whether the 
requirement of insurable interest should be repealed and “promote discussion 
before the formal consultation process begins” and therefore only set out the 
Law Commissions’ tentative proposals for the reform of insurable interest.1103 
Consultees responded to IP 4 by strongly arguing that the insurable interest 
requirement should be retained. They thought the requirement could play a role 
in preventing moral hazard, gambling in the guise of insurance, invalid claims 
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and reinforcing market discipline. 1104  In 2011, they published their second 
consultation paper1105 as 2011 CP on insurable interest, in addition to the other 
three topics of: damages for late payment, insurers’ remedies for fraudulent 
claim, and policies and premiums in marine insurance.1106 They proposed to 
retain the requirement of insurable interest but to plainly restate it.1107 They then 
published an analysis of responses in 2012 to Chapter 3 and concluded that it 
was not a priority to reform insurable interest. 1108  However, in 2014, the 
Investment and Life Assurance Group (ILAG), on behalf of life insurers, 
requested the English Law Commission to revisit insurable interest. After 
revisiting this issue, ILAG hoped that their members need not consider the issue 
of life policies void for lack of insurable interest when taking out useful covers, 
such as policies on children, cohabitants and key employees.1109 Besides, the 
English Law Commission was not satisfied with the moribund law and worried 
that the outdated law on insurable interest may lead to disrepute of the law. 
They thus decided to return to it by publishing IP 10. They intended to consult 
on whether there was a need to reform insurable interest and whether their new 
updated proposals could get wide support. 1110  Those undated proposals 
received very good support. In order to echo those, the Law Commissions then 
published the 2016 Draft.1111 
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In this chapter, proposals for each topic on insurable interest by the Law 
Commissions in their various papers will be discussed. Furthermore, analysis 
on the topic mainly occurs in the 2016 Draft, representing decisive proposals. 
4.2 Whether the requirement for insurable interest in indemnity 
insurance should be retained   
4.2.1 Attitudes to abolition in the IP 4 
The IP 4 did not represent the Law Commissions’ fixed views on this issue. 
Responses to it and stakeholders’ opinions included in it were nonetheless 
thought-provoking. It is thus meaningful to carefully study them. The problem as 
to whether the requirement of insurable interest was necessary to indemnity 
insurance must be primarily solved before exploring other issues relating to this 
principle. In IP 4, the English Law Commission seemed to be in favour of 
abolishing the requirement, instead only requiring the assured to show his 
possession of interest required by the indemnity principle at the time of loss. In 
order to explain it, the Law Commissions firstly recognised two functions of 
insurable interest and then denied them as follows. Firstly, they looked at 
whether insurable interest was necessary to define insurance. If not, the 
requirement of insurable interest may be abolished. If it was useful to 
distinguish insurance and other kinds of risk transfer contracts, such as wager 
and credit derivatives, it could then also help to identify the regulatory and tax 
regimes within which the insurance should fall. They tentatively stated that 
insurable interest was not needed to identify an insurance contract.  They 
further set out the FSA’s conclusion that factors like assumption of risk by the 
insurer, the consideration of a premium for the transfer of risk and the insurer 
undertaking a risk of loss only, not including that of profits, were more important 
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to define insurance contracts.1112 Secondly, they examined whether insurable 
interest was helpful to reduce the risk of moral hazard and prevent gambling 
under the guise of insurance, which were the initial reasons for the requirement 
of insurable interest. 1113  The provisional proposal seemed to be that the 
common law doctrine of indemnity could replace the statutory principle of 
insurable interest1114 because the former could also serve that purpose and 
could help to distinguish insurance from gambling as well. 
4.2.1.1 Whether statutory insurable interest is necessary to distinguish insurance 
from other contracts 
The issue may arise as to whether the strict insurable interest is a defining 
element of the concept of insurance so that without such an interest it will be 
difficult to distinguish insurance from other contracts. 1115  Some consultees 
expressed the opinion that the insurable interest principle was an essential part 
of the insurance contract and that its repeal might have a negative effect on the 
common understanding of insurance and the development of useful insurance 
products.1116 In IP 4, following the Australian experience,1117 the English Law 
Commission stated that it was merely some kind of interest rather than the 
requirement of insurable interest that was essential to defining insurance.1118 
Definitions of contracts of insurance have been explored as set out below in the 
areas of regulation, the risk transfer market, the common law and accounting 
and tax.1119 
                                                          
1112
 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 4-025 
1113
 IP 4, para 7.2 
1114
 IP 4, paras 7.34 and following 
1115
 IP 4, para 7.3 
1116
 IP 4, para 7.11 
1117
 Since 1995 the requirement of insurable interest is no longer used to distinguish insurance 
from other contracts in Australia. See IP 4, para 7.33 
1118
 IP 4, paras 7.31-7.33 
1119
 IP 4, para 7.31 
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4.2.1.1.1 Not necessary for regulatory purposes and other financial contracts 
The position was unclear as to whether the insurable interest requirement was 
necessary for the purpose of FiSMA to define an insurance contract. It seemed 
that FiSMA did not need insurable interest to identify an insurance contract. 
FiSMA was “the current governing legislation for insurance” and “regulates the 
‘effecting and carrying out [of] contracts of insurance’”.1120 It however did not try 
to define insurance contracts. Nor did the Financial Services and Market Act 
2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001. 1121  Instead, the latter only listed 
examples of insurance contract: any contract falling within its list of insurance 
contracts could be regarded as a contract of insurance.1122 It thus did not try to 
define insurance but listed types of insurance instead. 1123  Thus, FiSMA 
seemingly did not need the requirement of insurable interest to identify 
contracts of insurance.  
 
For regulatory purposes, in light of the response to the Law Commissions’ 
scoping paper,1124 the Financial Services Authority (FSA)1125 plainly set out that 
insurable interest recognised by law was not necessary for regulatory 
authorities to distinguish insurance from other contracts.1126  
 
                                                          
1120
 IP 4, para 7.6 
1121
 2001 Order, s 3(1); cited in IP 4, para 7.6 
1122
 2001 Order, s 3(1); cited in IP 4, para 7.6 
1123
 IP 4, para 7.8 
1124 Law Commissions, Analysis of Responses and Decisions on Scope (Law Com No 353, 
2006) 
1125 The FSA has been replaced from 1 April 2013 with the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) 
and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) due to its failure of financial regulation during the 
2008 financial crisis. The PRA will take the responsibility of regulating insurers, banks and large 
investment companies and the FCA is aiming to regulate the markets, protect investors and 
promote competition. 
1126
 IP 4, para 7.4 
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Besides, in a policy statement published in 2004 which aimed to provide 
guidance concerning whether a particular contract could be identified as a 
contract of insurance, 1127  the FSA expressed the same view. Although the 
requirement of insurable interest was not a topic covered by the guidance, it 
also pointed out that insurable interest was necessary for an insurance contract 
to be valid, but thought that insurable interest was not helpful to define the 
contract of insurance.1128 However, this was only the FSA’s test and did not 
consider the position as to this issue at common law or under statute.1129  
 
According to the FSA’s test, in order to be an insurance contract, the following 
factors must be included, that: 
 the insurer undertakes risk; 
 the consideration for the above duty is estimated based on the possibility 
of occurrence; 
 the parties assert to have entered into an insurance contract which has 
classic factors of insurance; 
 the risk has a nature of loss only rather than including that of whether 
profits can be earned. 1130 
How can the risk be understood here? In light of the policy statement, if an 
uncertain event occurs as a result of which the assured will inevitably suffer an 
adverse outcome regarding their interests, it can be called a risk.1131 It however 
should be noted that the “interests” consisting of the “risk” do not necessarily 
                                                          
1127
 FSA Policy Statement, 2004 
1128
 FSA Policy Statement, 2004, para 2.10; cited in IP 4, para 7.15 
1129
 FSA Policy Statement, 2004, para 2.10 
1130
 FSA Policy Statement, 2004, para 6.6.2; cited in IP 4, para 7.16 
1131
 Prudential v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1904] 2 K. 658; cited in FSA Policy 
Statement, 2004, para 2.18 
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mean an insurable interest as a statutory requirement.1132 It may be just an 
interest required under the indemnity principle. The nature of the interest 
required by these two principles is still unclear. Therefore, it is not right to say 
that the “assumption of risk” term is another expression of the requirement of 
insurable interest. However, according to Lawrence J’s test, an interest is 
insurable, where it has the nature of moral certainty, i.e. it cannot be beneficially 
affected, other than the perils insured against. Under the FSA’s test, the risk 
may imply that it has the nature of moral certainty. Firstly, according to the first 
limb, a policy commonly specifies the perils insured against, outside which an 
insurer is not liable to indemnify loss caused by other uncovered casualties. 
Secondly, the fourth limb may mean that a subject matter of insurance should 
embrace an interest an assured has. For example, a subject matter insured as 
profits can include an interest in goods. In short, for the regulatory purpose, 
insurable interest may be required to define an insurance contract.    
 
For the purpose of distinguishing insurance from credit derivatives, 1133  the 
opinion of Robin Potts QC should be firstly considered. He clearly stated that 
those were two different types of contracts for FiSMA and common law. But was 
insurable interest helpful to this distinction at common law? Life and non-life 
insurance are needed to be separately considered. In his opinion, as to an 
insurance contract: 
 the insurer only indemnifies an assured suffering a loss; and 
 the contract is thus to protect the assured’s insurable interest in the 
insured subject matter. 
                                                          
1132
 IP 4, para 7.17 
1133
 Credit derivatives are swap or option contracts which are “designed to lay off credit risk on 
loans, debt securities or other assets in relation to a particular reference entity or country in 
return for either swap payments or payment of premium”. Opinion prepared for the ISDA by 
Robin Potts QC, Erskine Chambers, 24 June 1997; cited in IP 4, para 7.9 
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For non-life insurance, insurable interest may not be necessary to identify 
insurance and the indemnity principle may be sufficient. That was because 
where the policyholder had only suffered loss, needing no further exploration of 
insurable interest, this can distinguish credit derivatives from indemnity 
insurance. However, it should be noted that this definition has used terms of 
“insurable interest”. By contrast, for non-indemnity insurance, it may be difficult 
to distinguish insurance and credit derivatives only using the loss test but 
without the insurable interest test: under both contracts one party would pay out 
an amount of money to the other party on the occurrence of a defined event 
rather than loss.1134 Therefore, the concept of insurable interest may be needed, 
in order to differ insurance from credit derivatives. 
4.2.1.1.2 No necessity at common law 
At common law, the statutory insurable interest is seemingly not necessary to 
define a contract of insurance. Instead merely some kind of interest, loss or 
adverse effect is needed. This can be demonstrated in the case of Prudential 
Insurance v Inland Revenue Commissioners.1135 Although the court dealt with 
the subject of a life insurance policy, three critical features of an insurance 
contract have been given as following: 
 payment; 
 uncertainty; 
 interest. 
Firstly, the insurer for some consideration of payment promises to pay some 
benefit to the assured on the occurrence of the uncertain event insured against. 
Secondly, the event should have the nature of uncertainty. Thirdly, the 
                                                          
1134
 IP 4, para 7.17 
1135
 Prudential Insurance v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1904] 2 KB 658 
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occurrence of the uncertain event should adversely affect the interest of the 
assured. 1136 It is not the case that the insurable interest is necessary to define 
an insurance contract due to an interest needed in the third aspect. Similar to 
the interest required by the indemnity principle, the range of such an interest 
here is different from and much wider than that of insurable interest. 
Nevertheless, as discussed above,1137 insurable interest may also be needed 
for the concept of insurance contract at common law.  
4.2.1.1.3 Not needed for the purpose of accountancy and tax 
In light of both definitions of accountancy and tax, despite complexity, the 
statutory insurable interest may not be essential for the definition of insurance 
contracts. The position, as that under common law, is clear as to the definition 
of insurance for accounting: the policyholder’s interest will be adversely 
affected.1138 Confusion may arise as to an insurance contract in relation to tax. 
Although the terminology of “insurable interest” is used as a description in tax 
guidance,1139 it in effect differs from the requirement of insurable interest. That 
is because the former is one to prove the loss suffered by the assured while the 
latter is one, besides, that can affect the validity of the insurance.1140 However, 
from the perspective of moral certainty of interest, avoiding to be too remote, 
insurable interest is necessary for accountancy and tax.  
4.2.1.1.4 Conclusion 
According to the above analysis, for the purpose of regulation, FiSMA and the 
FSA appears not to need insurable interest to define an insurance contract. The 
                                                          
1136
 Professor John Birds, Ben Lynch and Simon Milnes, MacGillivray on Insurance Law (12th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 1-1, 1-5; Malcolm A Clarke with Julian M Burling and Robert L 
Purves, The Law of Insurance Contracts (4th edn, LLP 2002) 1-1 
1137
 See 4.2.1.1.1 
1138
 International Financial Reporting Standards 4: Insurance contracts; cited in IP 4, para 7.26 
1139
 IP 4, para 7.29 
1140
 IP 4, para 7.20 
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former does not try to define it. The latter however adopts the test of interest, 
not insurable interest, to define it. Such are the positions under the risk transfer 
market, the common law, tax and accountancy. The interest here is just used to 
prove a loss and one required by the indemnity doctrine. In Potts’ opinion, it 
seems nevertheless that insurable interest is needed to distinguish a life 
insurance contract from credit derivatives. Although the above analysis is not 
the Law Commissions’ fixed proposals, they indeed reflect stakeholders’ 
attitudes to whether the requirement of insurable interest is necessary to define 
insurance contracts. Nonetheless, in light of the fact that an insurer is only liable 
to compensate a loss deriving from perils insured against, rather than other 
uncovered contingency: that is, an interest has to be ascertained, the definition 
of insurable interest may be indispensable for that of insurance contract. 
4.2.1.2 Whether the statutory insurable interest is still necessary to prevent moral 
hazard and gambling in the guise of insurance 
The IP 4 proposed that the indemnity principle could guard against gambling 
and moral hazard. The requirement of statutory insurable interest was originally 
aiming to reduce moral hazard and to ban gambling being disguised as 
contracts of insurance,1141 which was different from gambling itself.1142 Thus, 
both initial purposes should be considered in the modern context as to whether 
insurable interest can still achieve them, even though gambling itself appears to 
have been widely accepted currently and has been enforceable since the 
passing of the 2005 GA.1143  
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As far as indemnity insurance is concerned, the statutory requirement of 
insurable interest was regarded as no longer necessary for the protection 
against moral hazard and gambling by insurance1144 and however was able to 
be substituted by the indemnity principle. 1145  According to the doctrine of 
indemnity, policyholders could get indemnified only if they had suffered a loss; 
to suffer the loss, they must show some kind of financial interest.1146 Therefore, 
a loss sustained by policyholders on its own or with interests loosely defined 
was likely to provide such protection.1147 Without them, policyholders also could 
not get recovery, which had the same effect as that of the insurable interest 
principle. Consequently, moral hazard can be reduced and gambling under the 
guise of insurance can be prevented.1148 Putting aside the nature of interest at 
the time of loss, requiring an interest at such time appears to be able to play 
such a role. 
 
However, as discussed above, 1149  the indemnity principle cannot replace 
insurable interest. Besides, despite the approval of economic interest as 
insurable interest, it should not be explained as coming under the indemnity 
principle. It is because the former must depend on an existing right, like a 
contract, whereas the latter can be sufficient if the assured has suffered a loss. 
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 IP 4, paras 7.46-7.48 
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4.2.1.3 Whether to check the expectation of loss at the time of contract 
In light of the effects of the expectation of such an interest, 1150  the Law 
Commissions consulted, in order to avoid worthless policies, on whether or not 
insurers should be legally required to check that insurance was entered into 
with an expectation of an interest loosely defined at the outset of the indemnity 
insurance.1151  
4.2.2 Opinions about retaining in the 2011 CP 
In the 2011 CP, the Law Commissions further analysed consultees’ responses 
to the issue as to why the principle of insurable interest should be retained in 
indemnity insurance contracts.1152  They tended to retain the requirement of 
insurable interest in indemnity insurance 1153  because only 2 of the 15 
consultees (13%) had agreed with the repealing of the requirement of insurable 
interest.1154 Other consultees argued strongly that the common law doctrine of 
indemnity could not be a substitute for the statutory doctrine of insurable 
interest1155 and the latter was important for a number of reasons, which would 
be thoroughly explored below.1156 The following five reasons for retaining the 
insurable interest requirement were again mentioned using similar wording from 
the 2011 CP in IP 10.1157 There is thus no need to look in detail at that in the 
latter paper. 
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 For details as to the functions of the requirement of an expectation of interest at the outset of 
contracts, see IP 4, para 7.52 
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 IP 4, para 7.54; 8.5; see the last paragraph of 4.2.2.2; also referring to 4.2.3.2 
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4.2.2.1 Critical features of definitions of insurance contracts 
Consistent with several responses as to whether insurable interest should be 
retained, it was argued that it was necessary to define a contract of insurance. 
The Association of British Insurers was in favour of this view.1158 Contracts of 
insurance could thus be distinguished from other types of contracts by the 
requirement of insurable interest, such as gambling 1159  and credit 
derivatives. 1160  Different types of contracts had different operating systems, 
such as provisions of law, regulation, tax and accountancy. Insurable interest 
was thus necessary to distinguish insurance from other financial products for 
such purposes.1161 
 
Nearly all of foreign law and some regulation regarded the requirement of 
insurable interest as part of the definition of insurance. Had the insurable 
interest been repealed, the Lloyd’s Market Association was concerned about 
the reduction of market shares caused by the inconsistency of rules regarding 
insurable interest.1162 
4.2.2.2 Market discipline 
The Law Commissions’ preliminary thinking on the issue in IP 4 appeared to be 
that insurable interest was not necessary for market discipline;1163 the market 
could operate well even without the requirement of insurable interest.1164 This 
was based on the fact that the insurers sometimes, for instance with honour 
policies, did not need the assureds to show the possession of insurable 
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interest. 1165  The insurers seldom raised the lack of insurable interest as a 
defence to reject a policyholder’s claim; even in the case of being raised as a 
technical defence, the courts tended to strive to find an insurable interest.1166 
 
However, there was an argument by the ABI that market discipline could be 
reinforced by requiring the assured to have an insurable interest.1167 The ABI1168 
and Aviva1169 shared the same view that the requirement of insurable interest 
could guard against moral hazard and gambling in the guise of insurance. The 
insurers felt that “the doctrine of insurable interest has some underlying 
psychological effect in constraining the policies they were prepared to write”.1170 
Besides, the requirement of insurable interest was thought possibly to be helpful 
to guard against the insurance industry being involved in overly speculative 
products, not limited to the market of insurance.1171 It was alleged that one 
reason for the 2008 financial crisis was that kinds of trading products were too 
speculative; in other words, no interest in them was needed to be shown.1172  
 
In relation to the matter as to whether the insurers should be obliged to check 
the existence of the assureds’ expectation of loss or an interest in the subject 
matter, the Law Commissioners pointed out that no further review would be 
conducted regarding this issue for they did not regard it as a proper subject for 
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primary legislation and most respondents thought that it was an issue that 
should be left to regulation.1173 
 4.2.2.3 Invalid claims can be prevented 
Opinions were divided as to the issue as to whether insurable interest could 
prevent unrelated third parties from claiming under contracts of insurance. The 
Law Commissioners argued that the statutory requirement of insurable interest 
provided by section 5 of the 1906 MIA which provided a specific, limited relation 
to the subject matter could prohibit invalid claims.1174 For instance in a marine 
insurance policy on goods, the benefits of policies could be assigned while only 
those to whom the risk had transferred could make a claim.1175 Royal & Sun 
Alliance similarly set out that the statutory requirement of insurable interest 
could set a barrier against invalid claims. 1176  By contrast, the Law 
Commissioners disagreed1177 with the opinion of the Lloyd’s Market Association 
that the interest or some kinds of interest could have the same function.1178 
4.2.2.4 Other uses of the requirement 
The insurable interest doctrine, it was argued, was a useful tool to identify the 
location of insurance, which was crucial for the regulation of insurance.1179 
Where an international parent company had specified its legal insurable interest 
in the loss of its “subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures”,1180 the loss of them 
could be compensated for by the insurance effected by the parent company in 
the case of their loss, even though the insurer was not authorised in 
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1180 Suresh Krishnan and Brendan Hammond, ‘Structuring Multinational Insurance Programmes: 
Current Challenges in Australia, New Zealand and the Asia-Pacific Region’ (2011) ACE 
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jurisdictions where its “subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures” were 
located.1181 The location of insurance was becoming increasingly important in 
the context of continuing globalisation because it would have an effect on which 
insurance, tax law and regulator the insurer should be subject to.1182 
4.2.2.5 Few benefits from repealing insurable interest  
Differing from the tentative proposal in IP 4, the Law Commissioners in the 2011 
CP proposed not to abolish the requirement of insurable interest because its 
repeal was not a priority. 1183  Consultees argued that had the principle of 
insurable interest been repealed, no significant and clear benefits would be 
brought; undesirably disruptive effect might be caused as well.1184 What is more, 
the statutory insurable interest, in spite of the problems with it, produced few 
problems in practice:1185 insurers seldom raised it as a defence to defend a 
claim and the courts strived to find an insurable interest in favour of 
assureds.1186 Thus, it was argued that many problems with the law on insurable 
interest were more theoretical than practical.1187 
4.2.3 Rules for retaining under the 2016 Draft 
4.2.3.1 Different ways to divide insurance policies  
Different rules of law on insurable interest are subject to different statutes: for 
marine insurance, the 1906 MIA and 1909 MIA govern this issue; the 1774 LAA 
applies to the requirement of insurable interest in life insurance; as regards non-
marine indemnity insurance, prior to its repeal by the 2005 GA, the 1845 GA  
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indirectly requires the assured to possess an insurable interest in the subject 
matter insured.1188 It is thus important to clarify the types of insurance contracts 
in order to decide which category an insurable interest in question belongs to. 
Before the 2016 Draft, the insurance contracts have been typically divided by 
the English Law Commission into indemnity insurance and contingency 
insurance. It has been argued that there is no clear boundary between these 
two types of insurance: a key employee insurance, a type of contingency 
insurance, has a characteristic of the former, while a valued policy over property 
can recover a fixed sum of money on the occurrence of the insured perils.1189 
The 2016 Draft has thus divided insurance into life-related insurance and non-
life insurance. As for the former formulation, only if an insurance contract relates 
to a human life, the requirement of insurable interest should be governed by s 2 
of the 2016 Draft, which only applies to life-related insurance. By contrast, for 
the requirement for non-life insurance, rather than marine insurance which is 
still subject to the 1906 MIA, s 3 should apply. It is clear that the 2016 Draft has 
now created different regimes for different types of cover. 
4.2.3.2 The retaining of insurable interest in a non-life insurance context 
In light of the functions of the insurable interest principle recognised by the 
English Law Commission in the 2011 CP, s 3(1) retains the requirement of 
insurable interest in non-life insurance. Under s 3(1), it sets out that it is at the 
outset of the non-life insurance contracts that the assured must have an 
insurable interest or a reasonable prospect of obtaining such an interest during 
the life of the policy. The consequence of failing to comply with this requirement 
will make the policy void. This is the answer to the question as to whether the 
insurer should have imposed on him a legal duty to check the expectation of 
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loss at the time of contract.1190 It should be thus noted that the timing affecting 
the validity of a policy is at the time of taking out the contract. Also, it does not 
necessarily need the assured to possess an actual insurable interest at the 
outset of the contract, instead, it would be sufficient to show a reasonable 
prospect of acquiring an insurable interest at that time. This provision is in fact 
consistent with the requirement for marine insurance under the combination of s 
4(1) and s 4(2)(a) of the 1906 MIA apart from the formulation of ‘reasonable 
prospect’ in s 3(1) which intends not to show a too high threshold of the 
requirement which may prohibit the development of innovative commercial 
insurance products.1191 
4.2.3.3 Conclusion 
Several live issues will be addressed after the passage of the Insurable Interest 
Bill. After the enforcement of the Draft, the English law on insurable interest in 
non-life insurance makes it clear that an assured must meet the requirement of 
insurable interest at the time of effecting an insurance contract. In addition, s 
3(1) solves the unclear situation as to the consequence of lack of insurable 
interest in non-life insurance at the outset of the contract through providing that 
breaking the requirement will make the contract void. It is now consistent with 
the position in marine insurance. On the account of the requirement for 
insurable interest in three types of insurance policies by the Draft, the 2005 GA 
has not affected life-related insurance, non-life insurance or a marine insurance 
policy. Besides, s 5 of the 2016 Draft further provides that, after the 
enforcement, rules of this Act will replace those concerning the insurable 
interest principle, certainly including rules made in the 2005 GA even though it 
has affected the principle. As discussed below as to s 4(1) of the 2016 Draft, 
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due to the consequence of it being void not illegal, there is the potential for the 
assured to recover the premium paid if it did not make untrue statements 
relating to its insurable interest at the time of taking out the contract. 
4.3 Providing a clear statutory requirement of insurable interest  
4.3.1 Necessity 
The UK law on the requirement of insurable interest has been described as “a 
bewildering mixture of common law and statute”.1192 There is no certain and 
precise legal base for the requirement.1193 The position is unclear as to whether 
common law requires an insurable interest for an assured to obtain a valid 
contract of insurance.1194 For the position in statute law, many problems have 
arisen: the principle of insurable interest is required by varied statutes, in which 
the 1788 MIA and the 1909 MIA are regarded as outdated and moribund and 
thus it is proposed for them to be abolished.1195 It is uncertain as to whether the 
1845 GA indirectly imposes the requirement for non-marine indemnity 
insurance1196 and whether the requirement has been repealed by accident by 
the 2005 GA.1197  To make the position clear, it was proposed by the Law 
Commissioners that, leaving the common law aside, it was the statute on its 
own that should clarify that a policyholder effecting all kinds of insurance 
contracts1198 must have an insurable interest to obtain a valid insurance.1199  
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4.3.2 Rules 
Based on the statistics concerning this issue that 23 out of 30 (or 77%) 
respondents supported statutory clarification, in IP 10, the Law Commissioners 
again proposed that the statute should clearly require the assured to have some 
form of insurable interest in the subject matter in every kind of insurance.1200 
The statutory requirement of insurable interest for the purpose of non-marine 
indemnity insurance has thus been provided for by the 2016 Draft that a 
contract of insurance is void unless, at the time of entering the contract, the 
assured has an insurable interest or a reasonable prospect of acquiring such an 
interest during the life of the contract.1201  
 
4.3.3 Responses to the necessity 
By this method, as with the non-marine indemnity insurance, it is the first time 
that the insurable interest is required by statute. The confusing situation where 
the insurable interest has been governed by various statutes has also been 
resolved. After the enactment of the 2016 Draft, the 1788 MIA and 1909 MIA 
will be repealed and the Bill will be the only statute to provide the law on 
insurable interest in the area of non-marine insurance.1202 Hence, there is no 
need to consider the effect of the 1845 GA and its abolition by the 2005 GA and 
it is certain that s 335 of the 2005 GA does not affect the rules of insurable 
interest, at least in the realm of non-marine indemnity insurance.1203  
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4.4 Timing and consequences 
For different reasons, in marine insurance there is a difference in relation to the 
timing and the extent of insurable interest. To make a claim, the assured must 
have an insurable interest at the time of loss, not at the outset of the insurance 
contract.1204 To prevent a policy of insurance from being void, it is sufficient for 
the assured to show an expectation of insurable interest at the time of effecting 
the contract.1205   
4.4.1 Timing  
An example of non-marine indemnity insurance was given by the Law 
Commissioners to illustrate the case relating to timing of insurable interest: 
In January a second-hand car dealer enters into a year’s contract to 
insure a garage which it intends to buy in February. The purchase is 
delayed until 31 March. From 1 April to 31 October, the policyholder 
owns the garage, but sells it again on 1 November.1206 
 
From January at the outset of the contract of insurance, the policy was 
enforceable and not avoidable for the dealer had a real expectation of acquiring 
an insurable interest in the garage.1207 From January the premium was payable 
and the insurer was entitled to sue for it until the end of the insurance on the 
basis that the insurance policy attached from then.1208 The dealer could only 
claim the loss which had occurred from 1 April to 31 October because it could 
only have insurable interest during this period after the completion of the 
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 1906 MIA, s 6(1) 
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sale.1209 For the loss of premiums suffered by the dealer during the period from 
January to 31 March and from 1 November to the end of the insurance when it 
was obliged to pay premiums but not entitled to claim the loss, it was the risk 
that the dealer had to take by effecting the insurance in advance.1210 As to how 
to test the validity of an indemnity insurance contract in terms of insurable 
interest and when a policyholder may claim for the loss, these two issues will be 
discussed below. 
4.4.1.1 The validity of insurance in terms of insurable interest 
In the 2011 CP, the Law Commissioners proposed how to identify those 
contracts of non-marine indemnity insurance which would be deemed as void 
for lack of insurable interest: only where the contract is taken out without a real 
probability of acquiring some kind of insurable interest at any stage during the 
life of the contract.1211 Thus, to obtain a valid contract of indemnity insurance in 
terms of the insurable interest principle, the policyholder must demonstrate that 
at the time of the contract it has a real probability of acquiring insurable interest 
at some time.  
 
This proposal for non-marine indemnity insurance is different from the position 
in marine insurance. For the latter, a policy of marine insurance would be 
deemed as void that is in the guise of a gaming or wagering agreement as 
provided for in subsection 4(2) of the 1906 MIA.1212 Possibly to avoid being 
affected by the 2005 GA making gambling enforceable,1213 unlike in the Act 
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1906,1214 the proposal did not involve gambling contracts and directly provided 
which kind of non-marine indemnity contract could be regarded as void.1215  
 
The Law Commissioners stated that the majority of consultees (18 of 26, or 
69%) who responded were in favour of their proposal on this problem. In order 
to answer queries from some consultees as to how to test that an indemnity 
insurance contract was void for lack of insurable interest in particular 
circumstances, the Law Commissioners further studied this issue in detail in the 
following three subtitles.1216 
 
Under the 2016 Draft, it has been made clear that the timing which can affect 
the validity of a contract of non-marine insurance is the very outset of the 
contract and that a “reasonable prospect” (not “expectation” expressed in the 
1906 MIA or “real probability” proposed in the 2011 CP) of an insurable interest 
during the term of the contract is sufficient to support an assured having an 
insurable interest.1217  
4.4.1.1.1 Whether the term of “real probability” is too high a bar 
In the 2011 CP, the Law Commissioners used the wording of “real probability” 
to describe an indemnity insurance void for lack of insurable interest.1218 
 
In IP 10, the terminology of “real probability” was, it was argued, to be 
substituted by terms of “reasonable expectation” or “reasonable prospect” 
because the former may imply an overly high threshold than that of the latter, 
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 2011 CP, para 12.38 
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which was agreed by the Law Commissioners.1219 They thought however that, 
the differences between terms of “real probability” and “reasonable expectation” 
or “reasonable prospect” were more “presentational than substantive” for if 
occasionally raised by the insurer, the courts would strive to find an insurable 
interest for the policyholder. 1220  Despite that, the Law Commissioners 
recognised that the proper wording of “reasonable expectation” or similar should 
be made by them to prevent “real probability” from being understood by the 
parties as an overly high threshold leading to the insurer reluctant to provide 
useful insurance products.1221 In a word, to make an insurance contract valid, it 
was proposed by the Law Commission that the policyholder must have an 
insurable interest at the outset of the contract or at that time have a reasonable 
expectation (or similar) of acquiring such an interest at some stage during the 
life of the contract.1222  
4.4.1.1.2 Never actually acquiring an interest  
In the circumstance where the assured might have acquired an insurable 
interest at the time the insurance contract was taken out but eventually did not 
obtain it because of non-gambling reasons, such as the failure of the trade, the 
issue was raised as to whether the contract was valid and consequently 
whether the insurer was entitled to sue for premiums. In the 2011 CP, the Law 
Commissioners thought that the key to the test was whether there was a real 
probability at the time of the contract.1223 If there was, it was a valid contract and 
the assured had to pay premiums to the insurer even though the trade for which 
the assured had effected insurance later failed because of which it could not 
                                                          
1219
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obtain an insurable interest.1224 This proposal was again affirmed by the Law 
Commissioners in IP 10.1225 
 
By contrast, where the assured could never have a “real expectation” or 
“reasonable expectation” (or similar) of acquiring an insurable interest at the 
outset of the policy and ultimately did not do so, what the proper consequences 
of such a case should be was considered. The Law Commissioners in the 2011 
CP gave an example of gambling upon an agreement as to whether the Eiffel 
Tower would fall down, effected by an assured having no intention of obtaining 
an interest.1226 The outcome was proposed by the Law Commission in this 
paper that the policy was void for lack of insurable interest because there was 
no real expectation of acquiring some kind of insurable interest at the time of 
the contract.1227  This contract was effectively worthless.1228  As a result, the 
assured could not make a claim for the loss and the insurer could not sue for 
premiums not received. Besides, for those having been paid, the assured was 
entitled to get them refunded.1229 It thus appears true that the insurance, in 
particular the requirement of insurable interest, has not unintentionally been 
affected by the 2005 GA because the above gambling contract, it is suggested,  
is void and unenforceable. 
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In IP 10, the Law Commission still agreed with the above proposal; albeit being 
consistent with their new thinking, they replaced “real probability” with 
“reasonable expectation” or similar.1230  
 
S 3(1) of the 2016 Draft provides that it is at the outset of the contract that the 
assured must acquire at least a reasonable prospect in the subject matter in the 
non-life insurance, breach of which would affect the validity of a contract. Thus, 
in order to not be void, the timing of effecting the contract is crucial. Then, as 
long as the assured has an insurable interest or a reasonable prospect of an 
insurable interest, in spite of the fact that he later loses or assigns it, the 
contract is still valid because the insurer has assumed risks in such a situation. 
Due to the insurers having taken risks, the assured has to pay the premium 
which acts as the risk transfer mechanism.  
4.4.1.1.3 Actually acquiring an insurable interest 
In IP 10, the Law Commissioners discussed the validity as to a new 
circumstance, which was not mentioned in the 2011 CP, where there was no 
“real probability” or “reasonable expectation” or similar of obtaining an insurable 
interest at the outset of the contract, the policyholder however somehow indeed 
did so during the life of the insurance contract.1231 Under such a circumstance, 
according to the test relating to the validity of an insurance contract in the 2011 
CP, it would be void and thus would be unfair to both parties to the insurance 
where the dispute that the insurance is void for lack of insurable interest is put 
forward before a court. To put it simply: where the assured has known that no 
loss occurs, the insurer may be asked by the other party to the contract to 
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return premiums because it is argued that the contract is void for lack of 
insurable interest; where a loss has occurred, being faced with a claim made by 
the assured to compensate its loss, the insurer may decline to do so by arguing 
the invalidity of the insurance for lack of an interest.1232  
 
To address such a difficulty, the Law Commissioners made a proposal in IP 10 
as follows: in general, similar to the test raised in the 2011 CP, an indemnity 
insurance contract would be regarded as void where the assured at the time the 
contract was made had no insurable interest and at that time no “reasonable 
expectation” or similar of acquiring an insurable interest at any stage during the 
duration of the contract; for the case in which it was difficult to test the existence 
of such an expectation of an interest at the outset of the policy, the fact that the 
assured had obtained an insurable interest at any time during the life of the 
contract was the conclusive proof of its existence.1233 
 
However, the 2016 Draft does not encompass the proposal for the validity of an 
insurance contract which is described as a theoretical case where the assured 
has no reasonable prospect of having some form of insurable interest at the 
outset of the contract but in the end somehow acquires such an interest:  
a company acting optimistically by insuring a property it wished to 
acquire even though it did not have the resources to do so. If it 
received an unexpected windfall, the sale might go ahead.1234 
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Due to the ‘timid’1235 reform in the 2016 Draft, the law on this case remains 
unclear. This approach may leave the assured and the insurer hopeless: for the 
assured, the insurer may assert the avoidance of the contract because the 
assured has no reasonable expectation of interest at the time of taking out the 
contract; for the insurer, the assured may claim for recovering the premium paid 
by asserting the avoidance of the contract after having known there was no 
occurrence of loss, despite the fact that he has effectively obtained an interest. 
The proposal could have asserted that the policy is not void for lack of insurable 
interest only if the assured can acquire an interest during the policy term.1236 
4.4.1.2 When the assured can make a claim for loss 
4.4.1.2.1 At the time of loss in the 2011 CP 
The Law Commissioners proposed the same position for marine insurance, as 
to the timing of insurable interest which the assured must have in order to claim 
for the loss, to be applied to non-marine indemnity insurance. For non-marine 
indemnity insurance, the assured could not make a claim and get indemnified 
unless it could show the possession of insurable interest at the time of loss.1237 
4.4.1.2.2 Same in the IP 10 
Identical to the proposal in the 2011 CP that the assured could make a claim 
conditional on it having an insurable interest in the subject matter at the time of 
loss, the Law Commission said this proposal represented the current law as to 
when the assured under an indemnity insurance could claim and it would be 
beneficial if this position could be clarified in a statute.1238  
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4.4.1.2.3 Same in the 2016 Draft 
For such reasons, the 2016 Draft makes it a clear statutory rule that the 
conclusive timing to determine whether an assured can claim to be 
compensated by the insurer is at the time of the insured event.1239 While it was 
not clear as regards when an insurable interest must be possessed in the non-
life insurance context, it has been expressly set out in s 3(2) that, in order to 
make a claim, the assured must obtain an insurable interest at the time of loss. 
It finally shares the clear position concerning the timing of having an actual 
interest as that of marine insurance provided for in s 6(1) of the 1906 MIA: the 
actual interest must attach at the time of loss. So it does not matter whether the 
assured has an actual insurable interest at the outset of the contract or it has 
lost or assigned its interest after the loss.1240 However, the rule of “lost or not 
lost” in marine insurance is not included in the Draft. Retrospective interests and 
declaration thus cannot apply to non-marine indemnity insurance. 
4.4.1.2.4 The consequences of lack of insurable interest are different 
A breach of the requirement of insurable interest by s 3(1) will render a contract 
void. By contrast, lack of insurable interest at the time of the insured perils will 
render the assured not able to make a claim, with nothing relating to the validity 
of the contract. Different types of interest are required. For the former, a 
reasonable expectation of obtaining an insurable interest meets the provisions 
by s 3(1). However, to satisfy the insurable interest required by s 3(2), an actual 
interest is essential.  
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4.4.1.2.5 The rule in s 3(2) is different from the indemnity principle. 
The English Law Commission stated that the insurable interest required at the 
time of loss is different from the indemnity principle. The former is designed to 
show who can make a claim and when. However, the latter focuses on the 
matter as to whether the assured has suffered a loss. And the Commissioners 
thought that the requirement of insurable interest by s 3(2) will not conflict with 
the indemnity principle because the latter also needs the proof of an interest in 
order to show its loss. 1241 
4.4.2 Consequences of being void for lack of insurable interest 
4.4.2.1 Proposals in the 2011 CP 
4.4.2.1.1 Premium not payable in the event of avoidance 
In indemnity insurance, in light of the proposal by the 2011 CP, the premium 
should be paid to the insurer unless the insurance was void.1242 An indemnity 
insurance policy would be regarded as void if the policyholder at the time of the 
insurance could not acquire a real probability of insurable interest at any stage 
during the insurance period.1243 As long as the insurance contract is valid for 
having a real probability of insurable interest, the insurer is entitled to sue for his 
premium.1244 For the above example of the second-hand car dealer, it was 
recommended that from the outset of the insurance the insurer could retain the 
premium because since that time the insurance was valid, because the assured 
possessed a real probability of obtaining insurable interest and then the insurer 
ran the risk, even though the sale did not effectively happen.1245 It should be 
highlighted again that although the insurer could sue for the premium because 
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of the validity of insurance contracts it did not mean that the assured for the 
consideration of the premium could get indemnified which could only be 
compensated where the assured could show its possession of insurable interest 
at the time of loss. The risk of premium loss, caused during the period from the 
insurance effected to that of the sale contract completed, fell on the assured.1246 
4.4.2.1.2 Different from the position in marine insurance 
In other words to set out the above proposal, if a policy was void owing to lack 
of a real expectation of acquiring insurable interest, either in the cases of 
gambling or failure of consideration, the outcome was the same: the insurer 
could not sue for the premium1247 and the assured could retain the unpaid 
premium and recover those having been paid.1248 The grounds for this proposal 
may rely on the fact that the consideration for the payment of the premium 
totally fails and the policy thus is totally worthless. 1249  The rule under the 
proposal is different from the position relating to marine insurance by section 
84(3)(c) in the 1906 MIA. Section 84(3)(c) regulates marine insurance policies 
as follows: if the policy is void due to it being in the guise of gambling contracts, 
the premium received by the insurer is not returnable. 1250  This reflects the 
legislative intention of the 1906 MIA, one aim of which is to prohibit wager 
policies. However, without a wager policy, the insurer should return the 
premium received where the policy is void due to the assured not acquiring an 
interest during the policy term. The premium being returnable is based on the 
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consideration of the premium failing: the insurer need not pay anything for the 
policy or the risk that never attaches.1251 
4.4.2.2 Proposals in IP 10 
4.4.2.2.1 Same 
Similar to the proposal to address the consequences of insurance contracts 
being void due to the assured having no real expectation of insurable interest in 
the 2011 CP, it was set out as follows: “if the insured shows that an insurance 
contract is void for lack of (actual or anticipated) insurable interest, the insurer 
should not be entitled to sue for the premium and the insured should be entitled 
to a refund of premiums already paid.”1252 As long as the insurance is valid, the 
insurer is entitled to sue for unpaid premiums.1253  
4.4.2.2.2 Reasons 
This proposal was based on three grounds. In the first place, consideration for 
the insurance contract fails.1254 Seeking to be compensated on the occurrence 
of loss, the assured, having no actual or anticipated insurable interest in the 
insured subject, has paid the premium as consideration for the indemnity.1255 
However, consideration on the part of the insurer fails because the assured 
cannot suffer a loss; the insurer thus needs to indemnify no loss.1256 Secondly, 
the concept of premium is regarded as “a risk transfer mechanism”. 1257  In 
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circumstances where the assured takes no risk for lack of insurable interest, a 
premium should not be involved. Thirdly, it can act as a barrier against the 
insurer effecting overly speculative contracts because the premium received will 
be returned to the assured should those contracts be deemed as void for lack of 
insurable interest.1258 Thus, both parties of the assured and the insurer will 
strive to take out valid insurance contracts. In virtue of this proposal, benefits of 
the insurance parties can be better balanced and the market discipline can be 
constrained.    
4.4.2.3 Provisions under the 2016 Draft  
4.4.2.3.1 Not including rules as to return of premium 
The 2016 Draft does not provide the proposal in IP 10 which stated that the 
premium paid should be returned to the assured where the policy was void for 
breaking the insurable interest requirement. The English Law Commission 
considered the proposal as the subject of the general law which should not be 
governed by the 2016 Draft. Subject to general rules, a void contract is as if it 
had never existed. So the parties to the contract should go back to the pre-
contract state. If the contract is void for lack of insurable interest, the assured 
then should be entitled to recover the premium paid. The function of the 
premium playing the role of risk transfer mechanism also decides this position. 
If the contract is void for having no interest at the outset, then the insurer has 
never been at risk, then the consideration of the premium fails; the premium 
should thus be returned to the assured.1259 The court held that the assured 
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could recover the paid premium where the reinsurance contract was void 
because the contract included the PPI term.1260 
4.4.2.3.2 Premium not being returnable caused by assureds’ untrue statement in the event 
of a policy’s avoidance 
Section 4(1) instead sets out that the premium paid by the assured is not 
recoverable from the insurer where not only the contract concerned is void for 
lack of insurable interest but, although the assured already knows or does not 
care about the nature of his interest, he still makes an untrue statement about 
his interest in the insured subject matter at the time of taking out the contract. 
This principle is consistent with that under s 84(1) of the 1906 MIA: if the 
contract is void for lack of insurable interest and the assured acts fraudulently or 
illegally, the insurer can retain the premium paid and not need to return them to 
the assured. In light of s 4(1), the debate can stop now that s 84(1) does not 
apply to non-marine insurance based on the common law principle that, despite 
the assured making a fraudulent statement relating to insurable interest, he 
seems to be able to recover the premium.1261 
4.4.2.3.3 Whether s 4(1) of the 2016 Draft can be replaced by the Consumer Insurance 
(Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 (CIDRA 2012, below) and the Insurance Act 
2015 
Both CIDRA 2012 and the Insurance Act 2015 have set out that the insurer 
need not return the premium paid in the case where the assured has known that 
it is in breach of the duty of disclosure or does not care whether or not it is in 
such a breach. There is a debate that the above two Acts may apply to the 
situation governed by s 4(1) because the assured has known that the statement 
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of its interest is untrue or does not care whether or not the statement is true. It 
may be not the case. The nature of the disclosure is a pre-contractual duty and 
the precondition for breach of the duty of disclosure is that the contract must in 
fact exist. However, the fact of the untrue statement as to insurable interest will 
render the contract void, meaning the contract has not ever existed. It is 
meaningless to assert the breach of the pre-contractual disclosure duty. The 
two Acts thus do not apply to a contract void for lack of interest and s 4(1) is 
then required. 
4.4.2.3.4 The problem with s 4(1) and possible improvement 
It should be noted that s 4(1) may create rigid outcomes against the assured, 
like the one in joint insurance. In this case, a joint assured may be left without 
cover and unable to recover premiums paid although it has acted honestly but 
other joint parties have fraudulently carried out the policy. Clause 4 of CIDRA 
2012 assists to limit the harsh outcomes in consumer insurance by ruling that if 
the assured of a consumer insurance contract has made deliberate or reckless 
misrepresentations, the insurer need not return the premium paid, except to the 
extent (if any) that it would be unfair to the consumer to retain them. However, 
the business assured in the situation in question is left vulnerable. Firstly, 
CIDRA 2012 does not apply to business insurance. Secondly, clause 4 does not 
apply in relation to a contract void for lack of interest because there is no need 
to discuss the effect of the assured’s misrepresentation as to a void contract. 
Thirdly, although the English Law Commission has recognised this issue, the 
2016 Draft does not provide rules to better address this harsh situation. It may 
be a good choice, to be consistent with CIDRA 2012,  clause 4, by adding terms 
like ‘except to the extent (if any) that it would be unfair to the assured to retain 
them’ to mitigate the harsh results. In short, the 2016 Draft should have 
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separately treated the parties to some kind of insurance, like the joint insurance, 
where one policyholder deliberately has made untrue statements as to the 
nature of his interest while others have acted honestly. 
4.5 Whether the 1909 MIA should be abolished  
In relation to marine insurance contracts, IP 4 tentatively proposed to repeal 
section 1(1) of the 1909 MIA which provides that it is a criminal offence against 
those policyholders who have taken out marine insurance contracts without 
insurable interest.1262 The Law Commissioners gave three reasons for repealing 
the 1909 MIA as follows: the first was to be consistent with their previous 
proposal using the general interest in the indemnity principle to replace that 
under the insurable interest principle; the other was that no prosecution had 
ever arisen under the 1909 MIA.1263  Besides, the English Law Commission 
thought the 1909 MIA had imposed unnecessary criminal penalties on the basis 
that financial services regulation, not criminal methods, should govern the issue 
of insurable interest in insurance contracts. 1264  In addition, the 2005 GA 
enforces a wager contract which is the reason for imposing the criminal offence. 
It is clearly no longer outlawed.1265 Thus, the 1909 MIA was again proposed by 
the Law Commissions in the 2011 CP and IP 10 to be entirely abolished.1266 To 
reflect the above-mentioned proposal, the 2016 Draft s 7(1) states that it will, if 
enacted, abolish the 1909 MIA. 
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4.6 Names of interested parties under the 1788 MIA 
4.6.1 Arguments at to the above rule and its repealing in IP 4 
As to the issue as to whether the names of interested parties should be written 
in a policy, before the 1906 MIA repealed the 1788 MIA insofar as it affected 
marine insurance, it seemingly varies in different types of insurance: there was 
a need for “life, goods and marine insurance but not for land, buildings or 
liability insurance”.1267 Some supported the insertion of the names by arguing 
that it was necessary for insurers to assess the risk. Others nevertheless took 
the opposite view on such a necessity: the assured’s disclosure or presentation 
could help to fulfil this function.1268 The provisional proposal in IP 4 thus was 
that the names of those interested in every kind of insurance need not be 
entered into a policy and affect the enforceability of contracts of insurance.1269 
4.6.2 Abolition in the 2011 CP and IP 10 and the position in marine insurance 
In the 2011 CP, the English Law Commission proposed abolishing the 1788 
MIA in its entirety, which IP 10 confirmed.1270 As a result of the repeal, names of 
interested parties both in marine insurance and non-marine insurance on 
“goods, merchandizes, effects or other property” were not needed to be written 
into policies. The position is clear in marine insurance because the 1788 MIA 
has been repealed by the 1906 MIA to the extent of marine policies1271 and the 
1906 MIA provides that only the names of the assured or of one effecting 
insurance on its behalf must be specified in the policy.1272 After the abolition, the 
assured may feel safer writing policies without being concerned that the insurer 
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was being relieved from its liability due to failing to insert names. This seems to 
be the practice of the market 1273  on the basis that the 1788 MIA, despite 
applying to non-marine insurance on goods, has no practical effects on such 
insurance1274 and is regularly ignored by insurers.1275  
4.6.3 Same position in the Draft 2011 and reasons 
As a result, s 7(1) of the Draft 2011 entirely abolishes the 1788 MIA. As for a 
contract of non-life insurance, the law no longer requires the assured to insert 
the names of those interested in the insurance contract. Taking the view of the 
Law Commissioners, there is no need to provide this requirement in law 
because it is a matter of contract and the insurer is free to contract with the 
assured to incorporate the interested peoples’ names into its contract. It may 
also be harsh to allow the insurer to be relieved from its duty because of the 
assured not inserting the interested parties’ names.1276 After this repeal, for 
policies on goods, land and buildings, and liability, it will be unnecessary for the 
assured to insert the interested names into these policies. Breach of inserting 
interested names into policies also no longer renders such a policy void. Rules 
for different kinds of insurance are now consistent. Section 23 of the 1906 MIA 
nevertheless demands the assured, or some person who has effected the 
insurance on its behalf under a marine insurance policy, to do so. It seems that 
s 23 is also applicable to non-life indemnity insurance. 
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4.7 Should the provisions on insurable interest in the 1906 MIA be 
affected? 
4.7.1 The position in IP 4 and the 2011 CP and reasons 
Sections 4 to 15 in the 1906 MIA relate to the law on insurable interest for 
insurance policies governed by the Act. In IP 4, the issue regarding those 
sections was not discussed. In the 2011 CP, according to the Law Commissions’ 
proposals, in the realm of marine insurance, no change should be made to ss 4 
to 15 of the 1906 MIA.1277 In the first place, those sections were considered to 
be operating satisfactorily according to the responses from consultees.1278 For 
instance, the RSA argued that the definition of insurable interest regarding 
marine insurance on goods, which was provided for in s 5 of the 1906 MIA1279 
operated well up until now.1280  Secondly, any reform may affect the limited 
specific definition of insurable interest, differing from that of loosely defined 
interest.1281 
4.7.2 No change in IP 10 and the 2016 Draft 
The Law Commissioners proposed in IP 10 to leave, in the marine insurance 
context, ss 4 to 15 of the 1906 MIA unaffected by their reform.1282 By restating 
that those provisions were deemed to operate well and there was no strong and 
urgent reason to reform them, s 6 in the 2016 Draft excludes marine insurance 
contracts from the ambit of the Draft’s regulation.1283 It means that ss 4 to 15, 
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governing insurable interest, still applies to a contract of marine insurance1284 
and the law on insurable interest in marine insurance is left unchanged.  
4.8 Definition of insurable interest 
4.8.1 Proposal in the 2011 CP 
4.8.1.1 Law Commissioners in favour of the broader test 
The IP 4 did not consider that the reformed definition of the statutory insurable 
interest should include what were critical elements or whether the concept of 
the statutory insurable interest was operating well. In the 2011 CP, some 
respondents did not seem satisfied with the narrow test of the legal or equitable 
interest; instead, they argued in favour of the broader test of economic or 
pecuniary interest being sufficient that the assured would, in the ordinary course 
of practice, benefit from the preservation of the insured subject matter and 
suffer an economic disadvantage should the subject matter of insurance be 
lost.1285 In light of the approach of the broader test of insurable interest by the 
courts, the Law Commissioners agreed to this argument. 1286  However, the 
insurers were less concerned about the test of insurable interest because they 
seldom raised the argument of the assured lacking insurable interest.1287 The 
English Law Commission thought that the issue of mere expectation to be at 
risk, still consistent with the current law, was a relationship too far to comprise 
an insurable interest.1288 
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1287
 2011 CP, para 12.26 
1288
 2011 CP, paras 12.30-12.31 
325 
 
4.8.1.2 Two methods of reforming the definition 
Despite differing opinions regarding the elements of the requirement of 
insurable interest expressed by the responses, the Law Commissioners 
recommended no major reform for the definition of insurable interest in 
indemnity insurance. 1289  They instead considered whether the definition of 
insurable interest for non-marine indemnity insurance should be provided for in 
the statute, similar to the approach of section 5 in the 1906 MIA or whether, with 
a statutory basis for the requirement of insurable interest, it should be totally left 
to the courts, as it is now.1290  For marine insurance, s 5 of the 1906 MIA 
provides a non-exhaustive definition for insurable interest, which codifies pre-
1906 cases on insurable interest. As far as non-marine indemnity insurance is 
concerned, the current state is unclear and the test of insurable interest is totally 
reliant on case law authorities. 
4.8.1.3 Three kinds of interest can be regarded as insurable. 
To count it as insurable interest in non-marine indemnity insurance, three kinds 
of relations between the assured and the insured subject were proposed by the 
Law Commissioners.1291 The law on insurable interest in marine insurance is 
nowadays recognised by these three types of interest.1292 The first was the 
same as that of marine insurance in the 1906 MIA: a legal or equitable interest 
in the subject matter of insurable interest.1293 The assured had to demonstrate a 
right to the property insured or a right deriving out of the contract relating to 
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it.1294 Secondly, the interest of possession is one kind of insurable interest, for 
instance, a carrier or other bailees. 1295  The third reflected the continually 
expanding tendency of insurable interest held by Lawrence J: a factual 
expectation or economic disadvantage could comprise insurable interest.1296 
Although this wider test was argued by Ward LJ as having no legal basis,1297 it 
has most recently been approved as one type of insurable interest in 
Feasey.1298  
4.8.2 Proposals in IP 10  
4.8.2.1 Further limitation of the above two methods in the 2011 CP by IP 10 
Differing from the proposal of the two options for the definition of insurable 
interest recommended in the 2011 CP, the Law Commission in the IP 10 only 
proposed an approach similar to how the requirement of insurable interest has 
been defined in the 1906 MIA, namely, the statute should provide for all types of 
non-marine indemnity insurance, a non-exhaustive definition including 
examples of kinds of interest which could comprise the requirement of insurable 
interest.1299  
4.8.2.2 Similar definition as that in the 2011 CP 
In respect to the three types of insurable interests proposed in the 2011 CP 
which was recommended as part of the non-exhaustive list of examples of the 
requirement of insurable interest, by and large, the Law Commission in IP 10 
was satisfied with the proposal, with minor amendments.1300 Again, three kinds 
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of interest could be deemed as examples of the non-exhaustive definition. The 
first kind is the classic definition by Lord Eldon in Lucena v Craufurd: to have an 
insurable interest, the assured must have a legal or equitable interest in the 
property. Secondly, the interest of possession or custody can amount to 
insurable interest. As to the possession interest, the English Law 
Commissioners retained the same situation as the current law.1301 In addition, 
more than the only interest of possession proposed in the 2011 CP, this 
category also added custody, a broader conception than possession, of the 
subject matter of insurance as one type of insurable interest. Thus, a manager 
who did not possess the insured vessel, but owed a duty of care, could have an 
insurable interest in the vessel.1302 Thirdly, a reasonable prospect (or similar) of 
benefit or loss can meet the requirement.1303 Regarding the “factual expectation” 
of economic benefits or loss, the Law Commissioners still proposed that this 
type of interest could count as an insurable interest, but they used the term 
“reasonable prospect” instead of “factual expectation” to avoid the insurable 
interest requirement being treated as an overly high bar.1304 
4.8.3 Provisions in the 2016 Draft 
4.8.3.1 Rules 
4.8.3.1.1 Four examples of insurable interest in the 2016 Draft 
The above three forms of insurable interest in IP 10 has been incorporated into 
the 2016 Draft with no substantial amendments but enlarging the form of the list 
into four limbs.1305 Section 3(3) sets out that the assured can have an insurable 
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interest in non-life insurance, other than marine insurance governed by the 
1906 MIA, if it: 
 has a right in the insured subject matter; 
 has a right arising from a contract as regards it;  
 has possession or custody of it; or  
 will suffer economic loss on the occurrence of the perils insured.  
The first three kinds of insurable interest mainly apply to property insurance and 
echo the current state of the law while the last type aims to widen the concept of 
insurable interest, although the English courts have in effect adopted the 
broader test.1306 After the adoption of the wider economic loss test, the assured 
will not be under pressure of insurable interest concerns as to when to write 
covers on liability, D&O and business interruption. For example, under the 
proper terms of the policy, a person can recover under a policy on property 
although he has mere potential liability. Despite being unclear in non-marine 
indemnity insurance before this reform, the definition of insurable interest in 
non-life insurance is now certain. Thus, there has been a statutory definition of 
insurable interest in the realm of non-life insurance.  
4.8.3.1.2 The definition in the 2016 Draft echoing that in Feasey 
This definition actually reflects that in Feasey: 
 it has a legal or equitable relation to the insured subject matter; 
 it is in possession of the subject; 1307 or 
 it has no possession but has a mere economic loss by damage to the 
subject.1308 
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With the last two limbs being the same, the first limb in Feasey representing the 
strict test in fact includes the first two types of insurable interest defined in s 3(3). 
Therefore, s 3(3) has just codified the law on insurable interest in Feasey, there 
is nothing new, which in effect mainly reflects Lawrence J’s factual expectation 
of loss test. However, due to this codification, the nature and ambit as to 
insurable interest in non-life insurance is to some extent plain now. 
4.8.3.2 Benefits from the non-exhaustive concept 
The definition of the insurable interest in non-life insurance under s 3(3) is a 
partial, non-exhaustive one, with the form of a list of examples of the assured 
having an insurable interest. In the 2016 Draft s 3(3) takes the method of s 5 of 
the 1906 MIA setting out the concept of insurable interest in marine insurance. 
By providing a non-exhaustive list of examples concerning some types of 
interest being regarded as an insurable interest in non-marine indemnity 
insurance, the parties can better understand what can constitute an insurable 
interest and the current attitudes by courts. In the meantime, it shows a flexible 
approach to satisfy the future development as to definitions of insurable interest 
caused by more new products of insurance, intended to conform to the needs of 
the future insurance market.1309 Thus, it is improper for the list to provide some 
interests relating to which the law is still developing and not closed, such as that 
of sub-contractors’ pervasive interest in the whole contract works:1310  i.e. it 
should not be confined to interests of sub-contractors under contracts of 
construction. If it included other specific types of interest other than the four 
forms of interest in the list, it might have caused the problem of a narrowing 
understanding of the definition. As for those interests not included in the list, it 
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does not necessarily mean they are not insurable; and the partial definition will 
allow the courts to, just like the present state, continually expand the concept of 
insurable interest.1311  
4.8.3.3 Possession rather than lawful possession 
Although the English Law Commission did not state “lawful” possession in its 
proposals for the reform of the definition of insurable interest, they did consider 
doing so. But they have omitted it by setting out that possession, but mere 
possession even though unlawful, is one of an insurable interest in the 2016 
Draft s 3(3). Two reasons have resulted in this decision. Firstly, the doctrine of 
indemnity can inhibit an assured, unlawfully possessing the insured subject, 
from benefiting. As for the indemnity doctrine, the assured can be indemnified 
only if it has suffered a loss. In a case of unlawful possession, the assured 
cannot possibly suffer a loss, which leads to it being impossible to get recovery. 
In addition, the term of possession can put such an assured into a 
disadvantageous position. The assured cannot sue for the return of the 
premium paid due to the untrue statement. Secondly, the term of “lawful” 
possession may lead to the situation where the lawful owner cannot be 
compensated despite the unlawful possessor having cover for it.1312 Suppose 
that A being poor has stolen an expensive car from the owner B and then took 
out a policy on the car. The car then crashed. If the unlawful possession is not 
one form of insurable interest, the contract will be void and the assured A will 
not get indemnification. Due to A being poor, the owner B cannot be indemnified 
without the insurer’s compensation.  
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4.8.3.4 Whether the economic loss test will lead to overly speculative insurance 
The wider test of economic interest concerned some people who had argued 
that the wider test would induce the insurance market to trade overly 
speculative products, which could destroy the market’s reputation. However, the 
English Law Commission thought it was essential to take a wider test for the 
requirement of insurable interest to meet the needs of the insurance market. 
Firstly, despite the wide test, an insurable interest must be based on an existing 
interest. Admittedly, as discussed above, many authorities have established 
that the concept of insurable interest should be widely construed as an 
economic interest. However, it could not be ignored that a limitation of the 
existence of a contract had been imposed on the economic test. Additionally, 
according to Lawrence J’s test in Lucena, the risk has to be ascertained. That is, 
loss of, or damage to, the insured subject matter cannot derive from other 
uncovered contingency. Thus, the wider test seems to some extent ascertained. 
Secondly, the assured needed the economic interest in the subject insured to 
be protected and such an agreement should be allowed where the insurer was 
also willing to effect the contract. Thus, it was now clear that if the assured had 
an interest in the subject matter of the insurance of liability, D&O and business 
interruption, it satisfied the definition of insurable interest. Thirdly, the insurer of 
itself could decide not to underwrite an overly speculative risk by investigating 
the material circumstances disclosed by the assured. Fourthly, the common law 
had recognised the wider test and no evidence of problems had ever arisen.1313 
Fifthly, the experience from the reform of Australia relating to the Insurance 
Contracts Act 1984 (1984 ICA) s 16 or s 17 had shown that it brought about 
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neither more litigation nor uncertainty as to case law principles. 1314  It thus 
seems to be proper to approve the wider test of insurable interest. 
Chapter 5 Insurable interest in Australia and in New Zealand  
5.1 Insurable interest in Australia 
5.1.1 Introduction 
In Australia, there are two different regimes in respect of the law on insurable 
interest: one for marine insurance, which is governed by the Marine Insurance 
1909 MIA (Cth) (1909 MIA(Cth)); and the other for non-marine insurance, which 
is subject to the 1984 ICA.1315 The changes to the law of insurable interest in 
Australia by the 1984 ICA have not been extended to the marine area and have 
not affected the 1909 MIA (Cth).1316 Sections 10-21 of the 1909 MIA (Cth)1317 
involves the law on insurable interest in marine insurance, which uses almost 
the same terms as those in the 1906 MIA (UK).1318  Hence, relating to the 
detailed law on insurable interest in the 1909 MIA (Cth), Chapter 2 above, can 
be referred to. With regard to that in general insurance or non-marine indemnity 
insurance, under the 1984 ICA, the requirement that the assured must have an 
actual or potential insurable interest has been repealed and the pecuniary or 
economic interest test, rather than the strict legal or equitable interest test, is 
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sufficient for the assured to make a claim at the time of the loss of or damage to 
the insured subject matter.1319 
 
Dissatisfied with the inconvenience caused by the existence of the above two 
regimes and problems deriving from the strict test of insurable interest, the 
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) thus issued ALRC 91 in May 2001. 
Despite the title of the report, studies and proposals for reform were made not 
only to the 1909 MIA (Cth) but also to the 1984 ICA.1320 In respect of insurable 
interest in marine insurance, it in the first place reviewed ss 10 to 12 of the 1909 
MIA (Cth). 1321  ALRC 91 then examined two types of occasions where the 
statutory insurable interest possibly gave rise to problems: one particularly 
focused on was where goods buyers, the assured, on FOB, CIF or CFR terms, 
despite having paid the goods, had no insurable interest required by the 1909 
MIA (Cth) in the subject matter of marine insurance prior to the shipment and 
thus could not recover the pre-shipment loss unless both clauses of “lost or not 
lost” and “warehouse-to-warehouse” had been included in the marine policy;1322 
the other was the problem with the assignment of policies of marine 
insurance. 1323  Finally, two sets of recommendations were proposed for the 
reform of insurable interest in marine insurance.1324  
 
The discussion in respect to the law on insurable interest in Australia is 
hereinafter divided into four parts. Firstly, the current provision as to the 
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requirement of insurable interest in the 1909 MIA (Cth) has been briefly 
introduced. From two aspects relating to the arguments of abolition and 
retention, the issue as to whether the insurable interest should be repealed then 
has been explored. The two sets of recommendations for reform of requisite 
insurable interest by the ALRC have eventually been set out. This discussion is 
mainly based on but not limited to ALRC 91. The insurable interest requirement, 
in the context not only of marine insurance but of general indemnity insurance, 
has been explored. 
5.1.2 Ss 10-12 of the 1909 MIA (Cth) 
5.1.2.1 Origins of the principle of insurable interest 
It was set out in ALRC 91 that there were two sources for the requirement of 
insurable interest. The first were statutes governing insurance which directly 
required insurable interest and others as to gambling contracts which indirectly 
imposed the requirement.1325 The other source was the indemnity doctrine.1326 
As for various statutes regulating insurance and wagers which imposed on the 
assured the requirement of insurable interest, Chapter 1 above can be referred 
to. The 1745 MIA (UK) was the first statute requiring insurable interest in the 
subject matter of marine insurance1327 in virtue of prohibiting policies by way of 
gaming or wagering on British ships and goods.1328 In order to obtain a valid 
policy of marine insurance and avoid being deemed as wagering policies, the 
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assured had to show the possession of insurable interest in the insured property, 
otherwise the policies would be rendered null and void.1329 Although the Acts of 
1745 and 1788 (UK) (the latter had been repealed by the Insurance Contract 
Act 19841330) was not repealed by the 1909 MIA (Cth), those two Acts were not 
applicable to marine insurance contract within the scope of the 1909 MIA 
(Cth).1331 
 
Under the other source of the principle of indemnity, the assured could not be 
compensated until it had suffered a loss caused by the insured perils; a loss 
could probably be suffered only where it had an insurable interest in the insured 
subject.1332 Therefore, the requirement of insurable interest must be satisfied in 
order to prove the loss, without which the doctrine of indemnity could not be met. 
Be that as it may, the above paragraphs have concluded that these two kinds of 
interest are different.1333 The nature of the interest required by the indemnity 
principle is in the realm of the 1909 MIA (Cth), differing from that under the 1984 
ICA, which will be examined below.1334 
5.1.2.2 Ss 10-11 of the 1909 MIA (Cth) 
The ALRC 91 stated that wagering policies were void and unenforceable under 
s 10 of the 1909 MIA (Cth) and the following two sets of marine insurance 
contracts would be deemed to be policies by way of gaming or wagering: 
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policies having no actual or potential insurable interest and those with PPI 
terms.1335  
 
S 11 and ss 13-20 of the 1909 MIA (Cth) listed the parties who could be held as 
having an insurable interest. 1336  The ALRC 91 mentioned the two classic 
definitions derived from Lucena v Craufurd 1337  and analysed cases 1338 
separately based on the two tests.1339  
 
In terms of the strict criteria provided by s 11 of the 1909 MIA (Cth), the test as 
to an insurable interest in the subject matter insured was based on whether the 
assured could establish a legal or equitable interest in the subject matter. 
Namely, an insurable interest has to be one in law or in equity. As to both 
insurance of cargo1340 in which such problems frequently arise and of hull,1341 in 
order to ascertain whether the assured possessed such an interest, the fact as 
to whether the property or risk in the subject matter had passed to, or was 
possessed by, the assured was often needed to be ascertained by careful 
investigations of the contracts of sale.1342 The ALRC 91 criticised the fact  that 
the statutory requirement was so strict that the assured to whom no property or 
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risk had passed, according to the interpretation of the sale contracts, 
notwithstanding that it had suffered an economic or pecuniary loss, would still 
not be entitled to recover such loss.1343 
5.1.2.3 S 12 of the 1909 MIA (Cth) 
To prevent the insurance contract being void, the assured had to have either 
actual or expected insurable interest at the outset of the contract of marine 
insurance; but to make a claim it must be able to prove the possession of 
having an actual insurable interest at the time of loss except on occasions 
where a “lost or not lost” clause had been included in the policy.1344 The rule 
that the assured must possess an insurable interest at the time of loss was 
derived from the requirement of the fundamental doctrine of indemnity, 1345 
which should nevertheless not be narrowly understood as the principle of 
insurable interest.1346 For illustration, two provisions can be used which infringe 
the principle of insurable interest but not of indemnity: “lost or not lost” with the 
meaning of “retrospective interest”, not the meaning of “retrospective 
declaration”,1347 and the assignment of a marine policy after loss.1348 In both 
cases, the assured can acquire an insurable interest after a loss but still be 
subject to the indemnity principle. 
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5.1.3 Arguments for abolition  
5.1.3.1 The statutory requirement preventing the buyers on FOB or CFR terms from 
recovering pre-shipment loss 
By analyzing the case of NSW Leather Co Pty Ltd v Vanguard Insurance Co 
Ltd, 1349  ALRC 91 focused in particular on the prevailing problem with the 
practice in marine cargo insurance so that a vendee purchasing cargo on FOB 
or CFR terms might not be able to recover the pre-loading loss from its payment 
for the goods because of the insurer arguing that it did not possess the 
insurable interest in the insured subject of the goods at the time of loss 
occurring prior to the shipment.  
 
The strict test for insurable interest was thus submitted as possibly giving rise to 
problems with FOB or CFR purchasers exposed to no cover who had even 
contracted insurance policies on terms of pre-loading clauses, which were 
deemed by the assured and their brokers as an effective cover for the pre-
shipment loss.1350 As seen in Chapter 3, above, in light of clauses of “lost or not 
lost”, notwithstanding its diverse understanding and usage,1351 and “warehouse 
to warehouse”, in isolation, neither of them could help the buyer FOB or CFR 
who had intended to recover his pre-shipment loss; but nevertheless the 
combination of them might assist such buyers1352, at least in the event of the 
goods being damaged or lost in part1353. Where the insured goods had been 
totally lost or destroyed, the contract of sale of goods might be frustrated and 
                                                          
1349
 NSW Leather Co Pty Ltd v Vanguard Insurance Co Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 699, for the facts 
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 ALRC 91, para 11.87 
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the insurer thus might argue to decline to compensate the assured buyer on the 
ground that it could never have acquired the insurable interest: it was one case 
where the “lost or not lost” clause was applicable, in spite of the provisions as to 
both clauses above provided for in the insurance policy.1354   
5.1.3.2 Reform needed by the market 
Despite the requirement of insurable interest, it appeared that Australian 
insurers “commonly enter contracts of insurance — using either FOB and CFR 
pre-shipment clauses or, more rarely, a “lost or not lost” clause”. 1355  This 
practice at present could be deemed to be evidence that the Australian insurer 
would provide the pre-loading cover to meet the buyer’s needs.1356  
 
Unless the insurable interest requirement was abolished, the Australian insured 
importers could not legally obtain the adequate and valid policy of covering the 
pre-shipment loss.1357 For the purpose of being able to legally acquire insurance 
cover for the post-shipment loss, exporters in Australia also supported the 
abolition of the insurable interest requirement. Where it might occur that 
overseas purchasers declined to pay for goods damaged or lost after they had 
been loaded on board the ship during the transit at sea, Australian exporters 
might observe that under the 1909 MIA (Cth) they were not entitled to cover 
such loss by means of its insurance contracts because they were no longer at 
risk after the shipment of goods had been insured.1358 
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5.1.3.3 No prospect of uncertainty  
If the requirement was to be repealed, the Insurance Council of Australia (the 
Council) was concerned that the competitiveness of the Australian insurance 
market would be reduced and, consequently, the premium would be largely 
increased.1359  The ALRC 91 disagreed with the submission that uncertainty 
would arise1360 caused by the extensive rise in premiums 1361. 
 
If the requirement of insurable interest was removed which was a legal 
impediment inhibiting the recovery for the pre-shipment loss, the assured FOB 
buyer might legally insure its pre-shipment interest.1362 The seller might want to 
insure the goods as well to cover the post-delivery loss. Consequently, 
overlapping insurance might commonly arise and the seller might thus reject 
claims made against it under the contract of sale by arguing the existence of 
buyer’s cover from Australia, which was argued to be disadvantageous to the 
Australian insurers and assureds. 1363  To respond to such a situation, the 
Australian insurers might extensively increase the premium.1364 In the view of 
ALRC 91, however, the competitive position of the insurance industry in 
Australia would not get worse. As for the overlapping insurance, it could be 
addressed in virtue of a contract of sale providing that it was the obligation of 
the exporter who should firstly claim for the pre-shipment loss from its insurer 
and the importer should claim against its Australian underwriters only where the 
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 Insurance Council of Australia Submission 11; Michelle Taylor ‘Is the Requirement of an 
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exporter had no cover or had insured inadequately. 1365  In other words, the 
insurance effected by the exporter was the primary cover, to which the 
insurance by the importer was subsidiary.1366  
 
On the other hand, it was held by ALRC 91 that, by providing the service of pre-
shipment insurance, the Australian insurance market could obtain an 
advantageous position over the regimes where strict insurable interest was 
required.1367 The ALRC 91 confessed that the premium for the cover for pre-
loading risk might increase to more than that for cover not including pre-loading 
insurance but unlikely to the extent of the general rise in that.1368 Also, the 
higher premium was commercially reasonable.1369  
5.1.3.4 Positive experience as to reform of insurable interest in non-marine indemnity 
insurance from the 1984 ICA 
The ALRC 91 concluded that the reform of the law in relation to the insurable 
interest requirement of general insurance by the enactment of the 1984 ICA did 
not give rise to problems.1370 As a result, there seemed to be no justification as 
to why this successful experience could not be applied to the context of marine 
insurance.1371 
5.1.3.4.1 Ss 16-17 of the 1984 ICA  
In 1984 the Australians abolished insurable interest at the time of contract and 
recognised a pecuniary or economic interest as insurable, no longer limiting that 
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at law or in equity for non-marine indemnity insurance. Section 16 of the 1984 
ICA provides that a contract of general insurance is not void merely because 
the assured does not have an interest at the time of entering into the 
contract.1372 For the purposes of this Act, a contract of general insurance is a 
contract of insurance that is not a contract of life insurance.1373 However, s 18 
adds that policies on life insurance, personal accident and sickness do not 
require insurable interest currently.1374 Therefore, a general insurance means a 
non-marine and non-life indemnity one, and thus ss 16-17 apply to the non-
marine and non-life insurance.1375  
 
As to the 1984 ICA s 171376 which deals with the problem with the nature of 
interest required by the indemnity principle in the realm of general insurance 
contracts,1377 the proof that the assured possesses a pecuniary or economic 
interest other than the strict insurable interest in the insured subject matter at 
the time of loss is sufficient for them to make a claim against their insurers.1378 
According to this modified doctrine of indemnity, the sole shareholder in the 
case of Macaura would be entitled to recover the company’s loss because he 
had sustained an economic loss.1379 Further, s 17 deals with the timing when an 
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Repeals) Act 1995 (Cth), prior to which, under the ICA 1984, for life policies, insurable interest 
was requisite. 
1375
 Robert Merkin, ‘Reforming Insurance Law: Is there a case for reverse transportation? A 
report for the English and Scottish Law Commissions on the Australian experience of insurance 
law reform’ [2007] Law Commissions 8.7 
1376
 This section does not apply to life insurance. 
1377
 Ian Enright and Professor Robert M Merkin, Sutton’s Law of Insurance in Australia (4th edn, 
Thomson Reuters  2014) para 22.300;  Advance (NSW) Insurance Agencies Pty Ltd v Matthews 
(1988) 12 NSWLR 250 (AC) 168 
1378
 Suresh Krishnan and Brendan Hammond, ‘Structuring Multinational Insurance Programmes: 
Current Challenges in Australia, New Zealand and the Asia-Pacific Region’ (2011) ACE 
Progress Report 1, 3 
1379
 David St Leger Kelly, Michael L Ball, Principles of Insurance Law in Australia and New 
Zealand (Sydney: Butterworths 1991) para 2.53 
343 
 
interest must attach, failing to be consistent with which the assured cannot 
make a claim. 
 
This test of economic loss has also been recently adopted by the English 
courts,1380 which is deemed to be a strong support for the wide reform. After the 
abolition of the insurable interest requirement, there is no longer need for 
arguing which kind of interest constitutes the insurable interest required by the 
1909 MIA (Cth) and the controversy as to the definition of insurable interest 
would no longer exist; it has been substituted by the question as to whether the 
assured has sustained a pecuniary loss caused by insured perils during the 
period of cover.1381 However, the ALRC also warned that merely proving that 
the buyer suffered the economic loss could not entitle him to get indemnified; as 
in general situations, the insurer was only liable for losses that were proximately 
caused by marine perils insured against.1382 
5.1.3.4.2 Few cases relevant to ss 16-17 occur 
Pursuant to the case search during the period after the enactment of 1984 ICA 
up to the report of ALRC 91, only three cases relating to ss 16-17 were brought 
before the courts, which was evidence that the reform in marine insurance 
might not lead to more legal disputes.1383 As to the authorities, it was held by 
Samuels JA in the Advance (NSW) Insurance Agencies Pty Ltd case that the 
husband was entitled to have an insurable interest in his wife’s personal effects 
or clothing due to the economic loss he might suffer by being possibly bound to 
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pay for replacing or repairing them in the event of loss or damage.1384 The 
Federal Court was required, pursuant to ss 16-17 of the 1984 ICA, to decide 
whether an insured company having contracted to maintain and crew the 
aircraft had an economic interest, or would sustain an economic loss. No 
decision was made in this litigation due to lack of evidence, but the economic 
test was relied upon. 1385  The uncertainty as to whether the third parties, 
satisfying specific qualifications who were not a party to the contract of the 
general insurance and not the assured for the purposes of ss 16 and 17, could 
derive assistance from s 17, was considered by the Supreme Court of 
Victoria.1386 It appeared that the courts might agree to do so for those non-
parties having been specified or referred to in the insurance contract.1387 
5.1.3.4.3 Recommendations by the ALRC 20 for ss 16-17 
Sections 16-17 of the 1984 ICA followed recommendations by the ALRC 20 
which had advised that the strict insurable interest requirement should be 
replaced1388 and proof of the economic loss was sufficient for the assured to 
make a claim in its application to all contracts of indemnity.1389 Both documents 
did not extend to marine insurance.1390 The ALRC 20 argued to abolish the 
requirement due to deciding this was a result of “a combination of imprecise 
drafting and historical accident” and it could be substituted by the doctrine of 
indemnity, which was the basic principle governing indemnity insurance. 1391 
From the historical perspective, it was argued that the 1774 LAA (UK) might not 
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have existed if statutes relating to gambling had been enacted prior to its 
passage.1392 The provisions in relation to legislative requisite interest under the 
Acts of 1774 and 1788 (UK) were also suggested to be repealed.1393 It was 
contended as well that many difficulties had arisen because of the strict 
proprietary interest. Due to the merely technical construction of this test, an 
assured could not recover for loss under its adequate policy, if he had been 
economically and actually disadvantaged caused by the insured event.1394 By 
this modification of the economic interest test required by the indemnity doctrine, 
it was said that Australian insurers and assureds would be more flexible to 
place insurance and no adverse consequence would arise such that a moral 
risk or the risk of wilful destruction would be promoted1395 since, pursuant to the 
indemnity doctrine, the recovery was not available to the assured unless it could 
show the loss1396. 
5.1.4 Grounds for retention 
5.1.4.1 The requirement of the special nature of marine insurance on goods 
Both in submissions to the Attorney-General’s Department in 19971397 and to 
the current consultations for the ALRC 91 1398  in respect of reforming the 
insurable interest requirement, the Council held the same view that the principle 
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of insurable interest should be retained and the provisions concerning insurable 
interest in the 1909 MIA (Cth) should remain unchanged.1399 
 
One argument for opposition to reform of insurable interest was due to the 
distinctive nature of marine cargo insurance:1400 that is, contracts of marine 
insurance followed the contracts of sales of goods,1401 the ownership of which 
might change many times during the transit at sea.1402 It was thus argued that 
no reform should be made for the requirement of insurable interest in marine 
insurance law as the approach had been adopted in the 1984 ICA for general 
insurance contracts, because these were two different sets of insurance 
contracts. Marine insurance cover would continue to be effective after changes 
of title many times, which was deemed to be the noticeable characteristic of 
marine cargo insurance.1403 In general insurance contracts, in comparison, once 
the assured disposed of the subject insured, it would generally lose its insurable 
interest in the insured subject and the policy would be cancelled.1404 The ALRC 
91 was not persuaded by the preceding argument, and on the other hand, 
stated that under both insurance contracts, the assignment of insurance policies 
could occur and title to the goods might be changed on a number of occasions 
during the transit.1405 The argument based on the specific nature of marine 
cargo insurance thus was not convincing. 
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5.1.4.2 Confusion arising for the parties to the contract of marine insurance 
Because of the rapid changing of title to cargo following the cover of marine 
cargo insurance, concerns were also expressed that, if insurable interest 
requirement was not required at the time of loss, uncertainty might have arisen 
that more than one party might have claimed for the loss.1406 The ALRC 91 
however disagreed with this argument based on the analysis that, 
notwithstanding that there might be a long chain of owners of goods insured, 
there was frequently only one party sustaining an economic loss as to goods 
themselves because there was only one party who would have paid for the 
goods.1407 Other interested parties in the chain could not claim for the value of 
goods themselves but might recover other forms of loss regarding the goods 
from their respective insurers, such as the anticipated profits which had been 
recognised as one form of insurable interest.1408 
5.1.4.3 The seller should not be let off the hook considering indemnity to the buyer 
Concerns were also expressed that, if strict insurable interest was no longer 
required at the time of loss, the fundamental nature of contracts of international 
sales of goods would have been altered1409 and the seller might be relieved of 
its obligations relating to compensating the assured buyer on FOB or CFR 
terms under contracts of sale because the buyer might incline to recover from 
its insurer.1410 The ALRC was not in favour of this argument: after the reform, 
the seller would still not be relieved of its duties to remedy the buyer 
notwithstanding the abolition of requisite insurable interest. Besides, in spite of 
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amendments to insurable interest, where the buyer chose to claim against its 
insurer other than the seller and the insurer had consequently indemnified the 
buyer’s loss, the seller could not possibly be let off the hook regarding its liability 
to the buyer unless the insurer gave up its right of subrogation as to the buyer’s 
claim against the seller.1411 
5.1.4.4 Commercial risk differing from insurance risk 
The problem that the FOB or CFR buyer could not claim against its insurer for 
the pre-shipment loss on the insured goods, caused by the insured marine 
perils within the coverage of insurance contract, was justified by the insurer, 
stating that such loss was caused by “trade or commercial” risks not by 
insurance risks.1412 In the ALRC’s opinion, this artificial distinction between risks 
had no merits. Firstly, it was a matter of market consideration rather than that of 
the law in respect of whether the insurer provided the insurance cover for pre-
shipment risks.1413 Secondly, it was common insurance practice that the insurer 
would provide insurance cover for so-called trade risks and that was why, in the 
event of losses, they exercised their right of subrogation against third parties, 
such as vendors and carriers.1414 
5.1.4.5 Existence of several means to remedy the buyer’s pre-loading losses 
Oppositions to reforming the insurable interest requirement were stated that the 
FOB or CFR buyer might be able to claim against its insurer for its pre-loading 
loss by relying on FOB or CFR pre-shipment clauses,1415 which allowed the 
buyer to elect to recover from either the seller or the insurer.1416 It was also 
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argued that the buyer could protect the pre-shipment loss by means of 
contracting proper terms of trade. They might also derive assistance from “the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and equitable doctrines of estoppel, unjust 
enrichment and restitution”.1417 Besides, the courts would seemingly tend to 
favour the FOB or CFR buyer’s claim for recovery of the pre-shipment loss 
against its insurer.1418 Thus, insofar as such problem with pre-loading loss was 
concerned, it was argued that there was no necessity to amend the requirement 
by the way of legal reform.1419  
5.1.4.5.1 Problems with FOB or CFR pre-shipment clauses 
However, it was argued that there were three noticeable problems as to the 
policies providing the insured buyer with “FOB or CFR pre-shipment clauses” 
offered by Australian marine insurers.1420 At the beginning, it was ambiguous as 
to when the cover would commence to attach. 1421  Secondly, such clauses 
usually included terms in respect of requiring the buyer to use “all reasonable 
means to first recover the full amount of the loss or damage from the exporter or 
supplier”, but there was no certain and clear interpretation for the term of 
“reasonable”; consequently, the buyer’s such duty was uncertain.1422 Last but 
not least, notwithstanding such clauses being provided for in policies, in the 
event of loss of or damages to the insured cargo, the insurer might also be 
reluctant to compensate the buyer by arguing that such commercially 
enforceable clauses, not including the type of the deeming cover for the pre-
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loading loss, 1423  were legally void for inconsistency with the statutory 
requirement of s 11 of the 1909 MIA (Cth).1424 Grounds were also given that the 
validity as to “FOB or CFR pre-shipment clauses” was uncertain because the 
courts had not yet had the chance to consider it.1425 
5.1.4.5.2 Terms of contracts of sale 
Putting aside reasons for the buyer, especially the Australian importers, 
preferring to purchase on FOB or CFR rather than on CIF,1426 the ALRC 91 
argued that it might not be right to say that CIF buyers were in a better position 
so as to protect their pre-loading economic loss due to payment before 
shipment than that on FOB or CFR terms in terms of the same time at which the 
risk passed to the buyer under both terms.1427 Thus, although the purchase 
terms of CIF might help the buyer to recover loss occurring before the 
assignment of the policy as assignee, it might not be helpful to losses occurring 
after that assignment.1428 
 
It might be argued that Australian buyers on FOB terms could protect their pre-
loading interests in goods by negotiating the following two terms of contracts for 
sales of goods. Firstly, the contract could entitle risk of loss of or damage to the 
insured cargo passing from sellers to buyers at an earlier point in time than that 
of shipment,1429 such as the FCA term, which was designed for cargo loaded 
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into containers.1430 However, as discussed above, 1431  the FCA term cannot 
now be widely used. Secondly, terms could entitle buyers to inspect insured 
goods prior to the goods being loaded on board ship.1432 But it was not the 
current practice to entitle buyers to examine the conditions of goods prior to 
payment for them.1433  
5.1.4.5.3 Recovery rights against sellers and the carriers 
In practice, it may be difficult to obtain compensation from sellers and carriers. It 
was argued that numerous contractual, statutory and tortious remedies against 
sellers could assist buyers on FOB or other terms.1434 It might be right in certain 
situations,1435 but nevertheless wrong where FOB buyers suffered loss incurred 
by theft or wilful destruction prior to transfer of risk.1436 There were no certain 
and consistent authorities for the preceding situation1437 and nor was there in 
respect of tortious remedies.1438 From the perspective of statutes, the Sale of 
Goods Act 1896 (QLD) and the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) could also not 
be available to assist FOB buyers to recover such loss from the sellers.1439 In 
particular, with regards to those three remedies, it might in effect be 
commercially difficult for an FOB buyer to bring an action against overseas 
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sellers.1440 Similarly, by reason of the contractual and statutory exclusions or 
immunities to the carriers, namely, that provided by the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Amendment Act 1997 (Cth) in the Australian context, the contractual, 
statutory and tortious recovery rights against them for the pre-shipment loss 
might also not be viable to an FOB buyer.1441  
5.1.5 Wide and narrower recommendations by the ALRC 91 
In order to solve the problems as to the insurable interest requirement, 
particularly the FOB or CFR buyers’ pre-shipment risk, the ALRC 91 proposed 
two options for reforming the 1909 MIA (Cth), both of which might entitle the 
buyer to recover pre-loading transit loss.1442 Although the ALRC was urged to 
reform insurable interest in the 1909 MIA (Cth) and the wide proposal was bold 
enough, neither options came into force, leaving the area of insurable interest in 
marine insurance unaffected.1443 
 
The wider recommendations were that the requirement for insurable interest 
should be repealed to coincide with that under the 1984 ICA: namely, ss 10–12 
of the 1909 MIA (Cth) would be substituted by and in terms of ss 16–17 of the 
1984 ICA;1444 as a necessary consequence of this wider reform, ss 13–21, 57 
and 90(3)(c)–(d) of the 1909 MIA (Cth), setting out various examples of 
insurable interest, should be repealed as well.1445 Consequently, the repealing 
of the strict interest test might simplify the application of the insurable interest 
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principle and the economic loss test might clarify the interest required as being 
that of the indemnity principle.1446  
 
The other recommendation was narrower by way of inserting a new rule, as a 
substitute for the former, in the event of which was not accepted, that the point 
in time when the buyer could obtain insurable interest in the insured subject of 
marine cargo should be “when it pays for the property or when it becomes 
bound to pay for the property provided that it subsequently pays for it” prior to 
the passing of risk at the time of it being loaded on board the ship under the 
contract of sale1447 and s 16 of the 1909 MIA (Cth) should be extended, beyond 
the obsolete bottomry and respondentia, to cover secured loans over insurable 
property.1448  
 
Although the two narrow proposals advance the timing and are clearer than that 
set out in the 1909 MIA (Cth), they are possibly not needed to be included in the 
MIA. The first proposal in fact has reflected the well-established authority that a 
buyer under an existing contract has an insurable interest in goods if it is liable 
to pay, whether or not goods have safely arrived. The second has actually 
echoed the general principle that a creditor having a claim on property pledged 
to him has an insurable interest. 
5.2 Insurable interest in New Zealand 
5.2.1 Three stages of reform as to Insurable interest in New Zealand 
The Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee (the CCLRC) in 1983 
proposed, for the purpose of the reformed Insurance Law Reform Act, that: 
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 a life insurance requires no insurable interest (s 6); 
 as to other kinds of insurance contracts rather than life insurance, the 
requirement of insurable interest is needed, and such contracts cannot 
be made in guise of gaming or wagering (s 7(1)); 
 the violating of s 7(1) will render such contracts void (s 7(2)); 
 a person under a marine policy must possess an insurable interest (s 
7(3)); 
 the 1774 LAA shall be repealed, meaning that contingency insurance can 
have no insurable interest and be made by way of gaming or wagering (s 
7(4)). 
 
In the Insurance Law Reform Act 1985 (1985 Act) ss 6-8 then remain the same 
provisions as the above proposals, except for one addition, as s 7(1), that an 
assured effecting a non-marine indemnity insurance needs no insurable interest 
based on the fact that the indemnity principle can replace the requirement of 
insurable interest. 
 
Furthermore, in 2003, it was proposed that s 374 of the Gambling Act 2004 
(2004 Act) should repeal s 7(2), after its coming into force, having the effect that 
insurable interest under contracts of insurance rather than marine insurance is 
not needed any more and wagering insurance is now enforceable.  
5.2.2 Need for insurable interest requirement in marine insurance  
The insurable interest requirement in marine insurance is prescribed in ss 5-16 
of the Marine Insurance Act 1908 (1908 MIA).1449 Notwithstanding the above 
changes to the requirement of insurable interest in other insurance contexts, the 
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law on insurable interest in marine is left unaffected. 1450  The 1908 MIA 
abolishing the Acts of 1745 and 1788 (UK) is identical with the 1906 MIA 
(UK). 1451  Therefore, Chapter 2 supra can be referred to when the detailed 
provisions of ss 5-16 need to be examined. The following discussion will focus 
on the issues as to what changes have been made to the requirement of 
insurable interest in non-marine indemnity policies in New Zealand and the 
reasons why they have adopted such steps. 
 
S 7(4) of 1985 Act prescribes the following: “Nothing in this section limits the 
provisions of the Marine Insurance Act 1908”.1452 It has hence been submitted 
that the effect of s 7(4) on marine insurance is uncertain: the provision can 
mean either that it has no application to marine insurance or that both Acts 
govern marine insurance but s 7(4) would not place a limit on the provisions of 
the 1908 MIA.1453  Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the word “limits”, in the 
context of the provisions of s 7 in respect of the requirement for insurable 
interest, in particular, s 7(1) having excepted its application to the 1908 MIA, s 
7(4) thus appears to mean that nothing in this section affects the provisions of 
the 1908 MIA and ss 5-16 of the 1908 MIA shall be left unaffected.  
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5.2.3 Non-marine insurance now not requiring insurable interest 
5.2.3.1 The 1774 LAA 
5.2.3.1.1 The 1774 LAA seemingly applicable to non-marine insurance prior to the 1985 
Act 
It appeared that, prior to the enforcement of the 1985 Act, it was the 1774 LAA 
(UK) (in force in New Zealand1454) that governed the issue as to whether the 
assured having effected non-marine insurance contracts had to prove the 
possession of insurable interest. A non-marine insurance may mean a 
contingency insurance and a non-marine indemnity insurance. Under this Act, 
the assured under such contracts must have a legal or equitable interest in the 
insured property at the time of the contract,1455 contrary to which it would be 
rendered null and void; consequently, the premium paid to the insurer may be 
returned to the assured due to the failure of consideration.1456 
5.2.3.1.2 The 1774 LAA actually applicable only to contingency insurance 
As for the present position, the 1774 LAA has been repealed by s 8 of the 1985 
Act which came into effect as part of the law in New Zealand in 1 April 1986. 
The effect of the repeal is that an assured under certain insurance contracts is 
not required to show insurable interest and he can make an insurance by way of 
wagering or gaming, which will not be rendered void. There is thus a need to 
discuss when the Act applies to what insurance before the effect of the repeal 
on insurance is discussed.1457  
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Seemingly, there had been controversy relevant to which kind of insurance 
contracts were within the scope of the 1774 LAA. Section 1 required insurable 
interest in all forms of insurance “on the life or lives of any person, or persons, 
or on any other event or events whatsoever”. The words in italic seemed to 
make void all types of insurance without insurable interest or by way of gaming 
or wagering, 1458  including all contingency insurance and indemnity 
insurance.1459 In light of s 4 which excluded its application to insurance on ships, 
goods, or merchandise, it thus appeared that the statutory insurable interest in 
the 1774 LAA was applicable to all types of insurance policies apart from that 
on marine ships, goods, or merchandise1460. Non-marine insurance on buildings, 
life or accidents thus seemed to be within its application. A minority of the 
CCLRC also took this view.1461 In the obiter of the In re King, decd case,1462 a 
similar view was expressed that the 1774 LAA was designed to apply to ‘any 
other event’ as well as life.  
 
Nevertheless, the common law made it clear that the 1774 LAA did not apply to 
indemnity insurance but only to contingency insurance. Thus, where an 
employer effected an indemnity insurance against claims by its employees, the 
court held that such insurance was not within the ambit of the 1774 LAA.1463 It 
was also held by the Court of Appeal in the UK that the 1774 LAA aimed to 
govern insurance which provided that a certain sum of money would be paid on 
the occurrence of the event insured against, not that of indemnity.1464 In favour 
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of this judgement, in the opinion of the Privy Council, the 1774 LAA merely 
applied to non-indemnity insurance.1465 Of course, nowadays there is no longer 
any necessity of arguing whether the 1774 LAA applied to non-marine 
indemnity insurance, as it has been repealed by the 1985 Act.  
5.2.3.1.3 The effect of repealing the 1774 LAA on insurance contracts 
Therefore, as the result of the repeal and the clarification of insurance contracts 
within the ambit of the 1774 LAA, no contingency insurance is subject to 
insurable interest. Consequently, such insurance is not void only for having no 
insurable interest at the time of the contract or for being made in the guise of 
wager. This is identical with the rule in s 6 of the 1985 Act and the repeal of s 
7(2). 
5.2.3.2 Recommendations for the reform of insurable interest in non-marine 
insurance by the CCLRC 
In its second report from which the 1985 Act was derived, the requirement of 
insurable interest was considered by the CCLRC.1466 Although it mainly focused 
on the issue as to whether the insurable interest requirement in life policies 
should be abolished, 1467  recommendations for insurable interest in other 
contracts of insurance were also proposed by them. 
5.2.3.2.1 Reasons for repealing the requirement of insurable interest 
As far as non-life insurance was concerned, the CCLRC pointed out five 
problems with insurable interest provisions. Firstly, at the time of the raising of 
the dispute as to the existence of insurable interest, the courts would always 
lean towards supporting an assured having one. 1468  Secondly, the insurer 
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tended not to require insurable interest: they might waive the insurable interest 
and indemnify the assured regardless of whether they had an insurable 
interest.1469 In such a case, the parties’ rights to the payment were the same as 
those under the normal valid policies.1470 Thirdly, the majority of the CCLRC 
argued that the then prevailing contracts of gaming or wagering did not exist in 
the current insurance market anymore. 1471  Fourthly, the requirement of 
insurable interest was not helpful to prevent moral hazard. Fifthly, the indemnity 
doctrine could prevent a person who has suffered no loss from recovering.  
5.2.3.2.2 Grounds for the retention 
A minority of the CCLRC supported the retention of the requirement by arguing 
that there were two policies served by the requirement: notwithstanding 
insurable interest at present possibly not needed to forbid gaming or wagers, it 
was still required to minimise the risk of wilful destruction of the insured subject 
matter by the assured insofar as the insurance of indemnity was concerned. 
This argument was not favoured by the ALRC 91, in which it was said that the 
preceding two problems, without requiring insurable interest, could be 
addressed by the indemnity doctrine itself.1472 
5.2.3.2.3 Recommendations1473 
The requirement of insurable interest in life insurance was by a majority of the 
CCLRC recommended to be abolished in s 6 of the draft bill by the CCLRC.1474 
The proposed s 7 recommended the retention of the law then in force as to the 
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requirement of insurable interest governing non-life insurance as follows:1475 
every contract of non-life insurance effected without interest or by way of 
gaming or wagering shall be null and void; this section was not intended to 
extend to marine insurance within the meaning of s 3 of the 1908 MIA; the 1774 
LAA should be repealed after s 7 came into effect.1476 
5.2.3.3 The 1985 Act   
5.2.3.3.1 No requirement for contingency and non-marine indemnity insurance and 
reasons 
The counterpart of the 1985 Act followed the recommendation for s 6 in the 
proposals by the CCLRC, but added one rule to s 7 in the proposals. The new 
rule as to repealing the requirement in non-marine indemnity insurance was 
proposed by the Statutes Revision Committee during its passage through 
Parliament.1477 Under s 7 of the 1985 Act prior to the 2004 Act, life insurance 
and non-marine indemnity insurance needed no requirement of insurable 
interest.1478 However, a person effecting insurance other than life or non-marine 
indemnity insurance must have an insurable interest and no kind of insurance 
could be made by way of gaming or wagering.1479 Prior to the repealing of s 
7(2), it seemed that contingency insurance1480 was no longer needed to be 
supported by showing the possession of insurable interest. However, it might 
not be the case. There seemed a need for insurable interest in contingency 
insurance other than life insurance, such as policies on health and personal 
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accident, 1481  because s 7(2)(a) dictated that other contracts of insurance, 
except that of life and non-marine indemnity, required insurable interest. 
Without the insurable interest in its application to other contingency insurance, s 
7(2)(a) appeared to be meaningless. S 7(3) rendered void insurance in violation 
of s 7(2)(a). Section 7(4) retained insurable interest in the realm of marine 
insurance untouched. 
 
In addition, the requirement of insurable interest was also imposed by 
legislation against gambling. Gaming contracts were not prevented until the 
passage of the 1845 GA (UK). 1482  Then, under s 128 of the Gaming and 
Lotteries Act 1977, non-marine indemnity insurance required insurable interest: 
wagers on buildings, goods and legal liabilities were also illegal and void.1483 It 
was then repealed by the 2004 Act in s 9 providing that gambling could be 
legally made with some restrictions. 1484  Specifically, insurance by way of 
gaming or wagering was not forbidden by s 374 in New Zealand.1485 In short, 
under the current 1985 Act, all non-marine insurance contracts are not subject 
to the requirement of insurable interest and such contracts in the guise of 
gaming or wagering are not void. 
 
Reasons for the addition of s 7(1) of 1985 Act to proposals by the CCLRC were 
as follows. Firstly, indemnity insurance was governed by the doctrine of 
indemnity, which was again argued to be able to be a substitute for the 
insurable interest principle: under the former doctrine, the assured could not 
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recover unless a loss suffered could be shown; in order to prove a loss, an 
interest was needed. Although the 1985 Act had repealed the requirement of 
insurable interest in non-marine insurance, such insurance were still governed 
by the indemnity doctrine.1486 However, on the other hand, it was held by a 
judge that the requirement that the assured must have an interest at the time of 
the insurance contract was different from the matters that must be supplied to 
prove a loss suffered by the assured under the doctrine of indemnity, 1487 
although the distinction between those two principles was not easy to be 
drawn.1488 In conclusion, the insurable interest requirement was contended to 
serve no useful purpose. Secondly, it was argued that by the above 
replacement the technical defence that the assured could not satisfy the 
requirement of insurable interest at the time of the contract could be 
prevented.1489  
5.2.3.3.2 The concept of insurable interest in New Zealand 
Indeed, s 7 of the 1985 Act only concerns the necessity of interest, there is 
nothing respecting the nature of the interest.  However, under the current 1985 
Act, as to non-marine insurance, there is no need to consider the elements of 
the concept of insurable interest. Nowadays, it is only the interest under the 
indemnity principle or the loss, and that is required to be tested. 
 
As to marine insurance, due to its being subject to the requirement of insurable 
interest, the concept of insurable interest thus needs to be examined. 
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Previously, in New Zealand, the common law rule was still regarded as good 
law, based on the judgement of Macaura that the assured must have the 
interest in law or in equity.1490 However, it is still unclear as to what constitutes 
an insurable interest in New Zealand. In light of the wider approach to construe 
insurable interest adopted by the courts in the UK1491 and Australia,1492 the New 
Zealand courts at present may lean toward adopting the economic interest test. 
To address the uncertainty as to the nature of the interest, the legislative 
approach to the 1984 Act in Australia can be drawn on. In this Act, s 16 
removes the insurable interest requirement in general insurance; s 17 
subsequently provides that an economic or pecuniary interest rather than the 
strict interest is sufficient to amount to the interest required by the indemnity 
principle at the time of loss. Alternatively, the court in New Zealand can provide 
a judicial interpretation as to this issue where appropriate.  
Chapter 6 Insurable interest in marine insurance in China 
6.1 Applicable statutes for marine insurance 
6.1.1 No provisions concerning insurable interest in the CMC 
In China, there is no separate Marine Insurance Act. As its counterpart, Chapter 
12, entitled Contract of Marine Insurance, in the Maritime Code of the People’s 
Republic of China (the PRC, infra)1493 (the CMC) regulates the area of marine 
insurance. Chapter 12 does not deal with the principle of insurable interest1494 in 
addition to the question as to whether the original assured has no interest in the 
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contract of reinsurance.1495 Having the same meaning as that under s 9 of the 
1906 MIA (UK),1496 it follows that “The insurer may reinsure its risk out of its 
cover for the assured’s subject matter enumerated in the preceding paragraph. 
1497 Unless otherwise agreed in the contract, the original assured shall not be 
entitled to the benefits of the reinsurance.”1498 In light of this provision, it can be 
said that the insurer has an insurable interest in the risk arising from its liability 
to compensate under the original insurance contract for the original assured’s 
interests in the subject matter insured. However, limited to the principle of 
contract privity, the original assured may not be allowed to recover its loss by 
the contract of reinsurance which was taken out between the original insurer 
and the reinsurer. 
6.1.2 Other applicable law 
Before the passage of the CMC and the Insurance Law (IL) of the PRC1499, it is 
the 1983 Regulation 1500 which has been repealed by the 1995 IL that governs 
the area of property insurance business, including marine insurance. In this 
Regulation, although there are no detailed provisions on insurable interest, the 
terms of it have been referred to for the purpose of providing who can take out 
an insurance. Then, in handling cases concerning disputes over contracts of 
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marine insurance, the enacted CMC shall apply. Where there are no relevant 
provisions in the CMC, such as that on insurable interest, the activities of 
insurance shall be in compliance with the IL, in which the law on insurable 
interest has been prescribed.1501 In other words, as far as the law on contracts 
of marine insurance is concerned, the application of the Chapter 12 of the CMC 
rather than the IL prevails.1502 In China, the Supreme People’s Court (the SPC, 
infra) is entitled to interpret the application of law and guide the trial of the lower 
courts, and despite its interpretation and guidance being rules not law it has 
legal effect. It has further clarified rules on insurable interest. Therefore, its 
opinions on the insurable interest will be explored hereafter. Where there are no 
relevant provisions in the CMC  and the IL, other relevant law, such as Contract 
Law of the PRC1503 (the Contract Law, infra), shall apply.1504 Also, if there is a 
lack in the above provisions, contracts of marine insurance which are a specific 
kind of civil legal act, should also be within the ambit of the General Principles 
of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (Civil Law, infra).1505 In short, 
as for the law on insurable interest in marine insurance which has not been 
prescribed by the rules of Chapter 12, the IL and the SPC’s Interpretation and 
Guidance shall apply, as well as other general statutes such as the Contract law 
and the Civil Law which have provided assureds’ legal interests. In other words, 
there is only one regime as to the indemnity insurance, including the marine 
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insurance; unlike that in Australia and New Zealand, where there are two 
regimes to respectively regulate marine insurance and non-marine insurance. 
6.2 Arguments that s 216 of the CMC has required insurable interest. 
As mentioned above, the law on contracts of marine insurance has been 
provided by Chapter 12 of the CMC. Nevertheless, the principle of insurable 
interest, either in general insurance or in marine insurance, has not been 
prescribed therein.1506 However, it has been argued that s 216 which defines 
the contract of marine insurance, notwithstanding not by its express terms, has 
indirectly included the principle of insurable interest. According to s 216, a 
contract of marine insurance is a contract whereby, as the consideration of the 
premium paid by the assured, the insurer undertakes, as thereby agreed, to 
indemnify the loss of the subject matter insured and the liability of the assured 
caused by perils insured against it.1507 There is no doubt that the contract of 
marine insurance is one of indemnity, to which the indemnity principle applies. 
Therefore, s 216 may impliedly require insurable interest, which is required by 
the indemnity principle to prove the assured may sustain a loss. However, since 
the interest required by the requirement of insurable interest and the doctrine of 
indemnity is different, the above submission may not be right. In addition, it 
relates neither to the concept and requirement of insurable interest, the time 
when the insurable interest must attach nor to the legal effect of contravening 
the requirement of insurable interest, etc. Section 218 of the CMC exemplifies 
eight kinds of objects which can be the subject matter of the insurance. Since 
the concept of insurable interest is different from the insured subject, it is not 
right to say that this Section has been involved in insurable interest. 
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6.3 Insurable interest under the 1995 IL  
6.3.1 Section 11 
The 1995 IL, coming into operation on 1 October 1995, was adopted at the 14th 
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress 
on November 7, 1992. The 1995 IL was afterwards amended by the IL 2002.1508 
Although the Section governing the law on insurable interest has been changed 
from s 11 to s 12, the provisions of the law on insurable interest were not 
altered. The law on insurable interest in all kinds of insurance, including 
indemnity insurance (containing marine insurance) and life insurance, has been 
dictated by s 11 as follows:1509 
ss 1 An insurant shall have an insurable interest in the subject matter 
insured. 
ss 2 Every insurance made contrary to s 1 is void. 
ss 3 An insurant has an insurable interest where it stands in any legal 
relation to the subject matter of insurance. 
ss 4 The subject matter of the insurance refers either to the property 
of the assured and related benefits associated therewith, or to the life 
and the body of the assured, which is the object of the insurance. 
As can be seen, s 11 involves the statutory requirement of insurable interest, 
the outcome of violating the requirement, the concepts of insurable interest and 
the subject matter of life and non-life insurance.  
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6.3.2 The timing 
Insurable interest has been required by ss 1-2 because a contract of insurance 
is void if the assured has no insurable interest. Where the court found that the 
insured respondent, the buyer, had no insurable interest in the insured goods 
which had been stolen by finding that the risk had still been borne by the seller 
and had not been passed to the insured buyer, under ss 11(2) of the 1995 IL, 
such contract, with its lack of insurable interest, was void; as a result of this the 
appellant, the insurer, was entitled to resist the claim against it.1510  
 
However, there are two requirements for insurable interest: the first is that an 
assured must have an actual or potential interest at the time of contract, 
otherwise the contract is void; the other is that an actual insurable interest must 
attach at the time of loss otherwise the assured cannot validly claim. Thus, the 
time when the assured must have an insurable interest in indemnity insurance 
is uncertain: at the time of the contract or of the loss. 1511  In light of the 
consequence of breaching the requirement, as a void contract, it may be 
reasonable to deduce that the assured must have an actual or potential 
insurable interest at the time of effecting the contract. It thus seems likely that it 
is consistent with the rule under s 4 of the 1906 MIA (UK), which was to a large 
extent drawn on, when the CMC was drafted. Also, considering the fact that the 
requirement of insurable interest is imposed on the insurant who is involved in 
taking out the contract, the timing of the requirement may be the time when the 
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contract is entered into.1512 However, it is uncertain as to whether the fact that 
an assured only has a potential insurable interest at the time of contract can 
prevent the contract from being void. The insurable interest in ss 11(2) should 
be widely construed: i.e. the policy will be void if the assured has no actual 
insurable interest; but will be enforceable if has an expectation of acquiring one. 
Consequently, the requirement that insurable interest must attach at time of loss 
and the effect of breaching is not provided for in the 1995 IL, which can be 
governed by the indemnity principle.  
6.3.3 The assured rather than the insurant 
Unlike the term of “the assured” under s 4 of the 1906 MIA (UK), in the 1995 IL, 
the requirement of insurable interest is imposed on “the insurant”. Under s 9 of 
the 1995 IL, the term “insurant” means a person who has concluded the 
contract of insurance with the insurer and who under the contract has the 
obligation to pay the premium. Therefore, in indemnity insurance, the insurant 
means the assured then effecting the contract of insurance. Additionally, in 
terms of marine insurance, the insurant could be commonly understood to be 
the assured because there is no concept of the former in the CMC.1513 In the 
2009 IL s 12(2) thus uses the term “assured”.  
6.3.4 The concept of insurable interest 
6.3.4.1 An economic interest recognised by law 
The insurable interest in s 11 is defined as a legal interest possessed by the 
assured in the subject matter of insurance. Accordingly, the nature of the 
insurable interest must be an interest recognised by law. It has been argued 
                                                          
1512
 Nian-hong Zhang, The Theory and Practice of Maritime Law (China Legal Publishing House 
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that, in marine insurance, the term “recognised by law” is designed to limit the 
extent of economic interest so as to render it certain.1514 For example, a buyer’s 
expectation of profits may be insurable only if it has been based on an existing 
title, such as having had a contract of sale. This test is by and large in 
accordance with the approach adopted by s 5 of the 1906 MIA (UK):1515 the 
interest should be a legal relation, such as a right to the property or deriving 
from the contract, due to which the assured may suffer a loss.  
6.3.4.2 Wide construction 
6.3.4.2.1 Not limited to ownership 
The interest is insurable as long as it is an economic interest recognised by law 
and it is not limited to ownership. The 1983 Regulation provides that a person 
cannot be the assured unless he is the owner, operating manager of the insured 
property or other persons interested in it. Thus, a proprietary interest is an 
insurable interest. A person who operates the insured property, either having or 
not having possession of it, can have an insurable interest if the interest is 
relying on an existing right, such as that from a contract of management. To 
leave space for new products of insurance, other interests may also be 
insurable. In line with this, the 1990 Reply by the SPC held that the contract of 
insurance was valid because the assured at the time of contract had an 
insurable interest in the vessel, on the basis that the assured legally possessed 
the vessel although the assured was not the owner of the vessel. Accordingly 
the possessory interest was also an insurable interest.1516 In the case where the 
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insured ship, in which the assured in effect had the ownership, for the 
consideration of tax and as the qualification for operating the business, had 
been registered as the property of another company, it was held that the 
assured who was in possession of the ship had an insurable interest in this 
ship.1517 It is noteworthy that mere possession, or operating is not sufficient to 
be an insurable interest, such an assured must be pecuniarily affected by the 
perils insured against. 
 
Furthermore, in the case of Shanghai Zhongfu Shipping Co,1518 the assured, the 
operator of the vessel, took out the contract of insurance with the insurer on the 
vessel which subsequently sank in transit. Then the assured made a claim for 
its loss which was however rejected by the insurer arguing that the contract was 
void due to lack of insurable interest because the assured was not the owner of 
the ship, and thus had no rights or interests in the insured ship. The court 
leaned toward the assured having an interest on the following grounds. Firstly, 
the assured had an economic interest in the ship. It might incur liability on the 
occurrence of the insured perils. Besides, it could get remuneration from its 
operating work. This proved that it would be prejudicially affected due to the 
perils insured against. Secondly, the assured stood in a legal relation to the 
vessel. In this case, as the operator, the assured had made a contract with the 
owner to manage the vessel. Also, the assured possessed the vessel. Both 
relations could be recognised by law. Therefore, insurable interest was not 
limited to the possessory interest. The judgement of this case is similar to that 
for the assured manager in The Martin P and the assured user in The Moonacre. 
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Both cases have tried to widen the definition of insurable interest. Therefore, it 
is definite that in China insurable interest is not limited to proprietary interest 
and can include possessory interest, at least a legal one. Seemingly, with the 
existence of a contract, a person who will be economically affected or will incur 
liability on the occurrence of an insured peril has an insurable interest. 
 
In addition, two steps should be taken to test the existence of insurable interest: 
it can be firstly examined as to whether the assured has an economic interest in 
the insured subject, in consequence of which it will benefit from its preservation 
or be prejudiced by its destruction, then whether such interest is recognised by 
law. Admittedly, there are many kinds of insurable interest which are impossible, 
or at least difficult, to exhaustively enumerate. This is an approach in line with s 
5(2) of the 1906 MIA which illustrates the types of insurable interest. 
6.3.4.2.2 Shareholder interest 
Unlike in the judgement of Macaura,1519 Beihai Maritime Court held that the 
shareholder, the assured, had an insurable interest in the insured cargo, as the 
asset of its private enterprise, which had been lost during the inland water 
transit because it had a shareholder interest in the property of the company, 
which had been recognised by law.1520 This judgement should not be construed 
that a shareholder can insure its company’s asset, but by the specific facts of 
this case, i.e. the nature of the company being a private enterprise, it can have 
an insurable interest. 
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6.3.4.2.3 Conclusion 
The definition in s 11(3) of the 1995 IL is a rather abstract one and needs 
further construction. It seems to be consistent with the strict test. The elements 
of it are unclear, such as what the legal relation is. However, it seems that the 
definition needs to be widely construed, at least being the approach adopted by 
the courts in China. Although the law has not further explained the definition of 
insurable interest, as will be discussed below, academics, courts and the SPC 
have all tried to make it clear; in particular, the SPC’s Interpretation and 
Guidance can have legal effect and should be followed by all the lower courts in 
China. 
6.4 Certainty as to the timing when an insurable interest must attach in 
marine insurance by the SPC Summary 2005 
The provisions respecting insurable interest under s 11 of the 1995 IL have 
been deemed to be obsolete.1521 However, for marine insurance, the above 
controversy has been solved by the SPC Summary 2005.1522 Although it is not 
part of the law in China, it is used by the SPC to guide the lower courts 
respecting marine trials. Under this guidance, the insurer shall be liable to 
compensate the assured who has no insurable interest in the subject of 
insurance at the time the contract was entered into but has one at the time of 
the occurrence of the event insured against. By contrast, the insurer can be 
relieved from its liability by reason only that the assured has lost its insurable 
interest at the time of loss, notwithstanding that it had an insurable interest at 
the time of entering into the contract. In terms of this judicial guidance, the time 
when the assured must have an insurable interest is unequivocal and clear: the 
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interest must attach at the time of loss. It does not matter whether the assured 
has an insurable interest at the time of taking out the contract, and not having 
an actual one at such time will not render the contract void. This is because an 
expectation of interest is sufficient to prevent a policy from being void. This rule 
reflects the indemnity doctrine. Also, it echoes the principle of contractual 
freedom and adjusts itself to the common commercial practice, i.e. the assured 
frequently concludes contracts of marine insurance prior to the passing of risk.  
 
However, it may be argued that the insurable interest is required at the time of 
contract because although the actual interest is not needed at such time, an 
expectation of acquiring it may be needed, and consequently lack of such an 
expectation will avoid the contract. Therefore, as far as this Summary is 
concerned, the proposition is arguable.  
 
In conclusion, as to contracts of marine insurance, it is established that the 
assured must have an actual insurable interest at the time of loss, which affects 
whether he can make a valid claim and no actual interest is needed at the time 
of contract. It is at least arguable that a potential one is required at the time of 
contract, which will decide the enforceability of the contract. 
6.5 Arguments for reform of insurable interest 
6.5.1 Functions of insurable interest 
Despite the arguments for repealing the insurable interest requirement in 
marine insurance, it has been thought by the majority that this doctrine should 
be retained with revisions, for it could serve the following three purposes.1523 As 
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mentioned supra, requiring the assured to have an interest at the time of the 
contract could prevent the insurance being a tool for gambling and could 
minimise the moral hazard that the assured might be tempted to deliberately 
damage the subject matter of the insurance or incur liabilities thereon.1524 In 
addition, some have argued that the requirement of insurable interest could 
prevent the assured from recovering the payment from the insurer in excess 
of the indemnity1525  because the assured is only entitled to recover its loss 
which is limited to insurable interest owned by the assured in the insured 
subject.1526  
6.5.2 Reasons for amendment 
6.5.2.1 Easy substitutes to ban gaming and wagering contracts 
Nevertheless, opinions have been stated that functions of the insurable interest 
requirement do not withstand scrutiny. The aim of prohibiting gaming and 
wagering contracts may be achieved by directly providing that every contract of 
insurance in the guise of gambling is void. Thus, the concept of insurable 
interest, which is deemed to be complex, would be excluded from the provision 
respecting banning gambling.1527  
6.5.2.2 Moral hazards may not be able to be prevented 
It has been considered to be illogical that the risk of moral hazard could be 
discouraged by the requirement of insurable interest. It is the assured rather 
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than those without insurable interest that have a much easier opportunity to 
dispose of the insured subject matter. This could be illustrated by the common 
marine practice of the valued policy: where the actual value of the subject 
matter insured is lower than the value fixed by the policy, it is not uncommon to 
witness the wilful destruction by the assured. By reason of the various regimes 
as to the legal outcome of deliberately damaging the insured subject, the 
assured may be tempted to do so because he may just be disallowed recover 
payment from his insurer while others having done so may be punished by the 
Criminal Law.1528 In addition, while it may be expected that the assured having 
an insurable interest in the insured subject should take good care of such 
subject, the reality may be that the assured may be more likely to be negligent 
due to the cover provided by the insurer.1529 
6.5.2.3 Other measures to fulfil the purpose of prohibiting the assured from profiting  
It has been said that there seems little point in adopting the insurable interest 
requirement to preclude the assured from benefiting by the insurance. Such aim 
having been argued might be achieved by means of the indemnity doctrine (the 
assured can only claim against the insurer for the loss sustained) or provisions 
under the insurance policy (a prudent agreement may avoid compensation 
under the insurance contract being the economic incentive for pursuing benefits, 
e.g. the assured is required to partly insure itself). The requirement of insurable 
interest has been considered as being able to be substituted by the indemnity 
principle as well because the former is inherently required by the latter.1530 
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6.5.2.4 Difficult to define the insurable interest 
There have been complaints that the test to insurable interest is so ambiguous 
that it is not easy to test whether an assured has an interest in practice and no 
provisions of any statute ever provide the essentials to constitute an insurable 
interest,1531 which renders the rules under ss 11(3) of the 1995 IL difficult to be 
apply. In addition, as mentioned above, the timing when the assured must have 
an interest is also unclear under the 1995 IL. 
 
Based on the above objections to the functions of the insurable interest principle, 
it is submitted that the law on insurable interest under the 1995 IL should only 
be amended not repealed. In particular, in the realm of insurance on marine 
adventures, concerns have been expressed that related provisions, such as 
insurable value,1532 the sum of money being able to be recovered,1533 and the 
right of subrogation,1534 may be affected. 
6.5.3 Recommendations  
6.5.3.1 Concepts of insurable interest 
6.5.3.1.1 Academic proposals 
Similar to the approach in UK. It has been submitted that Chapter 12 of the 
CMC should provide the law on insurable interest in marine insurance so as to 
resolve the problems in the practice and theory of marine insurance.1535 This 
provision leading to two regimes as to insurable interest in marine and non-
marine insurance may not be favourable. Despite the particularity of marine 
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insurance, the better choice may be to integrate the law on insurable interest in 
all indemnity insurance and then to provide for them in the IL.  
 
The proposal for the reform of insurable interest defined in marine insurance on 
cargo has been set out as following: the assured shall stand in a legal relation 
to the insured subject, in consequence of which it may be prejudiced or incur 
liability by reason of the occurrence of the perils insured against. Such prejudice 
or liability is an economic interest which has been covered by the contract. 
Examples of such interests are as follows: ownership in the cargo, lien therein, 
risk on the cargo borne by the assured and of the insurer when the policy 
attaches, pledge on the bill of lading at the time when it has been delivered to 
the creditor.1536 Besides the above, it has also been submitted that the interest 
recognised by law should be clearly provided as the real right or the creditor’s 
right.1537 Actually, this step to define insurable interest is similar to that adopted 
by ss 5-15 of the 1906 MIA: section 5 generally defines insurable interest, 
various examples of which have been provided for in ss 7-14. It can be helpful 
to understand insurable interest by the above illustrations. It however cannot 
reflect the current trend of widely interpreting insurable interest. The above 
examples should include an additional very wide example, e.g. that the assured 
can have an insurable interest if, based on a present contract, it will be 
economically affected. 
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Similar to Australian approaches. It is also contended that, similar to the wide 
test adopted by the Australians,1538 the assured has an insurable interest if it 
may suffer economic loss of or damage to the insured subject by the perils 
insured against during the cover of insurance.1539 Although there should be no 
legal relation to limit the concept of insurable interest, it should not be allowed to 
go so far as to be considered to be speculative. 
6.5.3.1.2 Opinions of the SPC  
6.5.3.1.2.1 The concept of insurable interest 
In light of the uncertainty as to the definition of insurable interest under s 12 of 
the IL 2002 Amendment and the problems with the understanding concerning 
its concept in the courts, 1540  the SPC 2003 CP further interprets insurable 
interest.1541 It first generally states that an insurable interest is an economic 
interest which can be ascertained. 1542  Examples of insurable interest in 
indemnity insurance are then provided: the assured has an insurable interest 
where it has economic interests which are derived from real right, a contract, or 
a civil liability to compensation according to the rules of law.1543 The two rules 
should be understood in their combination and it is not right to regard a mere 
economic interest as an insurable interest. The examples have actually 
imposed limitations on the test of economic interest because they are 
relationships recognised by law. The definition here may still have adopted the 
strict test.  
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In the SPC 2012 Consultation Paper (SPC 2012 CP),1544 it has been proposed 
that the insurable interest in property insurance contains interests recognised by 
law: the existing interests and interests in liability and in expectancies relying on 
an existing interest. However, there are no detailed interpretations of those 
three interests in this consultation paper, which will be explored infra.1545 
6.5.3.1.2.2 Various assureds owning their several interests 
In addition, ss 1(3) of the SPC 2003 CP stipulates that various assureds who 
have their own several interests in the same subject insured can take out their 
respective contracts of insurance to the extent of their own interest, which has 
been proposed as well in the SPC 2012 CP.1546 This rule has been made into 
law by the SPC’s interpretation in 2013.1547  
6.5.3.2 The timing 
6.5.3.2.1 Proposals by scholars 
Need for making the timing clear by law. As to the time when the insurable 
interest must attach, it has been argued that the timing, by s 11(1) of the 1995 
IL, of interest in marine cargo insurance is ambiguous and it thus should be 
made clear that, in line with the provision under s 6 of the 1906 MIA,1548 the 
assured is only required to show the possession of insurable interest at the time 
of loss to support the claim for recovery and cannot obtain an interest which it 
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has not had at the time of the loss, by any act or election after it is of the 
loss.1549  
 
Incorporation of the effect of retrospective declaration. It has been argued 
that there should be incorporated into the CMC an effect similar to that of 
retrospective declaration: the assured who at the time of contract was not aware 
of the loss occurring prior to the contract may be entitled to recover the loss by 
the perils insured against during the period of cover; however, the assured still 
must have an interest at the time of loss.1550 It has been contended that this 
term may assist the buyer on FOB or CFR terms to recover the loss occurring 
prior to the transfer of risk.1551 Apparently, the ALRC holds different views.1552 
This proposal has been made law by the SPC 2007 Regulation.1553 
 
Legal effect. Unlike the effect contrary to the requirement of insurable interest 
that such a contract would be void, it has been recommended that the assured 
lacking insurable interest at the time of loss will render it unentitled to sue for 
recovery.1554  
6.5.3.2.2 The SPC’s recommendation concerning the timing 
The SPC 2003 CP contends that the assured shall own an insurable interest at 
the time of loss rather than at the time of the contract: the insurer can be 
relieved of its liability to indemnify the assured who had an interest at the time of 
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contract but who lost it at the time of loss, while the insurer is not relieved of its 
liability to compensate the assured who had no interest at the time of the 
contract but nonetheless acquired one at the time of loss.1555 As with the above 
opinion, in the SPC 2005 Draft,1556 it is proposed that, in property insurance, the 
courts shall support the insurer’s arguments that they are able to be relieved of 
liability under the contract because the assured had no insurable interest in the 
insured subject on the occurrence of the event insured against. The timing for 
the time of loss has been adopted by the SPC 2005 Summary to guide the trial 
of the lower courts1557 and provided for in the 2009 IL.1558 In light of the above 
proposals by the SPC, the insurable interest must attach at the time of loss. 
However, it is still arguable whether an expectation of obtaining one is required 
to prevent the contract from being void. 
6.6 Insurable interest under the 2009 IL  
6.6.1 Provisions regulating insurable interest under this Act 
The following is the reform of the law on insurable interest under s 12 of the 
2009 IL, which amended the requirement of insurable interest in the 1995 IL. 
The 2009 IL has been amended by the IL 2014 Amendment.1559 Nonetheless, 
the reform does not extend to the law on insurable interest, which is identical 
with that under s 12 of the 2009 IL. For the property insurance, the requirement 
of insurable interest at the time of the contract is not imposed on the assured by 
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the 2009 IL.1560 Thus, a contract of property insurance will not be void only 
because the assured has no insurable interest at the time of contract. Instead, 
on the occurrence of the event insured against, the assured shall possess an 
insurable interest in the subject matter of insurance to support the claim for 
recovery. 1561  For property insurance, the concept of insurable interest is 
identical with that under s 11 of the 1995 IL. 
 
In addition, this section distinguishes property insurance from personal 
insurance by means of the subject matter of insurance: the former is one on 
property and related interest therein; by contrast, the latter is an insurance on 
the life or the body of a person.1562 The term “assured” is also defined by this 
section as the person whose property or whose life or body is protected by the 
insurance contract and who has the right to claim for recovery.1563 The relation 
between “the insurant” has been again defined in the 2009 IL:1564 the insurant 
may be the assured. Besides, the definition of the subject matter of insurance is 
not provided for in the 2009 IL, which has been prescribed in the 1995 IL. 
However, it has been specified and incorporated into the concept of the 
property insurance, for which it should be the property or the related interest 
therein.1565 
6.6.2 The timing 
The most significant change is the timing when the assured must own an 
insurable interest. Under s 12(2), the assured must have an insurable interest at 
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the time of loss and there is no strict legislative insurable interest requirement at 
the time when the contract of insurance on property, including marine insurance, 
is taken out. The issues have thus been made clear in relation to the timing 
when the assured needs to show the possession of insurable interest and the 
subject of the possession.1566 As a result, lack of insurable interest at the time of 
all indemnity contracts will not lead to the avoidance of the contract. By contrast, 
under s 48 of the 2009 IL, the assured is not entitled to make a valid claim if it 
has no insurable interest at time of loss. As can be seen, the provision of s 12(2) 
in effect incorporates proposals in the SPC 2003 CP and the SPC 2005 Draft 
and reflects the guidance of the SPC 2005 Summary. 
 
Although s 12 of the 2009 IL has not provided the timing at the time of contract 
and the consequence of breaching, it is however clear that an assured is not 
required to have an actual insurable interest at time of contract. Then here 
comes the question: whether an expectation of obtaining one is required or not 
required, the breaching of which will render the contract void. It may be right 
that the requirement at time of contract is abolished and is only retained at time 
of loss. Since in s 11 of the 1995 IL it involves the enforceability of contract 
whereas in s 12 of the 2009 IL that is not referred to and only the timing of loss 
and its consequence of violation has been provided. In short, in China, the 
timing when insurable interest must attach is at time of loss, violation of which 
will lead to the assured not being able to claim. It may also be deduced that in 
China the requirement at time of contract has been removed. However, a policy 
should be void if an assured cannot obtain an insurable interest during the life of 
a policy. As a result, an insurer who has received premiums of such an assured 
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cannot retain them. It does not necessarily mean that this rule has to be 
provided for in insurance law, because it is just a general principle of law. 
 
As can be seen, the law on insurable interest in indemnity insurance and life 
insurance has been divided into two regimes under s 12 of the 2009 IL, which is 
different from that under s 11 of the 1995 IL in which the requirement of 
insurable interest for both insurance has been provided for in the same 
provision, 1567  in consequence of which the timing and the person who is 
required to have the interest has been rendered unclear.  
6.6.3 Definition of insurable interest 
The concept of insurable interest remains unchanged in the 2009 IL since its 
first provision in the 1995 IL: insurable interest is an interest recognised by law 
which is owned by the assured. However, the concept, especially the meaning 
of “recognised by law”, has been argued as being too general to be understood 
by the parties to the cover and to be applied by the courts. Therefore, the 
following discussion, especially the opinion from the courts and the SPC,1568 
may be helpful to better understand the concept. 
6.6.3.1 The definition from the judgement of a court 
Section 12 seems to show that the 2009 IL adopts the narrower test of insurable 
interest given by Lord Eldon: the interest is insurable only if it is one that the 
assured has a legal right in the property or a right under the contract concerning 
property.1569  It has been submitted that the legal relation required by s 12 
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generally includes the interest either in the real right or creditor’s right.1570 From 
another perspective, one court held that, generally speaking, there were three 
kinds of insurable interest: existing interests, interests on expectancies and 
interests derivable out of liability arising from an existing interest. 1571  They 
actually both refer to the strict test but only use different terms from the different 
perspectives. 
6.6.3.1.1 Existing interests 
The phrase existing interest refers to that which has been had by the 
assured.1572  In China, the rights to property are generally divided into four 
categories: ownership in the property, possession right, usufruct and real rights 
granted by way of security, consisting of mortgage, pledge and lien. 1573 
Therefore, the court held that the assured who had the title to the property 
possessed an insurable interest in the insured cargo.1574 Those four categories 
of rights to property are non-exhaustive examples of existing interests. 1575 
Having a contract can be deemed to confer on the assured an existing right. It 
was thus held that the insured manager of a vessel had an insurable interest 
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because he had under the contract possession of the insured vessel and was 
liable to the insured ship if damaged.1576 
6.6.3.1.2 Expectancies 
Expectancies may be insurable interests: though they are inchoate at the time 
of the contract of insurance, they are already founded on an existing right;1577 
and they will in the ordinary course of things be achieved but for maritime perils. 
Two instances of interests from expectancies can be given. Freight is insurable 
where safe arrival may be expected under the charterparty, due to which mere 
expectancies turn out to be those based on existing interests. Also, profits are 
good examples of expectancies which can be obtained by the owner of the 
cargo due to the existence of the contract of sale; only perils from the voyage 
will prevent him from benefiting from the sale.1578  
6.6.3.1.3 Liability 
A person has an interest in the insured property if he might be responsible for it 
on the occurrence of its loss or damage.1579 It was held the liability of the 
assured incurred by loss or damage to the insured subject of insurance was 
insurable when that liability was generally derived from the assured’s acts in tort, 
or under contract or statute.1580 For example, a carrier and other bailees could 
have an insurable interest in goods under their control because on the 
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occurrence of insured perils they were liable to the owner of goods. In the case 
of Eleonora No. 8, the actual assured on CFR terms, in the view of the people’s 
court of second instance, had an insurable interest in the insured cargo which 
had been loaded on board the vessel because the assured was liable to pay 
whether or not the cargo arrived safely.1581  Additionally, where it is necessary 
to test whether the assured has an insurable interest, the key is to test whether 
the assured is at risk of possibly being liable to pay rather than whether the 
assured has paid for the insured cargo.1582 Where a buyer under the contract of 
sale of goods who has borne the risk of its loss has not paid the price for the 
insured goods which had been lost, but is still responsible for the payment 
thereof,1583 in such a case of non-payment, the assured has still an insurable 
interest in this liability.1584 
6.6.3.2 Essential elements of an economic interest recognised by law  
To constitute an insurable interest, the following three essentials containing 
both tests for insurable interest1585 i.e. the strict test and the economic test, 
must be met. In other words, an interest is insurable where there is a pecuniary 
interest recognised by law which can be used to ascertain such an interest. 
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6.6.3.2.1 Interest recognised by law rather than matters on legality  
Firstly, the interest should be a lawful relation, for instance, a right to the 
property or arising from a contract,1586 between the assured and the subject 
matter of insurance.1587 In China, unless otherwise provided by the 2009 IL, 
concluding the contract of the indemnity insurance, which is an act of civil law, 
shall be governed by related legislation, which stipulates that civil activities 
should not contravene the social ethics and the public interest.1588 Therefore, 
the interest in forbidden activities, such as smuggled goods, stolen goods, is not 
an insurable interest.1589 But it does not necessarily mean that the assured is 
deemed to have no insurable interest where its acts have contravened certain 
laws. To test whether an interest is recognised by law or not, the key point is to 
explore whether the relation between the assured and the insured subject has 
been provided by law, rather than to see the legality of the assured’s relevant 
act or the insurance contract. 
 
Two decisions on this same dispute. In the case of Sun Richie 3,1590 a 
dispute was brought to the court as to whether the insured buyer who had not 
yet paid the price of the insured cargo had an insurable interest in such cargo at 
the time of loss when it did not obtain the import licence for the cargo. 
Guangzhou Maritime Court held that the assured had been entitled to have an 
insurable interest in the insured cargo at the time when it passed the rail of the 
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carrying ship. Whether the assured had paid the price, which was a matter of 
the contract of sale, did not relate to the matter as to whether it was able to 
have an interest.1591 The Guangzhou High People’s Court held that it favoured 
the appellant, the insurer, on the grounds that the interest in the cargo, as 
illegally imported goods, which was contrary to the legislation,1592 was unlawful, 
although the respondent, the assured, had borne the risk of loss thereof.1593 
The first judgement may be correct. 
 
Reasons for respective decisions. It can be seen that the various judgements 
above are due to a differing understanding of the insurable interest. It is thus 
essential to precisely understand the conception of insurable interest under the 
IL, especially as to the meaning of the term “recognised by law”. There is 
controversy in respect of the meaning of “recognised by law”. Taking the 
instance of the above judgements, the trial court held that an interest was 
insurable as long as the interest owned by the assured was one provided for in 
law and the assured’s action contrary to the law did not necessarily render its 
interest not insurable, unless its action severely contravenes public interest. By 
contrast, in the opinion of the higher court, it has been argued that the phrase 
should be understood that the assured’s legal action should be consistent with 
the law, namely, the phrase actually involves the issue of legality. In this view, 
any interest is not insurable which derives from the object of insurance involved 
in any of the assured’s unlawful acts, although the assured has taken the risk. 
Such submission may not be right. 
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An interest provided for in law. As to this problem with the term of 
“recognised by law”, some argue that these are two different problems: that 
whether an interest is recognised by law and that whether the assured’s act is 
legal or not.1594 The following view may be the correct understanding of the term: 
to test whether an interest is recognised by law, the point should be focused on 
whether the relation between the assured and the insured subject is recognised 
by law,1595 not on the respect of the legality regarding the relation between the 
assured and administrative organs1596 or on the contract concluded between the 
assured and the insurer.1597 As long as the risk having passed to the assured is 
recognised by law, as in the facts of the above case, the assured is entitled to 
have an interest in the cargo. Other acts of the assured, such as in the above 
case not having paid the price or contravening the provisions of the Foreign 
Trade Law, did not necessarily have an effect on the issue as to whether the 
assured is entitled to have an interest. Even though, where the assured might 
be punished with a penalty for not having obtained the import licence,1598 the 
assured’s insurable interest in the subject of insurance may not be deprived by 
such penalties because the decision by an administrative organ, to adjust its 
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relation with the assured, may not necessarily influence the relation between 
the assured and the insured subject.1599  
 
Two cases. Identical with the above analysis, the court held that whether the 
shipowner had the ocean shipping business licence did not affect the test as to 
whether he was entitled to have an insurable interest in the vessel.1600 Also, a 
bare boat-charterer who had not registered had an insurable interest in the 
insured vessel. 1601  Clearly, although the assured’s act is inconsistent with 
related rules, the assured’s interests having been provided for and recognised 
by law is not affected. 
 
Conclusion. Therefore, where an assured’s act has been inconsistent with law, 
it is not right to say that the interest owned by the assured is definitely 
uninsurable. By contrast, to test whether an interest is recognised by law, the 
emphasis should be put on the key issue as to whether the interest in question 
has been provided as one right of real right or creditor’s right, by law, 1602 
regardless of other issues such as the legality of the insurance contract or the 
assured’s act. 
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6.6.3.2.2 Interest able to be ascertained 
Secondly, an insurable interest must have some degree of certainty,1603 either 
the actual interest which has been possessed by the assured 1604  or the 
expected interest relying on an existing interest.1605 In other words, an assured 
can only be economically affected by loss of, or damage to, the subject matter 
of insurance, only caused by perils insured against, rather than by other 
contingencies. Otherwise, without such certainty, “a speculative profit, which 
was unlikely to eventuate”1606 might be a proposed subject to insure, which is a 
departure from the indemnity principle. As to the latter which are expectancy 
interests, it may be concluded that the interest arising out of the “factual 
expectancy” of benefits or loss1607 which is based upon an existing interest is 
insurable. Illustrations of such expected interest may be as follows under the 
CMC: income from the operation of the ship including freight, charter hire and 
passenger’s fare or expected profit on cargo,1608 the interests in which must be 
based on existing interests. This approach to test the existence of an insurable 
interest has been currently adopted by the English courts.1609 
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6.6.3.2.3 An economic interest 
Thirdly, the economic or pecuniary interest is also required to amount to an 
insurable interest. 1610  As a result of such interest having been prejudicially 
affected, the assured would sustain an economic loss. If that is the case, then 
the reform of insurable interest requirement appears to be similar to that in 
Australia by the 1984 ICA: section 16 has repealed the statutory requirement at 
the outset 1611  and s 17 provides the economic or pecuniary test for what 
amounts to an insurable interest and thus makes it clear as to the nature of 
insurable interest required by the indemnity doctrine as an economic interest 
other than one at law or equity1612. The above assumption seems to be wrong 
when it has been noticed that such economic interest is not insurable unless it 
is also an interest which can be recognised by law. 1613  In conclusion, the 
requirement of insurable interest shall mean an interest arising from the 
indemnity principle that the assured must possess an economic interest which 
would be recognised by law. That explains why mere possession is not 
sufficient to be an insurable interest. 
 
The insurer under the contract is liable to indemnify the pecuniary loss in virtue 
of money other than the insured subject. It thus may not be right to conclude 
that the insurable interest is the subject matter of the insurance contract.1614 In 
light of the s 12(4) of the 2009 IL, despite the confusion caused by translation, it 
is in effect the “benefits” rather than the “interest” that can be the insured 
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subject. Accordingly, profits or freight are the insured subject rather than the 
insurable interest in them. Thus, it may be wrong to deem the insured subject 
as the insurable interest because the latter is some type of legal relation 
between the assured and the subject matter of the contract, as a consequence 
of which it may be economically beneficial or prejudicial.1615 That explains why, 
at the time of loss of the insured subject, the insurer indemnifies the assured by 
money to the extent to which it has sustained loss rather than by the 
replacement of a new subject matter. Additionally, if the insurable interest was 
the insured subject, after the loss thereto, the assured would also have lost the 
possession of its interest. Due to the loss of the insured subject owned or 
possessed by the assured, consequently, the assured would be unable to prove 
its insurable interest; the insurer could thus certainly be entitled to reject the 
claim against it. Obviously, it may be unjust to the assured. 
6.6.3.3 Various interests can exist in the same subject insured. 
6.6.3.3.1 A seller may have an insurable interest after the transfer of risk  
It is common commercial practice in the international trade of cargo that, under 
the wide use of FOB, CFR and CIF terms, passing of risk and the transfer of 
ownership are different issues. Where the risk has passed to the buyer while 
the seller still owns the title to the cargo, i.e. in the case of separation of 
ownership and risk, the fact that the buyer has an insurable interest due to its 
being at risk cannot prevent the seller from having an insurable interest based 
on the possibility that the latter may again be at risk of loss due to the former 
legally rejecting goods or payment. 
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Thus, where a total loss occurred after the risk had passed to the buyer who 
afterwards refused to pay the price after being aware of the loss, the problem 
arose as to whether the seller could claim. The insurer who argued that the 
assured, the seller on CIF terms, had no interest in the lost cargo rejected the 
claim made by the seller due to his bearing no risk. The court held that the 
assured had an interest and thus had a right to make a claim because, after the 
buyer resisted the payment, the risk of loss then reverted to the seller. Such an 
interest may be a contingent one and insurable, and has been covered by the 
marine insurance market.1616 Also, in the case where the insured seller held the 
through bill of lading concerning the insured goods but the risk of which had 
transferred to the buyer, the court held that the seller still possessed the 
proprietary interest in the cargo.1617 Similarly to the facts and judgement of the 
preceding case, Shanghai Maritime Court held that the seller on CIF terms 
possessed an insurable interest in the cargo which had been lost during the 
transit at sea because it still had ownership to it.1618 The judgement relied upon 
its understanding as to the concept of insurable interest, viz. that the interests 
were various economic relationships protected by law, such as not only a 
person being at risk but having a title. In this case, in light of the fact that the 
seller still might bear the risk of loss, the court was thereby in favour of the 
seller.  
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6.6.3.3.2 The assured has an insurable interest where the agent in its own name took out 
an insurance 
In a case of an unnamed agency1619 which had been known by the insurer, the 
buyer in its own name purchased the cargo on behalf of the actual buyer who 
was responsible for the payment of the cargo. On the occurrence of the damage 
to the insured subject, the assured, the actual buyer, claimed for recovery which 
was rejected by the insurer based on lack of insurable interest. The court held 
that the assured had an insurable interest deriving from the contract of sale 
because it was the actual buyer.1620 This is consistent with the rule in s 14(2) of 
the 1906 MIA that a person having an insurable interest can insure on behalf of 
other interested parties. 
 
Similarly, in the case of Eleonora No. 8, the agent who had been authorised by 
the actual buyer took out a contract of insurance in its own name for the benefit 
of the actual buyer with the insurer. The trial court held that the assured had no 
insurable interest in the insured subject on the basis that it, as the agent of the 
actual buyer, bore no risk of losses.1621 However, the people’s court of second 
instance, based on the evidence found, reversed the original judgment and 
delivered a new judgment that the actual buyer as the actual assured had an 
interest in the cargo because it was at risk after the cargo had passed the rail of 
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the ship.1622 It also held that where the agent who had been authorised by the 
principal of the buyer, concluded an insurance contract in its own name on 
behalf the principal with the insurer who was not aware of the agency 
relationship between the agent and the principal, and the insurer rejected its 
obligation of indemnification, the buyer had the right to exercise the agent’s 
rights against the insurer, unless the insurer would have refused to enter into 
the contract had it known the true principal.1623 
6.6.3.3.3 Conclusion 
There are different kinds of insurable interest and it is the definition that is 
needed when testing for its existence. The fact that a buyer has paid or not is 
not the test, but the liability for paying not dependent on the safe arrival is an 
insurable interest. Besides, it is possible that there exists various insurable 
interests in the same insured subject at the same time. Such a fact cannot 
prevent others interested from insuring. Also, if a person has an insurable 
interest in the insured property, it can insure its own interest as well as insure 
for the benefit of other interested parties, subject to their agreement. Although 
this rule has not been provided for in the 2009 IL, it has been established in the 
judgements of the courts. Like the effect of s 14(2) of the 1906 MIA, the SPC 
2013 Interpretations have provided a similar rule. 
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6.7 SPC’s rules as to insurable interest 
6.7.1 The timing  
6.7.1.1 Insurable interest must attach at time of loss 
Section 123 of the SPC 2005 Summary provides that the insurer shall be liable 
to indemnify the assured where the latter has no insurable interest at the time of 
the contract but has a real interest at the time of loss. In contrast, the insurer is 
not liable where the assured has one at the time of the contract but not one at 
the time of loss. This rule should be followed in the inferior courts. Thus, the 
SPC points out that the assured must have an actual insurable interest at time 
of loss. The consequence of violating the above requirement is that the assured 
cannot claim against the insurer. It thus seems that the requirement of insurable 
interest which will affect the enforceability of the contract of insurance has been 
repealed in China. The SPC 2013 Interpretation has not mentioned the timing 
as to the requirement of insurable interest. The 2013 Answers however showed 
that the effect of whether or not having an insurable interest is whether an 
assured can claim, which also means the assured only needs an insurable 
interest at the time of loss.1624 
6.7.1.2 The SPC 2007 Regulation1625 may have the effect of retrospective declaration 
The effect of the “lost or not lost” clause, which may be used in the common 
floating policy, incorporated in the contract of insurance, is not provided for in 
the 2009 IL, although it has been argued that the effect of retrospective 
declaration may be implied from s 224 of the CMC.1626 Notwithstanding not 
using the terms of the “lost or not lost” clause, the similar above effect of it has 
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been provided for by the SPC 2007 Regulations: the effect of the contract of 
marine insurance is not be affected where neither the assured nor the insurer at 
the time of contract has been aware of the loss of the insured subject which has 
been suffered by the event insured against, or of the impossibility that the 
insured subject may be lost on the occurrence of the perils insured against. As 
the “lost or not lost” clause may not assist the buyer on FOB or CFR terms and 
not be provided by the insurer,1627 for the purpose of better balancing profits of 
parties to the insurance contracts, the approach proposed by the ALRC can be 
considered that such buyers can have an insurable interest when they are liable 
to pay the insured cargo whether or not they arrive in safety.1628 
6.7.2 The definition 
6.7.2.1 Definition in the SPC 2004 Solutions 
The SPC 2004 Solutions 1629 set out that insurable interest means the pecuniary 
interest recognised by law between the assured and the insured subject. These 
persons can have an insurable interest, such as owners, insurers and 
mortgagees of a ship, buyers, sellers, carriers and insurers of goods, and a 
person who has a lien on a bill of lading. Thus, interests deriving from 
ownership, claims on property pledged and liability are insurable. It in effect 
echoes that in the SPC 2003 CP, although the terms and examples are different. 
They just express the same meaning and the examples are also subject to the 
strict test. 
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 ALRC 91, paras 11.97-98 
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6.7.2.2 Definition in the SPC 2012 Reply 
According to the Reply of the SPC, the assured can be deemed to have an 
insurable interest where it has been at risk.1630 However, it is noteworthy that 
the ambit of application of this reply is limited only to this specific case rather 
than guiding all inferior cases. However, the attitudes of the SPC may be helpful 
to understand the concept. The question in a case arose as to whether the 
seller on the modified FOB term under which the seller, not the buyer under the 
common practice, who actually took out the insurance and bore the risk of loss, 
had an insurable interest in the insured cargo which had been lost during transit 
at sea. The factual matters were that the seller, after the loss, agreed that the 
buyer could deduct the value of the goods lost from the payment for the goods. 
In the Reply, the SPC guided the lower court that, in light of the facts of the 
case, the FOB seller in the question had an insurable interest because it was 
the assured seller other than the buyer that actually bore the risk of damage 
after the cargo had passed the rail of the shipping vessel, which was an interest 
recognised by law.1631  
 
This guidance makes it clear that the actual performance of the parties to the 
contract can affect the true construction of the FOB terms. Thus, even though 
the risk seemingly passes to the buyer FOB, after finding that the seller actually 
bears the risk, the latter can have an insurable interest. Also, a person at risk 
can have an insurable interest. This Reply actually reflects the rule in s 12(6) of 
the 2009 IL. This opinion is similar to the provision under s 5 of the 1906 
MIA. 1632  Thus, the strict test for insurable interest in property insurance is 
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distinct from that under the 1984 ICA in Australia, which has adopted the 
economic test. 
6.7.2.3 Definition in the SPC 2013 Interpretations
1633
  
6.7.2.3.1 Issues to be solved 
The second judicial interpretations 1634  for the problems arising out of the 
application as to the 2009 IL, one of which relates to insurable interest, are 
enacted by the 1577th Meeting of the Trial Committee of the Supreme People’s 
Court on 6 May 2013. It addresses the issue as to whether different proposers 
can have their several insurable interest in the same subject matter of insurance 
and whether they can severally obtain a cover on this subject and 
representatively be indemnified to the extent of their own interest in the case of 
the event insured against occurring. The answer is positive. Consequently, the 
insurer is not relieved of liability under the contract by reason only that, at the 
time of the loss, the assured does not have a proprietary interest in the 
property.1635 
6.7.2.3.2 Reasons 
The grounds for the necessity of making this problem clear are as follows. 
Firstly, there is a market demand.1636 In the practice of indemnity insurance, it is 
not uncommon to see that various parties who have no ownership in the 
property but have some kind of interest in it, such as user, renter and carrier, 
have created the demand by effecting contracts of insurance for transferring risk 
arising from the loss of or damage to the property. Even where the insurer has 
received the premium paid by the assured and has provided the cover against 
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the loss of or damage to the same subject matter of insurance, they may also 
use the insurable interest as the technical defence by stating that the assured 
who has no strict proprietary insurable interest cannot make a claim against the 
loss.1637 It was commented by a judge that such defence was contrary to the 
principle of the utmost good faith and to the reasonable expectancy of the 
assured.1638  Secondly, clarifying the law on insurable interest can assist to 
establish trading rules and also reduce transaction costs. Market efficiency can 
be improved because the parties to insurance contracts can predict their 
outcomes of cover. 
6.7.2.3.3 Definition 
The SPC 2013 Interpretation may have widened the concept of insurable 
interest so that an economic interest under an existing contract is an insurable 
one. Firstly, in the SPC 2012 CP, the strict test has been proposed. However, 
the former has not included the proposal by the latter. It seems that the SPC is 
not in favour of the strict test. Secondly, the 2013 Answers set out that it is in 
violation of the utmost good faith doctrine that the insurer has received 
premiums but refuses to compensate the assured’s claim on the basis that the 
latter has no strict legal interest at the time of loss. Thirdly, one principle of the 
SPC 2013 Interpretation is to protect the assured. There is no doubt that the 
broadening of insurable interest can assist to eliminate its claim barrier. Fourthly, 
the SPC 2013 Interpretation is intended to encourage the innovation of 
insurance products and promote the development of insurance business. The 
wide test of insurable interest contributes to this goal. Last but not least, 
although the SPC 2013 Interpretation has not referred to the definition of 
insurable interest, the 2013 Answers give examples of persons who can have 
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an insurable interest, such as users, tenants and carriers. It is a wide test that a 
user who despite having no possessory interest may benefit from the enjoyment 
under a contract can now also be entitled to possess an insurable interest. This 
is similar to the judgement of the Moonacre and the 2013 Answers purports to 
draw on foreign experience. 
6.7.2.3.4 The extent of recovery 
The SPC 2013 Interpretation s 1 clarifies that the assured under the policy can 
recover only to the extent of its own insurable interest, which is also the 
requirement of the indemnity principle. This rule purports to prevent moral 
hazards. Although the above purpose cannot be denied, it may bring about 
commercial inconvenience. Similar to the approach in UK, it may be the 
commercial practice that a person having a limited interest can, subject to 
bilateral agreement with the other party to the insurance contract, insure and 
recover to the full value of the insured property; of course he can only be 
indemnified to the extent of his own interest but he can hold the surplus in trust 
for other interested persons. The reason for this has been discussed above.1639 
Thus, s 1 may truly mean that identical with the indemnity principle the assured 
can only recover his own loss but he may act as a trustee of other interested 
persons. 
6.7.3  Conclusion 
The SPC seemingly has repealed the requirement of insurable interest at the 
time of the contract and requires that an insurable interest must attach at the 
time of loss, in breach of which will render an assured unable to claim. An 
economic interest dependent on a contract may be insurable. Nonetheless, it 
may not mean that it could be understood as economic or pecuniary interest 
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under the Australian ICL 1984 because it still has to be one which relies on a 
contract. 
Conclusion 
One regime 
By the above analysis, it may be concluded that it will be more certain and 
commercially convenient if a single statute can provide a unified law on 
insurable interest in all indemnity insurance, just like the approach adopted by 
China. 
 
In the UK, the Law Commissions’ reform has to a large extent successfully 
addressed the problems raised in Chapter 3: the forthcoming Bill will uniformly 
govern the law as to insurable interest in life insurance and non-life insurance, 
not including marine insurance, without considering other statutes or common 
law; the definition has been widely explained, which has left space for the 
development of new insurance products; and in commercial practice a buyer 
can have an insurable interest just with an existing contract due to which it has 
an economic interest.  
 
It however cannot be denied that some minor problems may still exist, such as 
the following two problems. Firstly, cases such as joint insurance have not been 
considered in s 4(1) of the Draft. Secondly, after the enactment of the 2016 
Draft, there will be two regimes for the requirement of insurable interest in 
insurance contracts: one for marine insurance governed by sections 4 to 15 of 
the 1906 MIA and the other for life insurance and non-life insurance other than 
marine policies provided for in the 2016 Draft. It may be confusing when 
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choosing which law on insurable interest applies in different types of insurance 
policies.  
 
It may be better to encompass them into one regime. Firstly, the effect of the 
2016 Draft, if enacted, has been to bring the non-marine regime into line with 
the marine regime, as the requirements for insurable interest are now in effect 
the same. Both of these two types of insurance now have a clear statutory basis 
for the requirement that the assured must possess an insurable interest or a 
reasonable prospect of obtaining that interest at the time of making contracts. 
Failing to satisfy the requirement will render the contract void.  
 
However the Draft does widen the scope of insurable interest for non-marine 
insurance. Although the English courts have expanded the definition for marine 
insurance to the extent of being effectively similar to the provisions of s 3(3) 
under the Draft and they will try to find some kind of interest for the assured in 
most situations when encountering the issue of insurable interest, s 6 leaves the 
unsatisfactory position that s 5 of the 1906 MIA seemingly continues to provide 
a narrow definition for marine insurance but the forthcoming Bill has provided a 
much wider definition for non-marine insurance. Despite the reasons mentioned 
above for retaining sections 4-15 of the 1906 MIA, it is still difficult to understand 
why the Draft has not applied the same rules provided by it to marine insurance 
and non-marine insurance. 
 
Both in Australia and in New Zealand, there are two regimes as to the 
requirement of insurable interest. As for marine insurance, respective Marine 
Insurance Acts identical with those in the UK is applicable in both countries, 
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requiring the assured to have an insurable interest. Although the ALRC 
proposed reform to the requirement of insurable interest so as to have the same 
rules as that of ss 16-17 under the 1984 Act, the proposals have not been 
effected. In New Zealand, the Law Commission has not even recommended 
reform for insurable interest in marine insurance. Despite no change of 
provision in statute law, the common law has continually expanded the 
insurable interest. In the area of non-marine indemnity insurance, the 1984 Act 
has abolished the requirement of insurable interest and provided that a 
pecuniary interest is sufficient. By contrast, the 1985 Act has only repealed the 
requirement, but not mentioned what kind of interest can constitute interest 
under s 7. It should be same as that under the 1984 Act because subject to s 7 
of the 1985 Act the interest sufficient to satisfy the indemnity doctrine, i.e. an 
economic interest, is enough. The abolition of the requirement of insurable 
interest in non-marine insurance has not caused any problems in either 
Australia or New Zealand.1640 Thus, as to marine insurance, both countries, by 
retaining the requirement, seem to have left its expanding concept to the courts 
to decide.      
Retaining the requirement of insurable interest at the time of loss 
The requirement of insurable interest at the time of the contract can be 
abolished while an insurable interest is required at the time of loss. From the 
perspective of insurable interest, it should be a valid policy, as long as an 
assured can acquire such an interest during the life of a policy. An assured who 
has no insurable interest at the time of loss is not entitled to claim. There are 
four reasons for retaining the requirement of insurable interest at the time of 
loss as follows. In the first place, admittedly, insurance by way of wagers and 
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moral hazards may not be too popular nowadays. From a deeper perspective, 
the assured’s motive or the greed of man, gambling and moral hazards 
nevertheless cannot be avoided but can only be controlled. It may be right to 
say that most people want to receive a windfall without working hard. It is not 
surprising to see people pursuing rich benefits, better, with no cost or effort 
involved. And this has happened in the history of insurance. Therefore, the 
possibility of gambling and moral hazards still exists and the requirement of 
insurable interest at time of loss can indeed help to reduce that possibility. 
Secondly, too much speculative practice in insurance will lead to disrepute in 
the industry. The requirement of insurable interest, rather than a mere interest, 
can prevent a policy from going too far. Thirdly, the requirement of insurable 
interest only at the time of loss can prevent speculative activities contrary to 
public policies. Where the contract is void for being inconsistent with the 
requirement of insurable interest, the insurer generally needs to return the 
premiums to the assured. However, if insurable interest is only required at the 
time of loss, an assured without it cannot make a claim and premiums are not 
returnable, due to untrue statement of insurable interest. Apparently, the latter is 
more severe than the former and can prevent an assured making more 
speculative insurance. Hence, it would be an unfortunate outcome if policies by 
way of wagering or other speculative activities against public policies came 
back, attributable to the fact that an effective method, i.e. the requirement of 
insurable interest, cannot fully operate as it should do. 
 
In terms of the requirement of insurable interest, in China, part of it has been 
abolished and part retained: the insurable interest rather than a mere interest by 
the indemnity principle has been required only at time of loss. As a 
409 
 
consequence, the fact that the assured has no insurable interest at the time of 
the contract will not make the contract void.1641 It may be provided for that a 
policy is a valid one, provided that an assured can obtain an insurable interest 
during the life of a policy. By contrast, the assured who had no insurable 
interest at the time of loss will lose his right to sue the insurer.1642 Section 1 of 
the SPC 2007 Regulations may have the effect of retrospective declarations. 
Adoption of the wider test to insurable interest 
In indemnity insurance, the definition should be continually widely construed to 
match the development of insurance products in the future. A person as a party 
to the contract of an indemnity insurance can have an insurable interest in 
property should he under an existing contract be beneficially affected or incur a 
liability by the fate of the property. In other words, no matter how wide the 
concept is, the policy should be based at least on a contract. For the certainty of 
insurable interest under such a definition, a subject matter of insurance cannot 
affected by other casualties, other than those specified in a policy. Without it, 
the relation between the assured and the property insured seems far too remote 
or the policy is much too speculative. Thus, when testing for the existence of 
loss, a purely economic interest which can be sufficient for the indemnity 
doctrine will not be enough.  
 
In the UK, the most important significance of Feasey is that, in a modern setting, 
the courts’ attitudes to insurable interest have been expressly shown that the 
test should be interpreted broadly. In order to make it clear as to whether the 
assured could have an insurable interest in the subject insured, Waller LJ1643 in 
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this case summarized the cases relating to insurable interest into four groups by 
analyzing the case law of the past 200 years. Group 1, Group 3 and Group 4 
related to the insurance of property, which had witnessed a change of attitude 
from the strict one to the now broader one.  
 
Group 1 was concerned with the strict test of insurable interest that the assured 
must stand in legal or equitable relation to the property specified as the subject 
matter of the policy, the value of which it was intended to recover on the 
occurrence of loss of the subject matter of the policy. 1644 The subject insured 
had to embrace the insurable interest the assured had had in consequence of 
which the assured might suffer a loss arising from damage to or destruction of 
the subject. Therefore, the assured could not have a valid insurable interest in 
the property, the subject matter of the insurance, even though they might have 
an insurable interest in profits or benefits which however could not be embraced 
by the subject.  
 
Group 3 included cases which held that a pecuniary interest suggested by 
Lawrence J could constitute a valid insurable interest and that the subject 
matter could embrace the interest, as the assured had had where the subject 
was unclear, by truly identifying the subject intended to be covered. 1645 In light 
of this test, the strict legal interest was not needed but the assured could have 
an insurable interest in the subject matter of a policy where they might benefit 
from its preservation or be prejudiced by the its loss or by incurring liability for 
damage or loss of the subject. Waller LJ referred to the Wilson case to illustrate 
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this group, when deciding whether or not the assured had an insurable interest 
in profits from the success of the adventure, Blackburn J citing the pecuniary 
interest test held that the assured had an insurable interest in the adventure 
rather than in the cable because the shareholder would benefit from the 
success of the adventure.1646 In this group, in order to make the subject insured 
embrace the proper insurable interest, by means of a correct construction of the 
policy in question, the court had to identify the right subject of the policy with the 
help of identifying insurable interest intended to be insured where there was 
confusion as to which the subject was. In short, the court attempted to favour 
the existence of insurable interest by the following two steps: the court first 
identified broadly the subject as profits; the Lawrence test was then adopted. 
 
Group 4 also set out the broader insurable interest test, which reflected the 
attitude of the modern courts, that an interest less than a legal interest under 
Eldon’s test or a mere pecuniary interest was sufficient to satisfy the 
requirement of insurable interest.1647 In The Moonacre case, even though the 
words of “legal relation” to the vessel had been used to test whether the 
assured had an insurable interest in the vessel, the meaning of the words did 
not necessarily have the same one amounting to a legal interest in the subject 
matter in light of the strict right of ownership because the court held the assured 
had an insurable interest in the vessel based on the fact Mr. Sharp had been 
given two powers of attorney by the company totally owned by him allowing him 
to exclusively enjoy and use the subject insured.1648 It could be observed that 
the relation between the assured and the vessel relied on by the court was not a 
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proprietary interest while a beneficial right to property was sufficient. Further, it 
was settled on high authority that a pecuniary interest was a valid insurable 
interest, on condition that there is an existing contract or close physical relation 
to the insured property.1649 Thus, in the Deepak case, the Court of Appeal ruled 
that sub-contractors could have an insurable interest in the work as a whole 
under construction because they might lose the opportunity to do the work and 
to be remunerated for it on the occurrence of loss of or damage to the work.1650 
However, the test as to the assured being “substantially affected” by the loss of 
or damage to the property has been criticized as going beyond the potential 
liability for occasioning the loss of or damage to the property.1651 
 
As can be seen, both group 3 and 4 have reflected the test of pecuniary interest 
but the difference between them is that the subject of the policies falling within 
the former is unclear while the one of the latter is clear. As to the subject of the 
former, with assistance in identifying the insurable interest the shareholder 
really has, the court has widely construed the subject as profits. Both of them 
have tried to relax the definition of insurable interest, by which a change from 
the narrower test to the broader test can be witnessed. The courts, by properly 
construing terms of the policy, thus tend to be in favour of the assured having 
an insurable interest in the subject insured where an economic interest 
dependent on an existing contract is possessed by an assured.1652  
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In China, as to the definition of insurable interest, a person can have an 
insurable interest if, under an existing contract, it can have a pecuniary or 
economic interest in the insured property. The strict test may not be applicable 
in China. Consequently, the position has been recognised by the SPC 2013 
Interpretation that various assureds are entitled to have their respective 
interests in the same subject insured.1653  
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